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Overview article 
 
The economic and non-economic consequences of  
job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment  
in Germany and Europe  
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1. Motivation 
Job loss and unemployment are major social problems in modern market economies (Ehlert, 
2016).1 Understanding their consequences is of key concern to the social sciences, because 
they imply significant economic and non-economic costs for the affected individuals, their 
families, and societies as a whole (Brand, 2015; von Wachter, 2010). As high rates of job loss 
and rising levels of unemployment are not only due to periodic economic recessions, but also 
arise from continuous economic adjustments, they will remain important issues in the future 
(Gangl, 2003). In fact, many scholars state that European labor markets have been confronted 
with several interrelated structural changes that have taken place over the last four decades. 
Globalization, international trade, and technological change are believed to have increased the 
risk of workers losing their jobs and reduced their chances for standard and adequate re-
employment with significant negative effects on their careers and beyond (Mills et al., 2006).2 
The experience of unemployment deprives workers of their main source of income which has 
a negative impact on their own financial well-being and that of the household. Large welfare 
transfers are necessary to protect families’ standard of living in the short run (Ehlert, 2016). In 
addition to these direct economic consequences, job loss also affects workers’ subsequent 
careers (von Wachter, 2010). For example, it has negative effects on long-term employment 
chances, earnings and wages, and many other facets of non-monetary job quality (e.g., Brand, 
2006). Some studies even show that these effects are persistent and that workers never fully 
recover. 
Job loss is also detrimental to health and well-being, as it not only implies material depriva-
tion, but also the loss of a major social role and identity (Jahoda, 1982; Nordenmark and 
Strandh, 1999). Other non-economic consequences are persons’ lower social participation, 
trust, and political engagement (e.g., Brand and Burgard, 2008). Moreover, these negative 
effects are not limited to isolated individuals, but also spill over on economically dependent 
and emotionally close family members (Brand, 2015; Ström, 2003). For example, some stud-
                                                     
1 Throughout this thesis I refer to “job loss and unemployment” to highlight my interest in job loss or in unem-
ployment that follows after job separation. The use of “job loss and unemployment” does not imply that I am 
only interested in their joint occurrence. While in some articles I examine the consequences of job loss and dis-
tinguish different reasons (e.g., plant closures, layoffs, dismissals), in others I investigate the effects of unem-
ployment that follows after job separation. Subsection 4.1.2 discusses the definitions of job separation, job loss, 
job displacement, and unemployment and explains their implementation in the articles of this thesis. 
2 Mills et al. (2006) define globalization as four interrelated structural changes: the internalization of markets, the 
intensification of competition, the spread of global networks and knowledge via new ICTs, and the rising im-
portance of markets and their dependence on random shocks. Other authors have separately considered the roles 
of technological change and international trade (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Oesch, 2013). 
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ies show that the negative health and well-being consequences are shared by partners and 
children (e.g., Baranowska-Rataj and Strandh, 2017; Ström, 2003) and others find increased 
risks of divorce (e.g., Charles and Stephens, 2004). The role of families is further exemplified 
by research showing that spouses change their daily routines in the market and domestic 
spheres in reaction to partners’ unemployment (e.g., Gough and Killewald, 2011). Therefore, 
comprehensive assessments of the costs of job loss and unemployment not only require inves-
tigating the economic and non-economic consequences for extended periods of time, but also 
taking account of affected workers’ social environment. 
The described individual- and family-level effects likely add up to negative impacts on socie-
ty (Ehlert, 2016). The fact that persons who are able, ready, and willing to work are excluded 
from the system of economic production and exchange can be regarded as inefficient. The 
loss of produced goods and services leads to lower levels of income which negatively affect 
consumption and economic demand (Gangl, 2003). Job loss is also seen critically, because it 
devalues investments in firm-, occupation-, or industry-specific skills, implying that countries 
forfeit economic capabilities, which are important drivers of growth. In addition to the macro-
economic consequences, findings that unemployment reduces families’ health and well-being 
imply significant public health costs. Moreover, the results on family disruption and reduced 
social participation, trust, and political engagement suggest that job loss can contribute to the 
undermining of social cohesion with potentially severe consequences for democratic govern-
ance (Gangl and Giustozzi, 2018). 
High levels of unemployment also raise issues of inequity, because the risk and consequences 
of job loss are socially stratified (Gangl, 2003). Specifically, if job loss and unemployment 
have persistent negative effects and persons of lower socio-economic status are more often 
exposed or more vulnerable to these events, an accumulation of advantages and disadvantages 
across different life domains and over time results (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006). 
Given that the consequences of job loss are unequally distributed, welfare states assume a 
central role (DiPrete, 2002; Ehlert, 2016; Gangl, 2006). They not only buffer the direct eco-
nomic effects through unemployment insurance (UI) and benefits (UBs), but also moderate 
the long-term effects through a range of passive (PLMPs) and active labor market policies 
(ALMPs) as well as employment protection legislation (EPL). Depending on the design of 
such labor market policies, welfare states can partly determine the inequality-enhancing po-
tential of unemployment. 
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Historically, research on the consequences of job loss has been motivated by major economic 
crises. The seminal study by Jahoda et al. (2002 [1933]) was the first sociological inquiry 
showing how massive job destruction in the realm of the 1930s “Great Depression” affected 
the lives of a whole community. Similarly, the worldwide financial crisis in 2007/2008 and 
the subsequent “Great Recession” resulted in sharp increases in unemployment that stipulated 
new research on its effects for a wide range of outcomes (e.g., Baumann, 2016; Gangl and 
Giustozzi, 2018). 
However, scholars have also stated that job loss and unemployment are to some extent “nor-
mal” (Ehlert, 2016). Indeed, it is often argued that the creation and destruction of jobs in reac-
tion to structural changes represents a key source of productivity growth (Caballero, 2010). At 
the same time the reallocation of a large share of employment implies that many workers lose 
their jobs. If their skills are relatively fixed and not in line with the requirements of the ex-
panding sectors, they are likely confronted with difficult transitions, including extended job 
searches, inadequate re-employment, and increased risks to lose their jobs again. 
De-industrialization is one example of such a profound transformation of the occupational 
structure which shifted employment out of the manufacturing and into the service sector 
(Oesch, 2013). Its key driver was (skill-biased) technological change and, especially, ad-
vancements in the ability to automate certain tasks. While these changes not necessarily led to 
higher unemployment, they contributed to a polarization of employment and workers who lost 
jobs in production faced difficulties in finding adequate re-employment.3 Ongoing economic 
adjustments are also reflected in recent debates about the digitalization of the economy (e.g., 
OECD, 2017). However, the increasing use and diffusion of artificially intelligent robots has 
aroused fears that more jobs will be destroyed than created leading to technological unem-
ployment (e.g., Frey and Osborne, 2017). Arntz et al. (2016) suggests that these fears may be 
overstated, because studies reaching such conclusions assume that whole occupations rather 
than specific tasks can be replaced. 
In addition to technological advancement, globalization and international trade are also 
thought to have contributed to an increased risk of job loss, for example, through the out-
                                                     
3 Oesch (2013) summarizes two common scenarios. The skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis 
suggests that technology complements high-skilled and substitutes low-skilled labor. A refinement of this is the 
routinization hypothesis (Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007) stating that it is the easy-to-codify routine 
tasks of middle-range occupations (e.g., production jobs, administrative or clerical jobs) that are most likely 
replaced, resulting in a polarization of low-skilled interpersonal service jobs and high-skilled occupations. 
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sourcing and offshoring of production to countries with lower labor costs. Overall, many 
scholars have argued that these interrelated structural changes have raised job insecurity for 
workers in modern market economies (Mills et al., 2006).  
Another source of higher employment instability is the related growth of non-standard em-
ployment (Hipp et al., 2015).4 Whereas in the post-war period, European economies were 
characterized by stable growth and low unemployment and standard employment was the 
norm, in the beginning of the 1970s several supply side shocks and the described structural 
changes put European labor markets under severe pressure (Gebel, 2010). While the same 
challenges affected the United States (US), economists often argue that Europe’s rigid labor 
market institutions prevented adjustments via wage flexibility which led to rising levels of 
unemployment (Nickell, 1997).5 Given these trends and the growing flexibility demands of 
employers, many governments have reformed key labor market and welfare state institutions 
hoping to ease the (re-)integration of labor market outsiders and, especially, the unemployed 
(DiPrete et al., 2006; Hipp et al., 2015). 
One pan-European reaction has been the promotion of non-standard work and, in particular, 
the deregulation of employment protection, which led to a strong growth of temporary em-
ployment (Gebel, 2010). However, European countries differed in their implementation as 
some reduced employment protection for all workers, implying greater overall risks of job 
loss, while others focused on labor market outsiders and primarily increased employers’ op-
portunities to use temporary employment. This resulted in a partial and targeted deregulation 
(Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000) or a flexibilization at the margins (Barbieri, 2009). Tem-
porary jobs often go along with greater risks of job loss and unemployment and, in general, it 
is assumed that non-standard employment overall provides a lower job quality than standard 
employment (OECD, 2002, 2010; OECD/European Union, 2017). 
In addition to promoting alternative working arrangements, governments have also reformed 
the welfare state. They have reduced out-of-work benefits, leading to a re-commodification of 
                                                     
4 Kalleberg et al. (2000: 258) define standard employment as “the exchange of a worker’s labor for monetary 
compensation from an employer … with work done on a fixed schedule – usually full time – at the employer’s 
place of business, under the employer’s control, and with the mutual expectation of continued employment.” 
Therefore, non-standard employment includes temporary, part-time, and self-employment (Hipp et al., 2015).  
5 More detailed historic accounts are provided by Gangl (2003) and Gebel (2010). The institutional rigidity refers 
to high out-of-work benefits, high labor costs, strong unions and high collective bargaining, and low employ-
ment flexibility. DiPrete et al. (2006) question the idea that high unemployment was the only way for European 
countries to cope with economic pressure. Specifically, they point to increasing inequalities in job security. 
6 
 
workers, and placed a stronger emphasis on active labor market policies.6 While the latter 
provide services that aim at increasing the employability of the unemployed such as education 
and training programs or create private and public job opportunities, they also involve en-
forcement to work, the conditionality of rights, and increasing obligations (Dingeldey et al., 
2007; Kluve et al., 2007). Overall, these changes are thought to have reduced unemployed 
persons’ opportunities to search for jobs that match their skills and qualifications increasing 
the risk of inadequate re-entries (Pollmann-Schult and Büchel, 2005). However, similar to the 
deregulation of employment protection, European countries differed in the type and extent of 
such reforms. 
Together the described developments imply increased risks of job loss and unemployment due 
to ongoing structural changes. At the same time workers who lost their jobs face greater pres-
sures to accept non-standard or inadequate re-employment, because employment protection 
has been deregulated, out-of-work benefits have been reduced, and activation polices have 
been extended. The question remains whether quick re-employment is sustainable or puts 
workers at long-term disadvantages. As European economies differed in their reactions to the 
economic pressures and also have varying institutional set-ups today, the effects of job loss 
and unemployment and workers’ ability to locate adequate re-employment are likely to vary 
across countries and over time. 
Overall, the highlighted trends motivate the three general research questions of this thesis: 
First, what are the short- and long-term consequences of job loss and unemployment for indi-
viduals’ careers and their own and families’ lives? Second, how do individuals and families 
react to the events? While the reaction is part of the consequences, I here distinguish it as a 
separate research question, as some of the articles in this thesis put human’s agency at the 
center of investigation. Third, how do the effects of the events of interest vary across different 
contexts, including countries and time, which differ in their economic situation and labor 
market policies? 
To address these general research questions this cumulative thesis raises and answers different 
and more specific research questions in five articles. These specific research question are not 
only motivated from the trends of rising job insecurity, but further take account of some of the 
insights of previous studies. First, job loss and unemployment have economic- and non-
                                                     
6 Re-commodification is the opposite of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) de-commodification which describes a prin-
ciple by which welfare states make individuals’ life chances less dependent on market forces. 
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economic consequences. Second, the effects may be lasting. Third, they may also spill over to 
other family members. Fourth, the events may contribute to growing inequalities between 
individuals over time which, however, in part depends on countries’ institutional set-ups. 
To further organize these insights section 1.1 introduces the key principles of the life course 
perspective. The latter is a guiding framework for studying the effects of life events. Based on 
this background, section 1.2 will present the specific research questions for Articles 1 to 3 of 
this thesis which all focus on the economic consequences of job loss, unemployment, and 
inadequate re-employment. Subsequently, in section 1.3 I will describe the specific research 
questions for Articles 4 and 5 which both focus on the non-economic consequences of the 
events of interest. 
1.1 A life course perspective on research on job loss and unemployment 
This thesis has scientific roots in different disciplines in the social sciences. Labor economists 
were the first and remain the most frequent researchers of the economic effects of job loss and 
unemployment. Sociologists and, especially, stratification researchers have conducted com-
parative studies emphasizing the importance of the structural and institutional context in 
which unemployment occurs. They also have stressed that the risk and consequences of job 
loss are unequally distributed. Social epidemiologists, psychologists, and sociologists provid-
ed the first enquiries of the health and well-being effects of unemployment, broadening the 
previously narrow focus on employment and income. Demographers and family researchers 
were the first to notice that job loss has also an impact on the lives of other family members 
and that the latter participate in unemployed persons’ reactions to job loss. While over the last 
decades disciplinary boundaries have started to blur, research on the economic and non-
economic consequences of job loss and unemployment remains fragmented. Therefore, a cen-
tral goal of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive and interdisciplinary analysis that uses 
the life course perspective as a guiding framework. 
The life course perspective represents a consensus across many social sciences on how to 
study the lives of individuals using longitudinal data and methods. For example, previous 
stratification research has used some of its insights for cross-national comparative analyses. 
Mills et al. (2006) examined how individuals are affected by structural changes such a global-
ization. These changes are, however, channeled through institutional filters such as welfare 
regimes, education systems, or employment relation systems. In a similar way, DiPrete (2002) 
incorporated the life course perspective in his trigger event framework, which has recently 
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been refined by Ehlert (2016). This framework is concerned with explaining cross-national 
differences in the income mobility of households as triggered by adverse life events (DiPrete, 
2002; DiPrete & McManus, 2000). However, as previous studies only partly made use of the 
life course perspective or only focused on households’ financial well-being (Ehlert, 2016), in 
this thesis, I rely on reviews of leading life course researchers to derive seven key principles 
that can be applied to the study of life events (Elder and Giele, 2009; Mayer, 2009). The rela-
tion of these key principles to the trigger event framework are nevertheless highlighted below. 
Figure 1 illustrates the seven key principles of the life course perspective for research on the 
effects of life events. These have been derived by integrating the four principles highlighted 
by Elder and Giele (2009) and the six-point summary by Mayer (2009). I also blended in 
some additional aspects coming from foundational research on the non-economic conse-
quences of life events (e.g., Pearlin et al., 1981). In the following, I present the key principles 
in an order that reflects the focus of this thesis: the effects of life events on different, but inter-
related life domains at the individual-level. The key principles are also numbered from P1 to 
P7 as they are referred to throughout this overview article and Figure 1 can always be used as 
a reference. 
Principle 1 (P1) highlights the importance of time. In addition to the externally assigned or 
personally chosen timing of life events, the duration of specific states and the longevity of 
effects should be examined. The latter also involves investigating the dynamics in outcomes 
over time. Specifically, researchers have to consider whether the effects of life events are 
temporary blemishes or persistent scars (Ruhm, 1991). As shown in Figure 1, life courses are 
further comprised of different, but interrelated life domains. Specifically, principle 2 (P2) 
suggests that research on life events should be interdisciplinary and study how different life 
domains affect each other.  Moreover, multiple outcomes within each life domain should be 
considered to take account of their multidimensionality and highlight potential complementa-
rities and trade-offs. Principle 3 (P3) refers to linked lives. This means that related life courses 
affect each other and that persons are placed in collectives such as communities and families. 
It also implies that the effects of life events are not limited to isolated individuals, but spill 
over to economically and emotionally dependent persons. It further suggests that the latter 
take part in the reaction to life events. 
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Figure 1 Key principles of the life course perspective for research on the effects of life events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Own illustration based on Elder and Giele (2009) and Mayer (2009). 
Life domain 1 
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Principle 4 (P4) about cumulative advantages and disadvantages emphasizes that initial (dis-) 
advantages lead to further relative (dis-)advantages. As Figure 1 shows life events are one 
mechanism through which outcome trajectories of advantaged and disadvantaged groups di-
verge over time. Specifically, if a life event has persistent negative effects and disadvantaged 
groups are more likely exposed (differential exposure) or more vulnerable to it (differential 
vulnerability), outcome trajectories diverge. In the trigger event framework one explanation of 
persistent effects are mobility-reinforcing events meaning that an adverse life event in one life 
domain results in adverse life events in the same or other life domains. To examine the ine-
quality-enhancing potential of life events, research should, thus, consider the longevity of 
effects (P1: time), the selection into life events, and effect heterogeneity. 
Principle 5 (P5) points to the importance of human agency as individuals construct their life 
courses through choices and actions within opportunities and constraints. This suggests that 
persons have different degrees of control over and show different reactions to life events. In 
the trigger event framework this principle is reflected in the concept of counter-mobility 
events which allow persons to overcome the negative consequences. Human agency (P5) fur-
ther refers to the idea that individuals attach different interpretations to different life events 
affecting their actions and choices. Figure 1 further illustrates that the opportunities and con-
straints are determined by contexts of communities and families (P3: linked lives) and histori-
cal time and place (principle 6 (P6)). The latter concerns period and cohort effects as well as 
structural, institutional, and cultural contexts that are defined by region (e.g., countries) or 
time (e.g., years). The trigger event framework highlights that in studies on life events con-
texts take a key role, because countries’ institutional set-ups, which in their entirety form mo-
bility-regimes, affect the rate and the consequences of life events. The consequences of life 
events are in part directly affected by institutions, for example, insurances buffer the negative 
effects of life course risks, but also indirectly by affecting the rates of mobility-reinforcing 
and counter-mobility events. Therefore, the principle of historical time and place (P6) is 
closely related to principle 7 (P7) stating that life course research evaluates and informs social 
policies aiming at preventive intervention. In applied research this is mostly achieved by anal-
yses about how policies that vary across regions and over time moderate the effects of life 
events on different, but interrelated life domains (P2) and multiple outcomes within these. 
How do the seven key principles motivate the research presented in the five articles? Sections 
1.2 and 1.3 explain how they figure into the specific research questions about the economic 
and non-economic consequences of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment. 
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1.2 The economic consequences from a life course perspective 
Articles 1 to 3 examine the economic consequences of job loss and unemployment and con-
sider how persons’ reactions to unemployment affect their further careers. The articles share 
some commonalities in using the key principles of the life course perspective. Specifically, 
they all consider multiple outcomes within the career domain taking account of its multidi-
mensionality and pointing to complementarities and trade-offs (P2: different, but interrelated 
domains). They, thereby, also factor in research showing that careers and, especially, job 
quality cannot be measured by employment and income alone. This has implications for poli-
cy-makers as they have to consider complementarities and trade-offs between multiple out-
comes (e.g., employment vs. job quality) in thinking about the design of preventive policies 
(P7). Moreover, all articles take a medium- to long-term perspective, because the inequality-
enhancing potentials of life events (P4: cumulative advantages and disadvantages) are only 
present if their effects are persistent (P1: time).7 Next to these similarities, each article con-
siders additional (aspects of the) key principles. 
In Article 1 “Losing standard employment in Germany: The consequences of displacement 
and dismissal for workers’ subsequent careers” I ask: What are the short- and long-term con-
sequences of job loss for workers’ subsequent careers in Germany? Specifically, I examine 
workers’ labor market statuses, labor incomes, and risks for non-standard employment for up 
to five years after job loss. I also focus on job loss instead of all job separations and distin-
guish between workers who have been displaced due to plant closure and those who have lost 
their job due to dismissal. This is motivated by the fact that the consequences of life events 
vary by “their desirability, by the degree of control people have over their occurrence, or by 
whether or not they are scheduled” (Pearlin et al., 1981: 339; P5: human agency). Whereas 
job loss is involuntary and, thus, likely has severe negative effects, voluntary job separation 
often reflects upward mobility or workers leaving unsatisfying situations (Wheaton, 1990). 
Moreover, the effects of displacements due to plant closures and dismissals may also differ as 
economic theory suggests that future employers attached different interpretations to the dif-
ferent reasons for job loss when considering to hire job applicants (P5: human agency). 
                                                     
7 The definition of long-term differs from one research area to another. For the economic consequences a long-
term perspective is often assumed for follow-ups of five years. For studies on the health and well-being conse-
quences a long-term perspective only refers to research spanning different life stages (e.g., early to late life). 
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Article 2 “The effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality in Europe: The moderat-
ing role of economic situation and labor market policies” takes up the idea that life events 
can have different medium-term consequences, depending on the structural and institutional 
contexts in which they occur (P6: historical time and place). Specifically, I address two re-
search questions: First, what are the effects of unemployment on four different facets of non-
monetary job quality? Second, to what extent do countries’ economic situation and labor 
market policies moderate these effects? By taking a comparative perspective and examining 
economic situation and different labor market policies, this article also assesses the potential 
for preventive intervention (P7). 
Article 3 “Better overeducated than unemployed? The short- and long-term effects of an 
overeducated labour market re-entry” changes perspectives and focuses on unemployed per-
sons’ decisions on when to reject or accept different kinds of job offers. This highlights the 
importance of human agency (P5) and the use of counter-mobility events to overcome nega-
tive effects. Specifically my co-author and I raise the following research question: What are 
the effects of an overeducated labor market re-entry as compared to remaining unemployed 
and continuing the job search for adequate employment on short- and long-term employment 
chances and job quality? 
While Articles 1 to 3 already take account of five of the seven key principles of the life course 
perspective, two additional aspects have not yet been considered. First, even if careers are 
measured in more detail than usually, they only represent a single life domain (P2: different, 
but interrelated life domains). Second, the life course perspective clearly states that effects 
spill over on family members and that families react to life events collectively (P3: linked 
lives). This will be addressed in the next section presenting the specific research questions of 
Articles 4 and 5. 
1.3 The non-economic consequences from a life course perspective 
The life course perspective entertains the idea that early life events in one life domain affect 
later outcomes in others (P2: different, but interrelated life domains). Therefore, in Article 4 
of this thesis my co-authors and I ask: What are the long-term effects of an early-career job 
loss on persons’ late life health in Europe? To what extent do subsequent unemployment risks 
and employment instability mediate the potential negative effects? Next to focusing on job 
loss and distinguishing between displacements due to plant closures and layoffs (P5: human 
agency), we also take account of the timing of events, as it is often argued that life events in 
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sensitive periods, such as the early-career, have particularly negative effects (P1: time). 
Moreover, this focus allows taking a very long-time span examining persons’ health more 
than 30 years after job loss assessing the longevity of effects (P1: time). We are further inter-
ested in processes of cumulative advantages and disadvantages (P4) and examine to what ex-
tent the potential negative health effects can be attributed to mobility-reinforcing events as 
reflected in higher unemployment risks and employment instability throughout workers’ sub-
sequent careers. 
Article 5 emphasizes the interrelation between the career and family domains by examining 
how job loss and unemployment alter families’ daily routines and especially their time spent 
on domestic tasks (P2: different, but interrelated life domains). Specifically, my co-author and 
I ask: What are the effects of unemployment on couples’ reallocation of housework and total 
household production and how do they vary by the gender of the unemployed spouse? How do 
the effects vary by the specific tasks considered? How do the effects change with the duration 
of unemployment or non-employment? Therefore, this article not only considers an outcome 
that has been ignored in most previous studies, but also illustrates the idea of linked lives 
(P3). Moreover, it pays attention to the question of how families’ reactions change the longer 
the unemployed spouse remains unemployed or non-employed (P1: time). 
While sections 1.1 to 1.3 highlight how this thesis draws on the key principles of the life 
course perspective to motivate specific research questions, the articles are also located within 
different areas of research that already have offered  relevant empirical evidence. Therefore, 
the next chapter provides a detailed literature review pointing out what is known and what not 
to further explain the contribution of each article. 
2. The state of research and the contributions of this thesis 
In this chapter I review the state of research separately for the economic and non-economic 
consequences of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment. Section 2.1 reviews 
research on the effects of job loss and unemployment on workers’ subsequent careers and 
section 2.2 summarizes studies that examine how workers’ decisions to take up non-standard 
or inadequate re-employment compared to remaining unemployed and continuing the job 
search affects their careers. In section 2.3 I review research that examines the health and well-
being effects and in section 2.4 studies investigating how job loss and unemployment affect 
couples’ division of housework and total household production are summarized. 
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The aim of this literature review is to provide a detailed background about the areas of re-
search each article is located in and to highlight the limitations of previous studies and the 
contributions of the five articles of this thesis. For this purpose, each section and subsection 
follows one of two types of reviews. If the literature is well developed, I start by highlighting 
the (1) central findings which apply more or less universally across studies. I then discuss 
explanations for heterogeneity across studies. These may include (2) treatment heterogeneity, 
that is, differences due to the definitions of the independent variables, (3) effect heterogeneity, 
referring to (3a) worker- or (3b) context-level factors that moderate the effect of the inde-
pendent variable, and in some cases (4) methodological differences that are unique to the re-
spective area of research. If the literature is less developed, I only summarize the key findings 
or separately report the empirical evidence from the studies available. Irrespective of the type 
of review, I end each section or subsection by highlighting the limitations of previous studies 
and stating the contributions of the articles. Section 2.5 explains the structure of this thesis 
and also describes its overall contributions. 
2.1 The effects of job loss and unemployment on the subsequent career 
A large literature has examined how job loss and unemployment affect workers’ subsequent 
careers. Research on the economic consequences took off in the 1980s (see Hammermesh, 
1989 for a review) with an increasing number of studies having been conducted ever since. 
From more recent reviews (Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996; OECD, 2013; von Wachter, 2010), a 
number of important points stand out that affect the structure and scope of the literature re-
view for section 2.1. 
In line with a growing literature highlighting the multidimensionality of careers (Gallie, 2007; 
Green, 2006; Kalleberg, 2007; Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011), the previous reviews empha-
size that the economic consequences of job loss and unemployment cannot be assessed by 
only focusing on employment and income. Therefore, my review is separated into three sub-
sections each focusing on one of the following outcome groups: labor market status (subsec-
tion 2.1.2), labor income (subsection 2.1.3), and other job characteristics (subsection 2.1.4). 
The last group comprises research on the type of re-employment (e.g., non-standard or inade-
quate re-employment) and studies examining different facets of non-monetary job quality. 
The previous reviews further highlight the need to distinguish job loss from unemployment 
and to consider different reasons for job loss. With respect to the economic consequences, I 
focus on studies that investigate displacements due to plant closures or layoffs and job losses 
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due to dismissals, because these events have been the priority of this area of research and are 
also closely related to the articles of this thesis. However, if specific aspects of the literature 
are less developed (e.g., comparative studies), I also incorporate studies that have investigated 
transitions from employment to unemployment or focused on unemployment in general. 
Another point emphasized in previous reviews is the large variation in findings across studies. 
This can be either attributed to methodological differences or is explained theoretically. While 
the review in subsections 2.1.2 to 2.1.4 focuses on theoretical reasons, methodological differ-
ences should be kept in mind when considering the reasons for variation. Because there are 
some common methodological differences across the studies of the three outcome groups, 
these are reviewed next (subsection 2.1.1) such that they do not have to be repeated through-
out. This also provides insights about the methodologies used in research on the economic 
consequences and highlights that, in spite of some apparent issues, most studies have relative-
ly sophisticated research designs. 
2.1.1 Common methodological differences  
There are some common methodological differences across studies on the economic conse-
quences which may explain the large variation in findings. These include: the types of data, 
samples (and their restrictions), and methods used and the use (or not) of a control group and 
the definitions of job loss and the control group (Kuhn, 2002; von Wachter, 2010). I here re-
flect on how these may affect the findings, because the remaining review only comments on 
methodological differences that are unique to each outcome group. Arguments for the meth-
odological choices of the five articles of this thesis are discussed in chapter 4. 
While most studies are based on longitudinal data, differences may arise from using adminis-
trative or survey data and for the latter whether studies rely on prospectively (panel) or retro-
spectively collected (life history) data. In administrative data, coming from tax or social secu-
rity records and holding information on both employers and employees, displacements due to 
plant closures or mass layoffs are the focus and the following definitions are independent of 
any subsequent unemployment. Plant closures are identified from vanishing identifiers, neces-
sitating many ad-hoc adjustments to separate establishment or firm “deaths” from other pro-
cesses. Mass layoffs are arbitrarily defined as a specific share of employees (usually 30 to 80 
percent) leaving establishments or firms of predefined sizes (usually at least 50 employees) in 
a certain time period (usually one year). These definitions have the (dis-)advantage of focus-
ing on all workers who leave in a specific time period meaning that they include some “nor-
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mal turnover”, but also “early-leavers”. The latter are not identified in survey data and some 
studies find that they are positively selected such that their exclusion leads to an overestima-
tion of the costs of job loss (Schwerdt, 2011). However, adding “normal turnover” also leads 
to bias, as including workers who leave the labor force voluntarily likely overestimates the 
negative effects on employment and underestimates the negative effects on labor incomes due 
to capturing upward mobility. As these indirect measurements of displacements often require 
focusing on large establishments, especially for mass-layoffs, they miss the large number of 
job losses in small firms. Moreover, administrative samples are often large and besides exam-
ining effect heterogeneity, many studies have used this to focus on homogenous subgroups of 
workers (e.g., prime-age males with stable pre-job loss employment and high tenure) which 
may be affected more negatively (von Wachter, 2010).8 
In survey data displacements due to plant closures and layoffs and dismissals are self-reported 
such that all kinds of job losses are represented. However, here it is often difficult to distin-
guish whether dismissals are due to layoffs or workers are fired for individual reasons. Studies 
using survey data also vary in whether to include ambiguous reasons for job separation (e.g., 
mutual agreements, completion of temporary employment) and many do not differentiate or 
examine different reasons for job separation at all. The terminology (e.g., dismissed, fired, 
laid off, made redundant) and definitions of different reasons further vary across countries 
making cross-national comparisons more complicated. 
For retrospectively (life history) in contrast to prospectively collected (panel) data additional 
restrictions with respect to methodological decisions exist. Specifically, these data often do 
not include information on the outcomes before the event of interest or even on the exact tim-
ing of the event, making it impossible to apply longitudinal methods to control for unobserved 
characteristics of workers and more difficult to use and clearly define a control group. Not 
controlling adequately for worker heterogeneity likely results in an overestimation of negative 
effects. Not using a control group probably overestimates the negative employment effects, 
but underestimates income losses, as positive income trends can be expected in the absence of 
job loss. Definitions of the control group vary, too. If one compares affected and unaffected 
workers in a specific time period this allows that the latter may experience changes in em-
                                                     
8 Studies using administrative data are often only representative for a specific region (e.g., a state in a country). 
The attentive reader notices that they, in general, trade off external validity for internal validity. While homoge-
nous samples of workers, clear definitions of job loss, and the ability to observe workers for many years before 
job loss improve causal inferences, these inferences are often restricted in scope and not easily extrapolated.   
17 
 
ployment and income in the future. However, many studies have required the control group to 
be stably employed throughout the whole observation window overestimating the stability 
during the absence of job loss (Krolikowski, 2017). Such a static definition of the control 
group also precludes research on employment as an outcome and has ambiguous effects for 
income analyses as greater stability excludes downward but also some forms of upward mo-
bility. In other areas of research this problem has been referred to as conditioning on future 
outcomes which should be avoided in studies aiming at evaluation (e.g., Sianesi, 2004). 
With respect to the methods and, especially, the question of causal inference, research on the 
economic consequences is nevertheless relatively sophisticated, in particular, when compared 
to studies on the non-economic consequences (see sections 2.3 and 2.4). For example, most 
studies focus on concrete events that, in part, can be considered exogenous (e.g., plant clo-
sure, (mass-)layoffs). They also strongly rely on longitudinal data and apply methods that 
control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, many researchers are aware of 
the fact that one should only control for variables that affect the risk of job loss and the out-
comes and, thus, only condition on pre-treatment variables. Here administrative data offer an 
advantage as they allow focusing on very homogenous subgroups (which is one way of condi-
tioning). In contrast to survey data, which provides detailed information on workers’ pre-
treatment situation, they are, however, often restricted to demographic information and pre-
treatment outcomes in their sets of control variables. More details on these issues are dis-
cussed in chapter 4 which explains the approaches used in the five articles of this thesis. 
Administrative data also differ from survey data in the outcomes available. They often only 
have information on (specific forms of) dependent employment and registered unemployment 
and the respective incomes. However, they hold no information on working hours and work-
ers’ situation if they do not fall into the labor market statuses recorded. This likely overesti-
mates the negative employment effects as specific forms of re-employment are missed. For 
labor incomes this also means that administrative data do not take account of all income 
sources and that they cannot be used to calculate hourly wages.  
While it is often possible to formulate clear expectations about the impact of these methodo-
logical differences and the literature is mostly aware of these issues (e.g., Kuhn, 2002; von 
Wachter, 2010), relatively little systematic knowledge has been gained, for example, by vary-
ing these decisions in single studies (see Krolikowsi, 2017 for a recent exception) or by con-
ducting meta-analyses on the impacts of each of these aspects. 
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2.1.2 The effects on labor market status 
In this and the next two subsections, I follow the first type of review described at the begin-
ning of chapter 2. The (1) central findings are that displacements and dismissals decrease 
workers’ subsequent employment chances and increase their future unemployment risks 
(Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996; von Wachter, 2010). The effects are largest at the time of job 
loss, but become smaller over time. However, no consensus has been reached on whether any 
effects remain or how long it takes before they fade out. Some studies find that displaced or 
dismissed workers are able to catch up by around five years after the event (e.g., Ruhm, 1991; 
Upward and Wright, 2017), but others suggest that much longer time periods are required 
(e.g., Schmieder et al., 2010). However, the literature has agreed that the durations of jobless-
ness vary greatly across workers with some being able to avoid unemployment entirely and 
others staying out for very long (Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996). The latter have sometimes been 
labeled as “structurally unemployed” (Brand, 2006: 277). The variation across workers also 
translates into differences between studies, especially, for the question how lasting the nega-
tive effects are. These can be explained by several factors including common methodological 
differences (see subsection 2.1.1), but in the following I focus on (2) treatment heterogeneity 
and effect heterogeneity at the (3a) worker- and (3b) context-level. Moreover, I consider (4) 
methodologically differences that are unique to the measurement of non-employment or un-
employment. While the central findings reported up to here are similar for the US and Europe, 
it must be noted that the large majority of studies are still based on US data. In the remainder 
of this and the following two subsections, country differences are explicitly discussed in re-
viewing effect heterogeneity at the (3b) context-level.9 
With respect to (2) treatment heterogeneity, Gibbons and Katz (1991) show that layoffs are 
associated with longer unemployment durations than displacements due to plant closure. They 
interpret this finding using an adverse signaling model stating that markets cannot infer a neg-
ative signal from plant closures as their causes are external to the employees. However, 
layoffs signal workers’ lower ability or productivity to future employers, because there is 
some discretion in decisions on who is let go. This finding has been questioned by studies on 
labor incomes (see subsection 2.1.3), but research looking at employment is rather scarce.  
                                                     
9 The results about treatment heterogeneity and effect heterogeneity at the worker-level are themselves likely to 
vary across countries and over time. A review of this additional variation is beyond the scope of chapter 2. 
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Another reason for variation is effect heterogeneity. Some general findings at the (3a) worker-
level have been documented (Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996; Kletzer, 1998; Kuhn, 2002; OECD, 
2013), in particular, in a series of papers by Farber and colleagues (e.g., Farber, 2005, 2017; 
Farber et al., 1993, 1997) based on several rounds of the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) for 
the US.10 Therefore, the following results are relatively uncontroversial: non-employment 
lasts longer for women and non-whites. For women this is often explained by the availability 
of alternative roles, but also by their lower geographical mobility due to the fact that they of-
ten depend on their partners’ career choices. With respect to age re-employment is lowest 
among the oldest age group (about 55 years and older), with no clear patterns for differences 
between young and prime-age workers. The former finding is likely due to a combination of 
older workers facing greater difficulties to find re-employment and greater possibilities to exit 
the labor force. The most unambiguous finding concerns the skill divide in workers’ subse-
quent employment patterns. Higher educated and more skilled workers are more likely to find 
re-employment and to stay employed. 
Results for other pre-job loss employment characteristics are more mixed. Some studies find 
that workers with very low and high tenure are less likely to be re-employed with the former 
suspected to have less stable overall careers and the latter having to bridge larger quality gaps 
between the lost jobs and the available job offers (Fallick, 1996; Farber and colleagues). 
However, Kuhn (2002) points out that the latter finding may be specific to countries with low 
employment protection, while in those with high job security high-tenured workers have few-
er problems in finding a job. Other findings are that workers with higher earnings, unionized 
workers, and those who were employed in part-time have longer durations of joblessness. 
Effect heterogeneity may also stem from variation at the (3b) context-level. A standard finding 
highlights the importance of the economic situation (Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996; Farber and 
colleagues; Kletzer, 1998; OECD, 2013). Higher local or state unemployment rates tend to 
increase durations of non-employment, although this also depends on the macro-economic 
environment and workers’ willingness to be mobile. Poor economic conditions in workers’ 
former industries, whether locally or nationally, also increase joblessness and returning back 
into the labor market takes longer in recessions than expansions. The greatest problems have 
been documented during the worldwide economic recession following the 2007/08 financial 
crisis (e.g., OECD, 2013). 
                                                     
10 This series of papers is referred to as Farber and colleagues from here on. 
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Context-level effect heterogeneity does not only concern structural factors such as the eco-
nomic situation but also differences in countries’ institutional set-ups. However, while some 
studies provide results for several countries (e.g., OECD, 2013) and it is generally assumed 
that employment chances are a more relevant outcome in Europe than the US (von Wachter, 
2010), there are very few studies with an explicit cross-national perspective, examining the 
moderating role of UI, PLMPs, ALMPs, EPL, and general wage setting policies. The few 
studies that address such questions usually do not distinguish different reasons for job loss or 
only examine transitions from employment into unemployment (Brandt and Hank, 2014; Di-
Prete, 2002; Ehlert, 2016; Gangl, 2004, 2008; Kuhn, 2002; Layte et al., 2000). 
For example, Layte et al. (2000) examined four countries representing different welfare state 
or employment regimes. They found smaller effects of past on current unemployment in Swe-
den and the Netherlands as compared with Italy and the United Kingdom (UK). They attribut-
ed this to the stronger ALMPs in the former, which were assumed to foster re-employment. 
Brandt and Hank (2014) also used retrospective life history data and examined European 
workers aged 50 years and older. Grouping countries into welfare state regimes, they showed 
that unemployment in the early- and mid-career increased the risks of late-career unemploy-
ment with stronger effects in socio-democratic than conservative or southern welfare states. 
The authors explained the counterintuitive finding for Scandinavian countries by highlighting 
the particularly negative signal of individual joblessness in contexts of low aggregate unem-
ployment.11 Kuhn (2002) reports on a comparative project including ten countries that explic-
itly examined displacements and dismissals. In his summary of the findings, he notes that 
joblessness lasted longer in more generous welfare states such as Germany or France as com-
pared with the UK or US. Another explanation for these differences may be the former coun-
tries’ stricter EPL, which despite decreasing the risk of unemployment after job loss likely 
increases re-employment barriers for workers who are not able to find a new job immediately. 
Similar cross-country patterns were found in a number of studies comparing Germany and the 
US. Mostly based on previous research, DiPrete (2002) provides a stylized picture suggesting 
that German workers experience longer unemployment, but that US workers face larger earn-
ings losses (see subsection 2.1.3). These results have been updated in empirical analyses of 
Gangl (2004) and Ehlert (2016). Focusing on workers who transition from employment to 
                                                     
11 However, they report odds ratios which are known for their difficult interpretation as well as for their prob-
lems in comparisons across models (Mood, 2010). 
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unemployment, Gangl (2004) found longer unemployment durations in West Germany than 
the US and based on a simulation he attributed this to the more generous German UI. For both 
countries he also showed that workers with UI remained out of work longer and that a good 
economic environment increased re-employment rates. Ehlert (2016) defined job loss as tran-
sitions from employment to unemployment following displacements due to plant closures, 
dismissals, or the completion of temporary jobs. He found lower chances for quick re-
employment in Germany than the US, in particular, during the 1990s. The latter finding was 
not only due to the economic difficulties after reunification as it also held for West Germany. 
A commonality of the comparative literature is its focus on qualitative cross-country compari-
sons, where the effects of job loss and unemployment are examined for a small number of 
countries and differences are interpreted against the blueprints of welfare state or employment 
regime typologies. While these studies highlight how effects vary with institutional set-ups, 
they are not able to quantify the moderating role of specific policies. Such an analysis was 
provided by Gangl (2008) who estimated the effects of a transition from employment to un-
employment using panel data for 13 countries. In line with previous studies, the descriptive 
findings showed higher rates of non-employment in Germany than in the US or UK, in partic-
ular, in the long run. The quantitative comparative analyses also revealed that GDP growth 
reduced the negative effects on employment. Furthermore, strict EPL and generous UI miti-
gated the negative effects of job loss, but only if they were not combined. Thus, generous UI 
helped in flexible instead of strongly regulated labor markets and strict EPL was positive in 
countries with low instead of high UBs.12 
Besides treatment and effect heterogeneity, (4) methodological differences in the measure-
ment of non-employment or unemployment may explain different findings across studies. 
Researchers have measured these outcomes by examining the occurrence of a positive spell, 
the duration conditional on a positive spell, the unconditional duration, and non-employment 
or unemployment at a particular survey date (Kuhn, 2002). The above reported results mainly 
concern the latter two outcome measurements, because they not only capture workers’ diffi-
culties in finding a job but also in keeping it, which makes sense given that studies show that 
displacements and dismissals often occur repeatedly (e.g., Stevens, 1997). A related point that 
has only been highlighted recently is the sole focus on the level of non-employment ignoring 
                                                     
12 Gangl (2008) notes that his findings were associated with a high uncertainty, as only 13 countries were exam-
ined and the models included several macro-level variables and sometimes even interaction terms. 
22 
 
what workers do if they are without a job. The fact that only unemployment is distinguished is 
likely due to administrative data lacking detailed information. Among the survey research that 
has examined other labor market statuses a few specialist studies have considered the effects 
of job loss on (early-)retirement. 
Two studies by Chan and Stevens (1999, 2001) showed for the US that displacement led to a 
significant re-evaluation of the trade-off between work and retirement. Although job loss had 
large and lasting negative effects on older workers’ employment chances, which were due to 
their difficulties in finding and keeping work, those who did return and remained employed 
often delayed their retirement as a long-term reaction to job loss. Tatsiramos (2010) examined 
older workers in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK to shed light on the role of different rules 
concerning UBs and (early-)retirement, pointing out that older workers in some countries also 
have fewer incentives to search for re-employment. Examining transitions out of non-
employment and into employment or retirement, he found that workers in Germany and Spain 
were less likely re-employed if they were displaced at age 55 years and older, and they were 
more likely to retire after age 60 years. In Italy and the UK older workers were, however, less 
likely to exit to retirement. Germany and Spain offered the possibility to retire as early as 60 
years creating disincentives to search for a job. They also provided opportunities for early 
retirement for workers above 60 years.13 
Apart from these specialist studies on older workers’ (early-)retirement, only two studies have 
examined different forms of non-employment. Oesch and Baumann (2015) found for Switzer-
land that 1.5 to 2.5 years after plant closure, almost half of the non-employment effect was 
due to workers out of labor force with retirement being the main source of this. A recent UK 
study shows that other statuses such as education or family care are as important as unem-
ployment in explaining the long-term non-employment effects (Upward and Wright, 2017). 
Overall, the literature on the effects of displacements and dismissals on labor market status 
has several limitations that are addressed in this thesis: First, it strongly focuses on the level of 
non-employment ignoring its composition. But some forms of non-employment (e.g., inactivi-
ty) raise greater concerns among policy-makers than others (e.g., education or training) 
                                                     
13 Tatsiramos (2010) used data for the time period 1994-2001. However, over the last decades, early-retirement 
paradigms have changed. For example, in Germany it was long supported, because it relieved economic pres-
sures, but today workers are expected to stay employed longer with few opportunities to leave the labor force 
through a combination of extended unemployment benefits and early-retirement schemes (see Buchholz, 2013 
for a detailed review). 
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(OECD, 2013). For example, workers updating their skills (i.e., in education or training) or 
actively looking for a job (i.e., unemployed) likely have a stronger labor market attachment 
than inactive persons. Re-employment of the registered unemployed can also be supported by 
ALMPs. In contrast, governments have little influence over discouraged workers who left the 
labor force and are unlikely to return (i.e., inactive). Retirement may or may not be considered 
problematic depending on whether governments use early retirement to relieve the labor mar-
ket from economic pressure. Second, of the few studies that investigated other types of non-
employment most have focused on retirement or are subject to methodological restrictions. 
For example, Oesch and Baumann’s (2015) study was based on a small number of specific 
plants which mostly had an older workforce. Moreover, they only looked at the short- and 
medium-term effects and did not use a control group. Third, while these limitations were 
overcome by Upward and Wright (2017) who examined the general UK population, they did 
not distinguish different reasons for job loss. 
As knowledge on the size of the non-employment effects and their composition has important 
policy implications, Article 1 “Losing standard employment in Germany: The consequences 
of displacement and dismissal for workers’ subsequent careers” contributes to the literature 
by providing first empirical evidence for Germany using a representative sample and differen-
tiating non-employment into unemployment, education or training, retirement, and inactivity. 
Moreover, it distinguishes displacements due to plant closures and dismissals and also exam-
ines the varying importance of different forms of non-employment over time, for example, 
because decisions to leave the labor force only manifest after unsuccessful job searches. Addi-
tional contributions of Article 1 will be explained in subsections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. 
2.1.3 The effects on labor income 
The (1) central findings are that displacement and dismissal cause large earnings and wage 
losses, which are often shown to be more persistent than the negative employment effects 
(Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996; von Wachter, 2010). For example, Davis and von Wachter 
(2011) found relevant earnings losses for more than 20 years after workers had been laid off. 
Although most studies show that the negative effects on earnings decrease over time, the pat-
terns are less clear for wages. As for employment, the findings vary greatly across studies. 
Estimates of the immediate effects range between 5 to 60 percent and for the persistent effects 
(usually about five years after job loss) losses between 0 to 30 percent are reported (e.g., 
Couch and Placzek, 2010; Ehlert, 2013; Gangl, 2006; Jacobsen et al., 1993; OECD, 2013; 
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Ruhm, 1991). Reasons for this variation may be common methodological differences (see 
subsection 2.1.1), but also theoretical reasons pointing to the importance of (2) treatment het-
erogeneity as well as effect heterogeneity at the (3a) worker- and (3b) context-level. Similar to 
research on employment, studies show some (4) methodological differences in their defini-
tions of the outcome, but in case of labor income this plays and even greater role. Specifically, 
some studies focus on households’ total welfare losses while others examine the effects on 
individuals’ earnings and wages. While I focus on the latter, the main results of research on 
household income and poverty are also briefly summarized. 
Concerning (2) treatment heterogeneity, Gibbons and Katz (1991) found support for their 
adverse signaling argument. They report smaller earnings losses for workers who were dis-
placed due to plant closure than for those who were laid off. Subsequent studies have focused 
on earnings or wages and provided mixed empirical evidence for differences by the reason for 
job loss. While many of the studies summarized in Kuhn (2002) report less negative effects 
for plant closures compared to other reasons, Grund (1999) found almost no differences be-
tween German workers displaced due to plant closure and those who were dismissed, casting 
some doubt on the idea of stigma effects. Other studies have confirmed the original findings, 
but have challenged the adverse signaling interpretation. Stevens (1997) argues that the find-
ing is largely accounted for by larger pre-displacement wage cuts for displaced than laid-off 
workers. This leads to smaller negative effects for the former if one compares wages in the 
year before job loss to those reported after the event. Krashinsky (2002) also re-interprets the 
findings by pointing out that laid-off workers are employed in larger firms and, therefore, 
have higher pre-job loss wages than displaced workers. This may be understood from the fact 
that larger firms are more likely to weather the storm by layoffs whereas smaller firms face 
increased risks of closure in case of economic shocks. While the empirical evidence is ambig-
uous and the correct interpretation contested, the reason for job loss is shown to matter both 
theoretically and empirically. 
Although no group of workers is exempt from earnings and wage losses, there exist some 
regularities concerning effect heterogeneity at the (3a) worker-level (Brand, 2015; Fallick, 
1996; Farber and colleagues; Kletzer, 1998; Kuhn, 2002; OECD, 2013; von Wachter, 2010). 
The negative effects are larger for workers with higher tenure and incomes as well as for the 
older and less educated. This is often interpreted as losses in rewards to specific human capi-
tal and differences in the transferability of skills. Some other findings concern heterogeneity 
by potential effects of job loss. The importance of specific skills is illustrated by studies 
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showing that income losses are larger for workers who have to switch industries, occupations, 
or firms to find a job. It is also known that losses are larger among workers who experience 
multiple subsequent job losses, have longer non-employment or unemployed durations, and 
take up part-time instead of full-time jobs. The finding for joblessness may be interpreted as 
human capital depreciation, stigma effects, or as being due to compositional differences.14 For 
demographic variables surprisingly little is known. In terms of race no clear differences be-
tween whites and non-whites have been established and for gender findings differ widely 
across studies. Some authors report more negative effects for women (Gangl, 2006; Kuhn, 
2002; Strauß and Hillmert, 2011), while others show greater losses for men (OECD, 2013) or 
find no large differences (Farber and colleagues). 
Effect heterogeneity may also arise from differences at the (3b) context-level. Earnings and 
wage losses are cyclical meaning that they are larger in times of recessions than expansions. 
Positive economic conditions at the local level have been shown to reduce the negative ef-
fects. In line with this, workers who are displaced or dismissed from industries with shrinking 
employment levels are known to experience more severe earnings and wage losses. 
Next to these structural factors, institutional differences have been examined in a small num-
ber of studies (DiPrete, 2002; Ehlert, 2012, 2013; Gangl, 2004, 2006; Kuhn, 2002). However, 
with the exception of Kuhn (2002) they do not take account of the reason for job loss. DiPrete 
(2002) summarizes previous results and suggests that job loss leads to longer unemployment 
durations in Germany as compared to the US, but also to smaller earnings losses and lower 
poverty risks. This trade-off was also highlighted by Gangl (2004) who showed that having 
UI and the more generous UI in West Germany compared to the US allowed workers to 
search longer for re-employment increasing durations of joblessness but decreasing the risks 
of significant earnings losses. In another article comparing these countries, DiPrete and 
McManus (2000) found larger negative effects of unemployment in terms of earnings in Ger-
many, while the effects on household income after taxes and transfers were considerably 
smaller in Germany, pointing to the importance of the welfare state. These findings have been 
updated and extended by Ehlert (2012, 2013) who reports greater earnings losses for Germa-
ny. This may be explained by the fact that these studies consider foregone income in periods 
of non-employment and the latter usually lasts longer in Germany. 
                                                     
14 The first two explanations suggest a causal effect of longer non-employment or unemployment. This is called 
true duration dependence and distinguished from the compositional effect labeled spurious duration dependence. 
In the literature on job loss the relative importance of these explanations is not well understood (Brand, 2015). 
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Kuhn (2002) summarizes a collection of studies for ten different countries. In general these 
found that wage losses vary considerably but they were especially pronounced for workers 
with high tenure in the US, Canada, and the UK. In other countries such as Germany or 
France wage losses were overall lower. Kuhn (2002) interprets the larger wage losses in the 
former countries against the background of their de-centralized wage-setting institutions (i.e., 
weaker unions and less collective wage bargaining, no or lower minimum wages) which bring 
along higher wage inequality increasing workers’ risks for downward mobility. However, for 
Germany and France, Bender et al. (2002) found larger negative effects for workers who re-
mained unemployed for over a year, suggesting that these do not benefit as much from com-
pressed wage structures. 
Gangl (2006) provides the only quantitative comparative study. He compared the effects of 
unemployment across 13 countries and generally found the smallest negative effects in Scan-
dinavia and to some extent southern Europe, intermediate effects in continental Europe, and 
the most negative consequences in liberal market economies such as the US and UK. Moreo-
ver, in multi-level analyses positive moderating effects of EPL and UI were found with the 
latter unfolding its buffering effect more strongly if combined with a flexible and permeable 
labor market. The theoretical explanation for this is that workers in these countries are more 
de-commodified and at the same time a dynamic labor market provides a greater number of 
re-employment opportunities. Contrary to his predictions Gangl (2006) also found lower earn-
ings losses in strict EPL countries. While he expected that regulated labor markets create dif-
ficulties in securing quick re-employment, he explained this by a greater wage compression in 
these countries such that moves from one job to another were associated with lower risks of 
large earnings losses. 
(4) Methodological differences in the measurement of income likely contribute to the varia-
tion in findings. A key distinction is between studies focusing on individuals’ earnings and 
wages, capturing losses in productive capacities and wage rents (von Wachter, 2010), and 
research on the total welfare losses of households. As the latter has some implications for 
measurement differences in studies on earnings and wages, I here summarize the main results. 
Research on the transition from employment to unemployment and its impact on households’ 
welfare has a strong tradition in sociology (e.g., DiPrete, 2002; DiPrete and McManus, 2000; 
Gallie, 2004; Gallie and Paugam, 2000; see Ehlert, 2016 for a detailed review). Within this 
literature studies that focus on relative poverty can be distinguished from research examining 
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changes in household income. A central finding of the former is that job loss triggers transi-
tions into poverty and that re-employment facilitates transition out of poverty. As its focus is 
on the household level, this literature also highlights the role of other family members’ em-
ployment in ending poverty (e.g., Bane and Ellwood, 1986; McGinnity, 2004). Another key 
result is that poverty risks after unemployment are smaller in more generous welfare states 
regimes such as the Scandinavian countries, whereas less protection is offered by residual 
welfare states such as the UK (e.g., Layte and Whelan, 2003).15 
While studies on the poverty consequences have stressed the importance of the family and the 
welfare state, analyses of the mitigating effects of private help and the tax and transfer system 
have mostly been provided by research on household income (e.g., DiPrete and McManus, 
2000; Ehlert, 2012, 2013, 2016). Comparisons of earnings losses with losses in household 
incomes before taxes and transfers highlight the role of other family members’ incomes, 
whereas comparison of pre- and post-government household incomes shed light on the impact 
of the tax and transfer system. The mentioned studies all compared Germany and the US 
showing that for couples the economic consequences are similar, but that for men in the US 
family resources are the more important buffering factor while in Germany the welfare state 
assumes a central role. Private help is the main source of buffering in case of women’s unem-
ployment. In single households, the income consequences are much more pronounced in the 
US, because no family support is available and the welfare state provides less protection. 
Studies focusing on poverty and household incomes have to be distinguished from research on 
individuals’ earnings and wages which is the main focus of this review. However, even in this 
literature measurement differences are key (von Wachter, 2010) and in part related to the fo-
cus on total welfare losses. For example, some studies include zero income during periods of 
non-employment to acknowledge that foregone income contributes to the full costs of job loss 
(e.g., Ehlert, 2013; OECD, 2013). Other research has restricted their samples to workers with 
some positive hours or earnings, to focus on losses due to lower working hours and hourly 
wages (e.g., Couch and Placzek, 2010; Jacobsen et al. 1993). However, estimated earnings 
losses increase with the length of the reference period that is used for labor income reporting 
(OECD, 2013). This is because studies that examine annual or quarterly earnings are affected 
to a greater extent by periods of non-employment even if they focus on workers who are sta-
                                                     
15 However, see Kohler et al. (2012) for contradicting findings. They showed increased poverty risks after unem-
ployment in both Germany and the US, but German workers overall faced larger and more lasting poverty risks. 
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bly re-employed by setting some kind of positive hours and earnings restrictions (Kuhn, 
2002). A further difference lies in research that examines wages conditional on re-
employment and studies that already take into account the negative effects of job loss on 
working hours by only investigating hourly wages. 
Despite these differences in the earnings and wage measurements, few studies have decom-
posed the total labor income losses into its effects via non-employment, lower working hours, 
and lower hourly wages. A recent exception is the study by Upward and Wright (2017) for the 
UK showing that the short-term total labor income losses are mostly due to higher non-
employment, but that in the long run negative income effects are explained to a larger extent 
by lower hourly wages than reduced hours of work. Lachowska et al. (2018) found for the US 
that at the time of mass-layoff, non-employment and fewer working hours accounted for 80 
percent of the overall income effect, while five years later lower wage rates were the main 
reasons. 
Overall, the literature on the effects of displacements and dismissals on labor income has a 
number of limitations: First, while the measurement differences are mostly acknowledged, 
only two state-of-the-art studies for the UK (Upward and Wright, 2017) and the US (Lach-
woska et al., 2018) have decomposed the total labor income losses into different sources. Sec-
ond, these studies have not distinguished different reasons for job loss leaving unexplored 
whether the decompositions differ for displacements due to plant closures or dismissals. 
Third, these studies have been conducted for flexible labor markets such as the UK and US 
with no evidence being available for Germany which represents a conservative welfare state. 
However, examining Germany may help integrating seemingly disparate findings about larger 
total income losses in conservative welfare states (e.g., Ehlert, 2013) but greater earnings and 
wage scars in liberal regimes (Gangl, 2006). Specifically, the negative effects in Germany 
may be more apparent for earnings due to the longer durations of unemployment and non-
employment, while conditional on re-employment negative effects are stronger in labor mar-
kets that require workers to accept jobs with insufficient working hours and lower wage rates. 
Given these limitations, Article 1 “Losing standard employment in Germany: The conse-
quences of displacement and dismissal for workers’ subsequent careers”, next to other con-
tributions (the subsections 2.1.2 and 2.1.4), connects research on the total labor income losses 
with studies on earnings and wage scars, by decomposing the former into its effects via non-
employment, lower working hours, and lower hourly wages. In contrast to previous research I 
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focus on Germany, which provides an interesting contrasting case. I also estimate the effects 
on different labor incomes separately for displacements due to plant closures and dismissals 
showing how the relative importance of each of these sources differs by the reason for job 
loss and over time. 
2.1.4 The effects on other job characteristics 
The literature on the economic consequences of displacements and dismissals has primarily 
focused on employment and income. However, some scholars argue that careers and, espe-
cially, job quality cannot be measured by money alone (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011). 
While research on job quality has a long tradition (e.g., Jencks et al., 1988; Treiman, 1977), 
these themes have only been revived over the last two decades (Gallie, 2007; Green, 2006; 
Kalleberg, 2007). In studies on displacements and dismissals, this has manifested itself in two 
different, but interrelated research strategies. The first involves examining job quality indi-
rectly by looking at workers’ non-standard re-employment. The second focuses on more di-
rect measures of non-monetary job quality as given by occupational status, job authority, job 
autonomy, and employer-offered benefits. They are interrelated, because a lot of research 
casts doubt on the job quality of non-standard employment. For example, many studies meas-
ure job insecurity, which workers rate as more important than income (Muñoz de Bustillo et 
al., 2011: 16), by fixed-term contracts (Dieckhoff, 2011; Oesch and Baumann, 2015). While 
for temporary employment many authors agree that it indicates greater job insecurity and 
lower job quality in general (e.g., OECD, 2002), this is less clear for part-time and self-
employment which are more heterogeneous in their reasons for use and job quality (e.g., 
OECD, 2010; OECD/European Union, 2017). On the other hand, it has been argued that part-
time and self-employment after job loss are more likely to be among the alternative working 
arrangements that provide lower job quality than standard employment. 
In the following, I distinguish studies on non-standard re-employment and research that fo-
cuses on more direct measures, because the former not necessarily implies lower job quality 
and is often understood as a means of labor market re-integration. In fact, many governments 
have promoted its growth by supporting marginal part-time jobs next to unemployment, em-
ployers’ use of temporary employment, and entrepreneurship as a route out of joblessness 
(Gebel, 2010, 2013; Hipp et al., 2015; Lietzmann et al., 2017). As much less is known for 
these groups of outcomes, I here separately report the empirical evidence from the studies 
available. 
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The only encompassing assessment on non-standard re-employment was offered by Farber 
(1999). He merged data from the DWS to identify displaced workers with information on 
non-standard jobs from the Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements Supple-
ments (CAEAS) to the CPS. He distinguished independent contractors from other self-
employed as well as identified temporary workers as those with temporary jobs, those in tem-
porary agency work, on-call workers, day laborers, and contract workers. All others were con-
sidered regular workers with further distinctions made between full-time and part-time em-
ployment. Among the latter Farber also identified involuntary part-time jobs. Disadvantages 
of his data were the complex merging procedures necessary and that reported changes in the 
risk of non-standard employment over time did not concern the same workers. The retrospec-
tive data also made it difficult to define a suitable control group. Nevertheless, his study still 
provides the most comprehensive picture. He found that displaced workers were not more or 
less likely to become independent contractors and were less likely to be other self-employed. 
This may cast doubt on the idea of self-employment as low quality work. He also showed that 
displaced workers faced significantly higher risks of temporary and involuntary part-time em-
ployment. These risks declined over time (though no control group was used for temporary 
jobs) suggesting that non-standard jobs may provide a stepping stone to standard work. 
A few years ago the OECD (2013) updated Farber’s (1999) study, showing that workers’ risks 
of part-time, temporary, self-, and informal employment increased from before to after dis-
placement.16 However, the analyses were restricted to displaced workers who found re-
employment within one year, such that no control group or over time analysis was provided, 
making it impossible to judge whether non-standard re-employment is transitory or persistent. 
While these are the only studies examining different forms in parallel, others have focused on 
specific types only. With respect to part-time jobs, Farber and colleagues provide interesting 
results, although these studies do not use control groups. Their results suggest that displaced 
workers have increased risks of part-time employment compared to their situation before. 
This is also the case for workers who are full-time employed before job loss such that the 
findings are not easily explained by voluntary labor supply decisions. These studies also show 
that part-time rates decline with time since job loss highlighting that it may serve as a bridge 
into full-time jobs. For workers displaced from full-time jobs, the risk of part-time work is 
                                                     
16 The forms of non-standard and, especially, temporary work examined differed by country. They included 
casual jobs, fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work, daily hires, as well as seasonal and interim contracts. 
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greater in recessions than expansions. Farber and colleagues highlight that these differences in 
the part-time risks are largely explained by involuntary part-time employment. 
Temporary employment and, especially, fixed-term contracts have also been examined as 
indicators of job quality (Dieckhoff, 2011; Oesch and Baumann, 2015). Investigating five 
plant closures in Switzerland, Oesch and Baumann (2015) found that about two years after job 
loss 14 percent of the re-employed workers held fixed-term contracts. They consider this pro-
portion low, despite the Swiss labor market’s weak EPL. However, without a control group 
and an over time analysis, their findings are difficult to interpret. Dieckhoff (2011) examined 
the effects of a transition from employment into unemployment on fixed-term employment 
and other more direct measures of job quality (see below). She considered Austria, Denmark, 
UK, and Spain to analyze effect heterogeneity arising from countries’ institutional set-ups. 
Being the only study that used a suitable control group and offered an over time analysis, she 
found the highest risks of fixed-term contracts for workers from Spain both in the short and 
long run. Relevant effects were also revealed for Austria with somewhat smaller risks for 
Denmark and the UK. In all countries the effects declined with time since job loss but re-
mained substantial. These results are consistent with institutional differences as Spain and 
Austria have the strongest EPL for regular jobs, such that job seekers more often have to use 
temporary jobs to re-enter the labor market. The somewhat smaller effects in Austria may also 
be explained by workers’ higher bargaining power due to more generous UBs, albeit the dif-
ferences between Austria, Denmark, and the UK were small, in particular, in the long run. 
Von Greiff (2009) analyzed whether displacement increases the risk of self-employment in 
the year after the event. Using Swedish administrative data she included all workers who were 
displaced due to plant closures in 1987 and 1988 and used a random sample of employed in-
dividuals to form a control group. The results showed that displacement almost doubles the 
risk of self-employment with an effect of about 1.2 percentage points, but no over time anal-
yses were conducted. She also found that the groups most prone to enter self-employment in 
reaction to displacement were workers with less favorable positions. This suggests that many 
workers are pushed into self-employment, as they cannot find regular jobs in the first place. 
While research on non-standard re-employment assumes that these jobs offer a lower job 
quality, a few studies have also used more direct measures. Gangl (2004) compared Germany 
and the US and examined the job quality at re-employment after workers experienced a transi-
tion from employment to unemployment. Next to earnings, he looked at downward occupa-
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tional status mobility and the likelihood of entering jobs that lasted less than 12 and 6 months. 
In general, workers who became unemployed faced downward status mobility and higher job 
instability with larger effects in the US than Germany. The latter finding is consistent with 
Stevens (1997) who reports increased risks for multiple job losses after displacements and 
dismissals. Gangl (2004) further provided empirical evidence for positive effects of UI on 
post-unemployment job quality with clearer results for job stability compared to downward 
status mobility. The cross-country differences were to a substantial part explained by differ-
ences in UI, suggesting that de-commodification helps workers in locating adequate re-
employment. 
Brand (2006) was the first study for the US that systematically examined a wide range of oth-
er job characteristics. Using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) workers were classi-
fied as displaced if their jobs were terminated due to downsizing, restructuring, business clo-
sure, or relocation. Extending earlier studies, Brand analyzed six outcomes including occupa-
tional status (i.e., occupational income and education), job autonomy (i.e., worker is not su-
pervised) and authority (i.e., worker supervises) as well as employer-offered pension and 
health insurance. She found negative effects on occupational status, job authority, pension 
benefits and health insurance benefits with job autonomy being the only characteristics not 
consistently affected. She also examined effect heterogeneity with the results depending on 
the measure of job quality. For example, men and low educated workers experienced larger 
losses in occupational status and employer-offered benefits, while women and high-educated 
workers had larger losses in job authority. Upper white-collar and non-manufacturing workers 
experienced greater negative effects in terms of occupational status, job autonomy, and job 
authority, while blue-collar and manufacturing workers had greater losses in employer-offered 
benefits.  
Lippman and Rosenthal (2008) investigated the effects of job loss on occupational prestige by 
using data from the DWS and the Employee Tenure Supplement of the CPS. Occupational 
prestige reflects evaluations of the social standing of occupations by the general population 
and corresponds well with workers’ appreciation of jobs that are interesting, helpful to others, 
and useful to society (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011: 16). The study showed that, on average, 
displaced workers experienced downward occupational prestige mobility, but that the effects 
varied for different subgroups. Specifically, those with high levels of education did better up-
on re-employment. 
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Dieckhoff (2011) not only studied fixed-term re-employment (see above) but also three more 
direct measures. Specifically, she considered job authority (i.e., supervision and coordination 
of personnel), satisfaction with job security, and satisfaction with the type of job. The results 
for job security mirrored the findings for fixed-term contracts as Spanish workers experienced 
the most negative effects followed by Austrian and Danish employees and no long-term ef-
fects in the UK. While these findings are in line with institutional differences, the negative 
effects for job authority were very similar across countries, questioning the importance of 
differences in labor market policies. Dieckhoff (2011) also found no consistent effects on sat-
isfaction with the type of job suspecting that this may be due to workers changing their job 
values in reaction to unemployment. Overall, she found mixed support for the role of institu-
tions in moderating the effect of unemployment on subsequent non-monetary job quality. 
Nedelkoska et al. (2015) used German administrative data to assess skill (mis-)matches of 
displaced and dismissed workers. Specifically, they examined occupational changes and char-
acterized these on a horizontal (distance) and a vertical dimension (direction). They found that 
job loss has large positive effects on changing occupations and that conditional on this the 
new occupations are less demanding and provide fewer opportunities to learn new skills. This 
shows that workers not only face higher risks of non-standard, but also of inadequate re-
employment. Similarly, Pollmann-Schult and Büchel (2005) examined transitions from un-
employment into adequate employment and overeducation using West-German life history 
data. They showed that workers who receive unemployment benefits have longer job search-
es, but also lower risks to take up a job for which they are overeducated, suggesting that the 
welfare state can mitigate the negative effects of unemployment on job quality to some extent. 
Overall, a growing number of studies have examined other job characteristics with some fo-
cusing on non-standard or inadequate re-employment and others on more direct indicators of 
job quality. However, the majority of these studies share several limitations. First, they exam-
ined only one outcome making it difficult to highlight potential complementarities or trade-
offs. Second, a lot of research has not considered the reason for job loss. Third, no control 
groups were used making it difficult to judge how job quality would have changed in the ab-
sence of job loss. Fourth, many studies only took a short-term perspective, but what this area 
of research is most concerned with is the persistency of the effects, as some of the alternative 
work arrangements are suggested to only be transitory. Fifth, there are almost no comparative 
studies and not a single study has taken a quantitative comparative approach to estimate the 
moderating effects of policies. 
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Article 1 “Losing standard employment in Germany: The consequences of displacement and 
dismissal for workers’ subsequent careers” next to other contributions (the subsections 2.1.2 
and 2.1.3), provides first evidence for Germany on workers’ use of non-standard re-
employment. In contrast to most previous studies, I examine different forms of non-standard 
work in parallel and in some analyses even distinguish varying types of temporary, part-time, 
and self-employment. Moreover, I consider the reason for job loss and distinguish displace-
ments due to plant closures from dismissals, make use of suitable control groups, and follow 
workers for five years after job loss to investigate whether the take up of non-standard work is 
transitory or persistent. Article 2 “The effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality 
in Europe: The moderating role of economic situation and labor market policies” contributes 
to the literature by examining the effects of unemployment on four different facets of non-
monetary job quality: occupational status, autonomy, authority, and job security. Specifically, 
I extend the few available cross-country comparisons by estimating the moderating effects of 
specific policies using a quantitative comparative analysis instead of interpreting differences 
among countries in view of their institutional set-ups. 
2.2 The effects of non-standard or inadequate re-employment on the subsequent career 
The literature review in the last subsection suggests that workers who lose their job and be-
come unemployed have increased risks for non-standard or inadequate re-employment. Work-
ers may be willing to accept these jobs, because they expect quick re-employment to still offer 
better career outcomes than remaining unemployed and continuing the job search.  
Gebel (2010, 2013, 2015) offers a valuable framework for thinking about the effects of non-
standard or inadequate (re-)employment. He surveys research on labor market (re-)entry in 
temporary or inadequate jobs, but his observations apply to non-optimal jobs in general. Spe-
cifically, he states that most studies concerned with non-standard or inadequate employment 
have performed “upward” comparisons to standard or adequate jobs. Not surprisingly these 
studies find negative effects on future employment chances and job quality. However, in line 
with other scholars (e.g., Korpi and Levin, 2001), Gebel argues that to evaluate non-optimal 
jobs’ integrative function, “downward” comparisons are necessary, too, contrasting non-
standard or inadequate (re-)entries with the alternative of remaining unemployed and continu-
ing the job search. Therefore, the following subsections review empirical studies that compare 
non-standard (subsection 2.2.1) and inadequate re-employment (subsection 2.2.2) to unem-
ployment. The review for non-standard work is related to Article 1 as results on the down-
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ward comparison are helpful in assessing how problematic increased risks of non-standard 
employment are. It also is the foundation for the literature on inadequate re-employment, 
which is the focus of Article 3. 
2.2.1 The effects of non-standard re-employment 
Most research on the downward comparison of non-standard re-employment to unemploy-
ment has focused on temporary employment in general (see Gebel, 2010, 2013 for reviews) or 
on temporary agency work in particular (see Houseman, 2014 for a review).17 Based on these 
reviews and some additional studies (Barbieri and Sestito, 2008; De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2011; 
Hagen, 2004; Jahn and Rosholm, 2014; Korpi and Levin, 2001, Kvasnicka, 2009; Lehmer, 
2012, Picchio, 2008) the following (1) central findings stand out.18 Workers often only take 
up temporary work if they cannot find permanent jobs over an extended job search. Moreover, 
starting a temporary job as compared to staying unemployed reduces subsequent unemploy-
ment and inactivity risks and also improves the chances for permanent employment. It further 
increases subsequent job quality as measured by wages and other indicators.  
However, the results differ considerably with respect to the type of temporary employment 
indicating (2) treatment heterogeneity. While substantial positive effects are apparent for 
fixed-term contracts, for temporary agency work only small positive effects on subsequent 
employment are found and most studies show no evidence for a stepping-stone effect into 
regular or other high-quality employment, in particular, in the long run. In addition, some 
studies even found negative effects for temporary jobs that are part of job creation schemes. 
Therefore, comparisons across studies need to consider the different types of temporary jobs 
examined. Although many studies have examined effect heterogeneity at the (3a) worker-level 
no clear patterns have been established. The general contention is that the effects should be 
more positive for disadvantaged groups, but some studies find stronger stepping-stone effects 
for more educated workers. Very little research has compared the integrative function of tem-
porary employment across different countries or over time to study heterogeneity at the (3b) 
context-level. The few available studies find that the stepping-stone effects of temporary em-
                                                     
17 Temporary employment is often defined as work that is limited in time (Gebel, 2013). This usually includes 
fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work, job creation schemes or subsidized temporary jobs, and training 
contracts. Some studies also include on-call work, day labor, contract work, casual work, or seasonal and interim 
jobs. 
18 I only focus on studies that contrast non-standard employment and unemployment (downward comparison). 
See Gebel (2010) and Houseman (2014) for more encompassing reviews that also compare temporary to perma-
nent employment and report results on studies examining the transition out of temporary employment. 
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ployment and, in particular, temporary agency work are stronger in good economic conditions 
and in countries with higher EPL for regular employment, because in these countries tempo-
rary jobs are used a screening devices. 
For part-time employment the empirical evidence on the downward comparison is much 
scarcer. Therefore, I only report the key findings without systematically distinguishing forms 
of heterogeneity. Most studies for part-time work come from Germany (Caliendo et al., 2016; 
Freier and Steiner, 2008; Lehmer, 2012; Lietzmann et al., 2017) and focus on marginal em-
ployment which are jobs with low working hours that can be combined with unemployment to 
top up benefits and where earnings are not or only partially susceptible to social security con-
tributions. Over the last years, additional studies have been conducted for other countries 
(Austria: Böheim and Weber, 2011; Finland: Kyyrä, 2010; Denmark: Kyyrä et al., 2013). 
Across all studies, the results show that taking up marginal employment as compared to un-
employment leads to small reductions in future unemployment and inactivity, but that it has 
no or only small stepping-stone effects into regular employment. With respect to other 
measures of job quality the findings are mixed. Overall, the effects are very heterogeneous 
with the exception that the positive effects on employment chances and regular employment 
increase the longer persons have been unemployed before taking up marginal jobs. 
For self-employment compared to unemployment the evidence is even more limited. While 
there are no studies that are comparable to those for temporary or part-time jobs, some infor-
mation is offered by research on start-up programs, as these studies often compare workers 
who receive subsidies or training to start self-employment with those that remain unemployed 
and continue the job search. A recent review by Dvouletý and Lukeš (2016) shows that self-
employment out of these programs has overall positive effects on employment and earnings, 
although the evidence is mostly limited to Germany (e.g., Caliendo and Künn, 2011, 2015) 
and it has to be considered that many workers remain solo self-employed. 
The reported findings have some implications for the evaluation of the results of Article 1 
which examines the effects of displacements due to plant closures and dismissals on non-
standard employment risks. For temporary employment, quick re-employment may have posi-
tive career consequences, but mostly only for fixed-term contracts. For part-time jobs almost 
all research points to the specific role of marginal employment, which, on average, neither 
helps nor hinders workers’ re-employment, with little evidence for regular part-time. For self-
employment the only evidence comes from research on ALMPs that foster entrepreneurship 
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such that it is unclear whether the results can be transferred to workers starting self-
employment on their own terms, but the distinction of solo- from other self-employment is 
shown to be important. Next to taking these heterogeneities within non-standard employment 
into account in Article 1, this review also is the foundation for the following summary of stud-
ies comparing inadequate work to unemployment. 
2.2.2 The effects of inadequate re-employment 
While most of the literature on inadequate employment has performed an upward comparison 
to adequate jobs (see McGuinness, 2006 for a review) or examined transitions out of inade-
quate employment (e.g., Pollmann-Schult and Büchel, 2004a; Scherer, 2004), almost no stud-
ies have investigated the career effects of taking up inadequate work compared to remaining 
unemployed and continuing the job search. Therefore, I review these studies separately. 
Pollmann-Schult and Büchel (2004b) used life history data for West Germany to examine 
transitions from unemployment into adequate employment. They found higher transition rates 
for workers who directly changed from unemployment to adequate employment as compared 
to those who had an intermediate spell of inadequate work. This suggests that overeducation 
is not a bridge into adequate employment. However, Pollmann-Schult and Büchel (2004b) 
note that inadequate re-employment may increase overall employment chances.   
Two methodologically advanced studies are Baert et al. (2013) and Baert and Verhaest 
(2014). Baert et al. (2013) investigated whether unemployed graduates in Flanders who accept 
a job below their level of education sped up or slowed down their transition to adequate em-
ployment using the timing of events approach which accounts for selection into overeducation 
due to time-constant unobserved characteristics. They found that overeducation trapped young 
workers, because those who took up inadequate jobs had much lower transition rates. Howev-
er, this effect depended on the elapsed unemployment duration and for the long-term unem-
ployed the results showed that an overeducated re-entry may be preferable. Baert and Ver-
haest (2014) focused on estimating the stigma effects of unemployment and overeducation 
using a field experiment. They sent out applications from fictitious candidates who only dif-
fered in their labor market activity. They distinguished those who graduated a few months 
before, those who graduated a year earlier and had been unemployed, and those who graduat-
ed at the same time, but were overeducated. Their experimental study showed that applica-
tions with unemployment received the fewest positive reactions suggesting a negative signal-
ing effect even in comparison to graduates who were overeducated.  
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The research on inadequate re-employment has several important limitations: First, only very 
few studies have compared inadequate re-employment and unemployment at all reflecting that 
most research ignored overeducation’s integrative potential. Second, almost no studies have 
examined the trade-off between higher employment chances and at the same time lower 
chances for long-term adequate employment. Third, most studies have taken a short-term per-
spective by focusing on transitions from overeducation into the next job instead of following 
the careers of workers over an extended period of time. Fourth, the current evidence is strong-
ly focused on graduates and early-career workers, ignoring workers who lost their job and are 
confronted with the decision to either reject or accept an overeducated re-entry. 
Therefore, in Article 3 “Better overeducated than unemployed? The short- and long-term 
effects of an overeducated labour market re-entry” my co-author and I contribute to the lit-
erature by examining both the short- and long-term effects of an overeducated re-entry com-
pared to unemployment. This complements the large number of studies that have documented 
overeducation’s inferiority to adequate work. It also extends the few previous studies on the 
downward comparison by offering first evidence on the German labor market for all levels of 
education and labor market experience including some effect heterogeneity analyses. Moreo-
ver, my co-author and I apply sophisticated methods of causal analysis that allow for an ap-
propriate comparison of an overeducated re-entry to unemployment. Furthermore, we investi-
gate both employment chances and chances of adequate employment for up to five years after 
re-employment, allowing for a comprehensive assessment of the short-and long-term effects 
as well as highlighting potential complementarities or trade-offs. 
2.3 The effects of job loss and unemployment on health and well-being 
Next to their economic consequences, job loss and unemployment are also thought to have 
negative effects on individuals’ health and well-being. In subsection 2.3.1 I review what is 
known about the direct or short-term effects, which have been the focus of a large and inter-
disciplinary literature. Based on this, subsection 2.3.2 summarizes the state of research con-
cerning the potential long-term consequences of job loss and unemployment as this is the area 
of research in which Article 4 is located and seeks to make several contributions. 
2.3.1 The direct or short-term effects  
The health and well-being effects of job loss and unemployment have been studied across the 
social sciences and several meta-analyses and literature reviews exist (Bartley et al., 2006; 
Dooley et al., 1996; Ezzy, 1993; McKee-Ryan et al., 2005; Murphy and Athanasou, 1999; 
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Paul and Moser, 2009; Roelfs et al., 2011; Rogge, 2013; Voßemer and Eunicke, 2015; Wan-
berg 2012). Using the reviews, I here summarize the (1) central findings and results about (2) 
treatment heterogeneity and effect heterogeneity at the (3a) worker- and (3b) context-level. 
The (1) central finding is a negative association of unemployment and health, which is 
stronger for mental health and well-being than for physical health and health behaviors. This 
result has been established in different contexts, time periods, and research designs (Voßemer 
and Eunicke, 2015). Concerning the question whether the found associations are due to causal 
effects, health selection (reverse causality), or confounding, the literature has highlighted the 
importance of all three explanations. Although it is methodologically less sophisticated than 
the research on the economic consequences (see section 2.1), support for the hypothesis of a 
causal effect of unemployment on health is provided by studies based on panel data and ap-
plying methods to control for previous health as well as time-constant unobserved confound-
ing. Another strategy that has been used is to approximate causal effects by focusing on job 
losses due to exogenous reasons (e.g., plant closures) as well as studies that provide bounding 
analyses based on the potential outcomes framework.19 While the question about how much 
of the association is due to causation or selection (or confounding) is still highly contested, 
Fryer (1997) argues that it will never be settled by a single study and researchers should rather 
focus on the interplay of different explanations.20 Theoretically, the negative effects are as-
sumed to be explained by either of two channels (see Nordenmark and Strandh, 1999 for a 
theoretical synthesis; see Voßemer and Eunicke, 2015 for a review of theories). The direct 
income losses following from job loss and unemployment and the loss of an important social 
role that provides identity. Empirically the relative importance of these explanations is con-
tested, but the majority of studies find the negative psychosocial effects to be more relevant 
(e.g., Knabe and Rätzel, 2011a; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Young, 2012). While 
these central findings highlight some striking similarities, research has also paid a lot of atten-
tion to different sources of heterogeneity. 
                                                     
19 Some studies finding effects of job loss and unemployment are: Burgard et al. (2007), Strully (2009), Brown-
ing and Heinesen (2012), Cygan-Rehm et al. (2017), and Krug and Eberl (2018). There are also sophisticated 
studies that do not find such evidence (e.g., Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009; Browning et al., 2006). A close 
reading of the literature suggests that the evidence for effects of job loss and unemployment is much stronger for 
mental health and well-being than for physical health (Gebel and Voßemer, 2014; Krug and Eberl, 2018). 
20 Although many studies entertain the idea that either of these explanations is true and that more sophisticated 
studies will proof one or the other wrong, it is more likely that the causative and selective parts producing the 
association vary across contexts and time periods such that it is plausible that well-done studies show evidence 
for both. 
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Some researchers have focused on (2) treatment heterogeneity or differences in the experienc-
ing of unemployment (e.g., Voßemer and Eunicke, 2015). The most researched factors are 
repeated unemployment and unemployment duration. Theoretically, adaptation or habituation 
after the first unemployment experience or with increased duration is distinguished from the 
idea that repeated and cumulated exposure result in more negative effects. With respect to 
repeated unemployment no meta-analytical evidence exists and the available studies provide 
mixed findings (e.g., Booker and Sacker, 2012; Strandh et al. 2014). More negative effects are 
found for longer durations (McKee-Ryan et al., 2005) and some support is provided for a peak 
effect (Paul and Moser, 2009) with an incomplete adaptation occurring afterwards. Other as-
pects of treatment heterogeneity that have received limited attention concern whether unem-
ployment follows after employment and the role of different reasons for job separations 
(Voßemer and Eunicke, 2015). Many studies do not differentiate whether unemployment fol-
lows employment or inactivity (see Young, 2012 for a discussion) and relatedly most longitu-
dinal studies mix the effects of unemployment and re-employment (see Gebel and Voßemer, 
2014 for a differentiation). Similarly, the research on health and well-being has been more 
concerned with unemployment than the economic literature which has focused on displace-
ments and dismissals. However, an increasing number of studies that concern the short-term 
effects of unemployment have looked at specific reasons (e.g., Burgard et al., 2007; Strully, 
2009). While few systematic comparisons are available, it is generally assumed that studies 
that make fewer of the mentioned differentiations underestimate the negative effects of job 
loss, as job searches after inactivity are not problematic and transitions from employment to 
unemployment include voluntary job separations (e.g., Wheaton, 1990; Young, 2012). 
Concerning effect heterogeneity at the (3a) worker-level, the three moderating factors that 
have received most attention are gender, age, and socio-economic status. Most studies show 
that women suffer less than men and this is usually attributed to their lower work norms and 
the availability of alternative roles as wives and mothers. While this has been found repeated-
ly and also in a meta-analysis (Paul and Moser, 2009), there are also several studies, including 
a meta-study (McKee-Ryan et al., 2005), that show no differences or even suggest that wom-
en are more negatively affected. As Voßemer and Eunicke (2015) argue these disparate find-
ings may be reconciled if more attention is paid to study context. For example, studies that 
find no differences often took place in more gender-equal contexts or are based on younger 
workers where gender norms are already more similar. With respect to age early studies as-
sumed and found a non-linear moderation with prime-age workers being more negatively af-
41 
 
fected than younger and older workers. However, the meta-analytic evidence is ambiguous 
(Murphy and Athanasou, 1999) or even finds the opposite (Paul and Moser, 2009) which is 
partly supported in another summary of the literature that suggests that it is the youngest 
workers who are off worst (McKee-Ryan et al., 2005). The latter finding is often interpreted 
in view of the life course perspective, where it is argued that labor market entrants are in a 
sensitive period such that they are particularly susceptible to negative life events that hinder 
their establishment in the world of work and as adults in general. For socio-economic status, 
which is usually measured by education, occupational status, or class (McKee-Ryan et al., 
2005; Paul and Moser, 2009), theories assume that individuals with higher education and oc-
cupational status or class have greater resources to buffer the negative effects of unemploy-
ment. A contrary argument states that these persons have more to lose as they experience 
larger income losses and are often more invested in their jobs. The empirical evidence is very 
mixed, especially with respect to the moderating effects of education (McKee-Ryan et al., 
2005; Voßemer and Eunicke, 2015). Clearer results are available for occupational status or 
class where the majority of studies and meta-analyses show more negative effects for blue-
collar as compared to white-collar workers (Norström et al., 2014; Paul and Moser, 2009). 
Effect heterogeneity has also been investigated at the (3b) context-level. Most research has 
used variation across regions or over time and examined factors out of three broad groups: 
structural contexts, institutional set-ups, and culture. Voßemer and Eunicke (2015) provide a 
detailed review but some general findings are summarized here. The evidence is mixed for 
structural factors such as the unemployment rate. Some research shows that unemployment 
hurts less if there is more of it around, which is potentially explained by lower work norms in 
these contexts (e.g., Clark, 2003). Other research highlights that the prospects for re-
employment are poor if the economic outlook is bad, suggesting more negative effects. So-
phisticated studies such as Oesch and Lipps (2013) have found little evidence for the moderat-
ing role of regional unemployment and this is supported by meta-analyses which either find 
weak evidence for more negative effects (Paul and Moser, 2009) or no moderating effects 
(McKee-Ryan et al., 2005). Clearer results are available with respect to institutional set-ups 
and specifically PLMPs. A review and meta-analytic evidence (McKee-Ryan et al., 2005; 
O’Campo et al., 2015; Paul and Moser, 2009) provide strong support for the idea that unem-
ployment has less negative effects on health and well-being if welfare states mitigate the neg-
ative financial effects through sustained income replacement. This is also found in recent 
studies (Voßemer et al. 2018; Wulfgramm, 2014) and the few contrary results (Eichhorn, 
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2014) may be explained by different measurements of benefit generosity. For other labor 
market policies such as ALMPs and EPL, the findings are more ambiguous and differ across 
the studies available (Voßemer et al. 2018; Wulfgramm, 2014). There is almost no evidence 
for the role of culture and studies that examine the moderating role of countries’ work ethic 
report differing results (Eichhorn, 2013; Gallie and Russell, 1998). 
While the direct- or short-term effects of job loss and unemployment for health and well-
being have been thoroughly investigated, much less is known about the long-term effects, 
which will be the focus of Article 4 and are reviewed next. 
2.3.2 The long-term effects 
I here separately review the few studies that have focused on estimating the long-term effects 
of job loss and unemployment (see Voßemer and Eunicke, 2015; Baranowska-Rataj et al., 
2016). In contrast to studies on the economic consequences, which were concerned with the 
scarring nature of job loss from the beginning, research on the long-term health and well-
being consequences has only taken off in recent years (Brydsten et al., 2015; Daly and 
Delaney, 2013; Mossakowski, 2009; Schröder, 2013; Strandh et al., 2014, 2015).  
Korpi (1997) focused on the well-being of Swedish youth. Based on cross-sectional data he 
found a negative effect of the number of month in unemployment since the end of compulsory 
education. However, when using longitudinal data only current unemployment showed an 
effect implying that the well-being consequences of unemployment may be transitory. A simi-
lar study for the general population is Clark et al. (2001). Using German panel data they 
showed that past unemployment was negatively associated with current life satisfaction for 
men. However, they rather studied medium-term effects as their measure of past unemploy-
ment only involved the last three years. Using more waves of the same data, Knabe and Rät-
zel (2011b) replicated these results and also found that the effect of past unemployment was 
explained by workers greater fears to lose their job again. While they did not cast their results 
in terms of a mediation analysis, their study offers first evidence that the total effect of past 
unemployment on well-being may operate through the mechanism of lower job security. 
Research that looks beyond medium-term effects usually relies on one of two longitudinal 
cohort studies. The National Child Development Survey (NCDS) which follows persons born 
in 1958 in Great Britain or the Northern Swedish Cohort (NSC) following all pupils in their 
last year of compulsory school in a medium-sized industrial town in Sweden. These data have 
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the advantage that they cover long time periods and also include measures of childhood socio-
economic status and health. Using the NCDS, Wadsworth et al. (1999) showed that the cumu-
lated month of unemployment between the ages 16 and 33 years were negatively associated 
with an index of health capital (i.e., capturing body-mass index, exercising, diet, and smok-
ing) at age 33 years, after controlling for childhood socio-economic status, intelligence, and 
health. Bell and Blanchflower (2011) used the same data and estimated the effects of month 
spent in unemployment between the ages of 16 to 23 years on various indicators of well-being 
(i.e., life satisfaction, subjective health status, feeling miserable or depressed) when respond-
ents were aged 50 years finding negative effects of early unemployment for all outcomes. 
Also using the NCDS, Daly and Delaney (2013) showed that the cumulated years of unem-
ployment between ages 16 and 50 years were positively associated with psychological distress 
at age 50 years controlling for childhood psychological factors at age 11 years and psycholog-
ical distress at age 23 years. 
Three studies have used the NSC to investigate the long-term health effects of youth unem-
ployment (Brydsten et al., 2015; Hammarström and Janlert, 2002; Strandh et al., 2014).21 
Hammarström and Janlert (2002) showed that cumulated unemployment of 6 months or long-
er between the ages 16 and 21 years increased daily smoking and psychological symptoms 
(i.e., nervous and depressive symptoms, sleeping problems) but not excess alcohol consump-
tion at age 30 years. For men only, a statistically significant effect on somatic symptoms was 
found. Strandh et al. (2014) estimated the effects of unemployment (i.e., 6 months or more) 
between the ages 18-21, 21-30, and 30-42 years on changes in mental health (i.e., nervous and 
depressive symptoms, sleeping problems) at ages 21, 30, and 42 years. Unemployment at ages 
18-21 years resulted in decreases in mental health between the ages 16 to 30 and 16 to 42 
years. Brydsten et al. (2015) used the same data to show that the number of month in unem-
ployment between the ages 16 to 21 years increased somatic symptoms at age 42 years, but 
only for men. Their study is special in that they explicitly examined whether the effects of 
youth unemployment were explained by later unemployment which was not the case.22 
                                                     
21 Strandh et al. (2015) is a related study which used the NSC to, in addition, compare the experience of open 
youth unemployment to the participation in ALMPs between the ages 18 to 21 years. They find negative effects 
of unemployment on mental health at the age of 21 and 42, but not for those who participated in the ALMPs. 
22 While all studies based on the NCDS and the NCS have the advantages that they can control for early-life 
health and other important confounders, with few exceptions they controlled for potential mediators (such as 
employment status or health after the initial unemployment) and, therefore, likely underestimate the total effects 
on late life health. While such adjustments after having estimated the total effect offers insights on their role as 
mediators, controlling for it right away is usually not informative and may result in wrong conclusions. 
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Two further studies have used other data to examine long-term effects. Mossakowski (2009) 
used a youth survey for the US and found that cumulative unemployment between the ages 14 
to 22 years was positively associated with depressive symptoms at the ages 27 to 39 years. 
Schröder (2013) used data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) and compared persons who lost their job due to plant closures or layoffs with per-
sons who never lost a job. Controlling for childhood socio-economic status and health, he 
showed that job loss has negative effects on various health measures for 25 years and more 
after the event. His study is sophisticated in that it is the only one on long-term effects that 
differentiates reasons for job loss. However, his definitions of only experiencing plant closure 
or layoff and the choice of the control group as persons who never experienced either event is 
problematic, as it implicitly conditions on some of the consequences of job loss. 
The review in section 2.3 highlights some important limitations of the literature on the health 
and well-being consequences. First, the majority of studies have focused on short-term ef-
fects. Second, the few studies that have investigated the long-term effects only considered 
specific cohorts from the UK and Sweden and strongly focused on measures of cumulated 
unemployment which bring along all the issues reviewed on treatment heterogeneity. Third, 
almost no studies have empirically investigated the mechanisms for the long-term effects. 
Fourth, while the majority of research on the long-term effects has focused on youth no study 
has examined the effects of job loss in the early-career and differentiated reasons for job loss. 
My co-authors and I contribute to the research on the long-term effects in several ways. Arti-
cle 4 “The effect of an early-career involuntary job loss on later life health in Europe” makes 
use of so far underutilized data. These allow estimating the effects of an early-career job loss 
on late life health for more than 30 years after the event and concern 14 European countries 
making it possible to examine if the results of previous studies extrapolate beyond specific 
birth cohorts. Further, we distinguish displacements due to plant closures from layoffs and are 
among the first studies that empirically investigate to what extent subsequent unemployment 
risks and employment instability mediate the total effect of job loss on health. Thereby, we 
also connect the research on the economic and non-economic consequences of job loss. 
2.4 The effects of job loss and unemployment on partners’ division of housework 
The impact of job loss and unemployment on families is another topic concerning the non-
economic consequences. Specifically, the negative effects are assumed to spill over to other 
family members. For example, research has shown that job loss affects couples’ fertility and 
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marital stability and also partners’ well-being and children’s socio-economic outcomes 
(Brand, 2015; Ström, 2003). The role of the family has mostly been examined in studies on 
economic well-being arguing that households should be the center of analysis (see subsection 
2.1.2), because other family members take part in the reaction to unemployment (DiPrete, 
2002; DiPrete and McManus, 2000; Ehlert, 2012, 2013, 2016). Many researchers have exam-
ined the added-worker effect which refers to partners’ adjustment of labor supply in case of 
unemployment by taking up work or increasing their hours in order to mitigate the negative 
income consequences (e.g., Bredtmann et al., 2017; Stephens, 2002). While changes in 
households’ market activity have been extensively researched little is known about how cou-
ples alter their division of housework and total household production and how this depends on 
the gender of the unemployed person. As only few studies have been conducted, I here sepa-
rately summarize their results. 
Shamir (1986) conducted the first study on the effect of unemployment on households’ divi-
sion of housework. He used a small sample of unemployed Israeli academics that were aged 
27 to 47 years and married and he excluded individuals with unemployed partners. Shamir 
(1986) collected two waves of data that were 6 month apart and respondents indicated for 11 
tasks of housework, including neutral, female-typed, and male-typed activities and childcare, 
to which extent these were performed by themselves or their partners. The cross-sectional 
analyses showed that the unemployed compared to the employed performed more of the tasks 
mostly by themselves and no moderating effect of gender was found. Therefore, no such in-
teractions were investigated in the longitudinal analyses which compared re-employed and 
continuously unemployed persons. The latter showed that re-employment reduced the extent 
of tasks that were mainly performed by the respondent and no important role of the duration 
of unemployment was found. 
Ström (2002) used samples of unemployed and employed persons from different Swedish 
data with the former being re-interviewed after about a year. She focused on heterosexual 
cohabiting or married partners that lived together and her data included information on differ-
ent tasks which, however, all reflected routine chores. Cross-sectional analyses showed that 
the unemployed had a higher domestic activity with stronger effects for women than men. 
Comparisons within the unemployed sample revealed that unemployment had a positive effect 
on respondents’ housework share, but only if the spouse was employed with similar effects 
for males and females. Moreover, unemployment of the spouse only was associated with low-
er housework shares for women. In longitudinal analyses, Ström (2002) showed that finding a 
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job decreased the domestic activities of the unemployed. Overall, the question whether and 
how these effects differ by gender received mixed answers depending on the analyses used. 
Gough and Killewald (2011) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the US 
and focused on cohabiting and married couples that lived together for at least a year and were 
younger than 60 years. Responses were provided by one household member only and they 
estimated match-specific fixed-effects regression models. However, their models used all var-
iation in employment status and did not distinguish transitions into and out of unemployment. 
The dependent variables were the weekly housework hours of the husband and wife and the 
question mostly addressed routine housework though “other work” was included and some 
respondents may have reported childcare responsibilities. They found that for both men and 
women unemployment increased own housework hours, with the effect being, however, twice 
as large for women compared to men. If partners were unemployed, own housework de-
creased with similar effects for men and women. Another relevant finding was that the total 
amount of housework increased. In additional analyses the authors showed that the effect of 
husbands’ unemployment was strongest for wives who worked full- or part-time compared to 
those being homemakers suggesting that changes in the household labor division depend on 
spouses’ relative labor market commitments. 
Van der Lippe et al. (2018) provide the only comparative study. Based on data from the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS) in 2004 and 2010 and information on 28 countries they analyzed 
the effects of persons’ and partners’ employment status on persons’ time spent on housework, 
which was not further defined. Information on all variables was reported by one respondent. 
Using separate multilevel models for men and women they found that unemployed men and 
women spent more time on housework than their employed counterparts, but that the effect 
was larger for women. Unemployment of the partner had a smaller effect on own housework 
with men reducing their housework somewhat more than women if their partner was unem-
ployed. The authors conclude from models that control for more variables that women spent 
more time in housework when their husband is unemployed and that men do not react to their 
wives’ unemployment. However, in these models they controlled for many of the mechanisms 
of unemployment including working hours such that these interpretations are rather problem-
atic. 
Although in recent years more studies have considered the effects of unemployment on 
housework and the research has become more elaborate, various limitations remain. First, the 
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evidence is still scarce and most of the available studies rely on cross-sectional data or only 
use short-run panel data. Second, while the study by Gough and Killewald (2011) addressed 
this by using large-scale panel data and applying sophisticated longitudinal methods, it is re-
stricted in several ways. Although it uses panel data it does not distinguish transition into un-
employment, which may be regarded as a rough indication of job loss, from transitions out of 
unemployment. Moreover, while they examined the effects of unemployment of one partner 
on both spouses’ housework and also considered changes in total household production, they 
did not differentiate domestic tasks. Third, although the literature often raises the question 
about how the effects of unemployment develop with the unemployment or non-employment 
duration expecting either a lagged adaption or an increasing withdrawal of men such predic-
tions have not been tested with panel data so far.  
In Article 5 “Unemployment and housework in couples: Task-specific differences and dynam-
ics over time” my co-author and I contribute to this literature by studying the effects of un-
employment on both partners’ housework hours and their total housework production. In con-
trast to previous research, we use panel data and fixed-effects models that only focus on tran-
sitions into unemployment. By providing separate analyses for men and women we also offer 
evidence on competing theories about the gendered division of labor. Moreover, as we distin-
guish between female-, male-, and neutral housework tasks and examine how the effects 
change with the duration of unemployment or non-employment to test specific theoretical 
expectations, we arguably provide stronger evidence on the opposing theoretical perspectives 
than previous research. Specifically, we can distinguish in which areas partners adapt their 
housework and whether men follow the predictions of a lagged adaptation or an increasing 
withdrawal from housework. 
2.5 Structure and contributions of this thesis 
As highlighted in chapter 1 this is a cumulative thesis consisting of this overview article and 
five additional articles. The latter present theory-guided empirical studies which my co-
author(s) and I have either published in international peer-reviewed journals, listed in the So-
cial Science Citation Index (SSCI), or which have been submitted to journals. An overview is 
provided in Table 1. Because in the social sciences most journals have strict word limits de-
tails have often been left out of the main text. Therefore, each article has a supplementary 
material which is reproduced in this thesis and in the case of the published articles is also 
available on the journals’ websites. 
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Table 1 Overview of the articles 
# Author(s)/Share Year Title Journal/Status 
1 Voßemer, J. / 100% 
 
2018 Losing standard employment in 
Germany: The consequences of 
displacement and dismissal for 
workers’ subsequent careers 
Submitted to  
Research in Social 
Stratification and 
Mobility 
2 Voßemer, J. / 100% 2018 The effects of unemployment on 
non-monetary job quality in 
Europe: The moderating role of 
economic situation and labor 
market policies 
2nd revise and 
resubmit at Social 
Indicators Research 
3 Voßemer, J. / 60% 
Schuck, B. / 40% 
2016 Better overeducated than 
unemployed? The short- and long-
term effects of an overeducated 
labor market re-entry 
Published in 
European 
Sociological Review, 
32(2), 251–265.  
4 Voßemer, J. / 55% 
Gebel, M. / 15% 
Nizalova, O. / 15% 
Nikolaieva, O. / 15% 
2018 The effect of an early-career 
involuntary job loss on later life 
health in Europe 
Published in 
Advances in Life 
Course Research, 
35, 69–76.  
5 Voßemer, J.  / 60% 
Heyne, S. / 40% 
2018 Unemployment and housework in 
couples: Task-specific differences 
and dynamics over time 
1st revise and 
resubmit at Journal 
of Marriage and 
Family 
Source: Own illustration. 
As highlighted throughout chapter 2 the five articles of this thesis take up limitations of previ-
ous studies to make several contributions to the areas of research they are located in. Next to 
these specific contributions, chapter 1 emphasized that this thesis’ value lies in a comprehen-
sive and interdisciplinary analysis of the economic and non-economic consequences of job 
loss and unemployment based on the life course perspective. Three overall contributions can 
be distinguished. 
First, drawing on the life course perspective I develop a general theoretical model of the eco-
nomic and non-economic consequences of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-
employment (chapter 3). Although the life course perspective is not a theory in itself, because 
it does not explain why and how job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment af-
fect individuals’ and families’ careers and lives, its key principles allow putting the central 
concepts of this thesis into a logical order, make assumptions about how they affect each oth-
er, and highlight the interrelations between the theoretical mechanisms. For example, it relates 
the economic and sociological labor market theories focusing on the career domain with in-
terdisciplinary theories in the health and well-being and family domains. In addition to pre-
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senting a general theoretical model, chapter 3 also offers an overview and summary of the 
theoretical mechanisms and hypotheses of the five articles. 
Second, I examine the economic and non-economic consequences of job loss, unemployment, 
and inadequate re-employment using an encompassing evaluation design motivated by the life 
course perspective (chapter 4). Specifically, I investigate different, but interrelated life do-
mains and consider multiple outcomes within each of these. This not only allows understand-
ing how different life domains affect each other, but also makes it possible to take account of 
the multidimensionality of each life domain as well as to consider complementarities and 
trade-offs. All articles either examine the effects of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate 
re-employment on more than one outcome in the career domain or investigate how changes in 
the career domain go along with changes in the health and well-being and the family domains. 
Furthermore, other key principles of the life course perspective point to the importance of 
treatment and effect heterogeneity. To take account of the former I provide clear definitions of 
treatments and control groups for all articles. In the majority of the articles my co-authors and 
I also empirically examine treatment heterogeneity by considering the reason for job loss or 
the duration of unemployment or non-employment. With respect to effect heterogeneity three 
of the five articles explicitly test hypotheses about the moderating effects of worker- or con-
text-level characteristics. Most importantly, research based on the life course perspective must 
take into account that the effects of life events may be transitory or lasting, because the lon-
gevity of effects plays an important role in the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages. 
Therefore, all articles take a medium- to long-term perspective and in the majority of these 
my co-authors and I study the dynamics in the outcomes over time. In one article, we explicit-
ly examine whether the effects of job loss are persistent through triggering further mobility-
reinforcing events. 
Third, state-of-the-art methods of causal and multi-level analysis are applied (chapter 4). 
These are chosen against the background of the research questions and the theoretically de-
rived hypotheses. In line with the life course perspective, in the majority of the articles pro-
spectively collected panel data are used. In one article my co-authors and I use retrospectively 
collected life history data and in another article I rely on repeated cross-sectional data with 
some retrospective questions. Therefore, all data include at least basic information on the tim-
ing of the independent and dependent variables allowing for a clear temporal order and as-
sessing the longevity of effects. In the majority of the articles, the data further make it possi-
ble to examine the duration of specific states and the dynamics in outcomes over time. The 
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methods of causal analysis include (dynamic) (propensity score) matching, fixed-effects panel 
regressions, and combinations of these approaches. In chapter 4 these methods are discussed 
against the background of the potential outcomes framework, which has become the backbone 
of causal analysis in the social sciences. Two articles also use data with multi-level structures. 
In chapter 4 I explain different motivations of and approaches to multi-level analysis taking 
account of recent methodological debates. Specifically, in Article 2, which examines the 
moderating role of structural and institutional contexts, I apply the very flexible two-stage 
approach to multi-level analysis allowing for different relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables in each context. Moreover, this article draws on repeated cross-
sectional data to apply the logic of a longitudinal within-unit analysis at the macro-level by 
examining changes in countries over time. 
3. Theory and hypotheses 
In section 3.1 I present a general theoretical model of the economic and non-economic conse-
quences of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment. Using the life course 
perspective, I put the central concepts of this thesis into a logical order, make assumptions 
about how they affect each other, and highlight the interrelations between the theoretical 
mechanisms. In sections 3.2 to 3.5, I review the theoretical mechanisms underlying each arti-
cle and provide an overview and a summary of the theoretical mechanisms and hypotheses. 
3.1 A general theoretical model  
Figure 2 shows a general theoretical model of the economic and non-economic consequences 
of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment. It specifies Figure 1, which high-
lighted the key principles of the life course perspective, by focusing on the central concepts of 
this thesis. 
Based on the key principles of time (P1), cumulative advantages and disadvantages (P4), and 
human agency (P5), the central concepts (boxes) of “Job loss”, “Unemployment”, “(Inade-
quate) Re-employment”, and “Subsequent career” are put into a logical order and assumptions 
about how they affect each other are shown as solid black arrows. The italic texts in the boxes 
specify the empirical content of the central concepts. Figure 2 shows that job loss can trigger 
unemployment (mobility-reinforcing event), but that individuals may react to this in terms of 
(inadequate) re-employment (counter-mobility event). The decision for or against (inade-
quate) re-employment compared to remaining unemployed and continuing the job search is 
assumed to affect workers’ subsequent careers. Drawing on the key principle of historical 
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time and place (P6), Figure 2 also shows that the economic situation and labor market policies 
are expected to moderate the assumed effects at the career domain.  
Moreover, the ideas of different, but interrelated life domains (P2) and linked lives (P3) are 
exemplified by three different levels for the career (I), health and well-being (II), and family 
(III) domains and also by the assumed effects between these. As stated in section 2.5, the life 
course perspective itself is not a theory. Therefore, Figure 2 adds the theoretical mechanisms 
(grey dotted arrows and grey text) that are thought to bring about the assumed effects.23 They 
are based on economic and sociological labor market theories for the career domain and inter-
disciplinary theories for the health and well-being and family domains. Their details are dis-
cussed in sections 3.2 to 3.5. However, the life course perspective suggests that the theoretical 
mechanisms put forward in one life domain are also important for understanding the conse-
quences in other life domains. Therefore, in the following I locate each article within the gen-
eral theoretical model to further highlight the interrelations between the theoretical mecha-
nisms. The focus of each article is illustrated by the circled numbers in Figure 2. 
Article 1 examines the effects of displacements due to plant closures and dismissals on work-
ers’ subsequent careers measured by their labor market statuses, labor incomes, and non-
standard employment risks. In Figure 2 this corresponds to the path “Job loss”–
“Unemployment”– “(Inadequate) Re-employment”. The theoretical micro-level mechanisms 
rest on three different, but interrelated labor market theories (see subsection 3.2.1) including 
human capital, signaling, and job search theories. In short these theories state that the loss of 
rewards to and the depreciation of human capital, unemployment stigma or negative signal-
ing, and a lower match quality due to search constraints explain the negative effects on multi-
ple outcomes of the career domain. Article 2 uses the same theoretical micro-level mecha-
nisms, because it investigates the effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality. 
However, as it takes a comparative perspective to examine how the effects vary across coun-
tries and time, I also theoretically argue that depending on the economic situation and differ-
ent labor market policies these micro-level mechanisms are strengthened and weakened (see 
subsection 3.2.2). This is shown in Figure 2 by the grey dotted arrow that starts at “Economic 
situation, labor market policies” and passes through the micro-level mechanisms (grey dotted 
text) that explain the effect of “Unemployment” on “(Inadequate) Re-employment”. The same 
                                                     
23 They are shown as grey dotted arrows, because they are not tested empirically. In some instances, different 
theoretical arguments or mechanisms predict different effects, allowing assessing their relevance indirectly. An 
example of this is presented in Article 5, which explains why no grey dotted arrow is used here. 
52 
 
Figure 2 A general theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Boxes are the central concepts and solid black arrows show the assumed effects. Italic texts in boxes specify the empirical content of the central concepts. Grey dotted 
arrows and grey text show and explain the theoretical mechanisms. The circled numbers highlight the focus of each article of this thesis. 
Sources: Own illustration. 
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theories re-appear in Article 3 that investigates the career consequences of an overeducated 
re-entry in comparison to remaining unemployed and continuing the job search. In contrast to 
Articles 1 and 2, the interpretation of the theories is, however, more ambiguous with the step-
ping-stone and trap hypotheses making opposing predictions about each states opportunities 
for the development of human capital, for signaling one’s productivity to future employers, 
and for successful job searches (see section 3.3). 
Article 4 focuses on the long-term effects of job loss on health. One explanation for these is 
that the direct effect, once it occurred, persists over time. Figure 2 shows that the direct effect 
is explained by the loss of economic and psychosocial rewards (grey dotted line). Another 
mechanism states that the long-term effects are due to changes in the subsequent career such 
as increased unemployment risks or employment instability. In Figure 2 this is highlighted by 
the indirect path “Job loss”–“Unemployment”–“(Inadequate) Re-employment”–“Subsequent 
career”–“Health”. This emphasizes the interplay between the economic and non-economic 
consequences of job loss and also shows the interrelations between their theoretical mecha-
nisms (see section 3.4). Article 5 concerns the effects of unemployment on couples’ division 
of housework and total household production. Figure 2 omits some apparent theoretical links 
reflecting, for example, the idea that re-employment depends on and results in changes in the 
domestic sphere. These are ignored, because the empirical analyses focus only on workers 
who become unemployed and remain non-employed to test specific hypotheses that follow 
from theoretical debates in the research on the division of labor (see section 3.5). 
3.2 The economic consequences of job loss and unemployment 
In subsection 3.2.1 I review the micro-level mechanisms explaining why job loss and unem-
ployment have negative effects on workers’ careers. These mechanisms are the foundation for 
Articles 1 and 2. Subsection 3.2.2 explains how countries’ economic situation and labor mar-
ket policies strengthen or weaken the micro-level mechanisms, to derive hypotheses about 
their moderating role, which will be tested in Article 2. Table 2 provides an overview about 
the theoretical mechanisms and a summary of the respective hypotheses. It numbers the for-
mer from (1) to (11) and I refer to these in the following sections or subsections. 
3.2.1 Micro-level mechanisms 
Articles 1 and 2 examine the negative effects of job loss and unemployment on workers’ ca-
reers. One explanation for these is based on human capital theory (Becker, 1993) assuming 
that workers who lost their job and change firms, occupations, or industries (1) lose rewards 
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to their specific human capital. It is sometimes further argued that periods of non-
employment, following from job loss, result in the depreciation of general skills. Another ex-
planation rests on signaling theories highlighting the problem of asymmetric information be-
tween applicants and employers (Spence, 1973). Specifically, they assume that employers 
infer applicants’ unobserved productivity from their work biographies potentially resulting in 
(2) unemployment stigma. It also has been highlighted that the negative signal associated with 
job loss and unemployment should be stronger for layoffs or dismissals, because, in contrast 
to plant closures, firms have some discretion about which employees are let go, offering in-
formation to future employers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991).24 Job search theories provide an 
additional explanation assuming that job-seekers decision to accept or reject a job offer de-
pends on their reservation wage (Mortensen, 1986). The latter is in part determined by search 
constraints including the number of incoming job offers and workers’ financial resources. For 
example, if jobs that match their skills and qualifications are rare and benefits and private 
incomes run out or are used up over time, workers will reduce their reservation wage and ac-
cept lower quality job offers. Since job searches that follow after job loss are subject to (3) 
greater constraints than those that follow after voluntary job separation or education and inac-
tivity the quality of the formed matches is lower. 
As Table 2 summarizes, these theories suggest that job loss and unemployment have negative 
effects on multiple dimensions of workers careers. Specifically, Article 1 examines subse-
quent employment chances, different labor incomes, including earnings and wages, and non-
standard employment. In this article I also test whether the effects are larger for displacements 
due to plant closure than dismissals. In Article 2 the focus is on unemployment and its effects 
on four different facets of non-monetary job quality. 
3.2.2 Macro-level moderators 
The literature review in section 2.1 suggested that the negative effects of job loss and unem-
ployment on workers’ subsequent careers may vary according to countries’ institutional set-
ups. Four factors that are considered theoretically and which are examined empirically in Ar-
ticle 2 with respect to non-monetary job quality are the economic situation, ALMPs, UBs, and 
EPL. Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses and their derivation is explained in the following.  
                                                     
24 While applicants may not provide the information about job loss let alone the specific reason in the written 
applications, periods of unemployment or at least non-employment are apparent from résumés. Information 
about job loss and specific reasons may further be available publicly (e.g., plant closure, mass layoff), from ref-
erence letters or through inquiries from employers. 
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It can be assumed that a poor economic situation increases the negative effects, because (3) 
fewer available job offers reduce workers’ reservation wages resulting in a lower job quality 
(e.g., Gangl, 2006). If workers must change firms, occupations, or industries to find a job, (1) 
the loss of rewards to specific human capital is one explanation for this. The (2) unemploy-
ment stigma mechanism is ambiguous: while a poor economic situation increases unemploy-
ment duration and, thereby, stigma, individual unemployment is also less informative about 
individuals’ productivity in these contexts (e.g., Kroft, 2013).  
Generous UBs are expected to decrease the negative effects, because according to job search 
theory they (3) act as a search subsidy (Burdett, 1979) that increases workers’ reservation 
wages leading to a higher job quality. This also means that workers are less likely to (1) lose 
rewards to specific human capital. While generous UBs may also increase (2) unemployment 
stigma due to longer durations, this effect can be assumed to be weak, because employers in 
these countries know that prolonged job searches are not necessarily due to workers’ low 
productivity, but rather their high bargaining power.  
Support through ALMPs is assumed to buffer the negative effects of unemployment by coun-
teracting (1) the loss of rewards to specific and the depreciation of general skills. Specific 
education updates workers’ skills to changing demands (Gangl, 2006) reducing the losses 
associated with changes of occupations or industries. 
General education and on-the-job training can be assumed to stop the depreciation of general 
skills. The effects are likely to be more beneficial if programs are tailored to unemployed per-
sons’ needs. ALMPs may also reduce (2) unemployment stigma, although it is occasionally 
argued that in some countries participation in specific programs rather represents a negative 
signal. Wage subsidies in the private sector or direct employment programs in the public sec-
tor are also expected to reduce the negative effects, because in line with job search theory they 
(3) increase the number of available job opportunities. Another labor market policy is EPL for 
regular employment which reflects the extent of job security provisions. Stricter EPL increas-
es the costs of firing and indirectly also of hiring workers (Gangl, 2006). Job search theory 
states that this should (3) reduce labor market dynamics and increase unemployment dura-
tions. Prolonged unemployment increases the risk to (1) lose rewards associated with specific 
human capital, as it will become more difficult to locate re-employment that makes use of 
such skills. It will also lead to (1) a greater depreciation of general skills and (2) a stronger 
unemployment stigma. 
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Table 2 Overview and summary of the theoretical mechanisms and hypotheses 
# Theoretical mechanisms Hypotheses about total effects and heterogeneity or mediation [explanation] 
1* (1) Loss of rewards to and/or depreciation of human capital; 
(2) Unemployment stigma, negative signal; 
(3) Lower match quality due to search constraints 
Total effects: (-) employment, total labor income, earnings and wages, (+) non-standard 
employment 
Heterogeneity:  
[s] for dismissals than displacements [stronger (2)] 
2 Micro-level: (1), (2), (3)  
Macro-level: Arguments about how micro-level mechanisms are 
strengthened or weakened based on economic situation and 
labor market policies 
Total effects: (-) occupational status, job autonomy, job authority,  job security 
Heterogeneity:  
[s] the poorer the economic situation [stronger (3) and (1)] 
[w] the more generous the UBs [weaker (3) and (1)] 
[w] the more support received through ALMPs [weaker (1), (2), and (3)] 
[s] the stricter the EPL for regular contracts [stronger (3), (1), and (2)] 
3 Stepping-stone (SSH) and trap (TH) hypotheses interpret  
and weigh (dis-)advantages differently in terms of:  
(4) Different change in human capital, 
(5) Different signals, 
(6) On vs. off the job search  
Total effects: (Adequate ) employment chances 
Stepping-stone: (+) 
(4.1) Maintenance and/or acquisition 
(5.1) Positive signal: motivation 
(6.1) On-the-job: job shopping, networks  
Trap: (-) 
(4.2) Loss and/or depreciation, lock-in 
(5.2) Negative signal: aspiration 
(6.2) Off-the-job: intensity 
  Heterogeneity: 
[s] stepping stone for younger than older [stronger (5.1)] 
[s] stepping stone for academically qualified than vocationally trained [stronger (5.1)] 
4 (7) Direct and persistent health effects 
(8) Indirect effects via negative career consequences 
Total effects: (-) health 
Mediation: 
[w] after controlling for indicators of negative career consequences  [no (8)] 
5 (9) Gender-neutral perspective: change in time available, change 
in relative sources 
(10) Gender-based perspective: doing gender, gender display 
(10.1), gender deviance neutralization 
(11) inertial mechanisms 
Total effects: (+) on persons’, (-) on partners’, (+) total housework hours 
Heterogeneity:  
[s] effects for men than women [stronger (9)] 
[s] effects for women than men [stronger (10)] 
[s] effects for men (women) in male- (female-) typed tasks [stronger (9) and (10)] 
Only men: [s] effects the longer the non-employment duration [stronger (10)] 
Only men: [w] effects the longer the non-employment duration [stronger (11)] 
Notes: *Article 1 does not explicitly state the listed hypotheses. Theoretical mechanisms are numbered in parentheses and referenced throughout sections 3.2 to 3.5. Hypothe-
ses about total effects: (+) positive effects, (-) negative effects. Hypotheses about heterogeneity or mediation: [s] stronger effects, [w] weaker effects, texts in brackets explain 
why effects are expected to be stronger or weaker.  
Sources: Own illustration. 
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3.3 The economic consequences of inadequate re-employment 
The comparison of an overeducated re-entry and unemployment is also based on arguments 
from human capital, signaling, and job search theories. However, as highlighted in section 3.1 
and shown in Table 2, depending on the interpretation of these theories, two opposing predic-
tions can be distinguished. According to the stepping-stone hypothesis (SSH) taking up an 
overeducated job helps (4.1) maintaining and acquiring human capital. Sicherman and Galor’s 
(1990) career mobility theory explicitly states that investments in work experience through 
overeducation increase internal and external promotion probabilities. In contrast the trap hy-
pothesis (TH) suggests that an overeducated re-entry leads to (4.2) the acquisition of wrong 
human capital resulting in lock-in effects in inadequate employment and it even has been ar-
gued that workers adapt to lower job requirements and lose cognitive abilities (De Grip et al., 
2008). With respect to signaling the SSH maintains that overeducation provides (5.1) a more 
positive signal than unemployment as it highlights job-seekers motivation. However, the TH 
states that it may also (5.2) signal workers lower aspirations (McCormick, 1990). Finally, 
both hypotheses differ in their assessment of the (dis-)advantages of an on- versus off-the-job 
search. The SSH states that (6.1) an on-the-job search is more efficient, as it provides access 
to more information on adequate jobs, for example, through networks. In contrast, the TH 
highlights (6.2) the higher search intensity of an off-the-job search. Because it can be assumed 
that the positive signal prevails among workers who have accumulated less labor market ex-
perience or possess less specific skills, Article 3 also examines the hypotheses that an overed-
ucated re-entry is associated with more positive effects among younger than older unem-
ployed as well as those with academic qualifications than those with vocational degrees.  
3.4 The effects of job loss and unemployment on health and well-being 
The direct or short-term effects of job loss and unemployment on health are theoretically at-
tributed to the loss of economic and psychosocial rewards associated with employment (Nor-
denmark and Strandh, 1999). The loss of income is argued to restrict individuals’ agency and 
also forces adjustments to the standard of living. This may affect physical health through in-
creases in health-damaging and decreases in health-promoting behaviors (e.g., Bartley, 1994). 
Changes in mental health are explained by unemployment depriving individuals of the psy-
chosocial rewards of employment. Moreover, jobs are often important to individuals’ identity 
by providing a major social role. The different health consequences are also interrelated. For 
example, Korpi (2001) states that psychological problems can over time accumulate into 
physical health problems. 
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How can the potential long-term effects be explained? As Table 2 shows the life course per-
spective distinguishes two basic models (e.g., Strandh et al., 2014). The first perspective as-
sumes that (7) the direct negative effects, which theoretically may originate from the loss of 
economic and psychosocial rewards, persist over time. In contrast, a second perspective ar-
gues that job loss and unemployment (8) provoke a “chronic stress process” (Burgard et al., 
2007: 370) or a “social chain of risks” (Brydsten et al., 2015: 799). In this view, the negative 
effects are not explained by a persisting direct effect, but rather by an initial event resulting in 
negative economic as well as health consequences that in their interplay produce poor and 
declining health across the life course. This second perspective is closely linked to the idea of 
cumulative advantages and disadvantages. It also theoretically integrates research on the ca-
reer by considering higher unemployment risks, employment instability, and lower job quality 
in the subsequent career as mechanisms explaining the negative effects of an early-career job 
loss on later life health.25 Table 2 lists this mediation hypothesis, which is tested in Article 4, 
and states that the effect of job loss on health should become smaller or vanish once the nega-
tive career effects are taken into account. 
3.5 The effects of job loss and unemployment on partners’ division of housework 
Theories about the division of housework and additional theoretical mechanisms are used in 
Article 5 examining couples’ reallocation and changes in total housework after one partner’s 
unemployment. Table 2 shows that these theories can be sorted into a (9) gender-neutral and a 
(10) gender-specific perspective. The former comprises time-availability and relative re-
sources hypotheses that are derived differently in the literature (Bianchi et al., 2000). These 
state that spouses’ roles in housework are due to their different time constraints and their rela-
tive resources and productivities in the market and domestic spheres. Based on these, it is ex-
pected that job loss shifts housework to the unemployed person and away from the partner, as 
time and relative resources change. While these arguments are per se gender-neutral, men 
work longer and earn more meaning that they (9) should experience greater gains in time and 
larger losses in relative resources. This suggests that the positive (negative) effect on the per-
son’s (partner’s) housework is larger for men than women. However, a contrary hypothesis is 
derived from sociological doing gender theories arguing that women and men perform or 
avoid housework to symbolically enact their femininity and masculinity (Berk, 1985; West 
                                                     
25 Moreover, this perspective assumes that the direct and ongoing negative effects on health may vice versa af-
fect workers’ lower chances for (adequate) re-employment, reinforcing the negative effects through a combina-
tion of social causation and health selection. 
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and Zimmermann, 1987). Two specific versions are Brines’ (1994) gender display and Green-
stein’s (2000) gender-deviance neutralization hypotheses suggesting that (10) men who eco-
nomically depend on their partners do less housework than what would be expected based on 
rational grounds, while breadwinning wives do more domestic work to display their gender 
and compensate for norm deviations. From these arguments it is expected that the positive 
(negative) effect of job loss on a person’s (partner’s) housework is larger for women than 
men, because for the former unemployment results in norm compliance instead of deviation. 
For various reasons increases in the total household production are also likely: households 
have less income to “outsource” housework, a more frequent and extensive use of the home 
increases the amount of housework, a less efficient use of persons’ time due to lower oppor-
tunity costs, and the take up of tasks that were deemed unnecessary or simply neglected be-
fore (Gough and Killewald, 2011; van der Lippe et al., 2018). 
Although the theoretical discussion so far already extends previous studies, two further points 
that have often been neglected are different tasks of housework and the role of the duration of 
unemployment or non-employment following a job loss. Theoretically both the gender-neutral 
and gender-specific perspectives provide arguments for the idea that men and women increase 
their housework upon job loss more strongly in male- or female-typed activities respectively. 
While the gender-neutral perspectives explain this by reference to a specialization argument 
arguing that (9) partners not only have comparative advantages with respect to paid and un-
paid work but also for different tasks within the domestic sphere, the gender-specific perspec-
tive highlights that (10) societies also hold expectations about which tasks reflect masculinity 
or femininity next to ideas about who should perform the housework. Therefore, spouses are 
expected to disproportionately increase their time in those tasks that they are able to perform 
more efficiently or that demonstrate more clearly their belonging to a specific gender catego-
ry. A last theoretical argument concerns the duration of unemployment or non-employment. 
Table 2 list two different mechanisms. The classical argumentation of Brines (1994) states 
that (10.1) prolonged unemployment increases men’s distress over norm deviation such that 
over time they give up more and more on domestic tasks with their female partners having to 
take over responsibility. This is in stark contrast to another theoretical perspective that looks 
at the duration of non-employment and suggests that for men’s job losses (11) inertial mecha-
nisms hinder immediate changes (Gershuny et al., 2005). A lagged adaptation is more likely 
because habits are difficult to change, skills for housework must be built, and the gendered 
meaning of housework must be challenged. 
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4. Research designs 
In this chapter I describe the research designs of the five articles of this thesis and explain the 
choices regarding their specific characteristics. These include the data and samples and the 
definition of the independent and dependent variables used (section 4.1) as well as the meth-
ods applied (section 4.2). The specific characteristics are associated with certain strength and 
weaknesses, which I highlight by discussing similarities and differences between the articles 
and by drawing comparisons to the research designs used in the respective areas of research. 
4.1 Data, samples, and independent and dependent variables 
Table 3 provides an overview and summary of the research designs of the five articles. It 
shows that all micro-data include at least basic information on the timing of the independent 
and dependent variables allowing for a clear temporal order and assessing the longevity of 
effects. However, it also makes clear that the detail of this information differs, because the 
data range from prospectively collected panel data (Articles 1, 3, 5), over retrospectively col-
lected life history data (Article 4) to cross-sectional data with some retrospective questions 
(Article 2). In subsection 4.1.1 the choices of these data are explained against the background 
of the life course perspective, the research questions and theoretically derived hypotheses as 
well as available alternative data. Subsection 4.1.2 further highlights the advantages and dis-
advantages the data imply for the measurement of job loss and unemployment. Subsection 
4.1.3 explains how the data allow taking account of the idea of different, but interrelated life 
domains and their multidimensionality as well as to examine complementarities and trade-
offs. The implications of the data for the methods of causal and multi-level analysis applied 
are discussed in section 4.2. 
4.1.1 Data and samples 
Articles 1, 3, and 5 are based on the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which offers prospective-
ly collected panel data designed to be nationally representative of the German adult popula-
tion living in private households (Wagner et al., 2007). The articles draw on data from 1984 
(first wave) to 2015.26 The SOEP is well-suited for this thesis, as it is itself based on the life 
course perspective. It interviews all household members aged 16 years and older and offers 
large-scale and long-run panel data in different, but interrelated life domains. The SOEP also
                                                     
26 The articles use different waves or years of the SOEP, because not all variables are available in all waves or 
years. 
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Table 3 Overview and summary of the research designs 
# Micro-data Sample Independent variables Dependent variables Methods 
1 SOEPa, 
1988-2015, 
Germany 
20-60 years, employees, 
standard employment 
T: job loss: displacement due 
plant closure or dismissal;  
C: no T, but other job changes 
Labor market statuses (5), 
Labor incomes (3), Non-
standard employment (3); 
Time: -3 to +5 waves/years 
Logistic regressions; 
Exact and propensity 
score matching with 
fixed-effects regressions 
with impact function 
2 ESSb,  
7 rounds, 2002-
2014, 
34 countries, 
164 country-
rounds* 
20-64 years, employees,  
no armed forces 
T: unemployment of three 
months or more in the last five 
years; C: no T 
Occupational status, 
autonomy, authority, job 
security; Time: [0 to +5 
years] 
Multiple imputation; 
Coarsened exact matching 
and two stage multi-level 
models (with country 
fixed-effects) 
3 SOEPa,  
1984-2012, 
Germany 
18-54 years, unemployed 
persons after job loss, at 
least vocational degree 
T: overeducated re-entry in a 
specific month; C: remaining 
unemployed and continuing job 
search for at least one month 
Employment chances, 
Adequate employment 
chances; Time: -2 to +5 
waves/years 
Discrete-time hazard 
model with independent 
competing risks and a 
piecewise constant 
specification; Exact and 
dynamic propensity score 
matching 
4 SHAREc, 
SHARELIFE, 
2008-2009,  
14 countries 
≥ 50 years, left education/ 
first job between 11/14-35 
years, no self-employment 
or retirement in the early-
career 
T: job loss in the early-career: 
plant closure or layoff; C: no T, 
but other job changes  
(+ continuous employment) 
Self-rated health; 
Time: [+16 to 77 years] 
 
Logistic regressions with 
country fixed-effects and 
average marginal effects; 
Sequence analysis 
5 SOEPa,  
1991-2015, 
Germany 
Both partners’ at most 54 
years, heterosexual couples 
living together 
T: job loss of one partner: 
employed to unemployed;  
C: continuous employment of 
this partner 
Both partners’ total and 
task-specific housework 
hours (4); -3 to +4 
waves/years 
Fixed-effects regressions 
with impact function 
Notes: a SOEP: Socio-Economic Panel, b ESS: European Social Survey, c SHARE: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. *This analysis also uses macro-data 
from different sources for 26 countries and 124 country-rounds: see Article 2 and the supplementary material for details. 
Sources: Own illustration.
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collects retrospective data on individuals’ and families’ lives in-between interviews and on 
the time before their participation. It further has the advantage to include detailed information 
about workers’ careers. This allows for clear definitions of job loss and unemployment, mak-
ing use of the reason for job loss (see subsection 4.1.2), and the use of an extended subjective 
measure of inadequate employment which resolves many of the problems of other measures 
(see Article 3). The SOEP further offers unusually detailed information about the dependent 
variables of interest such as measures of labor market status, labor income, non-standard em-
ployment or inadequate employment (see Articles 1, 3) and task-specific housework hours 
(see Article 5). 
As all articles are based on the life course perspective, they make similar use of some of the 
advantages of the SOEP: First, the SOEP not only allows for a clear temporal order of the 
variables of interest, but also to examine the outcome dynamics for several years around job 
loss, unemployment, or inadequate re-employment. This is important, because it makes it pos-
sible to examine whether the effects of life events are transitory or lasting, which itself pro-
vides information about the potential for cumulative advantages and disadvantages (P4), as 
the longevity of effects is an important precondition (P1: time). It also allows taking account 
of the duration of unemployment or non-employment (P1: time). Second, all articles investi-
gate multiple outcomes within their respective life domains (see subsection 4.1.3). Third, they 
all apply sophisticated methods of causal analysis by making explicit use of outcome 
measures before and after the life events of interest (see subsection 4.2.1). 
Some differences in the use of the SOEP can be highlighted, too. While all articles are inter-
ested in job loss, they differ in their definitions. Only Article 1 distinguishes different reasons 
and focuses on job displacements due to plant closures and dismissals. Although there are 
theoretical arguments for Articles 3 and 5 to define job loss as the transition from employ-
ment to unemployment, the main reasons are practical. These articles use specific features of 
the SOEP (i.e., monthly data on labor market status, partner data) that make adding the infor-
mation on the reason for job loss difficult, as this results in too small sample sizes. The theo-
retical and methodological advantages and disadvantages of different definitions will be fur-
ther discussed in subsection 4.1.2. 
Table 3 shows that the articles further differ in their sample restrictions. While Article 1 fo-
cuses on workers who are employed and, therefore, can lose their job, Article 3 only examines 
those who already had a transition from employment to unemployment, because it is interest-
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ed in labor market re-entry. Article 5 extends the individual-level focus of Articles 1 and 3 by 
making full use of the fact that the SOEP is a household panel. Specifically, it links partners 
who live together via specific identifiers to construct longitudinal couple data. As it examines 
the gender-specific reaction to one partner’s unemployment with respect to the division of 
housework and the total household production, the analyses are restricted to cohabiting heter-
osexual couples. The remaining sample restrictions are explained in the respective articles. 
Article 4 uses retrospectively collected life history data from SHARELIFE, which is the third 
wave (2008-2009) of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) pan-
el study (Börsch-Supan et al., 2013). The SHARE data are based on individual or household 
probability samples and the target population consist of all persons aged 50 years and over 
with a regular domicile. Current partners living in the same household were interviewed re-
gardless of age. SHARELIFE retrospectively collected the life histories for all individuals 
who participated in the first two waves of SHARE and the following 14 countries are includ-
ed: Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzer-
land, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland.  
As my co-authors and I are interested in the long-term health effects of job loss and unem-
ployment, SHARELIFE has a number of advantages over other data. In contrast to household 
panel surveys, where the long-term effects label usually implies following individuals for up 
to five years, SHARELIFE makes it possible to focus on job loss in the early-career and ex-
amine health, on average, for more than 30 years later allowing to take the ideas of timing 
and, especially, the longevity of effects (P1: time) very serious. Second, in contrast to the co-
hort studies used in previous research (see subsection 2.3.2), the data include information on 
the reason for job loss, distinguishing between displacements due to plant closures and 
layoffs, which has both theoretical and methodological advantages. Moreover, by covering 14 
European countries instead of specific birth or school-leaver cohorts, it allows testing whether 
findings of earlier studies can be extrapolated to a much broader population. Third, in line 
with the life course perspective, SHARELIFE also includes an unusual amount of detail about 
workers early-life circumstances, which can be used to construct an extensive set of control 
variables. It also covers workers’ whole careers making it possible to examine to what extent 
the potential negative effects of an early-career job loss are mediated through increased sub-
sequent unemployment risks or employment instability offering some insights into processes 
of cumulative advantages and disadvantages (P4).  
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However, compared to the panel data arising from cohort studies, the use of retrospective in-
formation for 14 different countries also implies some methodological limitations for causal 
analysis (see subsection 4.2.1) and the need to take account of the nesting of individuals with-
in countries in multi-level analysis (see subsection 4.2.2). Another disadvantage may be that 
the data only offer limited information on the dependent variable health (see subsection 
4.1.3). Moreover, the implications of recall errors and the issue of survivor bias associated 
with retrospective data have to be considered (see section 5.1). As interest is in the effect of 
an early-career job loss, the sample is restricted to individuals who hold at least one job dur-
ing that time (see Table 3), with the specifics being explained in Article 4. 
Article 2 is based on the first seven rounds (2002-2004) of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
offering repeated cross-sectional data with some retrospective questions. It is a comparative 
survey that is collected biannually and the majority of countries participate repeatedly. In each 
country and round the population of interest is persons aged 15 and over living within private 
households and the data are based on random probability samples. The ESS was explicitly 
created to provide comparable data across countries and time and standardizes all important 
aspects of survey methodology (Fitzgerald and Jowell, 2010). The ESS has some advantages 
over alternative data with respect to the comparative research questions raised in Article 2. It 
not only provides data about past unemployment and non-monetary job quality, but also has 
been attested a high quality.27 Second, the ESS provides information for a large number of 
countries making it possible to use a quantitative comparative approach based on multi-level 
analysis (see subsection 4.2.2). Specifically, I aimed at using as many country-rounds as pos-
sible, because reliable estimates of the effects of macro-level variables require a sufficient 
number of macro-level observations. (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). Previous studies have used 
small-N panel data, such as the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) or data from 
different household panel surveys, and applied a qualitative comparative approach (e.g., 
Dieckhoff, 2011). While these studies highlight differences in the effect of unemployment for 
a handful of countries and offer interpretations about potential reasons for this, they are not 
able to quantify the moderating role of specific macro-level variables, because countries differ 
on more than one relevant factor.  
                                                     
27 Next to winning the Descartes Price of the EU for its advancements in survey research, an evaluation of the 
sampling quality by Kohler (2008), comparing the ESS 2002 with four other European comparative surveys, 
suggest that it performed best on all of four separate criteria (i.e., documentation, sampling process, external 
criteria for representativity, internal criteria for representativity). 
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Third, the ESS has the advantage of being a repeated cross-sectional survey with most coun-
tries participating more than once. This has also been labelled “comparative longitudinal sur-
vey data” (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016: 23) and similar to a within-person analysis 
at the micro-level it allows for a within-country analysis at the macro-level strengthening the 
comparative analysis of Article 2 (see subsection 4.2.1).  
While the ESS is well-suited to address individuals nesting in structural and institutional con-
text (P6: historical time and place) and, thereby, provides information about the potential for 
preventive intervention (P7), the information on the timing on the independent variable at the 
micro-level only concerns a question about past unemployment. This implies some limitations 
for the definition of job loss and unemployment used (see subsection 4.1.2) as well as the 
methods of causal analysis applied (see subsection 4.2.1). Given these issues it may be asked 
why no large-N comparative panel or life history data were used. Unfortunately such data are 
not available.28 
The ESS has been complemented with time-varying macro-data to measure countries eco-
nomic situation and labor market policies. These data have been collected from different 
sources and the details can be found in Article 2 and, in particular, in supplementary material 
3. The sample was restricted to workers in dependent employment, because the theoretical 
derivations do not directly apply to self-employed workers. Workers in the armed forces were 
excluded, because for these occupational status cannot be measured. 
While the preceding discussions highlight the trade-offs in the choice of data and their respec-
tive implications by making comparisons between the articles and to the state of the research, 
one question remains: Why do the articles only rely on survey data, whereas the literature 
reviews suggest the frequent use of administrative data? As discussed in subsection 2.1.1 
studies on the economic and in rare cases also the non-economic consequences of job loss can 
be based on both administrative and survey data and each implies advantages and disad-
vantages with respect to the specific characteristics of the research design (Kuhn, 2002; 
                                                     
28 Only the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) offers micro-level panel data 
(although only for up to four years) for a large number of countries. However, it has no information about non-
monetary job quality and, in contrast, to comparative surveys is based on the idea of a “common framework” as 
opposed to a “common survey” meaning that there exist “common procedures, concepts and classifications, 
including harmonised lists of target variables” (Wolff et al., 2010: 40), but each country is granted flexibility in 
the provision of the data. For example, some countries use administrative data, while others use survey data and 
some use one or more existing data sources, while others implement new harmonized surveys. Accordingly, 
countries differ in many survey methodological aspects (e.g., sampling designs, fieldwork periods, reference 
periods, data collection, questionnaires) raising some issues regarding the comparability of the data.  
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OECD, 2013; van Wachter, 2010).29 The main disadvantage of administrative data and the 
reason they were not used is the very limited information on the outcomes that are of interest, 
mostly because the processes they originate from (e.g., tax data, social security data, unem-
ployment benefit data) are not aligned with researchers’ interests. For example, the German 
administrative data do not or only recently have started to include information on labor mar-
ket statuses other than dependent employment or registered unemployment. The same applies 
to information on income from different sources, working hours, and non-standard employ-
ment. The way the data arise further makes clear that no subjective information such as self-
rated health or data about households members’ time-use and specifically housework hours is 
available. Also quantitative comparative projects would require the harmonized use of admin-
istrative data across a large number of countries (e.g., Kuhn, 2002; OECD, 2013). Potential 
disadvantages of not using administrative data are the rather low sample sizes coming along 
with survey data. They imply a lower precision in the estimates and some additional trade-offs 
between different research interests.30 A solution for future research, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, may be the combination of administrative and survey data. 
4.1.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables of all articles concern job loss and unemployment.31 As mentioned 
previously, different definitions of job loss and unemployment have been given. Following 
Brand (2015), I here distinguish some ideal definitions before considering the use in the litera-
ture and this thesis. However, as Brand (2015: 360) notes different terms are often used inter-
changeably and “distinctions are not always made explicit in the literature and are to some 
degree amorphous.” The subsection ends with a description of the definition of the control 
groups, a topic that has received very little attention so far. As suggested in section 1.1, clear 
definitions of treatment and control groups are not only important methodologically, but also 
theoretically, because individuals attach different interpretations to different life events affect-
ing their choices and actions (P5: human agency). For example, Pearlin et al. (1981: 339) state 
                                                     
29 While data on the economic consequences are readily available, information on the non-economic conse-
quences is mostly not. However, increasingly studies based on administrative data include information on health. 
The latter is, for example, measured by data on medical diagnoses or hospitalizations as well as ultimately by all-
cause and cause-specific mortality (e.g., Browning et al., 2006, Browning and Heinesen, 2012). 
30 Low sample sizes often preclude analysis of treatment- and effect heterogeneity. For example, Article 5 trades 
in differentiating the reasons for job loss against the use of partner data and the study of outcome dynamics. 
Article 4 trades in effect heterogeneity analyses across countries against differentiating the reasons for job loss. 
31 The exception is Article 3 examining inadequate re-employment after job loss and unemployment. Because 
details on different definitions of inadequate employment and overeducation as well as their measurement are 
provided in the article and the supplementary material, this subsection will focus on job loss and unemployment. 
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that the effects of life events vary by “their desirability, by the degree of control people have 
over their occurrence, or by whether or not they are scheduled.” 
Job separations can be roughly classified into voluntary separations that are worker-initiated 
(e.g., resigned, quitted) or involuntary separations that are employer-initiated (e.g., fired, laid 
off). Job separations due to health problems may be both, but are typically defined to be in-
voluntary. There also are reasons for job separations that cannot be easily classified, for ex-
ample, mutual agreements or the completion of temporary jobs.32 According to these defini-
tions, only involuntary separations are job losses. Among the latter, job displacements, result-
ing from economic and business conditions (e.g., downsizing, restructuring, relocating, plant 
closings) that are beyond the control of individual workers, are distinguished from other job 
losses, including those due to health problems and workers being fired for individual reasons. 
As I explain below, most surveys only partially take these differentiations into account.  
Job separations must be distinguished from unemployment which is normally defined as indi-
viduals without a job, but who want to work and are currently available to take up employ-
ment. In surveys this definition is implemented differently. Typically respondents are asked 
whether they are unemployed and (not) seeking a job or whether they are registered unem-
ployed. Comparing all the definitions it becomes clear that job loss (involuntary separation) 
can but must not result in unemployment. It also becomes apparent that unemployment may 
be due to voluntary separations and that it can follow after other labor market statuses, for 
example, if persons are unemployed after education or training as well as inactivity. 
The different areas of research this thesis is located in have paid more or less attention to 
these issues. However, studies on the economic consequences mostly focus on job loss and, 
especially, job displacements. Among displacements they also often distinguish between plant 
closures and layoffs. Although layoffs are also job displacements per definition, in surveys 
they often cannot be distinguished from other job losses (see below).  
The differentiations are made for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, 
job loss should be distinguished from voluntary separation as only the former is associated 
with negative economic consequences. Methodologically, clearer definitions of the life event 
                                                     
32 For example, mutual agreements reflect voluntary separations if they are used by employees to change jobs 
without consideration of the notice period. They reflect involuntary separations if they are used by employers to 
avoid legal and practical problems associated with dismissals. Similarly, after the completion of a temporary job, 
both employers and workers may decide to not renew their contract, because either is not satisfied with the other. 
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of interest make it easier to model the respective selection processes (see subsection 4.2.1). It 
can be assumed that the selection into all separations is more heterogeneous than that into job 
loss. Selection into job displacements is arguably easiest to model as by definition they result 
from economic and business conditions such that workers’ characteristics are likely to be less 
important. This point also provides a motivation for the distinction of job displacements due 
plant closures and layoffs. Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that the latter should be associated 
with more negative effects, because employers have some discretion about who is laid off and 
this information is used by prospective employers. A similar argument can be made for dis-
missals, for which it is unclear whether they reflect layoffs, health problems, or workers being 
fired. Related to these discussions, plant closure studies are often thought to have a methodo-
logical advantage, because if almost all workers are let go, selection is unlikely due to their 
individual characteristics. Methodologically, distinguishing job separations and, especially, 
job loss from unemployment is also important, because by looking at their joint occurrence 
one would already condition on a possible outcome of job loss such that estimates for all job 
losses are likely biased. Although research on the non-economic consequences and, especial-
ly, on health and well-being has a much stronger focus on unemployment, studies on the di-
rect or short-term effects have increasingly considered the reasons for job loss. 
Given these differences, which definitions are used in the articles of this thesis? Article 1 in-
vestigates the effect of job loss on workers’ subsequent careers and distinguishes displace-
ments due to plant closure and job loss due to dismissal. For dismissals it is unclear whether 
they should be considered as displacements, because the wording of the question does not 
provide any information about whether the worker was laid off, had health problems, or was 
fired for individual reasons. However, by making these distinctions the analyses go beyond 
the usual approach of grouping all job losses or examining transitions from employment to 
unemployment. 
Article 4 investigates the effect of an early-career (involuntary) job loss on later life health.33 
It considers both plant closures and layoffs. The word layoff is used in the question wording 
suggesting that workers rather reported displacements than all kinds of dismissals. This is 
further supported by the fact that only a very small fraction of job losses had to be excluded, 
because they were also due to illness or disability. However, as wording differences should be 
                                                     
33 Similar to other research the article refers to involuntary job loss to make clear that the reasons for job separa-
tions are considered. According to the above definitions the adjective involuntary is, however, redundant. 
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treated with caution, my co-authors and I also distinguished in some analyses between plant 
closures and layoffs as the reasons for job loss.34 With few exceptions such differentiations 
are not made in this area of research. 
While Articles 1 and 4 adhere to the ideal definitions, Articles 3 and 5 rely on another fre-
quently used definition equating “job loss” with the transition from employment to unem-
ployment (e.g., Dieckhoff, 2011; Ehlert, 2013; Gangl, 2006). Studies using this definition 
often argue that they want to distinguish “job loss” (transitions from employment to unem-
ployment) from “voluntary separations” (transition from employment to inactivity) and other 
reasons for unemployment (e.g., transition from inactivity to unemployment). While this mo-
tivation is similar to the one described above, the differentiations are less precise and also 
give up the key distinction between job loss and unemployment. Article 3 focuses on inade-
quate re-employment, but uses an inflow sample of persons who transitioned from employ-
ment to unemployment and, thereby, considers this definition of “job loss”. As explained in 
subsection 4.1.1 this has mostly practical reasons. Article 5 also uses this definition but next 
to practical reasons, there are theoretical and methodological arguments for focusing on tran-
sitions from employment to unemployment. The theories that expect individuals to change 
their housework hours rely on changes in relative time availability, relative resources, and 
norm conformity. These changes only occur if persons become unemployed and stay unem-
ployed or non-employed, while job loss (without following unemployment) may be less rele-
vant. Another reason for why the use of job loss and, specifically, job displacement is less 
relevant for this research question, is that the selection with respect to housework, in my view, 
can be modeled relatively well by observed variables available in the data. By focusing on 
transitions from employment to unemployment, Article 5 also extends the previous literature 
which has either used cross-sectional data or longitudinal analyses that do not distinguish be-
tween transitions into and out of unemployment (e.g., Gough and Killewald, 2011). Neverthe-
less, the above highlighted limitations should be considered in the interpretation of the results. 
Lastly, Article 2 examines the effects of unemployment on subsequent job quality. Given the 
trade-offs discussed in subsection 4.1.1, this article has to rely on a coarser definition of “job 
loss”, because workers only reported whether they have ever been unemployed and seeking 
work for a period of more than three months within the last five years. While the question 
                                                     
34 Kuhn (2002) points out that there exist a variety of expressions (e.g., dismissed, fired, laid off, made redun-
dant), such that different wordings in surveys may give respondents some hint about what data collectors are 
asking for, but should not be over-interpreted. 
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only ask workers for unemployment that lasted some time and they had to be searching for a 
job, indicating that unemployment was not voluntary, it does not offer any information about 
whether workers were employed before or why they were unemployed. An assumption of 
article 2, therefore, is that the reported unemployment mostly stems from core workers that 
have lost their jobs and that their unemployment was likely involuntary triggering the theoret-
ical mechanisms that have been discussed in subsection 3.2.1. While this is considered plausi-
ble, the ambiguity in the definition misses out on the theoretical and methodological ad-
vantages described above. 
A topic that is often neglected in discussions of the definition of job loss is the choice of the 
control group (see also subsection 2.1.1), which is, in general, used to approximate what 
would have happened to workers in the absence of the event (see subsection 4.2.1).35 Article 1 
uses as a control group all workers who did not lose their job at a specific time including 
workers who remained at their employer and those who separated for other reasons that do not 
indicate leaving the labor force. This contrasts with the definitions used in many previous 
studies requiring workers to remain at their employer or even employed throughout the whole 
observation window. I argue that my definition allows for a more general counterfactual and 
does not imply conditioning on future outcomes.36 A similar definition is used in Article 4. To 
assess the relevance of the control group choice, this article also uses a second definition 
where persons who did not lose a job had to be continuously employed in their early career  
The comparison group in Article 5 consists of persons who are continuously employed, be-
cause here the research question and the theories explicitly define a comparison with the sit-
uation of what would have happened if the person had remained employed. The limitations of 
the past unemployment definition in Article 2 become also (and possibly even more) apparent 
in the definition of the control group, which here refers to workers who do not report having 
been unemployed for a least three month in the past five years. Although the definition of the 
control group is clear in itself, the broadness implies that the counterfactual situation remains 
ambiguous. 
                                                     
35 In longitudinal analyses one may be thinking that it is sufficient to compare workers before and after job loss. 
However, not using a control group may result in wrong conclusions as discussed in subsections 2.1.1 and 4.2.1. 
36 Article 3 which focuses on inadequate re-employment as compared to continued unemployed specifically 
addresses the problem of conditioning on future outcomes, by applying a dynamic comparison of persons who 
left unemployment into overeducation in a specific month to those who continued searching for at least one 
additional month. Here the control group was not restricted to remain unemployed for a longer period of time to 
avoid that they are selected in terms of their future (adequate) employment chances.   
71 
 
4.1.3 Dependent variables 
The choice of the dependent variables of this thesis is motivated by the life course perspec-
tive. Details about their measurements can be found in each article. Following the idea of dif-
ferent, but interrelated life domains (P2), Articles 1, 2, and 3 consider the economic conse-
quences in the career domain. Articles 4 and 5 focus on the non-economic consequences by 
examining the health and well-being and the family domains. Moreover, all articles share the 
idea that the effects of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment within each 
life domain should be measured on multiple dimensions to take account of their multidimen-
sionality and to highlight potential complementarities and trade-offs. 
For example, Article 1 measured the career consequences by looking at labor market status, 
labor income, and non-standard employment. This is important to highlight trade-offs and 
complementarities that may arise between different aspects of careers. For instance, workers 
may want to minimize earnings and wage losses and, thus, be willing to accept non-standard 
employment. Examining only one of these dimensions misses such considerations. A similar 
motivation underlies Article 2 that looks at four different facets of non-monetary job quality 
taking account of recent debates that workers’ well-being cannot be measured by money alone 
(Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011). Article 3 also provides a more balanced assessment of the 
stepping-stone and trap hypotheses by not only considering adequate re-employment, but also 
investigating workers overall employment chances. 
Article 5 highlights the necessity to also consider multiple dimensions of outcomes in life 
domains reflecting the non-economic consequences. In contrast to most previous longitudinal 
research it measures different housework tasks and is able to examine whether men and wom-
en, despite both adapting their housework hours when becoming unemployed, do so in differ-
ent and potentially gendered spheres. This differentiation has strong theoretical implications 
as described in section 3.5. In contrast, Article 4 has to make some concessions with respect 
to the aim of considering multiple dimensions of the outcome as only one measure of health is 
used. This is due to the availability of suitable other indicators and the fact that Article 4 al-
ready added complexity to the analyses by differentiating the reasons for job loss and per-
forming a mediation analysis. However, by choosing self-rated health as an outcome which 
considers both aspects of physical health and mental health (see Garbarski, 2016 for a re-
search synthesis) and, in addition, is predictive of overall mortality after adjusting for specific 
health measures and other variables (Idler and Benyamini, 1997), it still is in line with the 
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idea of measuring consequences holistically.37 Moreover, the mediating variables in these 
analyses are measured on multiple dimensions. They not only concern the cumulated unem-
ployment duration, the number of job ends, and the number of job losses, but also are meas-
ured by a sequence analysis that calculated a complexity index based on workers activity sta-
tuses aiming at a broader assessment of employment instability (Gabadhino et al., 2011). 
4.2 Methods 
This chapter provides some background to and discusses decisions about the methods used in 
the five articles of this thesis. In subsection 4.2.1 I offer an introduction to causal analysis 
using observational data and discuss three common estimators that based on different assump-
tions allow estimating causal effects. Because each method used in the articles is associated 
with a common estimator, their strength and weakness are highlighted. In subsection 4.2.2 I 
discuss different motivations of and approaches to multi-level analysis which are reflected in 
the methods used in Articles 2 and 4. 
4.2.1 Causal analysis 
When examining the effects of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment, it has 
to be considered that these events are neither randomly assigned nor happen by accident. As 
explained before, their occurrence rather depends on employees’ and employers’ decisions 
and the contexts in which their interactions take place. In observational data the latter are re-
flected in characteristics of employees, employers, and the context. For example, the risk of 
job loss increases in recessions, because firms lay off workers to react to changes in demand. 
However, employees in small firms may have a greater risk to be laid off than those in large 
firms, because large firms have other resources to weather a recession. Layoffs or dismissals 
may also be more likely among workers with low than high education, because employers 
want to only keep the most skilled employees. Similarly, the decision to take up a job for 
which one is overeducated likely depends on the time one already has been unemployed and 
the resources available to continue searching. 
These selection processes imply that workers who experience job loss, unemployment, and 
inadequate re-employment will systematically differ in characteristics other than the event 
and if these characteristics also affect the outcome, simple comparisons of affected and unaf-
                                                     
37 Self-rated health, which strongly relates to physical health, may also be an adequate choice in the sense that 
many authors argue that while the short-term effects of job loss are more likely to be found for mental health, in 
the long run physical health problems accumulate (see subsection 3.4). 
73 
 
fected workers will confound outcome differences that are due to the effect with those result-
ing from the groups’ different compositions in terms of (observed and unobserved) character-
istics affecting the risk of (i.e., baseline bias) as well as their reaction to the event (i.e., differ-
ential treatment effect bias) (Morgan and Winship, 2015). 
To discuss how and when causal effects can be estimated using observational data (see Gangl, 
2010 for a review), I introduce the potential outcomes framework or counterfactual model of 
causality.38 To keep the discussion practical I focus on the effect of job loss on income as a 
running example, but the same ideas apply to the other areas of research.  
The potential outcome framework has been formalized by Rubin (1974), although the under-
lying ideas have been developed and can be found in earlier work in statistics and economet-
rics (see Morgan and Winship, 2015 for a review). It is particularly useful in defining causal 
effects and in clarifying under which assumptions they may be estimated. Specifically, I here 
discuss three common estimators that rely on cross-sectional or longitudinal data (Caliendo, 
2006) and explain how each method used in the articles can be associated with one of these. 
The potential outcome framework begins with the idea that a treatment has a specific effect 
for each individual.39 In the running example, the binary treatment is job loss (𝐷𝐷) with some 
workers 𝑖𝑖 experiencing it (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1) and others not (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0). The observed outcome income 
(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is measured at some post-treatment time 𝑡𝑡. Specific to the potential outcome framework 
is the idea that each worker also has two potential outcomes indicated by superscripts: the 
income (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1) that would have been realized at 𝑡𝑡 in case of job loss and the income (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0) that 
would have been realized at 𝑡𝑡 in the absence of job loss. Given these, it is easy to define the 
individual causal effect (1) of job loss on income as the difference between the two potential 
outcomes for each worker (or alternatively any other comparisons such as a ratio). 
(1) 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 
However, as the observation rule (2) highlights the individual causal effects can never be 
identified, because at some specific time 𝑡𝑡 one either observes the income in case of job loss 
                                                     
38 The following presentation is inspired by Caliendo (2006) and Morgan and Winship (2015), but differs in 
notation. Specifically, I introduce the post-treatment time 𝑡𝑡 at which the outcome is measured right from the 
beginning, because this is helpful in the discussion of estimators that are based on longitudinal data. 
39 The experimental language reflects the framework’s scientific origins, but has no further implications here. 
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or in the absence of it. This is also called the fundamental problem of causal inference (Hol-
land, 1986).40 
(2)  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 
Therefore, researchers focus instead on different kinds of average causal effects, which can be 
estimated under certain assumptions. The average treatment effect at 𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖) =
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0), is defined as the expected income difference for both states 
for a randomly chosen worker from the population. The average treatment effect on the treat-
ed at 𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖|𝐷𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1|𝐷𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1), is de-
fined similarly but for a randomly chosen worker who experienced job loss.41 It is this second 
average causal effect that is typically of interest as it reflects the consequences for those 
workers who are actually treated and is, thus, assumed to bear the greatest policy relevance 
(Caliendo, 2006). It is also the main interest of the articles and will be the focus of the remain-
ing discussion.42 Given the definition of the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, it becomes clear that the challenge lies in 
identifying the counterfactual 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1), that is, the expected income that workers who 
lost their job would have realized had they not lost their job, by maintaining plausible identi-
fying assumptions. 
The simplest way to identify the counterfactual is to use the observed income of the control 
group. This gives rise to the naive-estimator (NE) (3): 
(3) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1|𝐷𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 0) 
(4) 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 0) 
However, it immediately becomes clear that the naive estimator only estimates the ATT if the 
identifying assumption (4) is plausible. It states that the income at 𝑡𝑡 that is realized in the ab-
sence of job loss would be the same for the treated and controls. While this assumption would 
be likely fulfilled in an experimental study, where job loss would be randomly assigned by a 
coin flip, which is impartial to and independent of workers potential incomes, it is generally 
                                                     
40 The observation rule implicitly includes the so-called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), stating 
that a unit’s potential outcomes do not depend on the treatment of other units or the mechanism by which the 
treatment takes place (Morgan and Winship, 2015).  
41 The average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) is defined analogously, but of no further interest here. 
42 This also means that the differential treatment effect bias resulting from the treated and controls different reac-
tion to the treatment is not a problem, because the treatment effect on the treated only concerns the former. 
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violated in an observational study.43 The above discussed selection processes imply that 
workers who lose their job differ in observed (e.g., education) and unobserved (e.g., motiva-
tion) characteristics that affect income in the absence of job loss, resulting in baseline or con-
founding bias. However, the selection processes likely differ in their strength for different 
reasons of job loss. As explained in subsection 4.1.2, job displacement, in particular, if it is 
due to plant closure, is considered to be relatively exogenous meaning that selection is less 
likely driven by worker characteristics making (4) less implausible. 
If the identifying assumption that underlies the naive estimator is not credible, how can it be 
relaxed? While the cross-sectional estimator (CSE) (5) appears to be similar, it differs in that 
the expected incomes are now conditional on a vector of pre-treatment control variables 𝑋𝑋.  
(5) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1|𝐷𝐷 = 1,𝑋𝑋) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 0,𝑋𝑋) 
(6) 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1,𝑋𝑋) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 0,𝑋𝑋) 
Accordingly, the identifying assumption (6) states that within groups that are defined by the 
combination of the values of the control variables in 𝑋𝑋, the income at 𝑡𝑡 that is realized in the 
absence of job loss would be the same for the treated and controls. This assumption is also 
called selection on observables (Caliendo, 2006) highlighting that it is only plausible if all 
variables that drive selection and affect the potential incomes are known to the researcher and 
observed. The assumption is more credible than that for the naive estimator and all baseline or 
confounding bias that arises from observed variables can be eliminated by conditioning. 
However, it still rules out that unobserved variables, such as motivation, affect the probability 
of job loss and the potential incomes. This may be plausible if a rich set of control variables is 
available or if it is combined, for example, with a relatively exogenous reason for job loss 
such as plant closure. If selection into the latter is driven mainly by observable employer 
characteristics (e.g., industry) and not by workers’ characteristics, the cross-sectional estima-
tor can yield valid approximations to the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖.  
Articles 2 to 4 rely on the cross-sectional estimator as they compare treated and untreated in-
dividuals but condition on pre-treatment control variables. Given that its credibility relies on 
                                                     
43 Such an experiment not only implies large practical difficulties, but is also ethically unacceptable. Moreover, 
even experiments that randomly assign a manipulated treatment share some problems with observational studies 
as their practical implementation usually deviates from the ideal (Shadish et al., 2002). However, experiments on 
related research question are possible and promising as is illustrated by studies that send out applications with 
manipulated unemployment durations to study the effect on invitations to job interviews (e.g., Kroft et al., 2013). 
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the control variables chosen, the question arises what variables should be conditioned on. 
Methodologists in the potential outcomes tradition have warned that one should only control 
for pre-treatment variables and new research on causal graphs shows that the wrong set of 
control variables “may fail to remove all confounding bias or even introduce new biases 
through overcontrol or endogenous selection” (Elwert, 2013: 257). Therefore, I selected the 
set of control variables theoretically and only included pre-treatment variables that are as-
sumed to affect the treatment and outcome. I also avoided overcontrol bias by refraining to 
control for variables that mediate the total effect of interest.44 The exception is Article 4 were 
after estimating the total effect of job loss on health, my co-authors and I control for mediat-
ing variables to separate the direct and indirect effects. 
Next to identification, issues of estimation have to be considered. Ideally one would estimate 
the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 within groups defined by the combination of the values of the control variables in 𝑋𝑋 
and afterwards average over these. However, because there are usually many control variables 
with many values non-parametric estimation is not feasible due to problems of high dimen-
sionality or sparseness. Therefore, the articles rely on different (semi-)parametric methods for 
conditioning. Specifically, they use coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al., 2012) with regres-
sion models (Article 2), dynamic propensity score matching (Sianesi, 2004) (Article 3), and 
logistic regression (Article 4). Irrespective of their advantages and disadvantages the different 
conditioning methods all rely on the assumption that all relevant control variables have been 
considered. A discussion of the methods and the control variables is provided in the articles, 
but given the above considerations the assumption is more plausible in Articles 3 and 4. Arti-
cle 3 uses rich panel data which allows controlling for confounding in a detailed way and Ar-
ticle 4 in addition distinguishes different reasons for job loss making use of the idea that plant 
closures are relatively exogenous. Similar to most comparative studies on cross-sectional data, 
the list of available control variables in Article 2 is rather limited, making the identifying as-
sumption less plausible. 
What if the assumptions of the cross-sectional estimator are not considered sensible?45 Longi-
tudinal data and estimators make different assumptions that may be considered more convinc-
                                                     
44 While my choices are guided by the literature on graphical causal models (Pearl, 2009) I did not make full use 
of it by strictly applying, for example, the adjustment or backdoor criteria in the selection of control variables. 
45 If this assumption is considered implausible but only cross-sectional data are available, researchers often use 
instrumental variable estimators (Gangl, 2010) which rely on the availability of a variable Z that is associated 
with the treatment D (instrument relevance) and the outcome Y only through its effect on the treatment D (in-
strument exogeneity). For example, if interest is in the effect of unemployment on health, plant closure may be 
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ing. The classical estimator, which in addition to the post-treatment measure of the outcome (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) also uses a pre-treatment measure (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′), is the before-after estimator (BAE) (7).  
(7)  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1|𝐷𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) 
(8) 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) 
In contrast to the cross-sectional estimator, the before-after estimator does not identify the 
counterfactual 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) by means of a control group, but by the treated groups expected 
income 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) in the pre-treatment period 𝑡𝑡′, implying a within-worker comparison 
over time.46 The key advantage is that the within-worker comparison implicitly controls for 
all variables, unobserved or observed, that drive selection into job loss, are constant, and have 
constant effects over time. However, the estimator relies on the strong identifying assumption 
(8) that in the absence of the treatment the income would not have changed for the treated. In 
the running example this excludes changes in wages due to common period effects (e.g., eco-
nomic shocks) as well as other growth processes (e.g., wage increases). It also precludes tran-
sitory shocks in the pre-treatment period due to anticipation (e.g., wage restraints). 
Another estimator that is closely related to the before-after estimator but also makes use of the 
between-group comparison underlying the cross-sectional estimator is the so-called differ-
ence-in-differences estimator (DiDE) (9). It also relies on the income trend for workers who 
lose their job, but subtracts, in addition, the income trend in the control group. 
 (9) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 = [𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1|𝐷𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0|𝐷𝐷 = 1)] − [𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0|𝐷𝐷 = 0)] 
(10) 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0�𝐷𝐷 = 1� = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0|𝐷𝐷 = 0) − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′0�𝐷𝐷 = 0� 
The identifying assumption (10) for the difference-in-differences estimator is not anymore 
that in the absence of job loss those who lose their job would not have experienced any 
changes in income, but rather “only” that they would have experienced the same change as 
workers who did not lose their job. This is also called the common trends assumption (Lech-
ner, 2010). It is weaker than the one of the before-after estimator, because the difference-in-
differences estimator remains unbiased if period effects or other growth processes in the ab-
                                                                                                                                                        
used as an instrument maintaining that it is associated with unemployment and only is associated with health 
through its effect on unemployment. While instrument relevance is given, instrument exogeneity is not plausible, 
because unemployment rates (and other variables) may cause an association between plant closure and health. 
46 I here assume panel data and that the differences in pre- and post-treatment outcomes are taken within work-
ers. The BAE and the estimator introduced below can, however, also be used with repeated cross-sectional data. 
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sence of job loss are the same for the treated and controls. Anticipation effects are, however, 
still a potential issue. 
Articles 1 and 5 use fixed-effects regression models where either separate outcome trends are 
estimated for the treatment and control groups (Article 1) or a two-way fixed-effects model is 
applied that estimates period effects by using the information of the control group (Article 5). 
These methods apply the basic identification strategy of the difference-in-differences estima-
tor by combining a within- and between-group comparison.47 Article 1 extends the model 
further in that it combines fixed-effects regression models with a preceding propensity score 
matching. The idea of this approach is that the (conditional) common trends assumption is 
more plausible after matching on a vector of pre-treatment control variables 𝑋𝑋. Moreover, 
both articles not only examine how the effects develop in the post-treatment periods, but also 
investigate differences between treated and untreated in the pre-treatment period. If no differ-
ences are found in the latter this provides some credibility to the identifying assumption as 
outcome trends are similar in a period where the treatment is absent. 
While all articles are interested in the effects of job loss, unemployment, or inadequate re-
employment, two articles, in addition, have a multi-level structure in which workers are nest-
ed within countries. As will be discussed next, the multi-level structure has statistical implica-
tions that need to considered, but also offers additional possibilities to enrich the analyses. 
4.2.2 Multi-level analysis 
Articles 2 and 4 use data from individuals nested in countries.48 This multi-level structure has 
to be taken into account for statistical reasons, but may also be of interest for theoretical rea-
sons.49 In a recent review of multi-level analysis for comparative research Bryan and Jenkins 
(2016) distinguish four approaches. In two of these approaches researchers are interested in 
the effect of individual-level variables, but have to take account of the multi-level structure 
for statistical reasons. This is also the motivation Article 4 is based on. The other two ap-
proaches follow from theoretical reasons, because researchers not only want to take account 
                                                     
47 With balanced panel data and two periods, the difference-in-differences estimator is identical to the first-
difference and fixed-effects estimators that include period effects. With unbalanced panel data or more than two 
periods these estimators differ in relevant aspects, but the general identification strategy remains the same. One 
difference is that the fixed-effects estimator rather relies on a within-person demeaning than differencing 
(Brüderl and Luwdig, 2015). 
48 Article 2 includes an additional country-round level. For illustrative purposes, I here focus on the common 
two-level case. However, at the end of this subsection I discuss the advantages of using the additional level. 
49 The following presentation and the distinction between different motivations for and approaches to multi-level 
analysis is inspired by Bryan and Jenkins (2016), although my notation differs. 
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of the statistical issues a multi-level structure raises, but are also interested in estimating the 
effect of country-level variables and their cross-level interactions with individual-level varia-
bles. This is the motivation underlying Article 2. In the following I explain both motivations 
and the respective approaches and demonstrate how the applications in Articles 4 and 2 fol-
low from these. 
The statistical reasons for using multi-level analysis are best explained by reference to the 
simple multi-level model described in (11-3).  
(11-1) Yic =  𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=2 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 
(11-2)  𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 = 𝛾𝛾00 + 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐  
(11-3) Yic =  𝛾𝛾00 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=2 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  
In the multi-level model in (11-3) the outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 for an individual 𝑖𝑖 in country 𝑐𝑐 is deter-
mined by an intercept 𝛾𝛾00, the effect 𝛽𝛽1 of the independent variable of interest, the effects 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 
of the control variables 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, a country-level error 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐, and an individual-level error 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐. The 
model differs from a standard linear regression model, because it includes a country-level 
error 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐 representing the effects of unobserved country-level variables. The same model is 
also given in (11-1) and (11-2) showing that the country-specific intercepts 𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 are allowed to 
vary from 𝛾𝛾00 by 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐. 
Estimating model (11-3) with ordinary least-squares (OLS) based on pooled data gives unbi-
ased estimates of the effects, but results in invalid, and usually too small, standard errors, be-
cause the independence of errors assumption is violated. This violation results from the fact 
that individuals from the same country will be more similar than individuals from different 
countries as they share the effects of unobserved country-level variables 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐. 
Researchers who are interested in estimating the effect of 𝛽𝛽1but want to take account of the 
statistical issues can apply two approaches. The first is to use cluster-robust standard errors 
which control for the effects of 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐 and allow for a general correlation structure among indi-
viduals within countries. The second approach, the country fixed-effects model, addresses the 
clustering by estimating the 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐 by including a dummy variable for each country but one re-
sulting in country-specific intercepts. In practice it is often recommended to combine these 
approaches, because cluster-robust standard errors do not fully account for the clustering of 
individuals in countries (e.g., Cameron and Miller, 2015) and country-fixed effect may re-
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move confounding if the independent variable of interest is affected by the unobserved coun-
try-level variables.50 In Article 4 the interest is in the effect of the individual-level variable 
job loss on health. Accordingly, my co-authors and I used cluster-robust standard errors and 
country fixed-effects to account for the nesting of individuals in countries.51 We used country 
fixed-effects to additionally remove confounding as country-level variables such as economic 
situation or labor market polices affect both the risk of job loss and health. 
Although the two remaining approaches, so-called mixed-effects and two-stage models, also 
may be used to address the statistical issues associated with clustering, they are usually moti-
vated theoretically, because they allow estimating the effects of country-level variables and 
their cross-level interactions with individual-level variables.52 Two explain these approaches 
it is useful to extend the model in (11-3) as follows. 
(12-1) Yic =  𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=2 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 
(12-2)  𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 = 𝛾𝛾00 + 𝛾𝛾01𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 + 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐  
(12-3)  𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐 = 𝛾𝛾10 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 +  𝑣𝑣1𝑐𝑐  
(12-4) Yic =  𝛾𝛾00 + 𝛾𝛾01𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 +  𝛾𝛾10𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 +   ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=2 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  + 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐+ 𝑣𝑣1𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 
In contrast to the model in (11-3), the model in (12-4) includes a country-level variable 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 as 
well as the cross-level interaction between the country-level variable and the individual-level 
variable of interest 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐. It also adds an additional country-level error  𝑣𝑣1𝑐𝑐 which is interact-
ed with 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐. The model is equally described by (12-1) to (12-3) showing that it is similar to a 
standard linear regression model where the intercept 𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 and the slope 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐 are allowed to vary 
across countries. In contrast, to the model in (11-3) the variation in the intercept (as well as in 
the slope) is in part explained by the country-level variable 𝑍𝑍𝑐𝑐 and in part random. In Article 2 
a model similar to (12-4) is used, because interest is in how the effect of the individual-level 
variable unemployment on non-monetary job quality is moderated by country-level variables 
such as economic situation and labor market policies. 
                                                     
50 This is also the standard in panel data analysis (Brüderl and Ludwig, 2015). Panel data can be understood to 
have a multi-level structure with person-observations nested in persons. Therefore, Articles 1 and 5 use the same 
strategy as Article 4 by combining person fixed-effects with cluster-robust standard errors. 
51 A problem is that cluster-robust standard errors are only consistent for large numbers of clusters. For Article 4 
it was verified that the conclusions do not depend on the choice for or against cluster-robust standard errors. 
52 Mixed-effects models are also referred to as random coefficients or random effects models, while two-stage 
models also are known as the two-step approach. 
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In principal the model described by (12-1) to (12-3) may be estimated simultaneously by us-
ing the mixed-effects approach or in separate steps by using the two-stage approach with each 
having specific advantages and disadvantages. The mixed-effects approach uses pooled data 
and the country-level errors 𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐 and 𝑣𝑣1𝑐𝑐 are modelled as random effects which are assumed to 
follow a multivariate normal distribution. As described in (12-1) to (12-3), in practice this 
model is usually estimated by assuming random intercepts  𝑣𝑣0𝑐𝑐 for 𝛽𝛽0𝑐𝑐 as well as random 
slopes  𝑣𝑣1𝑐𝑐 for 𝛽𝛽1𝑐𝑐 the effect of the independent variable of interest. However, the effects 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 
of the control variables are most often assumed to be constant across countries.  
An alternative to the mixed-effects approach is the two-stage approach. In this approach, in 
the first-stage, an individual-level model similar to (12-1) is estimated separately within each 
country. However, in contrast to (12-1) all parameters are allowed to vary across countries 
including the variance of the individual-level error. The estimated intercepts or slopes are 
collected and, in the second-stage, regressed on the country-level variables of interest. Specif-
ically, if interest is in cross-level interactions, as in Article 2, the estimated slopes for the in-
dividual-level variables of interest are regressed on the country-level variables that are as-
sumed to be moderators (12-3). 
In Article 2 I chose the two-stage over the mixed-effects approach for a number of reasons. 
First, as it is implemented in two stages it allows applying additional analyses in each stage. 
For example, before estimating the effect of unemployment on non-monetary job quality 
within each country, I used coarsened exact matching (CEM) in Article 2. Second, the two-
stage approach can be graphically illustrated by a scatter plot of the first-stage estimates 
against the macro-level variable of interest (see Figure 3 in Article 2). This allows analyzing 
and interpreting the data visually making the procedure very transparent. Third and most im-
portant, the two-stage approach allows the effects of all individual-level variables to vary 
across countries. This is important, because Heisig et al. (2017) show that the usual practice in 
mixed-effects models, to constrain the control variables to have constant effects across coun-
tries, results in omitted variable bias due to misspecification.  
The two-stage approach also has some potential disadvantages. In contrast to the mixed-
effects approach, which constraints some coefficients to be constant across countries and also 
uses between-country variation to estimate the effects of the individual-level variables, its 
flexible specification and the fact that only within-country variation is used to estimate the 
latter, makes it less efficient and possibly results in imprecise estimates. However, as in Arti-
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cle 2 the number of individuals per country is, on average, large, this is not considered an is-
sue. A second problem may be that the dependent variable used in the second stage is estimat-
ed. To take account of the uncertainty in the first stage estimates, I follow the recommenda-
tion of the literature and use estimated dependent variables (EDV) regression models in the 
second stage. These are estimated by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) (Lewis and 
Linzer, 2005). To take further account of the nesting of country-rounds in countries (see next 
paragraph) standard errors are clustered by country. 
While I have focused on the common two-level case to explain the different reasons for and 
approaches to multi-level analysis as well as to demonstrate how the applications in Articles 4 
and 2 follow from these, the multi-level structure in Article 2 actually includes an additional 
level. Because I use repeated cross-sectional data, individuals are nested in country-rounds 
and countries. The fact that most countries are observed repeatedly over time allows to esti-
mate, in some analyses, the moderating effects of economic situation and labor market poli-
cies by only using within-country variation over time. As explained in section 4.1, this allows 
controlling for all time-constant unobserved heterogeneity between units. In this case this 
concerns all stable characteristics of countries such as social policy traditions or composition-
al differences. This strategy also reduces concerns about the cross-national comparability of 
non-monetary job quality measures. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In section 5.1 I summarize the main findings of the articles and discuss their limitations. 
Based on this, in section 5.2 I draw some general conclusions and give an outlook for future 
research. 
5.1 Main findings of the articles 
In Article 1 “Losing standard employment in Germany: The consequences of displacement 
and dismissal for workers’ subsequent career” I find that both displacements due to plant 
closures and dismissals have short- and long-term negative effects on employment. Five years 
after the events workers who lost their jobs have 12 to 15 percentage points lower employ-
ment chances than those who did not. The findings also suggest that their situation will only 
slightly improve as time passes. Although I show that the lower employment chances are 
mostly due to unemployment, more than a third can also be attributed to workers who have 
left the labor force entirely, especially into (early-)retirement. Apart from retirement, only a 
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small increase in inactivity is found. Sensitivity analyses based on retrospectively collected 
monthly data confirm these results. 
Article 1 also reveals that in Germany, in contrast to recent findings for the US and UK, the 
lasting total income losses, which are in the range between 15 and 23 percent, are to a greater 
extent explained by falls in employment and working hours instead of negative effects on 
hourly wages. However, even for hourly wages I find significant wage scars in the range be-
tween 6 to 8 percent. 
I further show that job loss increases the risk of non-standard employment. For self-
employment (5 to 7 percentage points) the findings are similar for both events, while for part-
time somewhat smaller increases are found for displacements (2 to 4 percentage points) com-
pared to dismissals (5 to 6 percentage points). For fixed-term contracts the effects are large in 
the year after job loss (20 and 25 percentage points for displacement and dismissal respective-
ly) but decrease in the long run (6 and 11 percentage points) with the over time pattern sug-
gesting further reductions. Sensitivity analyses on the heterogeneity within non-standard em-
ployment show that the increases in self-employment are largely due to solo self-employment, 
which is generally considered to be of a lower quality. For the effects on part-time work, mar-
ginal employment, which is often viewed critically, only plays a small role. Concerning tem-
porary agency work as specific form of temporary employment, I find increases of 3 to 5 per-
centage points in the short run. However, these fall to zero after about five years. 
Overall the findings are in line with the hypotheses about negative effects for employment, 
total labor income, earnings, and wages and positive effects for non-standard employment. 
The expectation of stronger effects for dismissals than displacements is only partly confirmed. 
Although the effects are more pronounced for dismissals for most outcomes, the differences 
to plant closures become smaller as time passes. A further interesting finding is that the nega-
tive effects on earnings are largely explained by dismissed workers’ lower working hours. 
The results on labor market status suggest that job loss does not necessarily result in a large 
group of discouraged workers who are not easily re-integrated into the labor market. For labor 
income, Article 1 improves our understanding of explanations for total labor income losses in 
different welfare states by linking previous findings about larger (short-term) total losses in 
conservative welfare regimes (Ehlert, 2013), but stronger earnings or wage scars in liberal 
welfare states (Gangl, 2006). For non-standard employment, the results imply that only tem-
84 
 
porary employment is a transitory experience although even here I show higher risks of fixed-
term employment five years after job loss. 
Next to the disadvantages associated with using survey instead of administrative data (see 
subsections 2.1.1 and 4.1.1) and similar to most previous studies the analyses are subject to 
two specific methodological issues. First, they do not account for workers leaving employers 
in anticipation of job loss. If these workers are selected with respect to the outcomes of inter-
est, this results in bias.53 Second, the findings of the analyses that are conditional on re-
employment may be biased, because they are not only affected by selection into job loss, 
which is thoroughly modeled, but potentially also by a dynamic selection into re-
employment.54 Third, I analyzed the risks of non-standard employment separately and it re-
mains open how they are interrelated.   
In Article 2 “The effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality in Europe: The mod-
erating role of economic situation and labor market policies” the first-stage micro-level anal-
yses reveal that unemployment negatively affects subsequent non-monetary job quality in the 
majority of the 164 country-rounds analyzed. Taking account of the multidimensionality of 
job quality, I show that workers who have experienced unemployment in the last five years 
have a lower occupational prestige, less autonomy and authority, and, in particular, face 
greater job insecurity than those who have not. This also confirms previous findings on the 
scar effects of job loss and unemployment for workers’ subsequent non-monetary job quality 
(Brand, 2006; Dieckhoff, 2011). 
However, the results reveal a large heterogeneity in the effects across countries and over time. 
In macro-level analyses I examine whether this variation can be explained by the unemploy-
ment rate, GDP growth, UB generosity, expenditures on ALMPs and PLMPs, and EPL for 
regular contracts. All models included period effects. In some specifications I added country 
fixed-effects to only estimate the moderating effects by using within country-variation over 
time. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Dieckhoff, 2011), the second-stage macro-level anal-
yses show that some of the moderating factors have effects that are in line with the theoretical 
                                                     
53 However, it is also not clear how these employees report their job loss in survey data. If they leave early but 
nevertheless report that they lost their job due to a plant closure or dismissal the problem vanishes. 
54 If selection into re-employment is due to temporally stable worker-specific characteristics the fixed-effect 
panel estimators are unbiased. Studies using selection-correction models in sensitivity analyses find that the 
results are relatively stable (e.g., Brand, 2006; Gangl, 2006). I refrained from using these, because they rely on 
strong assumptions. Specifically, they require a variable that affects selection into re-employment but not the 
outcomes of interest. 
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expectations. However, as the findings are not consistent across different outcomes, model 
specifications, and measures of the moderators, they have to be interpreted with caution. 
Overall, the results confirm Article 1 and the individual-level hypothesis suggesting that un-
employment has negative effects on subsequent non-monetary job quality. It also shows that 
the effects vary substantially across countries and over time. As the results of the macro-level 
analyses are not consistent, they imply a limited role of economic situation and labor market 
policies in explaining this variation and at the same time point to the need for further theoreti-
cal and empirical investigations. 
Some limitations have to be considered. First, the micro-level analyses may overestimate the 
negative effects of unemployment as they, similar to most comparative research, are based on 
cross-sectional data and the underlying selection on observables assumption may not be plau-
sible given the limited number of control variables (see subsection 4.2.1). If the amount of 
bias in the effect estimates varies across country-rounds, this may also affect the macro-level 
analyses. Another critique following from the mixed findings about the importance of coun-
tries’ institutional set-up concerns the theoretical expectations of this and previous studies. 
For some macro-level variables it is likely that they have heterogeneous effects, for example, 
due to differences in the design of labor market policies. If some ALMPs mitigate the nega-
tive consequences, but others result in lock-in effects or increase stigma, the overall effects 
may be close to zero. For other moderating variables opposing mechanisms may be at work 
resulting in ambiguous overall effects, too. For example, theory predicts that higher unem-
ployment rates increase stigma by prolonging unemployment, but also decrease stigma as 
unemployment is less informative about individual workers’ productivity. Similarly, while 
UBs increase unemployed workers’ bargaining power, they also extend unemployment dura-
tion, potentially fostering the depreciation of human capital or unemployment stigma. A relat-
ed issue is that specific policies may only work for specific population subgroups, which 
means that future research would benefit from more differentiated theoretical considerations. 
Article 3 “Better overeducated than unemployed? The short- and long-term effects of an 
overeducated labour market re-entry” switches perspectives and focuses on the re-
employment of workers after a transition from employment to unemployment. In descriptive 
analyses, my co-author and I show that more than a third takes up inadequate re-employment. 
Compared to the 18 percent of overeducated workers overall, this suggests that many use in-
adequate jobs to re-enter the labor market. However, the descriptive findings also indicate that 
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overeducation is of varying importance to workers, as the unemployment duration for those 
with adequate re-employment is three months shorter than for those with an overeducated re-
entry. This latter finding also supports the application of the dynamic propensity score match-
ing approach, which compares an overeducated re-entry after a specific unemployment dura-
tion with the alternative of remaining unemployed and continuing the job search for at least 
one additional month. Our findings show that overeducation is associated with large short-
term positive employment effects (61 percentage points after 6 months). Although the effects 
decrease over time as some of those who remained unemployed initially also take up jobs, the 
positive effects on employment chances range from 10 to 20 percentage points for two to five 
years after re-employment. Additional analyses show that these effects are to a similar extent 
explained by lower risks of unemployment and inactivity. However, further results reveal that 
the higher employment chances come at the costs of lower chances for adequate re-
employment. Across the follow-up period, workers who made an overeducated re-entry have 
a 30 to 40 percentage points lower chance to work in a job that matches their skills and quali-
fications than those who did not. Overall, the results support the stepping-stone hypothesis in 
terms of employment but the trap hypothesis with respect to adequate employment. 
My co-author and I also examined effect heterogeneity by labor market experience and educa-
tional qualification. The results are similar to the overall findings. In contrast to our expecta-
tion we find slightly higher employment effects for established workers and only small differ-
ences in adequate employment chances. With respect to education, we find stronger lock-in 
effects into overeducation for workers with vocational degrees lending slight support to our 
hypothesis, but no differences in the effect on employment chances. The similarities in the 
effects are potentially more striking than the small differences that are revealed. 
As highlighted in subsection 4.2.1 the analyses rely on the selection on observables assump-
tion. While we used a homogenous sample and the rich panel data allowed controlling for 
many observed variables and the elapsed unemployment duration, workers who take up an 
overeducated job may still differ on unobserved characteristics. For example, if they have a 
lower ability, we likely underestimate the positive employment effects and overestimate the 
negative effects with respect to adequate re-employment. Although we do not find any differ-
ences in employment chances before the treatment indicating that the selection on observables 
assumption is plausible we cannot rule out such issues. Similar studies with designs that also 
take account of selection on unobservable characteristics have reported results in line with 
ours (Baert et al., 2013). Another issue may be the measurement of overeducation with the 
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literature being in disagreement over the best approach. We used an extension of the standard 
subjective measure and also tested for alternatives with qualitatively similar results. Finally, 
our analyses do not allow us to disentangle different mechanisms for the effects of overeduca-
tion, pointing to an avenue for future research. 
In Article 4 “The effect of an early-career involuntary job loss on later life health in Europe” 
my co-authors and I focus on the non-economic long-term consequences of job loss. We find 
that workers who lost their jobs due to plant closures or layoffs in their early-career, defined 
as the first ten years after labor market entry, have an about 6 percentage points higher chance 
to be in fair or poor self-rated health than those who did not. Similar results are found using 
the five-point self-rated health scale and applying models for ordinal or continuous outcomes. 
The findings are also robust to the control group used as they do not change if comparisons 
with workers who did not lose their job and in addition were continuously employed through-
out their early career are made. The results are also very similar for plant closures and layoffs. 
This makes the effect estimates for layoffs more plausible as they correspond with those 
based on a relatively exogenous reason for job loss. Furthermore, a particularly interesting 
finding of this article is that the total effect of job loss on health was only reduced by about 10 
to 15 percent when controlling for the mechanisms of subsequent unemployment risks and 
employment instability. Overall the hypothesis about the negative long-term effects can be 
confirmed, but the results for the mediating role of economic consequences were only partly 
in line with our expectations. 
However, there remain some caveats to the analyses. The use of retrospective data implies 
that measures of childhood health and childhood socio-economic status are not as specific as, 
for example, in prospective cohort studies. In addition, the SHARELIFE survey may be af-
fected by recall errors, although studies that examine this issue find that respondents remem-
ber fairly well (Havari and Mazonna, 2015). Another problem may be survivor bias which can 
be interpreted quite literally here. As the literature review in section 2.3 emphasized job loss 
and unemployment may increase mortality. In our study this means that the persons who were 
most negatively affected by job loss may already have died or at least cannot participate in a 
survey. This would, however, result in an underestimation of the negative health effects in 
Article 4. Similar to Article 1, we cannot take into account selection arising from anticipation. 
If workers who leave early are positively selected with respect to health, we may overestimate 
the negative effects of an early-career job loss. Lastly, the finding that subsequent unemploy-
ment risks and employment instability only mediate a small share of the total effect is im-
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portant, but could to some extent be specific to our sample with workers building their careers 
during an overall good economic situation. 
In Article 5 “Unemployment and housework in couples: Task-specific differences and dynam-
ics over time” my co-author and I examine another aspect of the non-economic consequences 
of job loss by studying how couples change their division of housework and their total house-
hold production. We find that job loss by men increases their own housework by about 2.3 to 
2.5 hours and decreases their female partners’ housework by 0.3 to 0.8 hours a day. This also 
means that job loss results in an expansion of the total household production. For job loss by 
women the results are very similar with slightly smaller increases of 1.9 to 2.0 hours. Male 
partners accordingly reduce their domestic labor by 0.3 to 0.4 hours. The similar results for 
men and women and, especially, the finding that men increase their housework more than 
women cast doubt on the gender-specific perspective. They are likely explained by different 
initial conditions (men earn more, mean work longer) and confirm our hypothesis on the im-
portance of relative time availability, resources, and productivities. The relevance of different 
initial conditions is also supported in sensitivity analyses showing that men and women who 
work full-time before job loss as well as their partners show almost identical reactions. We 
further show that for both men’s and women’s unemployment couples adapt immediately 
providing little evidence for the hypotheses about a lagged adaptation or alternatively an in-
tensification of the avoidance of housework by men. 
However, because total housework may hide differences by specific tasks we also look at the 
effects for gender-neutral, female-typed, and male-typed housework. The overall results of 
immediate reactions and larger increases for the unemployed persons than decreases for their 
partner hold over the different tasks. However, in line with our expectation, we find that hus-
bands spend relatively more additional hours on neutral and, in particular, male-typed tasks, 
whereas wives’ extra time is to a large extent attributable to increases in routine chores. We 
also find slight signs of adaptation for the case of husbands’ unemployment and routine 
housework, which is consistent with the fact that adaptation should play a role for those tasks 
where men have collected the fewest experiences so far or that are most at odds with their 
traditional gender roles. 
Overall the results are, however, opposed to the gender-specific perspective showing that 
couples mostly follow economic rationales in reallocating their time spend on domestic work. 
The gender-specific reactions with respect to the tasks are in line with the doing gender ap-
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proaches, but can also be explained by specialization stressing that spouses spend relatively 
more of their extra time in tasks they possess skills for. While this is not easily distinguished 
the finding that men immediately and substantially increase their routine housework, is diffi-
cult to reconcile with gender-based expectations. 
Despite the article’s strengths, there remain some limitations. Stylized time use data are infe-
rior to diary methods and although fixed-effects models control for upward bias due to tempo-
rally stable over-reporting, time-varying measurement error due to respondents over-reporting 
more extensively after they have lost their jobs, for example, to appear productive, remains 
possible. Another shortcoming is that our data do not allow investigating the role of childcare 
in detail. While sensitivity analyses show that both men and women increase their time with 
children following a job loss, the type of childcare activities cannot be further distinguished. 
5.2 Conclusions  
Next to the main findings of the articles, this thesis also offers a number of conclusions on 
(research about) the economic and non-economic consequences of job loss, unemployment, 
and inadequate re-employment. In the following, I discuss three general conclusions that are 
related to the life course perspective and also refer back to the societal debates and trends de-
scribed in chapter 1. 
First, this thesis shows the value of a general theoretical model of the economic and non-
economic consequences of job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment. Endors-
ing the key principles of time (P1), cumulative advantages and disadvantages (P4), and human 
agency (P5), the results confirm the logical order of the central concepts and the assumed ef-
fects they have on each other. Specifically, Articles 1 to 3 show that job loss triggers unem-
ployment, which as a mobility-reinforcing event affects individuals’ chances for adequate re-
employment on multiple dimensions including labor incomes, non-standard employment 
risks, and non-monetary job quality. The findings further illustrate the importance of counter-
mobility events by highlighting their role in shaping the consequences of job loss and unem-
ployment. Specifically, the decision to accept inadequate re-employment compared to remain-
ing unemployed and continuing the job search affects workers’ subsequent careers. Moreover, 
as I find large variation in the effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality across 
countries and over time, I provide empirical evidence for the idea that the interactions of job 
searchers and employers are affected by historical time and place (P6). While this supports the 
life course perspective, the results indicate a limited role of economic situation and labor mar-
90 
 
ket policies as explanatory factors. As suggested in the last section, this points to the need for 
some refinements of the theoretical arguments about the moderating role of different macro-
level variables. The general theoretical model is also confirmed by the effects of job loss and 
unemployment in the health and well-being and family domains (P2: different, but interrelated 
life domains). Moreover, the principle of linked lives (P3) receives support as this thesis illus-
trates that unemployment not only affects persons own housework hours, but also their part-
ners’ domestic activities. Finally, the findings indicate that the theoretical mechanisms put 
forward in one life domain are important for understanding the consequences in other life 
domains. For example, processes of cumulative advantages and disadvantages (P4) are re-
vealed by showing that the economic consequences partially explain negative effects of an 
early-career job loss on later life health. However, as a large part of the effect still remains 
unexplained, some further theoretical and empirical work is warranted. 
Second, this thesis illustrates the importance of implementing an encompassing evaluation 
design. The results show that job loss, unemployment, and inadequate re-employment have 
negative effects on different, but interrelated life domains (P2) and affect multiple outcomes 
within these, highlighting their multidimensionality. They also suggest that the consequences 
are partly shared by family members (P3: linked lives). Furthermore, complementarities are 
revealed in the results of lower labor incomes, higher non-standard employment risks, and 
lower non-monetary job quality, while trade-offs are shown for finding quick re-employment 
and securing a high job quality. Concerning the trends of rising job insecurity described in 
chapter 1, these findings have two implications: Policy-makers need to be aware that the full 
costs of job loss and unemployment go far beyond lower employment and earnings. Moreo-
ver, they need to balance the trade-off between fostering quick re-employment and ensuring a 
high job quality in reaction to the highlighted economic pressures. The usefulness of the en-
compassing evaluation design is further confirmed in the analyses on treatment and effect 
heterogeneity. The finding of similar effects for job losses due to plant closures, layoffs, and 
dismissals indicate that the results are not limited to specific events only. The shown similari-
ties are further relevant for the interpretation of previous studies which have not made these 
differentiations. This thesis suggests that they still give a good impression of the average ef-
fects. The value of examining treatment heterogeneity is further highlighted by the results on 
spouses’ immediate adaptation in the domestic sphere in case of one partner’s unemployment. 
With respect to effect heterogeneity, the comparative analyses offer some implications for the 
societal debates (P6: historical time and place, P7: preventive intervention). In line with the 
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few previous studies no consistent moderating role of labor market policies is found, meaning 
that they are not associated with unambiguously smaller or larger negative effects of unem-
ployment on job quality. This also shows that more knowledge needs to be accumulated and 
that a stronger focus on specific policies that are targeted at concrete groups would be benefi-
cial. Most importantly, the findings of the five articles show the significance of taking account 
of the longevity of the effects (P1: time). This thesis shows that job loss, unemployment, and 
inadequate re-employment in general have lasting negative effects. For most outcomes the 
effects are still present after about five years and in some analyses effects for more than 30 
years later are found. However, the results also point out that for specific outcomes the effects 
may be transitory, for example, for temporary employment after job loss. The overall persis-
tency of the consequences has important implications for the trends of rising job insecurity. 
Given that the interrelated structural changes are likely to intensify the differential exposure 
and vulnerability to job loss, the shown longevity of effects implies and accumulation of ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Therefore, job loss and unemployment are key mobility mecha-
nisms that explain growing inequalities across different life domains and over the life course. 
Third, the findings of this thesis support the view that it is important to apply state-of-the-art 
methods of causal and multi-level analysis to test theoretically derived hypotheses. In line 
with the focus on causal analysis based on observational data, the results of this thesis empha-
size the need to consider the (dynamic) selection into life events. Descriptive results and, es-
pecially, the findings of (dynamic) (propensity score) matching analyses show that treated and 
untreated workers substantially differ in observed characteristics that also affect their further 
careers and lives. This thesis further indicates that clear definitions of the independent varia-
bles (e.g., specific reasons for job loss, focus on transitions from employment into unem-
ployment) as well as the use of longitudinal data allow for better causal inferences. For exam-
ple, I find that selection on observed characteristics is smaller for plant closures than layoffs 
and dismissals and analyses of pre-treatment trends in outcomes show only small differences 
if the focus is on specific life events. Moreover, the comparative analyses illustrate the very 
flexible two-stage approach to multi-level analysis. Specifically, they emphasize its transpar-
ency, for example, by visualizing the analyses and interpretations of the cross-level interac-
tions. The comparative analyses also point out the potential of using the logic of a longitudi-
nal within-unit analysis at the macro-level by examining changes in countries over time. 
Besides these general conclusions, this thesis also has three implications for future research. 
First, studies would benefit from extra knowledge about and (even) more concrete definitions 
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of job loss. While the differentiations made in this thesis already go beyond those usually ap-
plied, they are still not closely tied to the interrelated structural changes that motivate such 
research. Specifically, if interest is in how job loss due to technological change or internation-
al trade affects labor markets and societies, better tools to identify specific reasons in adminis-
trative data or more fine-tuned survey questions for employees and employers should be de-
veloped. For example, currently it remains unclear whether a plant closure results from larger 
trends or even whether it is involuntary or voluntary from the business owner’s perspective. 
Second, this thesis highlights another methodological issue. Research still has to apply or ap-
plies different research designs making it very difficult to integrate findings from different 
studies. While this is partly explained by different research questions, it mostly is due to prac-
tical limitations (e.g., available data). This issue may be addressed in two ways: Methodologi-
cal studies could systematically vary specific research design choices learning how they affect 
results (e.g., survey vs. administrative data, definition of samples, definition of treatment and 
control groups, methods applied). Another solution, which may build on these methodological 
studies, literature reviews, and meta-analyses, would be to aim for a stronger conceptual and 
methodological harmonization. This could be achieved by defining best practices and likely 
implies the collection of new harmonized longitudinal employer-employee data. While pro-
jects of this kind have been conducted (e.g., Kuhn, 2002; OECD, 2013), they have not inte-
grated administrative and survey data making it almost impossible to study the economic and 
non-economic consequences in parallel. 
Third, as highlighted by this thesis researchers should continue to examine different, but inter-
related life domains and multiple outcomes within these. In addition to the outcomes investi-
gated in this thesis, future research could pay more attention to individuals’ social participa-
tion, trust, and political engagement. More detailed assessments concerning the family life 
(e.g., family stability) including a more extensive theoretical and empirical foundation of 
spillover effects (e.g., partners’ health, children’s health) are also important avenues for future 
research. 
Although these different ideas can be pursued independently, interdisciplinary and interna-
tional research that addresses these issues jointly likely results in the greatest benefits. As has 
been illustrated in this thesis, the life course perspective provides a very useful guiding theme 
for such projects allowing for a theoretical and methodological integration, but also for mak-
ing use of the insights from varying disciplines in the social sciences.  
93 
 
6. References 
Acemoglu, D., & Autor, D. H. (2011). Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for em-
ployment and earnings, In O. Ashenfelter, & D. Card (Eds.) Handbook of labor eco-
nomics volume 4 part B (pp. 1043–1171). Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Arntz, M., Gregory, T., & Zierahn, U. (2016). The risk of automation for jobs in OECD coun-
tries: A comparative analysis, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Pa-
pers No. 189. Paris: OECD. 
Autor, D. H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (2003). The skill content of recent technological 
change: An empirical exploration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 
1279–1333. 
Baert, S., Cockx, B., & Verhaest, D. (2013). Overeducation at the start of the career: stepping 
stone or trap? Labour Economics, 25, 123–140. 
Baert, S., & Verhaest, D. (2014). Unemployment or overeducation: Which is a worse signal to 
employers? IZA Discussion Papers No. 8312. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor. 
Bane, M. J., & Ellwood, D. T. (1986). Slipping into and out of poverty: The dynamics of 
spells. The Journal of Human Resources, 21(1), 1–23. 
Baranowska-Rataj, A., Gebel, M., Gousia, K., Klobuszewska, M., Nikolaieva, O., Nizalova, 
O., Norton, E., Rokicka, M., Stasiowski, J., Strandh, M., & Voßemer, J. (2016). Inter-
dependencies between labour market insecurity and well-being: Evidence from panel 
data. EXCEPT Working Papers No. 8. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 
Baranowska-Rataj, A., & Strandh, M. (2017). Contagion of health effects of unemployment 
within families: Does becoming unemployed among young people affect health of 
their partners. EXCEPT Working Papers No. 13. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 
Barbieri, P. (2009). Flexible employment and inequality in Europe. European Sociological 
Review 25(6), 621–628. 
Barbieri, G., & Sestito, P. (2008). Temporary workers in Italy: Who are they and where they 
end up. Labour, 22(1), 127–166. 
Bartley, M. J. (1994). Unemployment and ill health: Understanding the relationship. Journal 
of Epidemiology and Community Health, 48(4), 333–337. 
Bartley, M. J., Ferrie, J. E., & Montgomery, S. M. (2006). Health and labour market disad-
vantage: Unemployment, non-employment, and job insecurity. In M. G. Marmot, & R. 
G. Wilkinson (Eds.) Social determinants of health (pp. 78–96). Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Baumann, I. (2016). The plight of older workers labor market experience after plant closure 
in the Swiss manufacturing sector. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 
Becker, G. S. (1993). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special ref-
erence to education. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Bell, D. N. F., & Blanchflower, D. G. (2011). Young people and the great recession. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, 27(2), 241–267. 
Bender, S., Dustmann, C., Margolis, D., & Meghir, C. (2002). Worker displacement in France 
and Germany. In P. J. Kuhn (Ed.) Losing work, moving on: International perspectives 
on worker displacement (pp. 375–470). Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. 
Berk, S. F. (1985). The gender factory: The apportionment of work in American households. 
New York: Plenum Press. 
Bianchi, S. M., Milkie, M. A., Sayer, L. C., & Robinson, J. P. (2000). Is anyone doing the 
housework? Trends in the gender division of household labor. Social Forces, 79(1), 
191–228. 
94 
 
Brand, J. E. (2006). The effects of job displacement on job quality: Findings from the Wis-
consin Longitudinal Study. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 24(3), 275–
298. 
Brand, J. E. (2015). The far-reaching impact of job loss and unemployment. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 41, 359–375.  
Brand J. E., & Burgard, S. A. (2008). Job displacement and social participation over the life 
course: Findings for a cohort of joiners. Social Forces, 87(1), 211–242. 
Brandt, M., & Hank, K. (2014). Scars that will not disappear: Long-term associations between 
early and later life unemployment under different welfare regimes. Journal of Social 
Policy, 43(4), 727–743. 
Bredtmann, J., Otten, S., & Rulff, C. (2017). Husband’s unemployment and wife’s labor sup-
ply: The added worker effect across Europe. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
Advance online publication. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793917739617.  
Brines, J. (1994). Economic dependency, gender, and the division of labor at home. American 
Journal of Sociology, 100(3), 652–688. 
Browning, M., Dano, A. M., & Heinesen, E. (2006). Job displacement and stress-related 
health outcomes. Health Economics, 15(10), 1061–1075. 
Browning, M., & Heinesen, E. (2012). Effect of job loss due to plant closure on mortality and 
hospitalization. Journal of Health Economics, 31, 599–616. 
Brüderl, J., & Ludwig, V. (2015). Fixed-effects panel regression. In H. Best, & C. Wolf (Eds.) 
The Sage handbook of regression analysis and causal inference (pp. 327–358). Los 
Angeles: Sage Reference. 
Bryan, M. L., & Jenkins, S. P. (2016). Multilevel modelling of country effects: A cautionary 
tale. European Sociological Review, 32(1), 3–22. 
Brydsten, A., Hammarström, A., Strandh, M., & Johansson, K. (2015). Youth unemployment 
and functional somatic symptoms in adulthood: Results from the Northern Swedish 
Cohort. European Journal of Public Health, 25(5), 796–800. 
Böckerman, P., & Ilmakunnas, P. (2009). Unemployment and self-assessed health: Evidence 
from panel data. Health Economics, 18(2), 161–179. 
Böheim, R., & Weber, A. (2011). The effects of marginal employment on subsequent labour 
market outcomes. German Economic Review, 12(2), 165–181. 
Börsch-Supan, A., Brandt, M., Hunkler, C., Kneip, T., Korbmacher, J., Malter, F., Schaan, B., 
Stuck, S., Zuber, S. (2013). Data resource profile: The Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). International Journal of Epidemiology, 42(4), 992–
1001. 
Booker, C. L., & Sacker, A. (2012). Psychological well-being and reactions to multiple un-
employment events. Adaptation or sensitisation? Journal of Epidemiology and Com-
munity Health, 66, 832–838. 
Buchholz, S., Rinklake, A., & Blossfeld, H.-P. (2013). Reversing early retirement in Germa-
ny: A longitudinal analysis of the effects of recent pension reforms on the timing of 
the transition to retirement and on pension incomes. Comparative Population Studies, 
38(4), 881–906. 
Burdett, K. (1979). Unemployment insurance payments as a search subsidy: A theoretical 
analysis. Economic Enquiry, 17(3), 333–343. 
Burgard, S. A., Brand, J. E., & House, J. S. (2007). Toward a better estimation of the effect of 
job loss on health. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 48(4), 369–384. 
Caballero, R. J. (2010). Creative destruction. In S. N. Durlauf, & L. E. Blume (Eds.) Econom-
ic growth. The new Palgrave economics collection (pp. 24–29). Palgrave Macmillan: 
London. 
95 
 
Cameron, C. A., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference. 
The Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), 317–372. 
Caliendo, M. (2006). Microeconometric evaluation of labour market policies. Berlin: Spring-
er. 
Caliendo, M., & Künn, S. (2011) Start-up subsidies for the unemployed: Long-term evidence 
and effect heterogeneity. Journal of Public Economics, 95(3-4), 311–331. 
Caliendo, M., & Künn, S. (2015). Getting back into the labor market: The effects of start-up 
subsidies for unemployed females. Journal of Population Economics, 28(4), 1005–
1043. 
Caliendo M., Künn S., & Uhlendorff A. (2016). Earnings exemptions for unemployed work-
ers: The relationship between marginal employment, Unemployment Duration and Job 
Quality. Labour Economics, 42, 177–193. 
Chan, S., & Stevens A. H. (1999). Employment and retirement following a late career job 
loss. American Economic Review, 89(2), 211–216. 
Chan, S., & Stevens A. H. (2001). Job loss and employment patterns of older workers. Jour-
nal of Labor Economics, 19(2), 484–521. 
Charles, K. K., & Stephens, M., Jr. (2004). Job displacement, disability, and divorce. Journal 
of Labor Economics, 22(2), 489–522. 
Clark, A. E. (2003). Unemployment as a social norm: Psychological evidence from panel da-
ta. Journal of Labor Economics, 21(2), 323–351. 
Clark, A. E., Georgellis, Y., & Sanfey, P. (2001). Scarring: The psychological impact of past 
unemployment. Economica, 68 (270), 221–241. 
Couch, K. A., & Placzek, D. A. (2010). Earning losses of displaced workers revisited. Ameri-
can Economic Review,100(1), 572–589. 
Cygan-Rehm, K., Kuehnle, D., & Oberfichtner, M. (2017). Bounding the causal effect of un-
employment on mental health: Nonparametric evidence from four countries. Health 
Economics, 26(12), 1844–1861. 
Daly, M., & Delaney, L. (2013). The scarring effect of unemployment throughout adulthood 
on psychological distress at age 50: Estimates controlling for early adulthood distress 
and childhood psychological factors. Social Science & Medicine, 80, 19–23. 
Davis, S., & von Wachter, T. (2011). Recessions and the cost of job loss. Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, 43(2), 1–72. 
De Graaf-Zijl, M., van den Berg, G. J., & Heyma, A. (2011). Stepping stones for the unem-
ployed: The effect of temporary jobs on the duration until regular work. Journal of 
Population Economics, 24(1), 107–139. 
De Grip, A., Bosma, H., Willems, D., & van Boxtel, M. (2008). Job-worker mismatch and 
cognitive decline. Oxford Economic Papers, 60(2), 237–253. 
Dieckhoff, M. (2011). The effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality in Europe: A 
comparative study of four countries. Acta Sociologica, 54(3), 233–249. 
Dingeldey, I. (2007). Between workfare and enablement: The different paths to transfor-
mation of the welfare state: A comparative analysis of activating labour market poli-
cies. European Journal of Political Research, 46(6), 823–851. 
DiPrete, T. A. (2002). Life course risks, mobility regimes, and mobility consequences: A 
comparison of Sweden, Germany, and the United States. American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 108(2), 267–309.  
DiPrete, T. A., & Eirich, G. M. (2006). Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequality: 
A review of theoretical and empirical developments. Annual Review of Sociology, 32, 
271–297.  
DiPrete, T. A., Goux, D., Maurin, E., & Quesnel-Vallee, A. (2006). Work and pay in flexible 
and regulated labor markets: A generalized perspective on institutional evolution and 
96 
 
inequality trends in Europe and the U.S. Research in Social Stratification and Mobili-
ty, 24(3), 311–332. 
DiPrete, T. A., & McManus, P. A. (2000). Family change, employment transitions, and the 
welfare state: household income dynamics in the United States and Germany. Ameri-
can Sociological Review, 65(3), 343–370. 
Dooley, D., Fielding, J., & Levi, L. (1996). Health and unemployment. Annual Review of 
Public Health, 17, 449–465. 
Dvouletý, O., & Lukeš, M. (2016). Review of empirical studies on self-employment out of 
unemployment: Do self-employment policies make a positive impact? International 
Review of Entrepreneurship, 14(3), 361–376. 
Ehlert, M. (2012). Buffering income loss due to unemployment: Family and welfare state in-
fluences on income after job loss in the United States and Western Germany. Social 
Science Research, 41(4), 843–860. 
Ehlert, M. (2013). Job loss among rich and poor in the United States and Germany: Who loses 
more income? Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 32, 275–298. 
Ehlert, M. (2016). The impact of losing your job: Unemployment and influences from market, 
family and state on economic well-being in the US and Germany. Amsterdam: Am-
sterdam University Press. 
Eichhorn, J. (2013). Unemployment needs context. How societal differences between coun-
tries moderate the loss in life-satisfaction for the unemployed. Journal of Happiness 
Studies, 14(6), 1657–1680. 
Eichhorn, J. (2014). The (non-) effect of unemployment benefits: Variations in the effect of 
unemployment on life-satisfaction between EU countries. Social Indicators Research, 
119(1), 389–404. 
Elder, G. H., Jr., & Giele, J. Z. (2009). Life course studies: An evolving field. In G.H. Elder, 
Jr., & J. Z. Giele (Eds.) The craft of life course research (pp. 1–24). New York, NY: 
The Guilford Press. 
Elwert, F. (2013). Graphical causal models. In S. L. Morgan (Ed.). Handbook of causal anal-
ysis for social research (pp. 245–273). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G., & Regini, M. (2000). Why deregulate labour markets? Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ezzy, D. (1993). Unemployment and mental health. A critical review. Social Science & Medi-
cine, 37(1), 41–52. 
Fallick, B. (1996). A review of the recent empirical literature on displaced workers. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 50(1), 5–16. 
Farber, H. S. (1999). Alternative and part-time employment arrangements as a response to job 
loss. Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4), 142–169. 
Farber, H. S. (2005). What do we know about job loss in the United States? Evidence from 
the Displaced Workers Survey, 1984–2004. Economic Perspectives, 29(2), 13–28. 
Farber, H. S. (2017). Employment, hours, and earnings consequences of job loss: US evi-
dence from the Displaced Workers Survey. Journal of Labor Economics, 235(1), 235–
272. 
Farber H. S., Hall, R., &, Pencavel, J. (1993). The incidence and costs of job loss: 1982–91. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 24(1), 73–132. 
Farber H. S., Haltiwanger, J., & Abraham, K.G. (1997). The changing face of job loss in the 
United States, 1981–1995. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 28(1997), 55–142. 
Fitzgerald, R., & Jowell, R. (2010). Measurement equivalence in comparative surveys: The 
European Social Survey (ESS): From design to implementation and beyond. In J. A. 
Harkness, M. Braun, B. Edwards, T. P. Johnson, L. E. Lyberg, P. Ph. Mohler, B.-E. 
97 
 
Pennell, & T. W. Smith (Eds.) Survey methods in multinational, multiregional, and 
multicultural contexts (pp. 485–495). London: Wiley. 
Freier, R., & Steiner, V. (2008). Marginal employment: Stepping stone or dead end? Evalu-
ating the German experience. Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung, 41(2/3), 223–
243. 
Frey, C. B., & Osborne, M. A. (2017). The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to 
computerization? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114, 254–280. 
Fryer, D. (1997). International perspectives on youth unemployment and mental health. Some 
central issues. Journal of Adolescence, 20(3), 333–342. 
Gabadinho, A., Gilbert, R., Müller, N., & Studer, M. (2011). Analyzing and visualizing state 
sequences in R with TraMineR. Journal of Statistical Software, 40(4), 1–37. 
Gallie, D. (2004). Resting marginalization. Unemployment experience and social policy in the 
European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gallie, D. (2007). Production regimes, employment regimes, and the quality of work. In D. 
Gallie (Ed.) Employment regimes and the quality of work (pp.1–33). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Gallie, D., & Russel, H. (1998). Unemployment and life satisfaction. A cross-cultural com-
parison. European Journal of Sociology, 39(2), 248–280. 
Gallie, D. & Paugam, S. (2000) Welfare regimes and the experience of unemployment in Eu-
rope. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gangl, M. (2003). Unemployment dynamics in the United States and West Germany. Heidel-
berg: Physica. 
Gangl, M. (2004). Welfare states and the scar effects of unemployment: A comparative analy-
sis of the United States and West Germany. American Journal of Sociology, 109(6), 
1319–1364. 
Gangl, M. (2006). Scar effects of unemployment: An assessment of institutional complemen-
tarities. American Sociological Review, 71(6), 987–1013. 
Gangl, M. (2008). Unemployment and worker career prospects: A cross-national comparison. 
In R. Muffels (Ed.) Flexibility and employment security: Labour markets in transition 
(pp. 169–194). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Gangl, M. (2010). Causal inference in sociological research. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 
21–47. 
Gangl, M., & Giustozzi, C. (2018). The erosion of political trust in the Great Recession. Cor-
rode Working Papers No. 5. Frankfurt am Main: Goethe University.   
Garbarski, D. (2016). Research synthesis: Research in and prospects for the measurement of 
health using self-rated health. Public Opinion Quarterly, 80(4), 977–997. 
Gebel, M. (2010). Temporary employment at labour market entry: Individual risk patterns and 
career consequences. Mannheim: University of Mannheim. 
Gebel, M. (2013). Is a temporary job better than unemployment? A cross-country comparison 
based on British, German, and Swiss panel data. Schmollers Jahrbuch, 133(2), 143–
156. 
Gebel, M. (2015). Labor market instability: Labor market entry and early career develop-
ment. In R. Scott, & S. Kosslyn (Eds.) Emerging trends in the social and behavioral 
sciences (pp. 1–15), New York: Wiley. 
Gebel, M., & Voßemer, J. (2014). The impact of employment transitions on health in Germa-
ny. A difference-in-differences propensity score matching approach. Social Science & 
Medicine, 108, 128–136. 
Gershuny, J., Bittman, M., & Brice, J. (2005). Exit, voice, and suffering: Do couples adapt to 
changing employment patterns? Journal of Marriage and Family, 67(3), 656–665. 
98 
 
Gibbons, R., & Katz, L. F. (1991). Layoffs and lemons. Journal of Labor Economics, 9(4), 
351–380. 
Goos, M., &, Manning, A. (2007). Lousy and lovely jobs: The rising polarization of work in 
Britain. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(1), 118–133. 
Gough, M., & Killewald, A. (2011). Unemployment in families: The case of housework. 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 73(5), 1085–1100. 
Green, F. (2006). Demanding work: The paradox of job quality in the affluent economy. 
Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Greenstein, T. (2000). Economic dependence, gender, and the division of labor in the home: 
A replication and extension. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62(2), 322–335. 
Grund, C. (1999). Stigma effects of layoffs? Evidence from German micro-data. Economics 
Letters, 64(2), 241–247. 
Hagen, T. (2004). Labour market effects of fixed-term employment contracts: Microecono-
metric analyses for West Germany. Frankfurt am Main: Goethe University. 
Hammarström, A., &, Janlert, U. (2002). Early unemployment can contribute to adult health 
problems. Results from a longitudinal study of school leavers. Journal of Epidemiolo-
gy and Community Health, 56(8), 624–630. 
Hammermesh, D. S. (1989). What do we know about worker displacement in the United 
States? Industrial Relations, 28(1), 51–59. 
Havari, E., & Mazzonna, F. (2015). Can we trust older people’s statements on their childhood 
circumstances? Evidence from SHARELIFE. European Journal of Population, 31(3), 
233–257. 
Heisig, J. P., Schaeffer, M., & Giesecke, J. (2017). The costs of simplicity: Why multilevel 
models may benefit from accounting for cross- cluster differences in the effects of 
controls. American Sociological Review, 82(4), 796–827.   
Hipp, L., Bernhardt, J., & Allmendinger, J. (2015). Institutions and the prevalence of non-
standard employment. Socio-Economic Review, 13(2), 351–377. 
Holland, P. (1986). Statistics and causal inference. Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation, 81(396), 945–960. 
Houseman, S. N. (2014). Temporary agency work: Temporary agency work is not generally a 
stepping-stone to regular employment. IZA World of Labor, 27.  
Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2012). Causal inference without balance checking: 
Coarsened exact matching. Political Analysis, 20(1), 1–24. 
Idler, E. L., & Benyamini, Y. (1997). Self-rated health and mortality: A review of twenty sev-
en community studies. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 38(1), 21–37. 
Jacobson, L., LaLonde, R., & Sullivan, D. (1993). Earnings losses of displaced workers. 
American Economic Review, 83(4), 685–709. 
Jahoda, M. (1982). Employment and unemployment: A social-psychological analysis. Cam-
bridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, P., & Zeisel, H. (2002 [1933]). Marienthal: The sociography of an 
unemployed community. New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers. 
Jahn, E., & Rosholm, M. (2014). Looking beyond the bridge: How temporary agency em-
ployment affects labor market outcomes. European Economic Review, 65, 108–125. 
Jencks, C., Perman, L., & Rainwater, L. (1988). What is a good job? A new measure of labor-
market success. American Journal of Sociology, 93(6), 1322–1357. 
Kalleberg, A. L. (2007). The mismatched worker. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Com-
pany. 
Kalleberg, A.L., Reskin, B.F., & Hudson, K. (2000). Bad jobs in America: Standard and non-
standard employment relations and job quality in the United States. American Socio-
logical Review, 65(2), 256–278. 
99 
 
Kletzer L. G. (1998). Job displacement. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(1), 115–136. 
Kluve, J., Card, D., Fertig, M., Góra, M., Jacobi, L., Jensen, P., Leetmaa, R., Nima, L., Patac-
chini, E., Schaffner, S., Schmidt, C. M., van der Klaauw, B., & Weber, A. (2007). Ac-
tive labor market policies in Europe: Performance and perspectives. Berlin, Heidel-
berg, New York: Springer. 
Knabe, A., & Rätzel., S. (2011a). Quantifying the psychological costs of unemployment: The 
role of permanent income. Applied Economics, 43(21) ,2751–2763. 
Knabe, A., & Rätzel, S. (2011b). Scarring or scaring? The psychological impact of past un-
employment and future unemployment risk. Economica, 78(310), 283–293. 
Kohler, U. (2008). Assessing the quality of European surveys: Towards an open method of 
coordination for survey data. In J. Alber, T. Fahey, & C. Saraceno (Eds.) Handbook of 
quality of life in the enlarged European Union (pp. 405-423). London: Routledge. 
Kohler, U., Ehlert, M., Grell, B., Heisig, J. P., Radenacker, A., & Wörz, M. (2012). Verar-
mungsrisiken nach kritischen Lebensereignissen in Deutschland und den USA. Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 64(2), 223–245. 
Korpi, T. (1997). Is utility related to employment status? Employment, unemployment, labor 
market policies and subjective well-being among Swedish youth. Labour Economics, 
4(2), 125–147. 
Korpi, T. (2001). Accumulating disadvantage: Longitudinal analyses of unemployment and 
physical health in representative samples of the Swedish population. European Socio-
logical Review, 17(3), 255–273. 
Korpi, T., & Levin, H. (2001). Precarious footing: temporary employment as a stepping stone 
out of unemployment in Sweden. Work, Employment and Society, 15(1), 127–148. 
Krashinsky H. (2002). Evidence on adverse selection and establishment size in the labor mar-
ket. Industrial Labor Relations Review, 56(1), 84–96. 
Kroft, K., Lange, F., & Notowidigdo, M.J. (2013). Duration dependence and labor market 
conditions: Evidence from a field experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
128(3), 1123–1167. 
Krolikowski, P. (2017). Choosing a control group for displaced workers. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland Working Papers No. 16-05. Cleveland, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland. 
Krug, G., & Eberl, A. (2018). What explains the negative effect of unemployment on health? 
An analysis accounting for reverse causality. Research in Social Stratification and 
Mobility, 55, 25–39. 
Kuhn, P. J. (2002). Summary and synthesis. In P. J. Kuhn (Ed.) Losing work, moving on: In-
ternational perspectives on worker displacement (pp. 1-104). Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Kvasnicka, M. (2009). Does temporary help work provide a stepping stone to regular em-
ployment?’ In D. H. Autor (Ed.) Studies of labor market intermediation (pp. 335–
372). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Kyyrä, T. (2010). Partial unemployment insurance benefits and the transition rate to regular 
work. European Economic Review, 54(7), 911–930. 
Kyyrä, T., Parrotta, P., & Rosholm, M. (2013). The effect of receiving supplementary UI ben-
efits on unemployment duration. Labour Economics, 21, 122–133. 
Lachowska, M., Mas, A., & Woodbury, S. A. (2018). Sources of displaced workers’ long-
term earning losses. NBER Working Papers No. 24217. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Layte, R., Levin, H., Hendrickx, J., & Bison, I. (2000). Unemployment and cumulative disad-
vantage in the labour market. In D. Gallie (Ed.) Welfare Regimes and the experience 
of unemployment in Europe (pp. 153–174). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
100 
 
Layte, R., & Whelan, C. T. (2003). Moving in and out of poverty. European Societies, 5(2), 
167–1991. 
Lechner, M. (2010). The estimation of causal effects by difference-in-difference methods. 
Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, 4(3), 165–224. 
Lehmer, F. (2012). Dient die Arbeitnehmerüberlassung für Langzeitarbeitslose als Brücke in 
nachhaltige Beschäftigung? Sozialer Fortschritt, 61(8), 190–197. 
Lewis, J. B., & Linzer, D. A. (2005). Estimating regression models in which the dependent 
variable is based on estimates. Political Analysis, 13(4), 345–364. 
Lietzmann, T., Schmelzer, P., & Wiemers, J. (2017). Marginal employment for welfare recip-
ients: stepping stone or obstacle? Labour, 31(4), 394–414. 
Lippman, S., & Rosenthal, J. E. (2008). Do displaced workers lose occupational prestige? 
Social Science Research, 37(2), 642–656. 
Mayer, K. U. (2009). New directions in life course research. Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 
413–433. 
McCormick, B. (1990). A theory of signalling during job search, employment efficiency, and 
‘stigmatised’ jobs. The Review of Economic Studies, 57(2), 299–313. 
McGinnity, F. (2004). Welfare for the unemployed in Britain and Germany. Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar. 
McGuinness, S. A. (2006). Overeducation in the labour market. Journal of Economic Surveys, 
20, 387–418. 
McKee-Ryan, F., Song, Z., Wanberg, C. R., & Kinicki, A. J. (2005). Psychological and phys-
ical well-being during unemployment: A meta-analytic atudy. The Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 90(1), 53–76. 
Mills, M. C., Blossfeld, H.-P., Bernardi, F. (2006). Globalization, uncertainty and men’s em-
ployment careers: A theoretical framework. In H.-P. Blossfeld, M. C. Mills, & F. Ber-
nardi (Eds.), Globalization, uncertainty and men’s careers: an international compari-
son (pp. 3–37). Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Mood, C. (2010). Logistic regressions: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what 
we can do about it. European Sociological Review, 26(1), 67–82. 
Morgan, S. L., & Winship, C. (2015). Counterfactuals and causal inference. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Mortensen, D. T. (1986). Job search and labor market analysis. In O. Ashenfelter, & R. Lay-
ard (Eds.) Handbook of labor economics volume 2 (pp. 849–919). North Holland: 
Amsterdam. 
Mossakowski, K. N. (2009). The influence of past unemployment duration on symptoms of 
depression among young women and men in the united states. American Journal of 
Public Health, 99(10), 1826–1832. 
Muñoz de Bustillo, R., Fernández-Macías, E., Antón J.-I., & Esteve, F. (2011). Measuring 
more than money. The social economics of job quality. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Murphy, G. C., & Athanasou, J. A. (1999). The effect of unemployment on mental health. 
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 72(1), 83–99. 
Nedelkoska, L., Neffke, F., & Wiederhold, S. (2015). Skill mismatch and the costs of job dis-
placement. Unpublished manuscript. 
Nickell, S. (1997).  Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3), 55–74. 
Nordenmark, M., & Strandh, M. (1999). Towards a sociological understanding of mental 
well-being among the unemployed. The role of economic and psychosocial factors. 
Sociology, 33(3), 577–597. 
101 
 
Norström, F., Virtanen, P., Hammarström, A., Gustafsson, P. E., & Janlert, U. (2014). How 
does unemployment affect self-assessed health? A systematic review focusing on sub-
group effects. BMC Public Health, 14, 1310. 
O’Campo, P., Molnar, A., Ng, E., Renahy, E., Mitchell, C., Shankardass, K., St John, A., 
Bambra, C., & Muntaner, C. (2015). Social welfare matters. A realist review of when, 
how, and why unemployment insurance impacts poverty and health. Social Science & 
Medicine, 132, 88–94. 
OECD (2002). Chapter 3: Taking the measure of temporary employment. In OECD employ-
ment outlook (pp. 127–185). Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2010). Chapter 4: How good is part-time work? In OECD employment outlook (pp. 
211–266). Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2013). Chapter 4: Back to work: Re-employment, earnings and skill use after job dis-
placement. In OECD employment outlook (pp.191–233). Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2017). Chapter 3: How technology and globalization are transforming the labour 
market. In OECD employment outlook (pp.81–124). Paris: OECD. 
OECD/European Union (2017). Chapter 7: Is self-employment quality work? In The missing 
entrepreneurs 2017: Policies for inclusive entrepreneurship (pp. 107–141). Paris: 
OECD. 
Oesch, D. (2013). Occupational change in Europe. How technology and trade transform the 
job structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Oesch, D., & Baumann, I. (2015). Smooth transition or permanent exit? Evidence on job pro-
spects of displaced industrial workers. Socio-Economic Review, 13(1), 101–123. 
Oesch, D., & Lipps, O. (2013). Does unemployment hurt less if there is more of it around? A 
panel analysis of life satisfaction in Germany and Switzerland. European Sociological 
Review, 29(5), 955–967. 
Paul, K. I., & Moser, K. (2009). Unemployment impairs mental health: Meta-analyses. Jour-
nal of Vocational Behavior, 74(3), 264–282. 
Pearlin, L. I., Lieberman, M. A., Menaghan, E. G., & Mullan, J. T. (1981). The stress process. 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 22(4), 337–356. 
Pearl, J. (2009). Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Picchio, M. (2008). Temporary contracts and transitions to stable jobs in Italy. Labour, 22(1), 
147–174. 
Pollmann-Schult, M., & Büchel, F. (2004a). Career prospects of overeducated workers in 
West Germany. European Sociological Review, 20(4), 321–331. 
Pollmann-Schult, M., & Büchel, F. (2004b). Wege aus Arbeitslosigkeit in ausbildungsadäqua-
te Erwerbstätigkeit: Kann unterwertige Beschäftigung eine Brückenfunktion einneh-
men? In S. Hillmert, & K. U. Mayer (Eds.) Geboren 1964 und 1971. Neuere Untersu-
chungen zu Ausbildungs- und Berufschancen in Westdeutschland (pp. 155–171). 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für  Sozialwissenschaften. 
Pollmann-Schult, M. , & Büchel, F. (2005). Unemployment benefits, unemployment duration 
and subsequent job quality: Evidence from West Germany. Acta Sociologica, 48(1), 
21–39. 
Roelfs, D. J., Shor, E., Davidson, K. W., & Schwartz, J. E. (2011). Losing life and livelihood: 
A systematic review and meta-analysis of unemployment and all-cause mortality. 
Social Science & Medicine, 72, 840–854. 
Rogge, B. G. (2013). Wie uns Arbeitslosigkeit unter die Haut geht: Identitätsprozess und psy-
chische Gesundheit bei Statuswechseln. Konstanz, München: UVK Verlagsgesell-
schaft. 
102 
 
Rubin, D.B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandom-
ized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66(5), 688–701. 
Ruhm, C. (1991). Are workers permanently scarred by job displacements? American Econom-
ic Review, 81(1), 319–324. 
Scherer, S. (2004). Stepping-stones or traps? The consequences of labour market entry posi-
tions on future careers in West Germany, Great Britain and Italy. Work, Employment 
and Society, 18(2), 369–394. 
Schmidt-Catran, A. W., & Fairbrother, M. (2016). The random effects in multilevel models: 
Getting them wrong and getting them right. European Sociological Review, 32(1), 23–
28. 
Schmieder, J. F., von Wachter, T., & Bender, S. (2010). The long-term impact of job dis-
placement in Germany during the 1982 recession on earnings, income, and employ-
ment, IAB Discussion Papers No. 1/2010. Nuremberg: Institute for Employment Re-
search. 
Schröder, M. (2013). Jobless now, sick later? Investigating the long-term consequences of 
involuntary job loss on health. Advances in Life Course Research, 18(1), 5–15. 
Schwerdt, G. (2011). Labor turnover before plant closure: Leaving the sinking ship vs. captain 
throwing ballast overboard. Labour Economics, 18(1), 93–101. 
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D. , & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-
experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Cengage Learning. 
Shamir, B. (1986). Unemployment and household division of labor. Journal of Marriage and 
the Family, 48(1), 195–206. 
Sianesi B. (2004). An evaluation of the Swedish system of active labor market programs in 
the 1990s. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), 133–155. 
Sicherman, N., & Galor, O. (1990). A theory of career mobility. Journal of Political Econo-
my, 98(1), 169–192. 
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 296–332. 
Stephens, M., Jr. (2002).Worker displacement and the added worker effect. Journal of Labor 
Economics, 20(3), 504–537.  
Stevens, A. H. (1997). Persistent effects of job displacement: the importance of multiple job 
losses. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1), 165–188. 
Strandh, M., Nilsson, K., Nordlund, M., Hammarström, A. (2015). Do open youth unem-
ployment and youth programs leave the same mental health scars?: Evidence from a 
Swedish 27–year cohort study. BMC Public Health, 15: 1151. 
Strandh, M., Winefield, A. H., Nilsson, K., & Hammarström, A. (2014). Unemployment and 
mental health scarring during the life course. European Journal of Public Health, 
24(2), 440–445. 
Strauß, S., & Hillmert, S. (2011). Einkommenseinbußen durch Arbeitslosigkeit in Deutsch-
land. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 63(4), 567-594. 
Ström, S. (2002). Unemployment and gendered divisions of domestic labor. Acta Sociologica, 
45(2), 89–106. 
Ström, S. (2003). Unemployment and families: A review of research. Social Service Review, 
77(3), 399–430.  
Strully, K. W. (2009). Job loss and health in the U.S. labor market. Demography, 46(2), 221–
246. 
Tatsiramos, K. (2010). Job displacement and the transitions to re-employment and early re-
tirement for non-employed older workers. European Economic Review, 54(4), 517–
535. 
103 
 
Treiman, D. J. (1977). Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Aca-
demic Press. 
Upward, R., & Wright, P. W. (2017). Don’t look down: New evidence on job loss in a flexi-
ble labour market, Economica. Advance online publication. doi: https://doi.org/10.111 
1/ecca. 12254. 
Van der Lippe, T., Treas, J., &, Norbutas, L. (2018). Unemployment and the division of 
housework in Europe. Work, Employment and Society, 32(4), 650-669. 
Von Greiff, J. (2009). Displacement and self-employment entry. Labour Economics, 16(5), 
556–565. 
Von Wachter, T. (2010). Summary of the literature on job displacement in the US and EU: 
What we know and what we would like to know. In D. Marsden,, & F. Rycx (Eds.), 
Wage structures, employment adjustments and globalization: Evidence from linked 
and firm-level panel data (pp. 64–121), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Voßemer, J., & Eunicke, N. (2015). The impact of labor market exclusion and job insecurity 
on health and well-being among youth : A literature review. EXCEPT Working Papers 
No 2. Tallinn: Tallinn University. 
Voßemer, J., Gebel, M., Täht, K., Unt, M., Högberg, B., & Strandh, M. (2018). The effects of 
unemployment and insecure jobs on well-being and health: the moderating role of la-
bor market policies. Social Indicators Research, 138(3), 1229–1257. 
Wadsworth, M., Montgomery, S., & Bartley, M. J. (1999). The persisting effect of unem-
ployment on health and social well-being in men early in working life. Social Science 
& Medicine, 48(10), 1491–1499. 
Wagner, G. G., Frick, J. R., & Schupp, J. (2007). The German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP): Scope, evolution and enhancements. Schmollers Jahrbuch, 127(1), 139–170. 
Wanberg, C. R. (2012). The individual experience of unemployment. Annual Review of Psy-
chology, 63, 369–396. 
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. Gender & Society, 1(2), 125–151. 
Wheaton, B. (1990). Life transitions, role histories, and mental health. American Sociological 
Review, 55(2), 209–223. 
Winkelmann, L., & Winkelmann, R. (1998). Why are the unemployed so unhappy? Evidence 
from panel data. Economica, 65(257), 1–15. 
Wolff, P., Montaigne, F., & González, G. R. (2010). Investing in statistics: EU-SILC. In A. B. 
Atkinson, & E. Marlier (Eds.) Income and living conditions in Europe (pp. 37–55). 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
Wulfgramm, M. (2014). Life satisfaction effects of unemployment in Europe. The moderating 
influence of labour market policy. Journal of European Social Policy, 24(3), 258–272. 
Young, C. (2012). Losing a job: The nonpecuniary cost of unemployment in the United 
States. Social Forces, 91(2), 609–634. 
  
104 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 1 
 
Losing standard employment in Germany:  
The consequences of displacement and dismissal for workers’ subsequent careers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Status: Submitted to Research in Social Stratification and Mobility. 
Acknowledgements: The author thanks Michael Gebel, Jonathan Latner, Paul Löwe, and Peter Valet for their 
insightful comments and helpful suggestions. The data were kindly provided by the German Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (DIW), Berlin, Germany.  
106 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the effects of job loss on workers’ subsequent careers in Germany. To 
provide a systematic and comprehensive picture, I distinguish between displacement due to 
plant closure and dismissal, and analyze the effects on workers’ subsequent labor market sta-
tuses, labor incomes, and non-standard employment risks. The results show that both events 
have lasting negative effects. Five years after job loss, displaced and dismissed workers have 
12 and 15 percentage point lower employment chances respectively. Although this is mostly 
explained by higher unemployment risks, more than third is due to displaced and dismissed 
workers leaving the labor force entirely, especially via (early) retirement. Moreover, I find 
large short-term total labor income losses which are mainly explained by lower employment 
chances and reduced working hours, but falls in hourly wages become relatively more im-
portant as time passes. Five years after job loss, the negative effects on hourly wages still 
amount to 6 percent for displaced workers and 8 percent for workers who were dismissed. 
With respect to non-standard employment, I show that both displacement and dismissal in-
crease the risks of self-employment, part-time employment, and temporary employment with 
only the latter being transitional in nature.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades, globalization, international trade, and technological change have 
increased job insecurity for workers in modern market economies (Mills et al., 2006). They 
are at greater risk of job loss, because firms increasingly adjust to these trends by closing, 
downsizing, relocating, or restructuring (Brand, 2006).1 They also often have to accept non-
standard re-employment, as in many countries, governments have deregulated employment 
protection laws and reduced unemployment benefits to increase labor market flexibility (Hipp 
et al., 2015). 
Although the process of job creation and destruction is an important source of productivity 
growth, it creates significant adjustment costs. For example, it is well-established that job loss 
has large and persistent negative effects on workers’ economic and overall well-being (see 
Brand, 2015; von Wachter, 2010). Studies have also shown that the risk and consequences of 
job loss are socially stratified (e.g., Ehlert, 2016), implying that it is a key mobility mecha-
nism through which workers’ career experiences are divided over time (Brand, 2006; DiPrete 
& Eirich, 2006). 
Despite extensive research documenting the negative effects of job loss on employment, earn-
ings, and wages (e.g., Ehlert, 2013; Gangl, 2006; Ruhm, 1991), previous studies have usually 
looked at these outcomes in isolation or ignored important consequences altogether. Further, 
the use of different data, definitions of job loss, and methods makes it difficult to compare the 
results for different outcomes across studies (Kuhn, 2002; von Wachter, 2010). To deal with 
these issues, I provide a unified analysis that offers a systematic and comprehensive picture of 
the consequences of job loss (Oesch & Baumann, 2015; Upward & Wright, 2017). Specifical-
ly, I address the following research questions: What are the short- and long-term consequenc-
es of displacement due to plant closure as well as dismissal for workers’ subsequent labor 
market statuses, labor incomes, and non-standard employment risks? The need for a unified 
analysis is also highlighted by four specific aspects that so far have received limited attention. 
First, in the analyses of workers’ subsequent labor market statuses, I differentiate non-
employment into unemployment, education or training, retirement, and inactivity. Earlier 
studies have often only examined the level of non-employment, ignoring that some forms 
(e.g., inactivity) usually raise greater concerns among policy makers than others (e.g., educa-
                                                     
1 In the German labor market, every year more than ten percent of workers separate from their current job and 
about one out of three of these are displaced due to plant closure or dismissed. 
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tion or training) (OECD, 2013). Second, I link the literature on the total labor income losses 
(e.g., Ehlert, 2013; OECD, 2013) to studies on so-called earnings or wage scars (e.g., Gangl, 
2006; Ruhm, 1991) by separating the former into three different sources: the loss of employ-
ment, lower working hours, and lower hourly wages. So far, such decompositions have only 
been reported for the flexible US and UK labor markets. I provide first analyses for the con-
servative welfare state of Germany which represents an interesting contrasting case. Third, as 
pay only partly reflects job quality, I follow the few studies that have examined a broader 
range of job characteristics (e.g., Brand, 2006; Farber, 1999) and provide first evidence for 
Germany on workers’ use of self-employment, part-time employment, and temporary em-
ployment in finding a new job. I extend previous research by simultaneously looking at dif-
ferent types of non-standard employment and examine to which extent these are transitory or 
lasting. Fourth, previous studies have often grouped displacements due to plant closures with 
dismissals and sometimes even voluntary job separations.2 This is unfortunate as plant clo-
sures offer a quasi-experimental strategy to estimate the effects of job loss (Brand, 2015). In 
contrast, for dismissals it is unclear whether or not they should be considered displacements 
as they may be due to layoffs but also can follow from workers being fired for individual rea-
sons. Therefore, I examine both events separately and assess empirically to which extent they 
differ in their consequences. 
The analyses are based on survey data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). In contrast to 
most administrative data, it provides detailed information on workers’ labor market statuses, 
labor incomes, working hours, and non-standard employment allowing investigating a wide 
range of outcomes.3 Moreover, the SOEP allows considering the reasons for job separations. 
It is also one of the longest running household panel studies, making it possible to follow 
workers for two years before and five years after job loss. This sheds light on the question 
whether the effects are “temporary blemishes” or “lasting scars” (Ruhm, 1991). In the anal-
yses, I focus on workers who are in standard employment before displacement or dismissal 
such that findings of increased subsequent non-standard employment are not simply explained 
by voluntary labor supply decisions. Methodologically, I combine propensity score matching, 
                                                     
2 Many studies define job loss as transitions from employment to unemployment. This ignores that job loss does 
not have to result in unemployment as well as mixes involuntary and voluntary job separations. As Brand (2015, 
p. 360) states “job loss is as discrete event, whereas unemployment is a state, with a great deal of heterogeneity 
with respect to instigation and duration.”  
3 For example, administrative data usually lack information on labor market statuses other than dependent em-
ployment and registered unemployment as well as on working hours and non-standard employment. 
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to find comparable workers who did not experience job loss, with fixed-effects regression 
models to additionally remove any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. 
The analyses show three important findings: First, displacement and dismissal have persistent 
negative effects on employment chances. The main source of this is higher unemployment 
risks, but more than a third of the long-term effect is due to workers who have left the labor 
force entirely, especially via (early) retirement. This must be interpreted in light of Germany’s 
traditional support of early retirement through a combination of extended unemployment ben-
efits and generous early retirement schemes. Therefore, for many older workers early retire-
ment represented an “attractive” alternative to long-term unemployment and a pathway out of 
the labor market. However, over the last two decades, these exit routes have been gradually 
closed such that the negative consequences of job loss for older workers have likely increased 
(Buchholz et al., 2013). Second, in contrast to recent findings for the US and UK, I show that 
in Germany the lasting total labor income losses are mostly explained by declines in employ-
ment and working hours instead of lower hourly wages. This integrates the seemingly dispar-
ate findings that total income losses are greater in conservative welfare states (Ehlert, 2013) 
but earnings and wage scars are more pronounced in liberal regimes (Gangl, 2006). Third, 
concerning non-standard employment, both displaced and dismissed workers are found to 
have consistently higher risk of self-employment, part-time employment, and temporary em-
ployment. More importantly, only temporary employment appears to be transitory in nature 
suggesting that for many workers non-standard re-employment is not a bridge into regular 
jobs. 
2. Literature review and theoretical mechanisms 
Sections 2.1 to 2.3 provide reviews of previous studies for each of the outcomes of interest 
and highlight some limitations that will be addressed in this study. To provide some theoreti-
cal background, section 2.4 summarizes the main mechanisms explaining why displacement 
and dismissal should have negative effects on workers’ subsequent careers. 
2.1 The effects of job loss on labor market status 
Earlier studies show that displacement and dismissal have substantial negative effects on em-
ployment chances (Brand, 2015; Fallick, 1996). Some studies find that higher unemployment 
risks fade away after about five years (e.g., Ruhm, 1991, Upward & Wright, 2017), but other 
research suggests more lasting consequences (e.g., Schmieder et al., 2010). It is generally 
known that durations of joblessness vary greatly (Fallick, 1996). Non-employment lasts long-
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er during recessions (e.g., Farber, 2017) or if the economic situation in workers’ former indus-
tries or occupations is poor. Comparative studies highlight the importance of labor market and 
welfare state policies (e.g., DiPrete, 2002; Ehlert 2016; Gangl, 2004). In flexible labor mar-
kets with low out-of-work benefits workers find new jobs quicker, partly because they cannot 
afford a lengthy search. Moreover, layoffs lead to longer unemployment than displacements 
due to plant closures, as they are supposed to send a negative signal about the workers (e.g., 
Gibbons & Katz, 1991). 
However, previous studies have strongly focused on the level of non-employment (Fallick, 
1996), ignoring policy makers’ interest in its composition (OECD, 2013). Workers updating 
their skills (i.e., education or training) or actively looking for a job (i.e., unemployed) likely 
have a stronger labor market attachment than inactive persons. Re-employment of the regis-
tered unemployed can also be supported by active labor market policies. In contrast, govern-
ments have little influence over discouraged workers who have left the labor force and are 
less likely to return (i.e., inactive). Retirement may or may not be considered problematic 
dependent on whether governments support early retirement to relieve the labor market in 
times of high unemployment (Buchholz et al., 2013). Recent research also attests to the im-
portance of examining different forms of non-employment showing that workers leaving the 
labor force explains as much as unemployment of the overall non-employment effect (Oesch 
& Baumann, 2015; Upward & Wright, 2017). I add to these studies by looking at different 
reasons for job loss and examine how the effects on different forms of non-employment de-
velop over time. 
2.2 The effects of job loss on labor income 
Displacement and dismissal have also been shown to cause large earnings losses (Brand, 
2015; von Wachter, 2010), but estimates of the immediate (5 to 60 percent) and persistent 
effects (0 to 30 percent) vary greatly (e.g., Couch & Placzek, 2010; Ehlert, 2013; Gangl, 
2006; Jacobsen et al., 1993; OECD, 2013; Ruhm, 1991). This is partly due to differences in 
worker and context-level characteristics. Earnings losses are cyclical (e.g., Farber, 2017) and 
larger for laid-off than displaced workers (e.g., Gibbons & Katz, 1991). Higher tenure and 
industrial or occupational mobility also result in larger negative effects, pointing to the loss of 
rewards to specific skills. However, methodological differences are another source of varia-
tion (Kuhn, 2002; von Wachter, 2010). Some studies include zero income during non-
employment in their measurement of earnings, because non-employment contributes to the 
full costs of job loss (e.g., Ehlert, 2013; OECD, 2013). Other research has restricted their 
111 
 
samples to workers with some positive earnings, to focus on losses due to lower working 
hours and hourly wages (e.g., Couch & Placzek, 2010; Jacobsen et al. 1993). Moreover, esti-
mated earnings losses increase with the length of the reference period for the reported labor 
incomes (OECD, 2013) as studies examining annual or quarterly earnings are affected to a 
greater extent by non-employment, even if they use some kind of positive earnings re-
strictions (Kuhn, 2002). 
Despite the fact that differences in the earnings and wage measurements used make compari-
sons across studies difficult, decompositions of the total labor income losses into its effects 
via non-employment, lower working hours, and lower hourly wages have rarely been report-
ed. A recent exception is the study by Upward and Wright (2017) showing that in the UK the 
short-term total labor income losses are mostly due to higher non-employment, but that in the 
long-run falls in income are mainly driven by lower hourly wages than reduced hours of 
work. Lachowska et al. (2018) find for the US that at the time of the mass-layoff, non-
employment and fewer working hours account for 80 percent of the total losses, while five 
years later lower wage rates are the main source. The current study adds to this research by 
decomposing the total labor income losses after displacement and dismissal in Germany. This 
not only sheds light on the unanswered question how much of the earnings losses are due to 
lower working hours instead of hourly wages, but also helps integrating findings from com-
parative research that show that total income losses are larger in conservative welfare states 
(e.g., Ehlert, 2013), but that conditional on employment earnings and wage scars are stronger 
in liberal regimes (e.g., Gangl, 2006). 
2.3 The effects of job loss on non-standard employment  
Non-standard employment has strongly increased over the last three decades (Hipp et al., 
2015). Although some have argued that it promotes the labor market re-integration of the un-
employed, it also has been questioned in terms of its job quality (e.g., OECD, 2002, 2010; 
OECD/European Union, 2017).4 Despite the fact that alternative work arrangements are im-
portant re-employment routes, they rarely have been investigated as consequences of dis-
placement or dismissal. To date Farber (1999) offers the only encompassing assessment of the 
effects of job loss on different forms of non-standard re-employment. Using US data, he finds 
                                                     
4 To take account of the heterogeneity of non-standard employment as well as the fact that concerns about job 
quality vary within its specific forms, too, I distinguish solo from other self-employment, marginal from regular 
part-time employment, and temporary agency jobs from fixed-term contracts in the sensitivity analyses. 
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that the risks of part-time and temporary employment increase substantially. While these ef-
fects are shown to level off with time since job loss, these findings are not established by fol-
lowing the same workers over time and in some analyses no control group is used. Some other 
studies have focused on specific forms only (Dieckhoff, 2011; Farber, 2017; Oesch & Bau-
mann, 2015; von Greiff, 2009). While they also find that job loss increases the risk of non-
standard employment, they often follow workers for a only short period of time or do not take 
into account the reason for job loss. However, similar to the employment and earnings effects, 
workers who have been laid off may face greater non-standard re-employment risks than 
those who have experienced plant closure. Moreover, a number of studies have examined 
non-standard re-employment’s role as a stepping stone towards regular employment (e.g., 
Gebel, 2013; Lietzmann et al. 2017). These studies emphasize that workers may not only react 
to financial constraints when taking up these jobs, but also consider that acquiring work expe-
rience, signaling their motivation, or searching on-the-job offers greater chances for adequate 
re-employment than a continued job search. If self-employment, part-time employment, and 
temporary employment act as stepping stones, the higher risks following displacement or 
dismissal should be transitory. I here follow workers for up to five years after job loss to pro-
vide some first empirical evidence for Germany. 
2.4 Theoretical mechanisms for the effects of job loss 
In this study I focus on estimating the effects of job loss on workers’ subsequent labor market 
statuses, labor incomes, and non-standard employment risks. However, to provide some theo-
retical background, I summarize the three mechanisms that have been put forward in the liter-
ature to explain the negative effects of job loss (e.g., Brand, 2006; Gangl, 2006). The first 
mechanism rests on the distinction between general and specific human capital (Becker, 
1993). Because the latter is not transferable across employers, displaced or dismissed workers 
lose rewards associated with their firm-specific skills. Comparable losses originate from 
workers changing industries or occupations in order to find a new job. Besides the loss of 
these rewards, non-employment due to job loss may also lead to the depreciation of general 
skills, further decreasing workers’ employability. 
Signaling theories present a second explanation, pointing to problems of asymmetric infor-
mation (Spence, 1973). If employers infer applicants’ unobserved productivity from their 
work biographies, job loss and the associated periods of non-employment represent a negative 
signal. Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue that the signal of job loss is more adverse for layoffs, 
because displacements due to plant closures do not carry information about workers’ perfor-
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mances. This further highlights the importance to empirically distinguish these events. A third 
explanation stresses the role of search constraints in matching workers to jobs. Although 
workers usually change jobs voluntarily to improve their labor market position, displacement 
or dismissal force them to find re-employment despite being “in a poor position to perform a 
quality job screening” (Brand, 2006, p. 294). Specifically, job search theories argue that 
workers’ reservation wages decrease over time, because benefits run out and private incomes 
are used up (Mortensen, 1986). 
Together these explanations imply that displaced and dismissed workers have difficulties to 
find new jobs that provide similar rewards to the one’s they lost, with more negative effects 
being expected for the latter. In the short-run this will lead to increased non-employment, 
partly because they will hold out for jobs befitting their skills and qualifications. Contingent 
on various factors, workers may react differently over time: Some will try to update their 
skills, while others may leave the labor force entirely. The majority of workers will, however, 
have to accept jobs of lower quality implying financial losses and increased risks of non-
standard employment. 
3. Data, measures, and methods 
3.1 Data 
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is an annual household panel survey that is designed to be 
nationally representative of the adult population living in private households in Germany 
(Wagner et al., 2007). It started in 1984 with approximately 12,000 persons living in 6,000 
households. In the latest wave, in 2015, about 27,000 persons and 16,000 households were 
interviewed. The SOEP interviews all household members aged 16 years and over and offers 
detailed data about job separations and their reasons, workers’ labor market statuses, labor 
incomes, and job characteristics as well as rich socio-demographic information. For the anal-
yses, I follow workers who are displaced due to plant closure or are dismissed (treatment 
groups) between the interviews 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 for up to three (𝑡𝑡 − 2) interviews before and five 
interviews (𝑡𝑡 + 5) after job loss. For each treated group, a control group of workers who do 
not experience job loss is defined since part of the negative effects may result from foregone 
upward mobility. I further restrict the sample to workers aged 20-60 years in 𝑡𝑡 and who are in 
standard employment (i.e. dependent full-time employment with a permanent contract) to 
focus on employees with stable careers. This also makes sure that findings of increased non-
standard employment risks after job loss are not simply due to voluntary labor supply deci-
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sions. Moreover, these restrictions further reduce heterogeneity. As information on displace-
ment due to plant closure or dismissal is only available since 1991, I use the data from the 
years 1988 to 2015. Applying these restrictions, the sample includes 116,417 person-spells 
from 21,515 persons, including 1,040 persons-spells with displacements due to plant closure 
and 2,641 with dismissals. 
3.2 Measures 
Table S1 in the supplementary material provides an overview about the measurements. The 
treatment groups displacement or dismissal between 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 are based on workers’ re-
ports about job separations and their reasons. Reported displacements are due to plant closure. 
For dismissals it remains unclear whether they are due to layoffs or workers being fired for 
individual reasons. While this cannot be distinguished, I go beyond most previous studies 
using the SOEP by explicitly separating displacements from dismissals. Workers who did not 
change their job are included in the control groups as are workers who resigned or had a mu-
tual agreement. Including these voluntary and other job separations allows for a more general 
counterfactual than only focusing on workers who remained with their employer (Upward & 
Wright, 2017). Some reasons are not considered, as they are not in line with the sample re-
strictions (e.g., expiry of fixed-term contract, end of vocational training, closure of own busi-
ness), indicate that workers leave the labor force (e.g., (early) retirement, leave of absence), or 
are ambiguous (e.g., other). 
Three groups of outcomes are measured at the time of the interview: labor market status, labor 
income, and non-standard employment. I distinguish five labor market statuses: employment, 
unemployment, education or training, retirement, and inactivity. The latter three are also 
grouped as out of labor force. Employment includes both dependent employment and self-
employment. In education and training is comprised of persons who are, in general, in voca-
tional, or in higher education as well as those in further education or occupational retraining. 
Inactivity includes all other non-employed persons. In the sensitivity analyses, the proportions 
of months in each labor market status since the last interview are also examined. 
The gross labor income in the last month excludes any extra income but includes overtime 
pay. The self-employed are asked to estimate their monthly income before tax. To decompose 
the total labor income losses into lower employment, working hours, and hourly wages three 
variables are used: Labor income including zero income for non-employment, labor income 
conditional on employment, and gross hourly wage conditional on employment. The latter is 
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calculated by using the average actual weekly working hours including overtime. All income 
variables are measured in Euros and deflated to 2011 prices using the consumer price index. 
Non-standard employment is defined as self-employment, part-time employment, and tempo-
rary employment. Self-employment includes farmers, freelance professionals and academics, 
other self-employed and family workers. In the sensitivity analyses, I distinguish the solo self-
employed from all other self-employed. Part-time employment is defined as having less than 
35 average actual working hours and in the sensitivity analyses marginal (0<hours<15) and 
regular part-time employment (15≤hours<35) are separated. Temporary employment is meas-
ured by having a fixed-term instead of a permanent contract. In the sensitivity analyses, tem-
porary agency employment, where the de-jure and de-facto employer are not the same, is ana-
lyzed, too. Both forms of temporary employment are conditional on dependent employment. 
To control for differences in observable characteristics between the treatment and control 
groups, I use several sets of control variables. These variables refer to the interview before 
job loss to avoid post-treatment bias and are selected theoretically assuming that they affect 
workers’ risk to experience displacement or dismissal as well as their future careers. They 
include demographics (age, sex, migration background), education, detailed measures of 
overall (full-time, part-time, unemployment experience) and recent (number of month in dif-
ferent labor market statuses in the year before the interview) employment history, job charac-
teristics (industry, firm size, occupation), firm tenure, household structure (partner or spouse, 
number of persons/children), health, region, and state unemployment rates. Specifically, de-
mographics and household structure likely affect employers’ firing and hiring as well as 
workers’ labor supply decisions. Health, region, and state level unemployment affect workers’ 
displacement or dismissal risks and represent important search constraints concerning their 
further career. Education, employment history, and firm tenure capture differences in human 
capital and indicate previous labor market attachment or performance. Industry, firm size, and 
the occupation are important structural determinants of the risk of job loss that will also affect 
workers’ subsequent career paths. 
3.3 Methods 
To analyze the effects of job loss, matching is combined with fixed-effects regression models 
and all analyses are performed separately for displacement and dismissal. In a first step, 
matched control groups are formed by combining exact and propensity score matching. In a 
second step, fixed-effects regression models are run on the matched samples to estimate the 
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effects of displacement or dismissal on those workers who have experienced the respective 
events. 
To ensure that workers who lose their job and those who do not face the same aggregate labor 
market conditions, exact matching on the year before job loss is used.5 For the remaining con-
trol variables, propensity score matching was performed with the propensity scores 𝑝𝑝(𝒙𝒙) es-
timated by logistic regression models of the respective treatment indicators on the vector of 
control variables 𝒙𝒙 (Tables S2-S3 in the supplementary material). Comparing different match-
ing algorithms, radius matching with calipers of 0.001 for displacement and 0.004 for dismis-
sal was used, because it provided the best results in the trade-off between bias, variance, and 
scope of the estimator (Gangl, 2015).6,7 Due to the exact matching on the year, common sup-
port is also checked in every year. For displacement only 12 of the 1,040 (1.2 percent) and for 
dismissals only 34 of the 2,641 persons-spells (2.8 percent) are off support. The matching was 
performed using the psmatch2 ado in Stata (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003). 
Based on the matched samples, which include treated and untreated workers with similar es-
timated propensity scores ?̂?𝑝(𝒙𝒙) and should, therefore, be balanced on 𝒙𝒙, fixed-effects regres-
sion models are run allowing to control for any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween the workers who lost their jobs and those who did not. The following model is fitted 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 +  � 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘5
𝑘𝑘=−1
+  � 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5
𝑘𝑘=−1
 
with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as the outcome for worker 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 as a worker fixed effect, 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 as a set of dum-
my variables indicating time relative to the reference year (𝑡𝑡 − 2), 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 as a time-constant 
treatment group indicator, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as the idiosyncratic errors. The coefficients  𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 measure the 
outcome trajectory in the control group relative to the reference year (𝑡𝑡 − 2) and the coeffi-
cients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 measure the difference in the outcome trajectories between the treated and controls, 
providing estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated. Standard errors are clus-
                                                     
5 Exact matching on the year also ensures that workers are not matched with themselves as different person-
spells of the same person may be part of the treatment group for one year and part of the control group in other 
years. 
6 The calipers are set to 10 percent of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity scores meaning that they 
are stricter than calipers that are usually employed in the literature (Gangl, 2015).  
7 King and Nielsen (2016) argue for the use of coarsened exact matching (CEM) over propensity score matching 
(PSM), as PSM may not necessarily decrease imbalances. I show below that PSM improves the balance from 
before to after matching in this study. Jann (2017) also suggests that King and Nielsen’s results rest on compar-
ing CEM to one-to-one nearest neighbor PSM without replacement. He argues that matching algorithms that do 
not throw away good matches such as radius matching are not affected by King and Nielsen’s main critique.   
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tered by workers. For binary outcomes 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (labor market statuses, non-standard employment), 
the above model is estimated as a fixed-effects linear probability model offering a clear inter-
pretation of the coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 as average discrete changes in the probability of the outcome 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Interpreting the 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 as effects of job loss requires the assumption that in 
the absence of displacement or dismissal the outcome trajectory of the treated would have 
remained parallel to the one of the untreated workers. While this assumption cannot be tested, 
zero effects of displacement or dismissal in the pre-treatment periods shown below indicate its 
plausibility. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive results 
To provide an overview about the sample, Table 1 reports the sample size, the number of in-
terviews, and some descriptive statistics separately for both treatment groups. The analyses 
are based on 1,040 persons-spells with displacement and 2,641 person-spells with dismissal 
and the median number of interviews is seven for both groups. The sample also holds infor-
mation on 112,736 person-spells who did not experience job loss and are used to form the 
matched control groups. Of the 1,040 workers that are displaced between 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1, about 
84 percent are re-employed in the five years after job loss. Among the 2,641 workers who are 
dismissed about 77 percent are re-employed. For workers who return into the labor market 
median durations until re-employment are the same for both treatment groups. Interestingly, a 
smaller share of workers are able to find standard re-employment, with only two third of those 
who are displaced and six out of ten workers of those who are dismissed. The latter also need 
longer to find standard re-employment. These results already point out that non-standard em-
ployment is likely to be an important route back into the labor market, an issue that is exam-
ined in more detail below. 
Table 1 Re-employment after displacement and dismissal 
 Displacement  Dismissal 
Percent/median  LQ, UQ  Percent/median LQ, UQ 
Re-employment? 83.5%   76.6%  
Years to re-employment  1 1, 2  1 1, 2 
Standard re-employment? 66.7%   59.0%  
Years to standard re-employment  1 1, 2  2 1, 3 
Number of interviews 7 6, 8  7 6, 8 
N (person-spells) 1,040  2,641 
N (persons) 987  2,225 
Notes: LQ: lower quartile. UQ: upper quartile. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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4.2 Propensity score matching 
The following discussion focuses on control variable balance before and after propensity 
score matching to assess the matching quality. To compare the balance, Table 2 reports the 
means of the respective treatment groups as well as of the unmatched and matched control 
groups. It also shows the corresponding standardized biases. The mean (median) standardized 
bias for displacement reduces from 13.7 (10.8) to 0.7 (0.5) percent from before to after match-
ing. For dismissal the respective changes are from 23.2 (21.5) to 0.8 (0.4) percent. Notably, 
the differences in observed characteristics before matching are much larger for dismissal than 
for displacement supporting the argument that plant closures represent a more exogenous rea-
son for job loss. However, the results also show that for both groups there are relevant differ-
ences between treated and untreated workers. That the matching has been successful is not 
only confirmed by the very low mean (median) standardized bias, but also by the fact that for 
each single control variable the standardized bias is below the threshold of five percent 
(Gangl, 2015). 
Table 2 highlights some further differences. Due to the exact matching on the year before job 
loss the standardized bias falls to zero after matching. Overall, the patterns for both treated 
groups are similar, although the differences to the control group are usually larger for dismis-
sal. Displaced and dismissed workers are younger, less often female, and more often have a 
migration background. They have lower education as well as less total and recent employment 
and more unemployment experience. They are more likely to work in the primary and con-
struction as well as trade industries but are less often employed in the bank and insurance as 
well as the services sector. They work in smaller firms, are more often blue-collar workers 
and less often white-collar workers or civil servants. Strong differences are also revealed for 
firm tenure indicating that low tenure increases the risk of job loss. Dismissed workers live 
less often with a spouse, while displaced workers have fewer children. Both treatment groups 
are less satisfied with their health and more often live in East-Germany, pointing to relevant 
regional differences. This is further confirmed by higher state unemployment rates for dis-
placement and, in particular, dismissal. 
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Table 2 Balance of the control variables before and after matching separated for displacement and dismissal 
 Displacement  Dismissal 
 Treated Controls  Treated Controls 
  Before After   Before After 
 Mean Mean  SB Mean  SB  Mean Mean  SB Mean  SB 
Year before job loss 2001.49 2003.40 -28.4 2001.49 0.0  2001.85 2003.40 -23.3 2001.85 0.0 
Age 41.06 41.78 -7.3 41.00 0.6  39.19 41.78 -24.9 38.99 1.8 
Female 0.31 0.33 -5.0 0.31 -0.2  0.30 0.33 -6.3 0.31 -1.2 
Migration background 0.25 0.21 8.3 0.25 -0.8  0.25 0.21 9.1 0.25 -0.3 
Education: Less than lower secondary  0.41 0.34 14.9 0.42 -1.8  0.44 0.34 20.6 0.44 0.2 
  Intermediate or higher secondary  0.43 0.42 1.8 0.42 1.8  0.44 0.42 5.0 0.44 0.1 
  Tertiary  0.17 0.25 -20.1 0.17 0.0  0.12 0.25 -32.5 0.12 -0.4 
Total experience: Full-time employment 17.94 18.34 -3.8 17.95 -0.1  16.05 18.34 -21.3 15.90 1.3 
  Part-time employment 1.03 1.07 -1.4 0.99 1.3  0.92 1.07 -5.0 0.93 -0.4 
  Unemployment 0.52 0.37 13.3 0.49 1.8  0.93 0.37 39.7 0.88 3.0 
Recent experience: Full-time employment 11.16 11.29 -4.9 11.16 0.1  10.55 11.29 -25.9 10.63 -2.6 
  Part-time employment 0.37 0.42 -2.4 0.35 0.8  0.34 0.42 -3.7 0.34 0.2 
  Unemployment 0.26 0.10 16.2 0.26 0.0  0.67 0.10 38.5 0.59 4.0 
  Education or training  0.12 0.12 -0.6 0.13 -0.9  0.28 0.12 12.5 0.28 -0.6 
  Inactivity 0.08 0.07 2.3 0.09 -1.8  0.16 0.07 10.5 0.15 1.0 
Industry: Primary & construction 0.26 0.18 19.6 0.27 -0.8  0.31 0.18 31.2 0.31 1.3 
  Manufacturing & energy 0.31 0.26 9.5 0.30 1.2  0.25 0.26 -2.2 0.25 -0.1 
  Trade 0.18 0.11 21.2 0.18 0.3  0.18 0.11 18.7 0.18 -0.8 
  Transport 0.07 0.06 5.6 0.07 1.5  0.05 0.06 -2.2 0.05 0.3 
  Bank & insurance 0.02 0.05 -16.0 0.02 -1.2  0.01 0.05 -21.2 0.01 -0.3 
  Services 0.15 0.34 -43.7 0.16 -1.4  0.19 0.34 -33.9 0.19 -0.7 
Firm size: Less than 20 employees 0.33 0.17 35.7 0.33 0.1  0.42 0.17 55.5 0.42 0.6 
  20 to less than 200 employees 0.34 0.29 10.5 0.34 -0.2  0.34 0.29 9.2 0.34 -0.1 
  200 to less than 2000 employees 0.16 0.26 -22.6 0.16 0.1  0.16 0.26 -25.2 0.16 -0.5 
  2000 or more employees 0.17 0.28 -26.6 0.17 0.1  0.09 0.28 -49.5 0.09 -0.1 
Occupation: Blue-collar worker 0.49 0.35 28.8 0.50 -0.5  0.58 0.35 46.0 0.57 0.2 
  White-collar worker 0.49 0.57 -16.7 0.48 1.1  0.42 0.57 -30.6 0.42 0.2 
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Table 2 continued 
  Civil servant 0.02 0.07 -28.1 0.02 -2.3  0.00 0.07 -38.2 0.00 -3.9 
Firm tenure 9.51 11.94 -25.6 9.39 1.2  5.62 11.94 -72.7 5.62 0.0 
Partner in household: No Partner 0.21 0.22 -2.1 0.21 0.2  0.27 0.22 11.1 0.26 1.0 
  Partner 0.14 0.12 5.5 0.13 1.9  0.16 0.12 12.7 0.16 0.0 
  Spouse 0.65 0.66 -2.1 0.66 -1.5  0.57 0.66 -18.9 0.57 -0.8 
Number of persons 2.96 2.98 -1.1 2.98 -1.0  2.96 2.98 -1.2 2.96 0.0 
Number of children 0.50 0.56 -7.9 0.49 0.3  0.57 0.56 0.9 0.57 0.5 
Health satisfaction 6.82 7.03 -10.7 6.82 -0.3  6.73 7.03 -14.9 6.75 -1.3 
Region: North Germany 0.11 0.13 -4.0 0.11 0.0  0.11 0.13 -5.5 0.11 -0.3 
  East Germany 0.34 0.26 18.4 0.34 0.0  0.42 0.26 35.6 0.42 -0.1 
  South Germany 0.30 0.36 -11.5 0.30 -0.4  0.26 0.36 -21.5 0.26 0.2 
  West Germany 0.24 0.26 -3.9 0.24 0.3  0.21 0.26 -11.7 0.21 0.2 
State unemployment rate 11.25 10.24 22.1 11.23 0.4  12.08 10.24 39.0 12.18 -1.8 
Notes: Means for the treated on-support are reported. SB: standardized bias. See Table S1 for details on the measurement of the variables. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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4.3 Effects of displacement and dismissal 
The results of the fixed-effects regression models based on the matched samples are illustrat-
ed in Figures 1 and 2. Specifically, I plot the coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 for the interaction between the 
time variable and the time-constant treatment group indicator, because these represent the 
estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated. The full regression tables are pre-
sented in the supplementary materials (Tables S4-S13). To help readers relating the figures 
and tables, I have bold-printed or highlighted some exemplary coefficients in the tables. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of displacement (solid black line) and dismissal (dashed grey 
line) on workers’ subsequent labor market statuses along with 95 percent confidence inter-
vals. Panel (a) shows large short-term negative employment effects. A year after job loss they 
amount to about 41.1 (=-0.411*100, coefficient in bold, Table S4) and 56.3 (=-0.563*100, 
coefficient in bold, Table S6) percentage points for displacement and dismissal respectively. 
Five years after job loss they remain at 12.2 and 15.0 percentage points, suggesting that many 
workers face difficulties in finding stable re-employment or have stopped searching. From 
panel (b) and (c) it can be seen that in the short-run these non-employment effects are mainly 
due to higher unemployment risks, but in the long-run workers leaving the labor force rela-
tively gains in importance. In the first year after displacement about 91 percent 
(=[0.374/0.411]*100, dark-grey shaded coefficients, Table S4) of the negative employment 
effect is due to unemployment, with the remaining 9 percent being explained by workers out 
of labor force. In the fifth year after displacement, 29 percent (=[0.035/0.122]*100, light-grey 
shaded coefficients, Table S4) of the employment effect is explained by workers leaving the 
labor force. Similar estimates are shown for dismissal with even 41 percent 
(=[0.061/0.150]*100, light-grey shaded coefficients in Table S6) of the negative long-run 
employment effect being due to workers not searching for a job. 
While panel (c) combined the different out of labor force states, panels (d) to (e) show the 
disaggregated effects for education or training, retirement, and inactivity. The positive total 
out of labor force effects are in the short-run not driven by any of these single activities. For 
example, two years after displacement, workers are more likely to be in education or training 
(2.3 percentage points, =0.023*100), retirement (0.9 percentage points, =0.009*100), and 
inactivity (1.3 percentage points, =0.013*100) adding up to about 4.5 percentage points (coef-
ficients in bold, Table S5). In the first years after dismissal similar effects are revealed (Table 
S7). However, as time passes, both treatment groups increasingly make use of retirement.  
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Figure 1 Effects of displacement and dismissal on labor market status (change in probability) 
  
  
  
Notes: Matched samples. Fixed-effects estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals based on clustered stand-
ard errors for the effects of displacement (solid black lines) and dismissal (dashed grey lines). See Tables S4-S7 
for the full regression models. The plotted effects are the respective interaction coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘. Out of labor force 
(c) combines panels (d) Education or training, (e) Retirement, and (f) Inactivity. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations.  
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Education or training represents only a short-term response to job loss with the largest but 
overall rather small positive effects observed two years after the event. The long-run effects 
for inactivity are somewhat more pronounced for dismissal. Overall, these findings confirm 
the idea of persistent negative employment effects. However, they go beyond previous studies 
in illustrating that although non-employment is mostly due to unemployment, workers also 
exit the labor market via other routes, especially (early) retirement. Given the higher short-
term unemployment risks associated with dismissal, this article suggest that dismissed work-
ers indeed take longer to find re-employment (Gibbons & Katz, 1991), although, the differ-
ences become smaller over time. 
Figure 2 shows the results for the two other outcome groups of interest: labor income (panels 
(a) to (c)) and non-standard employment (panels (d) to (e)). For the analyses of labor income, 
I estimate the effects of displacement and dismissal on three different measures, to decompose 
the total labor income losses into three sources: lower employment, lower working hours, and 
lower hourly wages.8 Because panel (a) includes zero income to measure the total labor in-
come losses, the dependent variable is unlogged. In panels (b) and (c) logged dependent vari-
ables are used. Before comparing the effects across the measures to assess the importance of 
lower employment, working hours, and hourly wages, each measure of labor income is first 
discussed separately. 
Looking at the total labor income including zero for non-employment (panel (a)), large short-
term losses are revealed. In the year after job loss, total labor income falls by 1,053 Euro for 
displacement and 1,346 Euro for dismissal (coefficients in bold, Tables S8, S10). This 
amounts to losses of about 40 and 61 percent in terms of each treatment groups’ average in-
comes in the year before job loss.9 As time passes, these falls in income are reduced to 407 
Euro (15 percent) and 514 Euro (23 percent) five years after displacement and dismissal re-
spectively. These income losses may be due to changes compared with workers’ situation 
before job loss or because workers miss out on income growth they would have experienced 
in the absence of job loss. This illustrates the importance of a control group allowing estimat-
ing the trend in labor incomes in the absence of job loss. These estimates are not shown in 
Figure 2, but are given by the coefficients 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 for the time variable 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 (Tables S8, S10). Espe-
                                                     
8 The analyses rest on labor incomes from workers in dependent as well as self-employment. Excluding all per-
son-spells with at least one person-year in self-employment does not change the results substantially. 
9 The average incomes of displaced and dismissed workers in the year before job loss are 2,646 and 2,223 Euro. 
The percentage losses in the year after job loss are 40 (=[1,053/2,646]*100) and 61 percent (=[1,346/2,223] 
*100). 
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cially for dismissal the control group trend is positive, suggesting that some part of the total 
losses can be explained by foregone upward mobility. 
Panels (b) and (c) in Figure 2 present the results for labor income last month as well as hourly 
wages conditional on employment. For the former the negative effects of displacement are 
relatively stable with 6.9 percent (=[exp(0.067)-1)]*100) in the first and 7.1 percent 
(=exp(0.069)-1) in the fifth year after job loss (coefficients in bold, Table S8). For dismissals, 
the estimates are larger ranging between 16.4 percent (year 1, =[exp(0.152)-1)]*100)) to 14.0 
percent (year 5, =[exp(0.131)-1)]*100)) (coefficients in bold, Table S10). Looking at the 
growth of the monthly labor income in the respective control groups (Tables S8, S10) it be-
comes clear that for both events the majority of the negative effects are due to workers miss-
ing out on income growth they would have experienced in the absence of job loss. Consider-
ing hourly wages (panel (c)), losses ranging between 5.8 (year 1, =[exp(0.056)-1)]*100) and 
6.3 percent (year 5, =[exp(0.061)-1)]*100) are found for displacement (coefficients in bold, 
Table S8). For dismissal the negative effects on hourly wages amount to 8.9 percent 
(=[exp(0.085)-1)]*100) in the year after the event and 8.0 percent (=[exp(0.077)-1)]*100) in 
the long-run (coefficients in bold, Table S10). For both events the hourly wage scars are most-
ly explained by the wage growth workers missed out on. 
I now turn the question to what extent the total labor income losses are due to the loss of em-
ployment, lower working hours, and lower hourly wages. To make the results comparable to 
previous studies, I first compare panels (a) to (c) to examine the extent to which the total loss-
es are due to non-employment and lower working hours as opposed to lower hourly wages. 
For displacement the total labor income losses amount to 40 percent, but hourly wages are 
reduced by only 5.8 percent. This means that about 86 percent (=1-(5.8/40.0)) of the total la-
bor income losses can be attributed to non-employment or lower working hours, with the re-
maining 14 percent being due to lower hourly wages. For dismissal about 85 percent (=1-
(8.9/61.0)) of the negative effects are due to lower employment or working hours. In the long-
run hourly wage losses become more important, but the percentage of total labor income loss-
es that is attributed to non-employment or lower working hours remains at 58 percent for dis-
placements and 65 percent for dismissals. In contrast to findings for the US and UK (Lachow-
ska et al., 2018; Upward & Wright, 2017), higher non-employment or lower working hours 
are more important in explaining the long-run negative effects of displacement and dismissal 
in Germany.  
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Figure 2 Effects of displacement and dismissal on labor income last month (a-c) (change in 
level or logs) and non-standard employment (d-f) (change in probability) 
  
  
  
Notes: Matched samples. Fixed-effects estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals based on clustered stand-
ard errors for the effects of displacement (solid black lines) and dismissal (dashed grey line). See Tables S8, S10, 
S12, and S13 for the full regression results. The plotted effects are the respective interaction coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘. 
Effects for panel (a) are measured in Euro deflated to 2011 prices and effects for panels (b) and (c) are in log 
labor income and log hourly wages. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations.  
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However, these comparisons still do not assess the relative importance of lower working 
hours conditional on employment. Contrasting panels (b) and (c), it can be seen that losses in 
monthly labor income and hourly wages are very similar for workers who have been dis-
placed. For example, in the fifth year after the event displaced workers have monthly labor 
income losses of about 7.1 percent and hourly wage losses of about 6.3 percent, indicating 
that lower working hours are relatively unimportant. In contrast, for dismissed workers five 
years after the event, their monthly income is reduced by 14 percent, but their hourly wage 
losses only amount to 8 percent. Lower working hours are, therefore, a relevant explanation 
for dismissed workers’ total labor income losses.10 Another comparison that is interesting is 
between displaced and dismissed workers. In line with Gibbons and Katz (1991), who analyze 
weekly earnings, I find larger negative effects for dismissal than displacement when looking 
at the monthly labor income conditional on employment (panel (b)). However, when investi-
gating hourly wages these differences become much smaller suggesting that the more nega-
tive effects of dismissal are mostly due to their reduced post-job loss working hours. 
Panels (d) to (e) of Figure 2 illustrate the results for workers’ risk of non-standard employ-
ment after job loss. Panel (d) reveals an increased probability of self-employment of about 5 
to 7 percentage points with very similar time paths for displacement and dismissal (Tables 
S12, S13). For part-time employment (panel (e)) the effects differ somewhat with 2 to 4 per-
centage point increases for displacement and somewhat larger positive effects of about 5 to 6 
percentage points for dismissal. Concerning fixed-term contracts (panel (f)), it is shown that 
workers who lose their job have higher risks of only holding a fixed-term contract with a 20 
(displacement) and 25 (dismissal) percentage points increase in the first year after the event. 
However, over time these risks decrease to 6 and 11 percentage points. Overall, this suggests 
that displaced and dismissed workers initially have a substantially higher likelihood for non-
standard employment and that only for fixed-term contracts the time paths suggest that the 
effects may be transitory. 
4.4 Sensitivity analyses 
To address concerns that employment is only measured at one specific point in time, the anal-
yses for labor market status are repeated using the retrospectively reported monthly status. 
The proportion of months a worker spent in each status since the last interview is analyzed 
                                                     
10 Estimates on the effects on working hours including zero and log working hours conditional on employment 
are presented in Tables S9 and S11 in the supplementary material, supporting these conclusions. 
127 
 
and the results are illustrated in Figures S1 and S2 (Tables S14-S17) in the supplementary 
material. The findings closely mirror those reported above showing that the large short-term 
effects on employment are mainly explained by higher unemployment. In the long-run work-
ers leaving the labor force explains a larger share of the non-employment effect with retire-
ment being the main reason. As the monthly data also allow distinguishing part-time and full-
time employment, the proportion of months in part-time conditional on employment is exam-
ined, too. Similar to the main analyses dismissed workers have somewhat greater part-time 
risks than displaced workers. 
Additional sensitivity analyses address the heterogeneity within the forms of non-standard 
employment. For these analyses displacement and dismissal have been grouped as the ana-
lyzed outcomes are rare and information is not available in all years. The results are shown in 
Figure S3 (Tables S18-S20) in the supplementary material. Solo-self-employment and other 
self-employment are distinguished as it is the former that raises the greatest concerns about 
job quality. Panel (a) in Figure S3 reveals that the increases in self-employment are mainly 
due to solo self-employment which makes up for about 70 percent of the effect in all years 
except for the last. Panel (b) distinguishes between marginal and regular part-time employ-
ment. It reveals that the positive part-time effect is mostly due to increases in regular instead 
of marginal part-time employment with the latter being responsible for about 19 to 38 percent 
of the effect. Lastly, panel (c) provides evidence that workers who have lost their job have an 
increased short-term risk for temporary agency work of about 3 to 5 percentage points. As 
time passes, this effect becomes close to zero suggesting that agency work is only used tem-
porarily to return into the labor market. 
5. Conclusions 
This article examined the effects of displacement due to plant closure and dismissal on work-
ers’ subsequent careers in Germany. Focusing on workers in standard employment, it pro-
vides comprehensive empirical evidence about the consequences of job loss on multiple ca-
reer dimensions as well as how these evolve over time. Specifically, using data from the So-
cio-Economic Panel (SOEP), I analyzed the effects on workers’ labor market statuses, labor 
incomes, and non-standard employment risks for up to five years after job loss. 
Applying fixed-effects regression models to matched samples, three main results stand out: 
First, displacement and dismissal have large and persistent negative effects on employment 
chances. While it is shown that in the short-run these negative employment effects are mainly 
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due to increased unemployment, over time the share that can be attributed to workers leaving 
the labor force rises. Especially (early) retirement seems to be a relevant response to job loss 
in Germany. Apart from retirement only a small positive effect on inactivity is found, suggest-
ing that job loss does not necessarily result in a group of discouraged workers who may not 
easily be reintegrated into the labor market. However, while (early) retirement long represent-
ed an “attractive” alternative to long-term unemployment, the pension policy paradigm in 
Germany has changed over time, suggesting that for many older workers this route has gradu-
ally been closed such that more negative career consequences can be expected (Buchholz et 
al., 2013). 
Second, similar to recent studies for the US and the UK labor market (Lachowska et al., 2018; 
Upward & Wright, 2017) it was revealed that the large negative short-term effects in terms of 
forgone total labor income are primarily due to the loss of employment and lower working 
hours. However, in contrast to these studies, I find that in Germany even five years after job 
loss the majority of the total losses can be explained by falls in employment or working hours 
instead of hourly wages. This improves our understanding of explanations for total labor in-
come losses in different welfare states by linking previous findings about larger (short-term) 
total losses in conservative welfare regimes (Ehlert, 2013), but stronger earnings or wage 
scars in liberal welfare states (Gangl, 2006). The current study also examined in more detail 
the reason for job loss. A particularly interesting finding is that for dismissals a substantial 
part of the earnings scars are explained by workers not being able to find full-time re-
employment. 
Third, this article provides first empirical evidence on the effects of displacement and dismis-
sal on workers’ non-standard employment risks in Germany. Extending previous studies (von 
Greiff, 2009), I show that job loss increases the risk of self-employment and this can be main-
ly attributed to higher solo self-employment. In addition, displaced and, in particular, dis-
missed workers face higher risks of part-time employment although this seems to be largely 
driven by regular instead of marginal part-time. Moreover, workers who lost their job are 
more likely to re-enter the labor market via fixed-term contracts and temporary agency em-
ployment. While these effects decrease over time, higher risks of fixed-term employment re-
main even five years after job loss. 
Furthermore, the results point to somewhat more negative effects for dismissals than dis-
placements, in particular, in the short-run. However, the differences become smaller over time 
and the overall patters are quite similar. This is an important finding meaning that results of 
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previous studies who have grouped these events are not driven by a single event and, there-
fore, offer useful summaries of the overall effects of job loss. 
There remain, however, some important caveats to the current analyses. First, the smaller 
sample sizes of survey compared to administrative data make it difficult to study the hetero-
geneity in the effects of job loss across subgroups. Ehlert (2013) shows that the effects of job 
loss are socially stratified. If workers who already face higher risks of displacement or dismis-
sal are also more negatively affected by these events, job loss implies an accumulation of dis-
advantages (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). An important next step, therefore, is to investigate effect 
heterogeneity especially for outcomes that have received less attention so far. 
A second limitation of the data is that displacement and dismissal are self-reported as well as 
that dismissals combine layoffs and workers being fired for individual reasons. Given that the 
recall periods for the reason of job loss at most concern the year before the interview, meas-
urement error may be less of an issue. Regarding the second point, I separated displacements 
due to plant closure in all analyses from the more heterogeneous group of dismissed workers. 
The fact that the results for displacements, which rely on plant closures as an exogenous rea-
son for job loss, are similar to those for dismissals also indicates that the findings for the latter 
are not driven by selection. Third, concerning non-standard employment I examined each 
form separately leaving open how they may interact (e.g., fixed-term part-time job) to create 
an even greater distance to the regular jobs displaced and dismissed workers held before. 
The results also point to some interesting avenues for future research. The fact that in Germa-
ny, in contrast to the US or UK, the total income losses are more strongly driven by the loss 
of employment and lower working hours emphasizes the need for comparative research that 
takes into account the institutional differences more explicitly. While some studies have pro-
vided such evidence by examining transitions from employment to unemployment (e.g., Eh-
lert, 2013; Gangl, 2006), comparative research looking at different reasons for job loss is rare 
(Kuhn, 2002). Moreover, the results for non-standard employment suggest that many workers 
try to find quick re-employment instead of waiting for an adequate job. An issue that merits 
further attention concerns the implications of taking up non-standard employment for work-
ers’ careers. As Gebel (2013) points out, workers’ use of non-standard employment may raise 
concerns if compared to standard re-employment, but displaced or dismissed workers taking 
up alternative work arrangements may still fare better compared to situation of remaining job-
less. Finally, although this article adds to and extends the few previous studies that have doc-
umented the negative consequences of job loss for a wide range of career outcomes (Oesch & 
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Baumann, 2015; Upward & Wright, 2017), future research should also pay more attention to 
the non-economic consequences of job loss including workers’ health and well-being as well 
as their family lives. 
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Figure S1 Effects of displacement and dismissal on proportion of month in each labor market 
status (change in proportion) 
  
  
Notes: Matched samples. Fixed-effects estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals based on clustered stand-
ard errors for the effects of displacement (solid black lines) and dismissal (dashed grey lines). See Tables S14 
and S16 for the full regression models. The plotted effects are the respective interaction coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘. Out of 
labor force (c) combines panels (a) Education or training, (b) Retirement, and (c) Inactivity from Figure S2.  
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations.  
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Figure S2 Effects of displacement and dismissal on proportion of month in each labor market 
status (change in proportion) 
  
 
 
Notes: Matched samples. Fixed-effects estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals based on clustered stand-
ard errors for the effects of displacement (solid black lines) and dismissal (dashed grey lines). See Tables S15 
and S17 for the full regression models. The plotted effects are the respective interaction coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations.  
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Figure S3 Effects of job loss on non-standard employment (change in probability) 
  
 
 
Notes: Matched samples. Fixed-effects estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals based on clustered stand-
ard errors for the effects of job loss on other self-employment/regular part-time employment/temporary agency 
employment (solid black lines) and solo self-employment/marginal part-time employment (dashed grey lines). 
See Tables S18-S20 for the full regression models. The plotted effects are the respective interaction coefficients 
𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘. Results for panel (a) and (b) are based on the SOEP 2000-2015 and the SOEP 2001-2015, respectively. 
Sources: SOEP 2000-2015, author’s calculations.  
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Table S1 Measurement of variables 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent variables  
  Labor market status (1) 1=employment, 2=unemployment, 3=education or training, 4=retirement, 5=inactivity, 
3-5=out of labor force, six variables for the analyses 
  Labor market status (2) 1=full-time employment, 2=part-time employment, 3=unemployment, 4=education or training, 
5=retirement, 6=inactivity, 1-2=employment, 3-5=out of labor force, proportion of month in each labor 
market status since the last interview, eight variables for the analyses 
  Gross labor income (1) Gross labor income last month (in Euro), deflated to 2011 prices using the consumer price index, zero 
income for non-employment 
  Gross labor income (2) (1) but only with positive income from dependent or self-employment, logged for the analyses 
  Gross hourly wage (2) divided by (average actual weekly working hours *4.33), logged for the analyses 
  Average actual working hours (1) Average actual weekly working hours (in hours), zero hours for non-employment 
  Average actual working hours (2) (1) but only with positive hours from dependent or self-employment, logged for the analyses 
  Self-employment 1=self-employment (includes family workers), 0=dependent employment 
  Type of employment 1=dependent employment, 2=solo self-employment (without employees), 3=other self-employment (with 
employees, includes family workers)  
  Part-time employment 1=part-time employment (0<hours<35), 0=full-time (35≤hours) 
  Working time 1=marginal part-time (0<hours<15), 2=regular part-time (15≤hours<35), 3=full-time (35≤hours) 
  Fixed-term contract 1=fixed-term contract, 0=permanent contract, only dependent employment  
  Temporary agency employment 1=temporary agency employment (de-jure is not de-facto employer), 0=no temporary agency employment 
(de-jure is de-facto employer), only dependent employment 
Independent variable  
  Job loss (1) 1=displacement due to plant closure, 2=dismissal, 3=no job loss (no job change and job separations due to 
own resignation or mutual agreement) 
  Job loss (2) 1= job loss due to displacement due to plant closure or dismissal, 0=no job loss 
Control variables  
Socio-demographics  
   Age In years 
   Female 1=female, 0=male 
   Migration background 1=migration background, 0=no migration background 
  
139 
 
Table S1 continued 
Education  
   Educational degree 1=less than lower secondary degree (CASMIN 1a-c), 2= intermediate and higher secondary degree 
(CASMIN 2a-c), 3=tertiary degree (CASMIN 3a-c) 
Employment history  
   Total experience 1=full-time employment, 2=part-time employment, 3=unemployment (in decimal years), total=complete 
employment history since the age of 15 years, 3 variables for the analyses 
   Recent experience 1=full-time employment, 2=part-time employment, 3=unemployment, 4=education or training, 
5=inactivity (in months), recent=in the year before the interview, five variables for the analyses 
Characteristics of the job  
  Industry 1=primary & construction, 2=manufacturing & energy, 3=trade, 4=transport, 5=bank & insurance, 
6=services 
  Firm size 1=less than 20 employees, 2=20 to less than 200 employees, 3=200 to less than 2000 employees, 4=2000 
and more employees 
  Occupation  1=blue-collar worker, 2=white-collar worker, 3=civil servant 
  Firm tenure In decimal years 
Household structure    
   Partner in household 1=no partner or spouse in household, 2=partner in household, 3=spouse in household 
   Number of persons Number of persons living in household 
   Number of children Number of children aged 0 to 14 years living in household 
Health  
   Health satisfaction On a scale with 11 scale points from 0=completely dissatisfied to 10=completely satisfied 
Context characteristics  
   Region 1=North-Germany (Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein), 2=East-Germany (Berlin, 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia), 3=South-Germany 
(Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse), 4=West-Germany (North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Saarland) 
  State unemployment rate Unemployment rate of the federal state (in percent) 
  Year before job loss 1990-2014 
Notes: All control variables refer to the interview before the job loss. The state unemployment rate is taken from the Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency (2017) and 
has been merged to the SOEP. 
Sources: Own illustration. 
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Table S2 Assignment model: Logistic regression of displacement on control variables (logits) 
 Displacement (=1)  
vs. control (=0) 
 Coef.  SE 
Age 0.008  (0.01) 
Female 0.027  (0.08) 
Migration background 0.181 * (0.08) 
Education: Less than lower secondary    
  Intermediate or higher secondary  -0.136  (0.08) 
  Tertiary  -0.227  (0.12) 
Total experience: Full-time employment -0.004  (0.01) 
  Part-time employment 0.006  (0.01) 
  Unemployment -0.006  (0.03) 
Recent experience: Full-time employment -0.173  (0.15) 
  Part-time employment -0.177  (0.15) 
  Unemployment -0.095  (0.15) 
  Education or training  -0.220  (0.16) 
  Inactivity -0.111  (0.16) 
Industry: Primary & construction    
  Manufacturing & energy -0.105  (0.09) 
  Trade -0.003  (0.10) 
  Transport -0.032  (0.13) 
  Bank & insurance -0.826 *** (0.24) 
  Services -1.026 *** (0.11) 
Firm size: Less than 20 employees    
  20 to less than 200 employees -0.377 *** (0.08) 
  200 to less than 2000 employees -0.826 *** (0.10) 
  2000 or more employees -0.813 *** (0.10) 
Occupation: Blue-collar worker    
  White-collar worker -0.046  (0.08) 
  Civil servant -0.544 * (0.27) 
Firm tenure -0.056 *** (0.01) 
Firm tenure (squared) 0.001 *** (0.00) 
Partner in household: No Partner    
  Partner 0.142  (0.11) 
  Spouse 0.074  (0.09) 
Number of persons 0.019  (0.03) 
Number of children -0.123 * (0.05) 
Health satisfaction -0.052 ** (0.02) 
Region: North Germany    
  East Germany 0.137  (0.14) 
  South Germany 0.249  (0.13) 
  West Germany 0.047  (0.11) 
State unemployment rate 0.201 *** (0.05) 
State unemployment rate (squared) -0.006 *** (0.00) 
Constant -2.841  (1.87) 
N (person-spells) 113776 
Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. See Table S1 for details on 
the measurement of the variables. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S3 Assignment model: Logistic regression of dismissal on control variables (logits) 
 
Dismissal (=1) 
vs. control (=0) 
 Coef.  SE 
Age -0.067 ** (0.02) 
Age (squared) 0.001 ** (0.00) 
Female -0.005  (0.05) 
Migration background 0.221 *** (0.05) 
Education: Less than lower secondary    
  Intermediate or higher secondary  -0.282 *** (0.05) 
  Tertiary  -0.563 *** (0.08) 
Total experience: Full-time employment -0.024 * (0.01) 
  Full-time employment (squared) 0.001 ** (0.00) 
  Part-time 0.010  (0.01) 
  Unemployment 0.196 *** (0.03) 
  Unemployment (squared) -0.011 *** (0.00) 
Recent experience: Full-time employment 0.201  (0.19) 
  Full-time employment (squared) -0.012 *** (0.00) 
  Part-time 0.039  (0.19) 
  Unemployment 0.108  (0.18) 
  Education or training  0.028  (0.19) 
  Inactivity 0.130  (0.19) 
Industry: Primary & construction    
  Manufacturing & energy -0.329 *** (0.06) 
  Trade -0.250 *** (0.07) 
  Transport -0.444 *** (0.10) 
  Bank & insurance -0.935 *** (0.19) 
  Services -0.714 *** (0.07) 
Firm size: Less than 20 employees    
  20 to less than 200 employees -0.462 *** (0.05) 
  200 to less than 2000 employees -0.721 *** (0.06) 
  2000 or more employees -1.089 *** (0.08) 
Occupation: Blue-collar worker    
  White-collar worker -0.222 *** (0.05) 
  Civil servant -2.170 *** (0.42) 
Firm tenure -0.175 *** (0.01) 
Firm tenure (squared) 0.004 *** (0.00) 
Partner in household: No Partner    
  Partner 0.054  (0.06) 
  Spouse -0.202 *** (0.06) 
Number of persons -0.033  (0.02) 
Number of children 0.123 *** (0.03) 
Health satisfaction -0.081 *** (0.01) 
Region: North Germany    
  East Germany 0.166  (0.09) 
  South Germany 0.065  (0.08) 
  West Germany 0.002  (0.08) 
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Table S3 continued 
State unemployment rate 0.067 *** (0.01) 
Constant -1.369  (2.26) 
N (person-spells) 115377 
Notes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. See Table S1 for details on 
the measurement of the variables. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S4 Effects of displacement on labor market status (1) (FE linear probability models) 
 Employment
 
 
Unemployment 
 Out of labor 
force 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before 0.035 ***  -0.007 **  -0.027 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  0 year 0.090 ***  -0.042 ***  -0.047 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.003)   (0.002)  
  1 year after 0.081 ***  -0.037 ***  -0.044 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.003)   (0.002)  
  2 years after 0.022 ***  0.000   -0.022 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.003)   (0.002)  
  3 years after -0.011 ***  0.017 ***  -0.006 ** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.003)   (0.002)  
  4 years after -0.036 ***  0.024 ***  0.012 *** 
 (0.004) 
  (0.003)   (0.003)  
  5 years after -0.057 ***  0.028 ***  0.029 *** 
 (0.005) 
  (0.004)   (0.003)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before -0.007   -0.001   0.008  
 (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.007)  
0 year 0.002   -0.002   0.000  
 (0.011)   (0.008)   (0.008)  
1 year after -0.411 ***  0.374 ***  0.037 *** 
 (0.019)   (0.017)   (0.010)  
2 years after -0.221 ***  0.175 ***  0.045 *** 
 (0.018)   (0.016)   (0.011)  
3 years after -0.166 ***  0.128 ***  0.038 ** 
 (0.018)   (0.015)   (0.012)  
4 years after -0.133 ***  0.110 ***  0.023  
 (0.019) 
  (0.016)   (0.013)  
5 years after -0.122 ***  0.087 ***  0.035 * 
 (0.020) 
  (0.016)   (0.015)  
Constant 0.910 ***  0.043 ***  0.047 *** 
 (0.006) 
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
N (person-spells) 97246  97246  97246 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
144 
 
Table S5 Effects of displacement on labor market status (1) (FE linear probability models) 
 
Education or 
training 
 
Retirement 
 
Inactivity 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.023 ***  0.000   -0.005 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.000)   (0.001)  
  0 year -0.037 ***  0.001 **  -0.010 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.000)   (0.001)  
  1 year after -0.036 ***  0.001 ***  -0.009 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.000)   (0.001)  
  2 years after -0.033 ***  0.008 ***  0.002  
 (0.001) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
  3 years after -0.032 ***  0.018 ***  0.008 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
  4 years after -0.032 ***  0.032 ***  0.011 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  5 years after -0.032 ***  0.050 ***  0.012 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.007   -0.001   0.002  
 (0.006)   (0.001)   (0.004)  
0 year 0.003   0.001   -0.004  
 (0.007)   (0.001)   (0.005)  
1 year after 0.012   0.005 *  0.020 ** 
 (0.007)   (0.002)   (0.007)  
2 years after 0.023 **  0.009 *  0.013  
 (0.008)   (0.004)   (0.007)  
3 years after 0.012   0.018 **  0.009  
 (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)  
4 years after 0.006   0.021 *  -0.004  
 (0.007) 
  (0.008)   (0.007)  
5 years after 0.006   0.026 *  0.003  
 (0.008) 
  (0.010)   (0.008)  
Constant 0.036 ***  -0.001   0.012 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
N (person-spells) 97246  97246  97246 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S6 Effects of dismissal on labor market status (1) (FE linear probability models) 
 Employment
 
 
Unemployment 
 Out of labor 
force 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before 0.051 ***  -0.005   -0.046 *** 
 (0.004) 
  (0.004)   (0.003)  
  0 year 0.175 ***  -0.083 ***  -0.092 *** 
 (0.005) 
  (0.004)   (0.003)  
  1 year after 0.161 ***  -0.074 ***  -0.087 *** 
 (0.005) 
  (0.004)   (0.003)  
  2 years after 0.085 ***  -0.023 ***  -0.061 *** 
 (0.005) 
  (0.004)   (0.003)  
  3 years after 0.045 ***  -0.002   -0.043 *** 
 (0.005) 
  (0.005)   (0.003)  
  4 years after 0.021 ***  0.002   -0.023 *** 
 (0.006) 
  (0.005)   (0.004)  
  5 years after -0.003   0.009   -0.005  
 (0.006) 
  (0.005)   (0.004)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.025 *  -0.021 *  -0.004  
 (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.007)  
0 year 0.030 **  -0.026 **  -0.004  
 (0.011)   (0.008)   (0.007)  
1 year after -0.563 ***  0.522 ***  0.040 *** 
 (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.008)  
2 years after -0.278 ***  0.237 ***  0.041 *** 
 (0.015)   (0.013)   (0.009)  
3 years after -0.195 ***  0.155 ***  0.041 *** 
 (0.015)   (0.013)   (0.010)  
4 years after -0.166 ***  0.101 ***  0.066 *** 
 (0.015) 
  (0.012)   (0.011)  
5 years after -0.150 ***  0.089 ***  0.061 *** 
 (0.016) 
  (0.013)   (0.012)  
Constant 0.810 ***  0.097 ***  0.093 *** 
 (0.005) 
  (0.004)   (0.003)  
N (person-spells) 112635  112635  112635 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S7 Effects of dismissal on labor market status (1) (FE linear probability models) 
 
Education or 
training 
 Retirement  Inactivity 
 
Coef. (SE) 
 
 Coef. (SE) 
 
 Coef. (SE) 
 
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.042 ***  0.000   -0.004 **  
(0.003)   (0.000)   (0.002)  
  0 year -0.076 ***  0.000   -0.016 ***  
(0.003)   (0.000)   (0.001)  
  1 year after -0.073 ***  0.000   -0.015 ***  
(0.003)   (0.000)   (0.001)  
  2 years after -0.067 ***  0.006 ***  -0.001   
(0.003)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
  3 years after -0.065 ***  0.014 ***  0.007 ***  
(0.003)   (0.001)   (0.002)  
  4 years after -0.065 ***  0.031 ***  0.011 ***  
(0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
  5 years after -0.066 ***  0.050 ***  0.011 ***  
(0.003)   (0.003)   (0.002)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.001   0.000   -0.005  
 (0.006)   (0.001)   (0.004)  
0 year 0.000   -0.001   -0.003  
 (0.007)   (0.001)   (0.003)  
1 year after 0.014 *  0.003   0.023 *** 
 (0.007)   (0.002)   (0.005)  
2 years after 0.017 *  0.013 ***  0.011 * 
 (0.007)   (0.003)   (0.005)  
3 years after 0.010   0.025 ***  0.005  
 (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.005)  
4 years after 0.006   0.038 ***  0.022 ***  
(0.007)   (0.006)   (0.006)  
5 years after 0.003   0.044 ***  0.014 *  
(0.007)   (0.007)   (0.006)  
Constant 0.075 ***  0.001   0.018 ***  
(0.003)   (0.001)   (0.002)  
N (person-spells) 112635  112635  112635 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses.  
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S8 Effects of displacement on labor income last month (FE linear regressions) 
 
Gross labor 
income, zero for 
non-employment 
 Log gross labor 
income, employ-
ment spells only 
 Log gross hourly 
wage, employ-
ment spells only 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before 110.968 ***  0.023 ***  0.016 *** 
 (6.43) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  0 year 270.283 ***  0.048 ***  0.024 *** 
 (6.98) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  1 year after 286.812 ***  0.059 ***  0.050 *** 
 (7.36) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  2 years after 188.214 ***  0.065 ***  0.062 *** 
 (8.29) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  3 years after 125.885 ***  0.066 ***  0.067 *** 
 (9.14) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  4 years after 75.905 ***  0.066 ***  0.072 *** 
 (10.99) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  5 years after 30.192 *  0.066 ***  0.075 *** 
 (12.53) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before -14.079   0.002   -0.004  
 (29.38)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
0 year -46.077   -0.001   -0.012  
 (32.77)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
1 year after -1052.524 ***  -0.067 ***  -0.056 *** 
 (58.97)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
2 years after -634.060 ***  -0.077 ***  -0.072 *** 
 (57.22)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
3 years after -523.692 ***  -0.089 ***  -0.084 *** 
 (57.08)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
4 years after -445.797 ***  -0.088 ***  -0.066 *** 
 (62.60) 
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
5 years after -407.074 ***  -0.069 **  -0.061 ** 
 (66.61) 
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
Constant 2436.388 ***  7.772 ***  2.561 *** 
 (18.85) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
N (person-spells) 97246  97171  97171 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Log gross labor income and log gross hourly wage are conditional on employment.  
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S9 Effects of displacement on average actual working hours (FE linear regressions) 
 
 
 Working hours, 
zero for non-
employment 
 
Log working 
hours 
  
  Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before    1.633 ***  0.007 *** 
  
  (0.13)   (0.00)  
  0 year    4.464 ***  0.025 *** 
  
  (0.15)   (0.00)  
  1 year after    3.641 ***  0.008 *** 
  
  (0.15)   (0.00)  
  2 years after    1.064 ***  0.003  
  
  (0.16)   (0.00)  
  3 years after    -0.439 **  -0.001  
  
  (0.16)   (0.00)  
  4 years after    -1.564 ***  -0.005 * 
  
  (0.19)   (0.00)  
  5 years after    -2.542 ***  -0.009 *** 
  
  (0.22)   (0.00)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before    -0.151   0.006  
    (0.50)   (0.01)  
0 year    0.173   0.011  
    (0.55)   (0.01)  
1 year after    -17.253 ***  -0.011  
    (0.88)   (0.01)  
2 years after    -9.295 ***  -0.005  
    (0.84)   (0.01)  
3 years after    -6.984 ***  -0.006  
    (0.84)   (0.01)  
4 years after    -5.957 ***  -0.022  
  
  (0.88)   (0.01)  
5 years after    -5.062 ***  -0.008  
  
  (0.91)   (0.01)  
Constant    39.295 ***  3.745 *** 
    (0.27) 
  (0.00)  
N (person-spells)   97246  97171 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Log working hours are conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S10 Effects of dismissal on labor income last month (FE linear regressions) 
 
Gross labor 
income, zero for 
non-employment 
 Log gross labor 
income, employ-
ment spells only 
 Log gross hourly 
wage, employ-
ment spells only 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before 124.539 ***  0.020 ***  0.012 *** 
 (8.31) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  0 year 408.750 ***  0.056 ***  0.022 *** 
 (9.46) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  1 year after 421.746 ***  0.068 ***  0.054 *** 
 (10.11) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  2 years after 297.865 ***  0.075 ***  0.067 *** 
 (10.97) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  3 years after 237.907 ***  0.079 ***  0.075 *** 
 (12.09) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  4 years after 200.962 ***  0.080 ***  0.083 *** 
 (13.05) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  5 years after 157.800 ***  0.083 ***  0.090 *** 
 (15.53) 
  (0.01)   (0.00)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 43.478   -0.006   -0.007  
 (25.11)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
0 year 12.698   -0.024 *  -0.017 * 
 (24.69)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
1 year after -1345.778 ***  -0.152 ***  -0.085 *** 
 (35.48)   (0.02)   (0.01)  
2 years after -759.699 ***  -0.141 ***  -0.100 *** 
 (38.09)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
3 years after -598.846 ***  -0.138 ***  -0.090 *** 
 (45.89)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
4 years after -552.429 ***  -0.128 ***  -0.082 *** 
 (39.21) 
  (0.02)   (0.01)  
5 years after -514.380 ***  -0.131 ***  -0.077 *** 
 (40.66) 
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
Constant 1875.981 ***  7.629 ***  2.414 *** 
 (12.73) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
N (person-spells) 112635  112464  112464 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Log gross labor income and log gross hourly wage are conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S11 Effects of dismissal on average actual working hours (FE linear regressions) 
 
 
 Working hours, 
zero for non-
employment 
 
Log working 
hours 
  
  Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before    2.411 ***  0.007 ** 
  
  (0.18)   (0.00)  
  0 year    8.378 ***  0.033 *** 
  
  (0.21)   (0.00)  
  1 year after    7.273 ***  0.015 *** 
  
  (0.21)   (0.00)  
  2 years after    3.838 ***  0.008 ** 
  
  (0.22)   (0.00)  
  3 years after    2.091 ***  0.004  
  
  (0.24)   (0.00)  
  4 years after    0.873 ***  -0.003  
  
  (0.26)   (0.00)  
  5 years after    -0.267   -0.008 * 
  
  (0.29)   (0.00)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before    1.025 *  0.000  
    (0.48)   (0.01)  
0 year    1.186 *  -0.007  
    (0.50)   (0.01)  
1 year after    -24.909 ***  -0.067 *** 
    (0.64)   (0.01)  
2 years after    -12.182 ***  -0.040 *** 
    (0.68)   (0.01)  
3 years after    -9.010 ***  -0.048 *** 
    (0.69)   (0.01)  
4 years after    -7.530 ***  -0.046 *** 
  
  (0.68)   (0.01)  
5 years after    -7.016 ***  -0.054 *** 
  
  (0.71)   (0.01)  
Constant    35.081 ***  3.749 *** 
    (0.23) 
  (0.00)  
N (person-spells)   112635  112464 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Log working hours are conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S12 Effects of displacement on non-standard employment (FE linear probability  
models) 
 Self-employment 
 
 Part-time 
employment 
 Fixed-term 
contract 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.003 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.013 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
  0 year -0.012 ***  -0.043 ***  -0.057 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  1 year after -0.003 **  -0.014 ***  -0.038 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  2 years after 0.002   -0.006 ***  -0.031 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  3 years after 0.008 ***  0.001   -0.024 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  4 years after 0.012 ***  0.007 ***  -0.022 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  5 years after 0.018 ***  0.015 ***  -0.020 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.001   -0.005   -0.010  
 (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.009)  
0 year 0.006   -0.013   -0.011  
 (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.009)  
1 year after 0.063 ***  0.026 *  0.201 *** 
 (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.019)  
2 years after 0.058 ***  0.024 *  0.153 *** 
 (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.017)  
3 years after 0.061 ***  0.023 *  0.109 *** 
 (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.017)  
4 years after 0.059 ***  0.035 **  0.080 *** 
 (0.011) 
  (0.013)   (0.016)  
5 years after 0.062 ***  0.025   0.062 *** 
 (0.012) 
  (0.013)   (0.016)  
Constant 0.009 **  0.044 ***  0.054 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.003)   (0.004)  
N (person-spells) 97171  97171  97057 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Self-employment and part-time employment are conditional on employment. Fixed-term contract is 
conditional on dependent employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S13 Effects of dismissal on non-standard employment (FE linear probability models) 
 Self-employment 
 
 Part-time 
employment 
 Fixed-term 
contract 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.005 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.023 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.003)  
  0 year -0.017 ***  -0.051 ***  -0.094 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.003)  
  1 year after -0.008 ***  -0.022 ***  -0.063 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.003)  
  2 years after -0.001   -0.012 ***  -0.055 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.002)   (0.004)  
  3 years after 0.005 **  -0.004   -0.049 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.003)   (0.004)  
  4 years after 0.010 ***  0.003   -0.043 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.003)   (0.004)  
  5 years after 0.014 ***  0.012 ***  -0.042 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.003)   (0.004)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.002   0.004   0.011  
 (0.003)   (0.006)   (0.008)  
0 year 0.005   0.008   0.012  
 (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.008)  
1 year after 0.068 ***  0.065 ***  0.252 *** 
 (0.008)   (0.010)   (0.016)  
2 years after 0.067 ***  0.054 ***  0.210 *** 
 (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.014)  
3 years after 0.065 ***  0.059 ***  0.165 *** 
 (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.014)  
4 years after 0.066 ***  0.064 ***  0.128 *** 
 (0.008) 
  (0.010)   (0.014)  
5 years after 0.071 ***  0.062 ***  0.109 *** 
 (0.009) 
  (0.011)   (0.014)  
Constant 0.015 ***  0.044 ***  0.082 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.003)   (0.003)  
N (person-spells) 112464  112464  112310 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Self-employment and part-time employment are conditional on employment. Fixed-term contract is 
conditional on dependent employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S14 Effects of displacement on proportion of month in each labor market status (2) (FE 
linear regression) 
 Employment 
 Unemploy-
ment 
 Out of labor 
force 
 Part-time 
employment 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
 Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
          
  1 year before 0.028 ***  -0.004 *  -0.024 ***  -0.010 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  0 year 0.065 ***  -0.018 ***  -0.047 ***  -0.022 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  1 year after 0.080 ***  -0.028 ***  -0.052 ***  -0.019 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  2 years after 0.043 ***  -0.007 ***  -0.036 ***  -0.013 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  3 years after 0.005   0.013 ***  -0.018 ***  -0.004 * 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  4 years after -0.022 ***  0.023 ***  -0.001   0.005 * 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  5 years after -0.043 ***  0.026 ***  0.017 ***  0.015 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
          
1 year before 0.001   -0.000   -0.001   -0.002  
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
0 year 0.003   -0.007   0.003   -0.009  
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
1 year after -0.241 ***  0.200 ***  0.040 ***  -0.007  
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
2 years after -0.254 ***  0.204 ***  0.050 ***  0.032 ** 
 (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
3 years after -0.176 ***  0.121 ***  0.055 ***  0.022 * 
 (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
4 years after -0.127 ***  0.096 ***  0.031 *  0.018  
 (0.02) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
5 years after -0.103 ***  0.083 ***  0.020   0.034 ** 
 (0.02) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Constant 0.905 ***  0.036 ***  0.058 ***  0.052 *** 
 (0.01) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
N (person-spells) 95926  95926  95926  95766 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Part-time employment is conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S15 Effects of displacement on proportion of month in each labor market status (2) (FE 
linear regressions) 
 
Education or 
training  
 
Retirement 
 
Inactivity 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.021 ***  0.000   -0.003 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  0 year -0.041 ***  0.000   -0.006 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  1 year after -0.045 ***  0.001 **  -0.008 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  2 years after -0.042 ***  0.006 ***  0.001  
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  3 years after -0.040 ***  0.015 ***  0.007 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  4 years after -0.040 ***  0.028 ***  0.011 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  5 years after -0.040 ***  0.045 ***  0.012 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Time x displacement: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.004   0.000   -0.005  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
0 year 0.007   0.001   -0.005  
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
1 year after 0.021 **  0.007 *  0.012 * 
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
2 years after 0.029 ***  0.011 **  0.010  
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
3 years after 0.029 ***  0.018 **  0.009  
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
4 years after 0.009   0.025 **  -0.003  
 (0.01) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  
5 years after 0.008   0.015   -0.003  
 (0.01) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  
Constant 0.044 ***  -0.001   0.015 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
N (person-spells) 95926  95926  95926 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S16 Effects of dismissals on proportion of month in each labor market status (2) (FE 
linear regression) 
 Employment 
 Unemploy-
ment 
 Out of labor 
force 
 Part-time 
employment 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
 Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
          
  1 year before 0.044 ***  -0.005 *  -0.038 ***  -0.014 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  0 year 0.123 ***  -0.037 ***  -0.085 ***  -0.034 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  1 year after 0.160 ***  -0.062 ***  -0.097 ***  -0.031 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  2 years after 0.111 ***  -0.032 ***  -0.079 ***  -0.022 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  3 years after 0.068 ***  -0.010 **  -0.058 ***  -0.010 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  4 years after 0.036 ***  0.003   -0.039 ***  -0.002  
 (0.01) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
  5 years after 0.016 **  0.005   -0.021 ***  0.009 * 
 (0.01) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
          
1 year before -0.011   0.004   0.007   0.005  
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.00)  
0 year -0.006   0.004   0.002   0.009  
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
1 year after -0.306 ***  0.272 ***  0.034 ***  0.025 *** 
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
2 years after -0.344 ***  0.285 ***  0.059 ***  0.066 *** 
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
3 years after -0.230 ***  0.179 ***  0.051 ***  0.072 *** 
 (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
4 years after -0.188 ***  0.125 ***  0.063 ***  0.076 *** 
 (0.01) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
5 years after -0.167 ***  0.097 ***  0.070 ***  0.076 *** 
 (0.01) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Constant 0.820 ***  0.073 ***  0.107 ***  0.054 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
N (person-spells) 111089  111089  111089  110905 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Part-time employment is conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S17 Effects of dismissal on proportion of month in each labor market status (2) (FE 
linear regressions) 
 
Education or 
training  
 
Retirement 
 
Inactivity 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.037 ***  0.000   -0.001  
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  0 year -0.077 ***  -0.000   -0.008 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  1 year after -0.087 ***  0.000   -0.010 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  2 years after -0.082 ***  0.005 ***  -0.001  
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  3 years after -0.078 ***  0.012 ***  0.008 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  4 years after -0.078 ***  0.026 ***  0.012 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
  5 years after -0.079 ***  0.044 ***  0.014 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Time x dismissal: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.009   -0.000   -0.002  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
0 year 0.006   -0.001   -0.003  
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
1 year after 0.016 *  0.002   0.017 *** 
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
2 years after 0.036 ***  0.011 ***  0.012 ** 
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
3 years after 0.023 **  0.023 ***  0.006  
 (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
4 years after 0.016 *  0.036 ***  0.012 * 
 (0.01) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  
5 years after 0.013   0.042 ***  0.015 ** 
 (0.01) 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  
Constant 0.087 ***  0.001   0.019 *** 
 (0.00) 
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
N (person-spells) 111089  111089  111089 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S18 Effects of job loss on type of employment (FE linear probability models) 
 Self-employment 
 
 Solo self-
employment 
 Other self-
employment 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.005 ***  -0.004 **  -0.002 * 
 (0.001) 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
  0 year -0.017 ***  -0.010 ***  -0.007 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
  1 year after -0.008 ***  -0.006 ***  -0.002 ** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
  2 years after -0.002   -0.002   0.000  
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
  3 years after 0.002   -0.000   0.002  
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
  4 years after 0.006 *  0.003   0.003 * 
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
  5 years after 0.010 ***  0.004 *  0.006 *** 
 (0.003) 
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Time x job loss: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before -0.002   -0.001   -0.001  
 (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.002)  
0 year 0.003   0.000   0.002  
 (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.002)  
1 year after 0.075 ***  0.054 ***  0.021 *** 
 (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.005)  
2 years after 0.072 ***  0.055 ***  0.017 *** 
 (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.005)  
3 years after 0.073 ***  0.051 ***  0.022 *** 
 (0.010)   (0.008)   (0.005)  
4 years after 0.073 ***  0.055 ***  0.018 ** 
 (0.010) 
  (0.009)   (0.006)  
5 years after 0.066 ***  0.034 ***  0.032 *** 
 (0.011) 
  (0.009)   (0.007)  
Constant 0.016 ***  0.011 ***  0.006 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
N (person-spells) 68498  68498  68498 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. All outcomes are conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 2000-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S19 Effects of job loss on part-time employment (FE linear probability models) 
 
Part-time 
employment  
 Marginal part-
time employment 
 Regular part-
time employment 
 Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)   Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before -0.011 ***  -0.002 ***  -0.008 *** 
 (0.001) 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
  0 year -0.046 ***  -0.008 ***  -0.038 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
  1 year after -0.016 ***  -0.003 ***  -0.013 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
  2 years after -0.007 ***  -0.002 *  -0.005 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
  3 years after 0.001   -0.001   0.002  
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
  4 years after 0.008 ***  0.001   0.007 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
  5 years after 0.016 ***  0.003 *  0.014 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
Time x job loss: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before 0.001   0.000   0.001  
 (0.005)   (0.002)   (0.004)  
0 year -0.003   -0.002   -0.001  
 (0.005)   (0.002)   (0.004)  
1 year after 0.048 ***  0.015 ***  0.033 *** 
 (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.007)  
2 years after 0.042 ***  0.009 *  0.033 *** 
 (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.006)  
3 years after 0.045 ***  0.009 *  0.036 *** 
 (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.007)  
4 years after 0.052 ***  0.011 *  0.041 *** 
 (0.008) 
  (0.004)   (0.007)  
5 years after 0.048 ***  0.018 ***  0.030 *** 
 (0.009) 
  (0.005)   (0.007)  
Constant 0.043 ***  0.008 ***  0.035 *** 
 (0.002) 
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
N (person-spells) 113361  113361  113361 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. All outcomes are conditional on employment. 
Sources: SOEP 1988-2015, author’s calculations. 
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Table S20 Effects of job loss on temporary agency employment (FE linear probability model) 
 
 
 
 
 Temporary agency 
employment 
  
     Coef. (SE)  
Time: 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  
       
  1 year before       0.000  
  
     (0.002)  
  0 year       -0.006 ** 
  
     (0.002)  
  1 year after       -0.008 *** 
  
     (0.002)  
  2 years after       -0.011 *** 
  
     (0.002)  
  3 years after       -0.009 *** 
  
     (0.003)  
  4 years after       -0.009 *** 
  
     (0.003)  
  5 years after       -0.008 ** 
  
     (0.003)  
Time x job loss: 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘  
       
1 year before       -0.011  
       (0.006)  
0 year       0.004  
       (0.007)  
1 year after       0.051 *** 
       (0.011)  
2 years after       0.044 *** 
       (0.011)  
3 years after       0.028 ** 
       (0.011)  
4 years after       0.016  
  
     (0.011)  
5 years after       0.007  
  
     (0.012)  
Constant       0.042 *** 
       (0.003) 
 
N (person-spells)     62500 
Notes: Matched sample. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,* p<0.05. Standard errors clustered by worker are shown in 
parentheses. Outcome is conditional on dependent employment. 
Sources: SOEP 2001-2015, author’s calculations.  
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Abstract 
Previous research has illustrated that unemployment not only has short-term, but also medi-
um-term negative effects on workers’ careers. While most studies have focused on employ-
ment chances and earnings losses, this article examines the effects of unemployment on four 
different facets of non-monetary job quality in Europe. Specifically, I take a comparative per-
spective investigating to what extent the effects of unemployment on subsequent occupational 
status, autonomy, authority, and job security are moderated by countries’ economic situation 
and institutions, including active and passive labor market policies in addition to employment 
protection legislation. The analyses draw on micro data from round 1 to 7 (2002-2014) of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) including harmonized information about 125,000 workers 
nested in 34 countries for up to 7 rounds. Using two-stage multi-level models, the first-stage 
micro-level analyses reveal that unemployment has negative effects on all four facets of non-
monetary job quality in the majority of the 164 country-rounds examined. Specifically, job 
security is negatively affected by experiences of unemployment within the last five years. 
However, at odds with the theoretical predictions, the second-stage macro-level analyses do 
not provide consistent empirical evidence for the moderating role of economic situation and 
labor market policies.  
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1. Introduction 
A large literature in the social sciences has illustrated that job loss and unemployment not 
only have short-term, but also medium-term negative effects on workers’ careers (see Brand 
2015; von Wachter 2010; OECD 2013 for recent reviews). In the wake of the financial crisis 
in 2007-2008 and its aftermath, interest in the so-called scar effects of unemployment has 
been renewed among researchers and policy-makers. While most previous studies have fo-
cused on unemployment’s negative effects on subsequent employment and earnings, little 
attention has been paid to its consequences for non-monetary facets of job quality such as 
occupational status, autonomy, authority, and job security (see Brand 2006; Dieckhoff 2011; 
Oesch and Baumann 2015 for exceptions). This is surprising, given that research on job quali-
ty has a long tradition (Jencks et al. 1988) and a growing literature across different disciplines 
highlights that workers’ well-being cannot be measured by earnings alone (e.g., Gallie 2007; 
Green 2006). The need for a multidimensional analysis of job quality is also mirrored in 
workers’ opinions on what makes a good job. For example, Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2011: 
16) find that “the most valued attribute … is job security” and that, besides a high income, 
workers “are also quite concerned about the nature of the job, whether it is interesting and 
useful to society.” Accordingly, previous research reveals that a variety of bad working condi-
tions negatively affect life satisfaction suggesting that the quality of work is essential for indi-
viduals’ overall well-being (e.g., Drobnič et al. 2010). 
Moreover, while researchers have started to examine how the effects of unemployment vary 
at the individual-level, for example by gender or immigration status (e.g., Birkelund et al. 
2017; Kuhn 2002; Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom 2015), only few studies have taken a compara-
tive perspective, examining how macro-level factors such as countries’ economic situation 
and institutions moderate the effects of unemployment on workers’ careers. Studies that have 
investigated cross-country differences in the effects of unemployment point to the importance 
of labor market policies such as unemployment insurance, training programs, or employment 
protection legislation (Dieckhoff 2011; Gangl 2006). However, among the latter only 
Dieckhoff (2011) has focused on non-monetary job quality. Using the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) she examined the effect of unemployment on job authority, subjec-
tive and objective job security, and job satisfaction in Austria, Denmark, Spain, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom. The results showed that unemployment has negative effects on authority as well 
as subjective and objective job security for at least two years after re-employment. The re-
vealed cross-country differences were in line with institutional variation for some facets of 
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non-monetary job quality but not for others. The study did not address the moderating role of 
macro-level variables empirically. However, from a policy point of view, it is important to 
understand to what extent cross-country differences are shaped by economic situation and 
specific labor market policies. 
Therefore, I address the following two separate but interrelated research questions. First, what 
are the effects of unemployment on four different facets of non-monetary job quality? Second, 
to what extent do countries’ economic situation and labor market policies moderate these ef-
fects? The first question is located at the micro-level and examines the effects of unemploy-
ment on non-monetary job quality within different countries and at different points in time. It 
builds the foundation for the second question that asks for the role of a variety of macro-level 
variables in explaining the variation in the effects of unemployment. 
Using micro-data from the European Social Survey (ESS), including information about 34 
countries for up to 7 rounds (2002-2014), this article complements previous studies in various 
ways. First, expanding on studies that solely focus on employment and earnings, it examines 
four different facets of non-monetary job quality, including occupational status, autonomy, 
authority, and job security. Thus, the micro-level analyses offer a multidimensional and com-
prehensive analysis of the costs of unemployment in terms of job quality. These measures 
have been used in previous studies this topic (Brand 2006; Dieckhoff 2011) and reflect im-
portant dimensions of job quality (e.g., Findlay et al. 2013 for a review).1 Second, comple-
menting previous comparative studies (e.g., Dieckhoff 2011) I examine the moderating role of 
economic situation as well as three different labor market policies by means of two-stage mul-
ti-level models (Lewis and Linzer 2005). Specifically, this article investigates active labor 
market polices, unemployment insurance benefits, and employment protection legislation. 
Moreover, I take advantage of the fact that the ESS not only allows for comparisons between 
countries, but also to examine the effects of within-country changes in economic conditions 
and labor market policies on the effect of unemployment on non-monetary job quality. Using 
this within-variation by including country fixed-effects controls for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries, such as social policy traditions or compositional differences, 
as well as reduces concerns about the cross-national comparability of job quality measures. 
Third, this article’s comparative focus also complements research that has focused on effect 
                                                     
1 While autonomy and job security figure prominently in different definitions of job quality (Findlay et al. 2013), 
occupational status (Brand 2006) and job authority (Brand 2006, Dieckhoff 2011) have been investigated in 
previous studies. Therefore, the latter measures allow discussing the results of this study in relation to previous 
findings.  
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heterogeneity at the micro-level (e.g., Birkelund et al. 2017, Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom 
2015), by investigating how the average effects for each country vary with their economic 
situations and institutional set-ups.2 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: the next section addresses the questions 
why unemployment should have a negative effect on job quality (micro-level, first step) and 
how economic situation and labor market policies are expected to moderate this effect (mac-
ro-level, second step). The following sections present the data, measures, and analytic strategy 
followed by a discussion of the results. The last section summarizes the findings and offers 
some concluding remarks. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 Micro-level: The effect of unemployment on job quality 
Considering the relationship between employees and employers at the micro-level, the ques-
tion arises why unemployment should have negative effects on job quality. Previous studies 
have identified three different, but interrelated mechanisms that explain how unemployment 
causes scar effects. 
First, human capital theory distinguishes between general and specific skills, where the latter 
are not transferable across firms and only partly across occupations or industries (Becker 
1993). Specifically, the longer an employee works for a firm, the more firm-specific skills are 
acquired and rewarded in terms of a higher job quality. Becoming unemployed and having to 
take employment different from one’s prior line of work goes along with losing the rewards to 
firm-specific skills and potentially occupation- or industry-specific human capital. Corrobo-
rating empirical evidence is presented in studies that find larger earnings losses for workers 
with higher pre-unemployment tenure as well as for those who change occupations or indus-
tries (Brand, 2015). Moreover, it is sometimes argued that work interruptions also result in the 
depreciation of general human capital. For example, Edin and Gustavsson (2008: 171-175) 
find a positive relationship between time out of work and deprecation of general work-related 
skills. Given the loss of rewards to specific and the depreciation of general human capital, 
                                                     
2 By average effects I mean that no subgroup differences between workers within countries are examined. For 
example, I do not estimate separate effects for women and men within each country. I also use regression meth-
ods that only model differences in conditional expectations/means, leaving changes in other aspects of the condi-
tional distribution unexamined. Although this is standard in the social sciences, it should be noted that means do 
not necessarily represent distributions very well (e.g., Maggino 2017) (see also footnote 7). 
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unemployed workers will likely receive job offers of lower job quality compared with their 
pre-unemployment jobs. 
Theories of signaling or unemployment stigma offer a second explanation for scar effects. 
The key idea is that employers overcome uncertainty about applicants’ productivity by con-
sidering observable characteristics such as their employment history (Spence 1973). Irrespec-
tive of unemployment’s actual effects on skills and knowledge, employers may view it as a 
signal of low productivity. This will weaken unemployed persons bargaining power and result 
in fewer and lower quality job offers (e.g., Lockwood 1991). In a recent field-experiment 
Kroft et al. (2013) manipulated the length of unemployment spells in fictitious résumés find-
ing that the likelihood of an invitation to a job interview decreases with the signaled unem-
ployment duration. 
Lastly, job search theories assume that job-seekers’ decisions to accept or reject a job offer 
are determined by their reservation wage (e.g., Mortensen, 1986). The latter reflects the low-
est job quality at which a worker is willing to accept a particular job offer and is affected by 
job searchers’ characteristics, but also by search constraints, such as the number of incoming 
job offers and workers’ available income. Given that most unemployed persons face financial 
constraints, because unemployment benefits or other income sources like savings or family 
income are used up over time, they likely have to accept job offers that are associated with a 
lower job quality compared with their pre-unemployment job. In other words, due to these 
search constraints newly formed job matches after becoming unemployed tend to be of a low-
er quality than those matches the workers had formed before. Previous research also attest to 
the significance of search constraints by showing that unemployment has less negative effects 
on workers’ careers if they receive unemployment benefits (e.g., Gangl 2004). 
A few previous studies have also examined to what extent the effects of job loss and unem-
ployment on job quality vary by workers’ characteristics such as gender, immigration status, 
or parenthood. In terms of employment and wages, Kuhn (2002) reports that job loss has more 
negative consequences for women. Following job search theories, this may be explained by 
their greater search constraints concerning geographical mobility. In contrast, Mooi-Reci and 
Ganzeboom (2015) find that wage losses due to unemployment are more short-lived for wom-
en and strongly persistent for men. With respect to immigration status the results are also 
mixed. While Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom (2015) find for the Netherlands more negative 
wages effects for non-Dutch workers, a recent field experiment by Birkelund et al. (2017) 
shows no multiplicative disadvantage for unemployed ethnic minorities in terms of callback 
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rates for job applications. Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom (2015) also investigated effect hetero-
geneity by parenthood finding, however, no statistically significant differences for either 
women or men. While these studies show that the effects of unemployment on subsequent job 
quality may vary across subgroups of workers, in this article, I focus on the average effects 
for workers within each country, in order to examine the moderating role of macro-level vari-
ables. 
Figure 1 summarizes the arguments showing that unemployment and job quality are linked 
through the micro-level mechanisms of loss of rewards to and/or depreciation of human capi-
tal, unemployment stigma or negative signaling, and lower match quality due to search con-
straints. Based on these mechanisms, I derive the following micro-level hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Unemployment compared to continuous employment has a negative effect on 
subsequent job quality. 
Figure 1 Micro-macro model regarding the effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality 
as well as the moderating role of economic situation and labor market policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Own illustration. 
2.2 Macro-level: The moderating role of economic situation and labor market policies 
Given that job quality scars can be explained by the interaction of unemployed persons’ job 
search and employers’ hiring behaviors at the micro-level, it is expected that macro-level var-
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iables which govern these interactions, such as economic conditions and institutions, are im-
portant moderators. 
With respect to economic situation, job search theory predicts that in slack labor markets, 
indicated, for example, by high unemployment or low growth, unemployed workers receive 
fewer job offers decreasing their reservation wage. In other words, workers losing their job in 
a poor economic situation often have to accept jobs with a lower job quality compared to their 
pre-unemployment job, because of the lack of better opportunities (e.g., Gangl 2006).3 Specif-
ically, if economic downturns push workers to accept jobs in occupations or industries they 
have not been trained for, the loss of specific human capital likely results in stronger negative 
effects on job quality. The unemployment stigma mechanism is ambiguous: while a poor eco-
nomic situation increases unemployment durations, and, thereby, also stigma, individual un-
employment is also less informative about individuals’ productivity in these contexts (Kroft et 
al. 2013). Overall, the job search and human capital mechanisms are expected to dominate.4 
Hypothesis 2: The poorer the economic situation in a country, the stronger the negative effect 
of unemployment on subsequent job quality. 
With respect to passive labor market policies, I mainly focus on the generosity of unemploy-
ment insurance in terms of income replacement and benefit duration. Based on job search 
theories, Burdett (1979) describes unemployment insurance as a “search subsidy” meaning 
that the additional income increases workers’ reservation wage. Put differently, the decom-
modification of workers through unemployment benefits increases their bargaining power 
such that they can reject poor job offers and continue the search for adequate re-employment. 
Consequently, workers are less likely to be pushed into occupations or industries outside of 
their qualifications, meaning that a complete loss of rewards to specific human capital is 
avoided. In summary, job search theory predicts that generous unemployment benefits extend 
unemployment durations and, thereby, increase the matching quality. While longer unem-
ployment durations may also increase unemployment stigma, this effect can be assumed to be 
weaker, because employers in these countries know that prolonged job searches are rather due 
                                                     
3 The theoretical argumentation focuses on what Gangl (2006: 990) calls the “behavioral implications” of macro-
level variables. However, economic conditions and labor market policies may also affect who becomes unem-
ployed and re-employed. For example, in countries with poor economic conditions, the re-employed may be 
composed of individuals who are less negatively affected by job loss.  
4 In this study, we focus on variation in the economic situation across countries and over time. Of course, differ-
ences in economic situations within countries across regions or industries may also result in different effects of 
past unemployment on subsequent job quality (see also footnote 10). 
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to workers increased bargaining power than their low productivity. Accordingly, I derive the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The more generous the unemployment benefits in a country, the weaker the 
negative effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality. 
Besides passive labor market policies, countries also differ in their use of active labor market 
policies (ALMP), which can be assumed to mitigate the negative effects of unemployment by 
counteracting the loss of rewards to specific as well as the depreciation of general skills. Spe-
cific education updates workers’ skills to changing demands (e.g., Gangl, 2006), reducing 
losses associated with changes of occupations or industries. General education and on-the-job 
training are thought to stop the depreciation of general skills. The effects are likely to be more 
positive if programs are tailored to job searchers’ needs. While ALMP overall is expected to 
decrease stigma, it is occasionally argued that in some countries participating in specific pro-
grams may rather send a negative signal. The creation of private and public job opportunities 
is also thought to buffer the negative effects as in line with job search theory the number of 
available job offers increases. Overall, ALMP are assumed to moderate the negative effect of 
unemployment on job quality in the following way: 
Hypothesis 4: The more support unemployed workers receive through ALMP in a country, the 
weaker the negative effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality. 
Lastly, it is often argued that employment protection legislation (EPL), governing the hiring 
and firing of workers, moderates the scar effects of unemployment (e.g., Gangl 2006). Focus-
ing on EPL for regular contracts, economic theory assumes that stricter job security provi-
sions reduce labor market dynamics and, therefore, result in an involuntary extension of un-
employment which, in turn, should be associated with a greater depreciation of general human 
capital and unemployment stigma. Given the longer unemployment duration, it is also more 
likely that search constraints gain in importance, pushing workers to accept jobs that have a 
lower job quality than their pre-unemployment position. For example, if stricter job security 
provisions create barriers to regular employment, due to employers risk-averse hiring, unem-
ployed workers may be hired on temporary contracts that provide less job security, but are 
also often associated with lower job quality (Dieckhoff 2011). 
Hypothesis 5: The stricter the employment protection legislation for regular contracts in a 
country, the stronger the negative effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality. 
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3. Data and methods 
3.1 Micro data  
I use comparative data of round 1 to 7 (2002-2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS) cov-
ering up to 36 countries. The ESS is collected biannually and the majority of countries partic-
ipate repeatedly.5 The data are based on random probability samples in each country and 
round and the population of interest is all persons aged 15 and over resident within private 
households. The ESS was explicitly created to provide comparable data across countries and 
time and standardizes all important aspects of survey methodology (Fitzgerald and Jowell, 
2010). I chose the ESS not only because it is the only comparative survey that includes data 
on past unemployment and non-monetary job quality for a large number of countries at differ-
ent points in time, but also because it has been attested a high quality. For example, next to 
winning the Descartes Price of the European Union for its advancements in survey research, 
an evaluation of the sampling quality by Kohler (2008) comparing the ESS 2002 with four 
other European surveys suggests that it performed best on all of four separate criteria (i.e., 
documentation, sampling process, external criteria for representativity, internal criteria for 
representativity). 
For the analyses, data from all rounds are pooled and the sample is restricted to employees 
aged 20 to 64, who do not work in the armed forces.6 It includes roughly 125,000 workers 
nested in 34 countries for up to 7 rounds. The average number of workers across all 164 coun-
try-rounds is about 762 ranging from 175 in Albania (2012) to 1302 in Germany (2014).7 Alt-
hough I aimed at using as many of the country-rounds as possible, 12 of the 176 potential 
country-rounds had to be excluded from the micro-level analyses, mostly because information 
on one or more of the key variables is not available (see supplementary material S1 for de-
tails). 
                                                     
5 I use the following integrated data files: ESS 1: Edition 6.4, ESS 2: Edition 3.4, ESS 3: Edition 3.5, ESS 4: 
Edition 4.3, ESS 5: Edition 3.2, ESS 6: Edition 2.2, ESS 7: Edition 2.0. For the imputation models I also use the 
following data from the interviewer questionnaires: ESS 1: Edition 5.1, ESS 2: Edition 3.2, ESS 3: Edition 2.0, 
ESS 4: Edition 2.0, ESS 5: Edition 3.0, ESS 6: Edition 2.1, ESS 7: Edition 2.0. The data are provided by the 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. 
6 Self-employed individuals have been excluded, because the theories that predict negative effects of past unem-
ployment on job quality do not usually apply. Individuals reporting an occupation in the armed forces have been 
excluded, too, because they are not differentiated in ISCO-88. 
7 As explained in footnote 2, I do not examine subgroup differences between workers within countries. This has 
two reasons. First, the sample sizes for subgroups within countries are often too low to reliably estimate the 
effects of unemployment within these. Second, focusing on average effects makes sense as a first step, because 
research on the effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality is still very scarce and the theoretical 
derivations presented do not suggest that the labor market policies I consider are targeted at specific subgroups. 
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While the ESS goes to great lengths to maximize comparability and homogenize data quality 
across countries and rounds, some issues remain. Specifically, exploratory analyses show that, 
on average, across all 164 country-rounds, 14 percent of workers have missing values on one 
or more variable. Furthermore, the percentage of complete cases ranges from 58 percent in the 
United Kingdom (2012) to 97 percent to Norway (2004). To handle missing data at the micro-
level, I use multiple imputation to create and analyze ten multiply imputed data sets. Com-
pared to other missing data techniques, it improves the accuracy and power of the analyses 
(Schafer and Graham 2002). Specifically, all incomplete variables are imputed under a fully 
conditional specification (White et al. 2011). The micro-level analyses are performed for each 
imputed dataset and the estimates and standard errors are combined using Rubin’s rules (Ru-
bin 1978). The imputation and analyses are done in Stata 13.1 using the mi package. Supple-
mentary material S2 provides details about missing data, the imputation models, and diagnos-
tics. It also shows that the estimates of the effects of unemployment on non-monetary job 
quality are very similar if instead complete case analyses are used. 
3.2 Micro-level variables 
The key independent variable is past unemployment. The respondents are asked whether they 
have ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months and 
whether any of these periods have been within the last five years. For the analyses, I compare 
workers who report unemployment in the last five years with those who do not. Because un-
employment periods last for at least three months and respondents report seeking work, it 
likely captures more involuntary than voluntary unemployment, although no information 
about the reason for unemployment is available. The restriction to unemployment within the 
last five years also increases the interpretability of the results by directing the attention to the 
medium-term effects of past unemployment. 
The key dependent variable non-monetary job quality is measured by the following four indi-
cators: occupational status, autonomy, authority, and job security. These measures have been 
used in previous studies (e.g., Brand 2006; Dieckhoff 2011) and reflect important dimensions 
of job quality.8 Occupational status is measured by the standard occupational prestige scale 
(SIOPS) which, according to Ganzeboom and Treimann (2003: 173), reflects the “social re-
                                                     
8 Unfortunately, the data used do not include repeated measures of earnings. The data do, however, include a 
question on whether respondents’ have taken courses or attended lectures or conferences. Although this may 
represent another dimension of job quality (“continued training”), the question does not allow identifying wheth-
er the training is employer-funded. It may also include participation in ALMP making it not suitable for the cur-
rent analysis. 
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wards (approval, admiration, deference, contempt) people can expect in human interactions” 
based on their jobs.9 This corresponds well with workers’ appreciation of jobs that are inter-
esting, helpful to other people, and useful to society (Muñoz de Bustillo et al. 2011). Autono-
my conceptually reflects the dimension of task discretion (Findlay et al. 2013). The respective 
question in the ESS main questionnaire is “Please say how much the management at your 
work allows you to decide how your own daily work is organized?” The answers range from 
“0 I have no influence” to “10 I have complete control” on an 11-point scale. Another job 
quality dimension is authority representing workers’ status within their workplace (Dieckhoff 
2011). It may also be indicative of the extent to which workers can participate in relevant de-
cision-making. In the ESS main questionnaire authority is measured by the question “In your 
main job, do you have any responsibility for supervising the work of other employees?” with 
“Yes” and “No” as possible answers. The questionnaire also makes clear the “supervising” 
refers to “both monitoring and being responsible for the work of others”. Finally, job security 
has been identified as one of the most important dimensions of job quality by both researchers 
and workers (e.g., Munoz de Bustillo et al. 2011). I use type of contract as an objective meas-
ure defining job security as having a contract of unlimited duration compared to workers with 
contracts of limited duration and those who do not have a contract at all. 
In general, all measures used can be considered objective in the sense that employees report 
their working conditions instead of their subjective satisfaction with the job or specific aspects 
of it. The latter measures are not used here, because they not only reflect objective working 
conditions but also job values making the interpretation of the results more difficult 
(Dieckhoff 2011). For example, if one would not find a negative effect of unemployment on 
job satisfaction this may either be explained by the fact that there is no effect on objective 
working conditions or due to a combination of changes in both working conditions and job 
values. 
The analyses also control for a number of variables that may confound the association be-
tween past unemployment and job quality. Besides socio-demographics, such as age and sex, 
individuals’ years of education as well as their social origin is controlled. Social origin is 
measured by the educational qualifications of the parents as well as the question whether or 
                                                     
9 I translated the four-digit ISCO-88 (COM) and ISCO-08 codes that are provided in the ESS into SIOPS using 
the conversion tools of Ganzeboom and Treiman. In round 6 and 7 the ESS changed its occupational coding 
from ISCO-88 (COM) to ISCO-08. The ISCO-08 codes have been translated into ISCO-88 before conversion 
into SIOPS. For occupational codes that are unique to ISCO-88 (COM), SIOPS is assigned using two- or three-
digit level information.  
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not the mother was working at age 14. For these control variables it is assumed that they af-
fect both workers’ unemployment risk and job quality. For example, older workers may have 
a lower risk of unemployment, because they have higher tenure or contracts of unlimited du-
ration. At the same time, they may hold positions of higher job quality due to their greater 
work experience. Similarly, it is known that education shields workers from unemployment 
and that employers reward higher qualifications with higher job quality. 
We explicitly do not control for variables that represent important mechanisms for the effect 
of unemployment on job quality. For example, a worker’s current tenure, occupation, and 
industry will at least in part reflect the loss of rewards to specific human capital. Adjusting for 
these variables would induce so-called overcontrol bias in estimating the total effect of unem-
ployment on non-monetary job quality (Elwert 2013). Details about the measurement are giv-
en in Table 1. 
3.3 Macro data and macro-level variables 
The ESS is complemented with time-varying macro data about unemployment rates, GDP 
growth, unemployment benefit generosity, active and passive labor market policies, and em-
ployment protection legislation (see supplementary material S3 for references). Because relia-
ble estimates of the effects of macro-level variables require a sufficient number of macro-
level observations, all efforts were made to assemble data for as many country-rounds as pos-
sible. However, not all indicators are available for all country-rounds. Therefore, the macro-
level analyses will focus on the 26 countries and 124 country-rounds with complete data (see 
supplementary material S1 for details). Table 1 offers a summary of the macro-level variables 
and Table 2, in addition, provides descriptive statistics for each of the 26 countries. 
Economic situation is measured by the harmonized unemployment rate from the Key Indica-
tors of the Labour Market (KILM) of the International Labour Organization (ILO). For a sen-
sitivity analysis, I also use the GDP growth per capita from the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) of the World Bank.10 
Information on unemployment benefit generosity is taken from the Comparative Welfare En-
titlement Data 2 (CWED 2) by Scruggs et al. (2014). These include harmonized time-varying 
information about net replacement rates and unemployment benefit duration in weeks. 
                                                     
10 While the labor market policies are designed and implemented at the national level, it would have been inter-
esting to examine variation in the economic situation at the regional or industry level, too (see also footnote 4). 
However harmonized information at these levels are not available for most of the examined countries. 
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Table 1 Measurement of the micro- and macro-level variables 
Variable Measurement 
Micro-level variables  
    Dependent variables  
        Occupational prestige a Standard occupational prestige scale (SIOPS) based on four-digit ISCO-88 (COM) and 
ISCO-08, Range: 6-78 
        Autonomy Allowed to decide how own daily work is organized? 
Range: 0 = I have no influence - 10 = I have complete influence 
        Authority 1 = responsible for supervising other employees, 0 = otherwise 
        Job insecurity 1 = contract of unlimited duration, 0 = no contract or contract of limited duration 
    Independent variables  
        Past unemployment 1 = experienced unemployment within the last 5 years, 0 = otherwise 
        Age In years 
        Sex 1 = female, 0 = male 
        Education Completed full-time education in years  
        Father’s education b Two categories according to ISCED: 1 = ISCED 3-6, 0 = ISCED 0-2  
        Mother’s education b Two categories according to ISCED: 1 = ISCED 3-6, 0 = ISCED 0-2 
        Mother’s employment at age 14 1 = employed, 0 = otherwise 
Macro-level variablesc  
    Unemployment rate  Unemployment rate in percent 
    GDP growth GDP growth per capita in percent (constant 2005 dollars)  
    Benefit generosity Index = average net replacement rate × benefit duration in percent of 48 months, 
Range: 0 = no benefits - 100 = full replacement for 48 months or longer 
    Passive labor market policies (PLMP) Expenditure per unemployed as percent of GDP per capita 
    Active labor market policies (ALMP) Expenditure per unemployed as percent of GDP per capita  
    Employment protection legislation (EPL) OECD EPL for regular contracts indicator (version1),  
Range: 0 = unregulated - 6 = highly regulated  
Notes: a Footnote 5 provides details about the conversion of ISCO-88 (COM) and ISCO-08 into SIOPS, b ISCED 3-6 reflect completed upper secondary education or higher 
and ISCED 0-1 reflect completed lower secondary education or less, c References to the macro data are given in supplementary material S3. 
Sources: Own illustration.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics on the macro-level variables 
Country Code N 
Unemployment 
rate 
GDP growth 
Unemployment 
benefit  
generosity 
PLMP  
expenditure 
ALMP  
expenditure 
EPL for  
regular contracts 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Austria AT 4 4.5 0.4 1.8 1.4 11.9 0.4 55.5 2.7 20.0 2.7 2.6 0.2 
Belgium BE 7 7.7 0.9 0.8 2.1 67.0 1.9 65.6 7.1 17.4 4.4 1.9 0.1 
Bulgaria BG 3 7.9 1.9 4.7 7.3 18.0 1.4 6.6 4.0 8.0 1.3 1.8 0.0 
Czech Republic CZ 5 7.3 1.3 2.2 4.6 5.9 0.7 7.3 2.7 3.2 1.2 3.2 0.1 
Denmark DK 7 5.3 1.3 0.1 2.7 54.3 12.4 76.1 22.3 51.1 10.4 2.1 0.0 
Estonia EE 4 9.4 3.9 2.9 11.7 8.2 1.8 7.4 7.9 1.2 0.5 2.9 0.1 
Finland FI 6 8.7 1.4 0.8 4.8 29.5 1.0 39.1 3.2 16.7 3.2 2.2 0.1 
France FR 5 8.4 0.5 0.2 2.1 34.3 0.7 39.0 5.1 19.1 2.3 2.4 0.0 
Germany DE 7 8.6 1.7 0.7 3.1 16.4 0.0 39.7 7.8 18.5 5.4 2.7 0.0 
Greece GR 3 10.1 1.6 1.9 1.5 13.9 0.2 8.1 0.8 3.1 1.7 2.8 0.0 
Hungary HU 3 8.2 1.6 -0.4 5.6 10.0 0.9 13.2 2.4 8.3 0.7 2.0 0.0 
Ireland IE 7 7.1 4.4 2.6 4.8 13.9 1.3 38.3 2.4 23.3 10.9 1.4 0.1 
Italy IT 2 9.7 2.8 -2.2 5.3 8.0 3.4 27.4 20.0 10.9 0.1 2.8 0.0 
Latviaa LV 1 10.0  11.9  13.5  4.5  2.2  2.3  
Lithuania LT 2 9.0 6.8 -0.7 18.6 8.1 0.5 7.3 2.4 6.9 5.6 3.0 0.5 
Netherlands NL 7 3.6 0.8 1.1 2.8 37.9 2.0 84.4 25.2 46.8 19.4 2.9 0.0 
Norway NO 7 3.5 0.7 0.5 1.7 42.2 9.4 23.6 5.2 28.6 2.6 2.3 0.0 
Poland PL 6 14.3 4.9 3.8 2.0 7.7 0.9 11.0 1.3 6.6 4.0 2.2 0.0 
Portugal PT 7 7.5 3.0 0.2 2.3 40.7 4.2 30.9 9.2 14.4 6.6 4.4 0.2 
Romaniaa RO 1 7.2  4.8  12.8  11.8  3.2  1.9  
Slovak Republic SK 5 15.2 3.5 4.1 6.1 8.5 1.9 6.0 3.1 2.0 0.4 2.3 0.1 
Slovenia SI 3 5.7 0.9 0.5 8.0 12.9 0.3 14.4 4.6 6.1 1.9 2.9 0.2 
Spain ES 7 13.4 5.0 0.9 2.8 37.9 0.8 28.7 4.9 11.4 3.5 2.3 0.1 
Sweden SE 5 7.1 1.2 0.6 3.7 20.3 2.2 25.6 11.0 22.4 5.0 2.6 0.0 
Switzerland CH 6 3.6 0.7 0.6 2.3 34.5 4.9 35.8 7.7 23.7 4.8 1.6 0.0 
United Kingdom GB 4 6.4 1.6 0.1 3.4 3.8 0.1 7.4 1.2 1.4 0.5 1.3 0.0 
Notes: Table 1 provides details about the measurement, all indicators are measured with a lag of three years to approximate the economic situation or labor market policies at 
the time of unemployment, a No within-country standard deviation reported, because only one round is available. 
Sources: Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) of the International Labor Office (ILO), World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank, Comparative Welfare 
Entitlement Dataset 2 (CWED2) of Scruggs et al. (2014), OECD, Eurostat, EPL for regular contracts of Avdagic (2015); Supplementary material S3 provides references. Own 
calculations. 
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The latter are re-expressed in percent of 48 months meaning that countries that offer unlimited 
duration or a duration of 48 months or more have a value of 100. To measure benefit generos-
ity an index was constructed that multiplies the average of the net replacement rates for two 
household types (i.e., single and family) with the benefit duration in percent of 48 months. 
This index takes values between 0 and 100. To give an example, a country with an average 
replacement rate of 0.7 and a benefit duration of 1 year has a value of 17.5 (=0.7*((12/48) 
*100)). Another measure of decommodification is the expenditure on passive labor market 
policies (PLMP) per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita. This measure is used for 
a sensitivity analysis. Although it covers unemployment assistance in addition to insurance as 
well as is more sensitive to the structure of unemployment across countries, it is less clear 
which aspects of decommodification are captured. Similarly, to assess how much support the 
unemployed receive through active labor market policies (ALMP), the expenditure on ALMP 
per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita is considered. The latter includes, for ex-
ample, expenditure on training, employment incentives, and job creation. Expenditure data are 
taken from OECD and Eurostat. 
Information on employment protection legislation (EPL) is taken from OECD (e.g., Veen 
2009). For a few Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the OECD indicator has 
been complemented by information from Avdagic (2015) who scored CEE countries follow-
ing the OECD approach. For the analyses, I focus on version 1 of the EPL indicator for regu-
lar contracts. The indicator is constructed from a number of items that capture different as-
pects of job security provisions (e.g., severance pay, advance notification) and varies between 
0 (unregulated) and 6 (regulated). 
3.4 Methods 
Since the individual-level data from the ESS (level 1) are nested within rounds (level 2) and 
countries (level 3), I use a multi-level model to take account of this structure. A general three-
level model can be written as follows: 
(1)    𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝=1 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the job quality for a worker 𝑖𝑖 nested in round 𝑡𝑡 and country 𝑗𝑗. 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are 𝑃𝑃 indi-
vidual-level variables such as past unemployment, age, and years of education, and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an 
individual-level error term. The variation of 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 across rounds and countries is modeled as a 
function of 𝑄𝑄 time-varying country-level variables 𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and a country-level error term 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
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(level 2 and 3) where the former include the indicators for economic situation and labor mar-
ket policies. 
 (2)    𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝0 +  ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝑍𝑍𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑞𝑞=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
This model can be fitted by either estimating the equations simultaneously, relying on so-
called mixed-effects models, or by using a two-stage approach (Lewis and Linzer 2005). In 
the latter, the individual-level parameters are estimated within each country-round (first stage) 
and, in a second stage, the estimated coefficients are used as the dependent variable in a mac-
ro-level regression. Compared to the simultaneous estimation, the two-stage approach is very 
flexible and allows all individual-level coefficients to vary across countries and rounds. This 
is important as not only the effects of past unemployment may vary across country-rounds, 
but also those of the control variables. In this article, I also use the two-stage approach be-
cause it reinforces the conceptual distinction between the micro- and macro-level analyses as 
well as allows implementing additional steps with respect to the former. 
Specifically, before estimating the effect of past unemployment on the different facets of non-
monetary job quality within each country-round (first stage), I preprocess the data by using 
coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2012). Preprocessing the data by matching 
workers who experienced unemployment with those who did not on the control variables 
(e.g., age, sex, years of education) makes the subsequent regression analyses less model-
dependent. It also restricts the data to the empirical common support in order to avoid model-
dependent extrapolations. CEM was performed separately within each country-round. After 
coarsening the age and years of education variable, exact matching on all control variables 
was performed. Balance checks comparing the differences in the control variables before and 
after CEM show that the matching was successful (see supplementary material S4 for details). 
The following micro-level analyses are all performed on the matched data. 
In the first-stage micro-level analyses for each country-round the respective non-monetary job 
quality indicator is regressed on past unemployment as well as the control variables. For the 
continuous control variables, age and education squared terms are included to allow for non-
linear effects. For the dependent variables, occupational prestige and autonomy, I estimate 
linear regression models and for the binary dependent variables, authority and job security, 
logistic regression models are estimated and average marginal effects are calculated. I used 
the provided design weights to take account of unequal selection probabilities in some coun-
try-rounds. 
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In the second-stage macro-level analyses the estimated past unemployment effects serve as 
the dependent variable and are regressed on time-varying indicators of economic conditions, 
labor market policies, and round dummies. Including dummies for each round allows control-
ling for common unobserved time-varying factors (e.g., common economic shocks). To take 
account of the uncertainty in the first-stage estimates, I follow the recommendation of the 
literature and use so-called estimated dependent variables (EDV) regression models in the 
second stage which are estimated by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) (Lewis and 
Linzer, 2005). To further consider the nesting, standard errors are clustered by countries. 
Moreover, the independent variables are measured with a three years lag to approximate the 
situation at job search. To increase the interpretability of the macro-level analyses all inde-
pendent variables were centered and standardized to unit variance. 
For the macro-level analyses, I estimate both EDV regression models without and with coun-
try fixed-effects. The latter models only use within-country variation over time to estimate the 
effects of economic situation and labor market policies on the past unemployment effect on 
non-monetary job quality. They serve as an important robustness check as they control for all 
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity between countries (e.g., social policy traditions, 
compositional differences) and reduce concerns about the cross-national comparability of the 
outcomes. 
4. Results 
4.1 Micro-level analyses 
Figure 2 shows the results of the first-stage micro-level analyses by plotting the distributions 
of the estimated past unemployment effects on the four indicators of non-monetary job quality 
for all country-rounds (Panels A-D). These estimates are based on regression models separate-
ly fitted to the matched data within each of the 164 available country-rounds. To give an ex-
ample, I highlighted the results for three country-rounds in Panel A. Using a linear regression 
of occupational prestige on past unemployment and the control variables, the negative effect 
of past unemployment is -5.36 scale points (90% CI: -7.79, -2.92) in Spain in 2012 (ES 2012). 
For Sweden in 2012 (SE 2012) and Spain (ES 2004) estimates of -4.22 (90% CI: -6.71, -1.72) 
and -1.37 (90% CI: -3.92, 1.17) are obtained. 
More generally, the distribution of the estimates indicates that in the majority of the country-
rounds unemployment within the last five years has a negative effect on current occupational 
prestige (Panel A). However, it also shows that the effects strongly vary across countries and
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Figure 2 Results of micro-level analyses: Effects of past unemployment on four indicators of non-monetary job quality 
 
Notes: Q1 = first quartile, Q3 = third quartile, distributions are smoothed by kernel density estimation with an epanechnikov kernel; ES 2012 (Spain), SE 2012 (Sweden),  
and ES 2004 (Spain) are only highlighted as examples of between- and within country variability (see text).  
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 164 country-rounds. Own calculations. 
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rounds. The median effect is -3.31 and 50 percent of the estimates range from -4.53 (first 
quartile) to -2.19 (third quartile). 
Similar results are obtained for the other measures of non-monetary job quality. Panel B 
shows the distribution of the effects for autonomy. Although the median effect of -0.54 is not 
very large, the results reveal that the negative effect of past unemployment on autonomy var-
ies substantially across country-rounds and that for about a quarter of the 164 available coun-
try-rounds the negative effect is at least -0.87 (first quartile). At the same time, Figure 3 
shows that in a quarter of the country-rounds unemployment does not seem to have any medi-
um-term effect on workers’ opportunities to decide about the organization of their own daily 
work (Q3=-0.18, third quartile). 
For the indicators of authority and job insecurity, I estimated logistic regression models and 
calculated average marginal effects. Panel C highlights that in most country-rounds workers 
who experienced unemployment in the last five years have a lower probability to hold a su-
pervising position. The median of the distribution is about -9 percentage points and in about 
10 percent of the country-rounds the negative effect exceeds -20 percentage points. This high-
lights that in some country-rounds past unemployment is associated with substantially signifi-
cant losses in authority. 
Lastly, considering job security (Panel D) the results show rather strong negative effects of 
past unemployment. The median across all country-rounds is -20 percentage points, indicating 
a substantially higher risk of having no contract at all or only a contract of limited duration. 
Moreover, looking at the distribution, we see that for almost all country-rounds past unem-
ployment decreases, on average, the probability of having a secure job. 
Overall, the results of the first-stage micro-level analyses are in line with hypothesis 1 as well 
as the findings of previous research (Brand 2006; Dieckhoff 2011), suggesting that unem-
ployment has medium-term negative effects on a variety of job quality indicators. Moreover, 
the analyses reveal substantial variation in the effects of past unemployment across countries 
and time, begging the question to what extent this can be explained by differences in econom-
ic conditions and labor market policies. 
4.2 Macro-level analyses 
To examine how the effects of past unemployment on job quality are moderated by economic 
situation and labor market policies the estimated effects are used as the dependent variable in 
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the second-stage macro-level analyses. For illustration, Figure 3 plots the effects of past un-
employment on occupational prestige (y-axis), including the respective 90 percent confidence 
intervals, against the unemployment rate before three years (x-axis). It also includes the re-
gression line from a bivariate EDV regression model of the past unemployment effects on the 
unemployment rate before three years. 
Figure 3 Moderating effect of unemployment rate on the effect of past unemployment on 
occupational prestige (Bivariate EDV regression model) 
 
Notes: Past unemployment effects on occupational prestige with 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 124 country-rounds; Table 1 and Table 2 provide 
details about the macro data. Own calculations. 
The results reveal that a higher unemployment rate is associated with slightly smaller negative 
effects of past unemployment on occupational prestige. Specifically, a five percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate is predicted to decrease the negative effect by about 0.2 
scale points. This bivariate finding is at odds with hypothesis 2 stating that poor economic 
conditions result in larger negative effects of unemployment. However, to check whether the 
bivariate results are robust to controlling for other macro-level variables, the following para-
graphs report the findings for the multiple regression macro-level analyses. 
Figure 4 shows the results of the EDV regression models controlling for the other macro-level 
variables as well as period effects. For example, in the models for unemployment rate, I con-
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trol for benefit generosity, ALMP expenditure, EPL for regular contracts, and period effects 
(model 1, black circle). In a second specification (model 2, grey square), country fixed-effects 
are added to check whether the results are robust to unobserved time-constant heterogeneity 
between countries. These latter models only use within-country variation in unemployment 
rates over time to estimate the moderating effect of unemployment rate on the effect of past 
unemployment on job quality. Panel A to D report the results for the different indicators of 
non-monetary job quality. The coefficients are standardized and accompanied by 90 percent 
confidence intervals. Supplementary material S5 provides the corresponding results table. 
For occupational prestige (Figure 4, Panel A), the findings of the multiple regression analysis 
are similar to those for the bivariate analysis shown in Figure 3. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.26 scale point reduction in 
the negative effect of past unemployment, controlling for labor market policies and period 
effects (specification 1, black circle). The model that adds country fixed-effects yields a very 
similar estimate of 0.24 (specification 2, grey squares). At odds with hypothesis 2, these re-
sults suggest that economic conditions do not strongly affect the size of the negative effect of 
unemployment on occupational prestige. 
For benefit generosity the results differ between the two specifications. While the first speci-
fication suggests almost no effect, the EDV regression model that includes country fixed ef-
fects shows a substantially significant positive effect. A one standard deviation increase in 
benefit generosity is predicted to reduce the negative effects of past unemployment on occu-
pational prestige by 1.2 scale points. Although this finding is in line with hypothesis 3, sug-
gesting that higher benefit generosity buffers the negative effects of unemployment, the wide 
90 percent confidence interval indicates that the effect is estimated with high uncertainty. For 
expenditure on ALMP (hypothesis 4), neither specification suggests a moderating effect 
meaning that investments in ALMP do not neither weaken nor strengthen the negative effects 
of past unemployment on occupational prestige. 
In contrast with hypothesis 5, the results for EPL for regular contracts suggest that stricter 
protection reduces the negative effects of unemployment. However, this effect is rather small. 
A one standard deviation increase in EPL for regular contracts is predicted to reduce the nega-
tive effect by about 0.31 scale points. For EPL regular no estimates are reported based on the 
EDV regression models including country fixed-effects (specification 2, grey squares). Due to 
the very little within-country variation in EPL for regular contracts over time (see Table 2), 
these estimates are not considered reliable. 
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Figure 4 Results of macro-level analyses: Moderating effects of economic situation and labor market policies on the effects of past unemploy-
ment on four indicators of non-monetary job quality (EDV regression models, 90 percent confidence intervals) 
 
Notes: Models for unemployment rate control for labor market policies and period effects, models for labor market policies control for other labor market policies,  
unemployment rate, and period effects; Latvia and Romania are not used for models that include country fixed effects, because they are not observed repeatedly. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 26/24 countries, 124/122 country-rounds; Table 1 and Table 2 provide details about the macro data. 
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Similar results are shown for autonomy (Panel B) and authority (Panel C). For autonomy 
most moderating effects are small and not substantially significant (Panel B). Only for unem-
ployment rate and ALMP expenditure the models including country fixed-effects suggest a 
moderating role. For unemployment rate, this result is at odds with hypothesis 2, suggesting 
that a one standard deviation reduces the negative effect of past unemployment on autonomy 
by 0.13 scale points. Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in ALMP expenditure buff-
ers the negative effect of past unemployment on autonomy by about 0.17 scale points. How-
ever, both of these estimates are accompanied by a high uncertainty, as reflected in the wide 
90 percent confidence intervals. 
For authority (Panel C) only the EDV regression model including country fixed-effects re-
veals a moderating effect of ALMP. In line with hypothesis 3, a one standard deviation in-
crease in ALMP expenditure is predicted to buffer the negative effect of past unemployment 
on authority by about 3 percentage points. Again, although small, the moderating effect of 
EPL for regular contracts is at odds with the expectation that higher job security provisions 
are associated with more negative effects of unemployment on authority. 
Panel D shows the results for job security. The negative moderating effect of the unemploy-
ment rate supports the hypothesis that the negative effect of past unemployment on job securi-
ty is exacerbated by poor economic conditions. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase 
in the unemployment rate is predicted to increase the negative effect of unemployment on job 
security by about 4 percentage points. The model with country fixed-effects gives a smaller, 
but similar estimate (2 percentage points). The results for benefit generosity are, however, not 
in line with the theoretical predictions as the negative effect of past unemployment on job 
security increases with higher benefit generosity. For ALMP expenditure the effects are small 
and substantially insignificant, while the results for EPL for regular contracts are in line with 
hypothesis 5. A one standard deviation increase in EPL for regular contracts is predicted to 
increase the negative effect of past unemployment on job security by about 3 percentage 
points. 
To test the sensitivity of these results with respect to the measurement of the macro-level var-
iables, I repeated the analyses for economic situation by using GDP growth per capita instead 
of unemployment rate as an alternative indicator. For benefit generosity, I repeated the anal-
yses using PLMP per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita as an alternative indica-
tor. A comparison of the results with the original and alternative indicators is given in sup-
plementary material S6. For GDP growth per capita the conclusions are very similar to those 
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using unemployment rates. The negative effect of economic conditions in Panel D is, howev-
er, not resembled in the sensitivity analysis. For PLMP expenditure the results are somewhat 
more sensitive. For example, the positive buffering effect of benefit generosity for occupa-
tional prestige or the negative moderating effect for job security cannot be reproduced using 
PLMP expenditure. The implications of these results will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. 
5. Conclusions 
This article complements research on the medium-term effects of unemployment on non-
monetary job quality. Specifically, it examines how past unemployment affects four different 
facets of non-monetary job quality and to what extent these effects are moderated by differ-
ences in economic situation and labor market policies across countries and time. 
The analyses draw on data from round 1 to 7 (2002-2014) of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), which includes harmonized information about 125,000 workers nested in 34 countries 
for up to 7 rounds. Appling two-stage multi-level models, the first-stage micro-level analyses 
reveal that past unemployment negatively affects non-monetary job quality in the majority of 
the 164 country-rounds analyzed. Approaching job quality in a multidimensional way, it is 
found that workers who have experienced unemployment within the last five years have a 
lower occupational prestige, less autonomy and authority, and, in particular, face greater job 
insecurity compared with those who have not been unemployed. These results confirm previ-
ous findings about the scar effects of job loss and unemployment for workers’ subsequent 
careers and job quality (e.g., Brand 2006; Dieckhoff 2011). Specifically, Dieckhoff (2011) 
found similar results for job authority and job security using panel data and applying a differ-
ence-in-differences estimator for four European countries. Using data for the US, Brand 
(2006) showed that job loss results in long-term losses of occupational status and job authori-
ty. Overall, this suggests that research that only focuses on employment and earnings likely 
underestimates the negative effects of unemployment on workers’ subsequent careers. 
Moreover, the analyses reveal that the negative effects on job quality vary substantially across 
countries and time. This raises the question to what extent economic situation or labor market 
policies shape the size of the effects of past unemployment. To address this, the ESS data 
have been complemented by time-varying macro data about unemployment rates, GDP 
growth, unemployment benefit generosity, expenditure on active and passive labor market 
policies, and employment protection legislation for regular contracts. The second-stage mac-
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ro-level analyses show that neither economic situation nor the different labor market policies 
consistently moderate the negative effects of past unemployment. Similar to previous com-
parative research (e.g., Dieckhoff, 2011), I find that some macro-level variables have moder-
ating effects that are consistent with expectations, but that others do not correspond to the 
theoretical predictions. One potential explanation is that some of the mechanisms concerning 
the macro-level variables neutralize each other. For example, theory predicts that higher un-
employment rates increase stigma by prolonging unemployment, but also decrease stigma as 
unemployment is less informative about individual workers’ productivity. Similarly, while 
unemployment benefits increase unemployed workers’ bargaining power, they also extend 
unemployment duration, potentially fostering the depreciation of human capital or unem-
ployment stigma. Relatedly, heterogeneity in the moderating effects may explain the findings. 
For example, if some ALMP buffer the negative consequences, but others result in so-called 
lock-in effects or increase stigma, the overall effects may be close to zero. A last explanation 
may be that the effects of unemployment on job quality vary across workers and that cross-
country variation by labor market policies may only be revealed for specific subgroups. 
Although the results indicate that economic situation and labor market policies cannot con-
sistently explain the variation in the effects of unemployment on non-monetary job quality, 
the following limitations have to be considered. First, this study does not allow distinguishing 
different experiences of unemployment, for example, by taking into account information on 
the unemployment duration or the reason for unemployment. It, therefore, may underestimate 
the scar effects of particularly negative experiences, such as job loss coupled with long-term 
unemployment. Second, similar to most comparative research, the micro-level analyses are 
based on cross-sectional data and not all relevant confounders can be taken into account. 
Therefore, the estimates of the past unemployment effects may be biased. Previous research 
by Brand (2006), finds remarkably similar results when comparing estimates based on cross-
sectional and panel data, but this study focused on job displacements. Moreover, at the macro-
level the analyses include country fixed-effects allowing taking account of time-constant un-
observed heterogeneity between countries. Furthermore, in line with the majority of quantita-
tive comparative studies, we focused on the average effects of unemployment on subsequent 
job quality within in each country, leaving unexamined the moderating role of worker charac-
teristics. 
While the results do suggest that economic conditions or labor market policies have a limited 
role in moderating the negative effects of past unemployment on job quality, future research 
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should continue investigating potential moderators, making use of both quantitative multi-
level approaches as well as comparative case-studies. Specifically, effect heterogeneities at 
the micro-level should be taken into account as the effects of unemployment on job quality 
likely vary across workers and countries’ economic situation and institutional set-up may 
have different moderating effects for different subgroups of workers within countries. With 
respect to the moderating role of economic situation, it also is interesting to complement 
cross-country comparisons by studies using variation at the regional or industry level, to ex-
amine the effects of unemployment on subsequent careers for different economic conditions 
employers and employees face. Given the results of this and previous studies, an additional 
avenue for future research is to look at a variety of objective and subjective measures of job 
quality as well as to examine in how far the negative effects carry on in the long-run. Specifi-
cally, it may be interesting to investigate objective and subjective measures in parallel. While 
this article focused on the former, a joint analysis may improve our understanding of the po-
tential well-being consequences of poorer working conditions due to unemployment. For ex-
ample, future work could examine whether objectively lower job quality also translates into a 
lower job satisfaction and, therefore, a lower overall well-being or whether workers are able 
to uphold the latter, for instance, by adapting their job values.  
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Supplementary material S1 Country-rounds available for micro- and macro-level analyses 
For the micro-level analyses 164 country-rounds from 34 countries are available. The column 
“Micro data” in Table S1.1 highlights the available country-rounds in green. Four reasons of 
“non-availability” can be distinguished. First, the data for round 7 (2014) have not yet been 
released (see the text for the versions of the integrated files used) [1 country-round]. Second, 
the data are not part of the integrated data files [6 country-rounds]. For example, the European 
Social Survey has excluded the data from Italy in 2004 because they are not comparable with 
those of the other countries. Third, there are problems with important variables. Variables that 
are used for the analyses or the multiple imputation (see supplementary material S2) are either 
completely missing (e.g., in France in 2002 no information about the employment relation or 
the type of contract are available) or the variables have too many missing values (e.g., in Tur-
key in 2008 more than 30 percent of the data are missing for the variable “respondent under-
stood question” of the interviewer questionnaire which is needed for the imputation) [10 
country-rounds]. Fourth, there are problems with the imputation models. This refers to issues 
of perfect prediction in logistic regression models used for imputation that are due to very low 
sample sizes [2 country-rounds]. 
Table S1.1 also provides details about the availability of macro data. Columns (1) to (6) refer 
to the following macro-level variables: (1) GDP growth per capita, (2) unemployment rate, (3) 
unemployment benefit generosity, (4) PLMP expenditure, (5) ALMP expenditure, (6) EPL for 
regular contracts. See supplementary material S3 for references to the macro data and Table 1 
as well as Table 2 for details about measurement and descriptive statistics. Note that the mac-
ro data are measured with a lag of three years to approximate the situation at the time of job 
search. 
The first three columns in Table S1 highlight the 124 country-rounds that have micro and 
macro data and are, therefore, used for the second-stage macro-level analyses. 
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Table S 1.1 Available micro and macro data 
Country Code Round, year Micro data 
Macro data 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Albania AL 6, 2012        
Austria AT 1, 2002        
Austria AT 2, 2004        
Austria AT 3, 2006        
Austria AT 4, 2008 Not in integrated files       
Austria AT 5, 2010 Not in integrated files       
Austria AT 7, 2014        
Belgium BE 1, 2002        
Belgium BE 2, 2004        
Belgium BE 3, 2006        
Belgium BE 4, 2008        
Belgium BE 5, 2010        
Belgium BE 6, 2012        
Belgium BE 7, 2014        
Bulgaria BG 3, 2006        
Bulgaria BG 4, 2008        
Bulgaria BG 5, 2010        
Bulgaria BG 6, 2012        
Croatia HR 4, 2008        
Croatia HR 5, 2010        
Cyprus CY 3, 2006        
Cyprus CY 4, 2008        
Cyprus CY 5, 2010        
Cyprus CY 6, 2012        
Czech Republic CZ 1, 2002        
Czech Republic CZ 2, 2004        
Czech Republic CZ 4, 2008        
Czech Republic CZ 5, 2010        
Czech Republic CZ 6, 2012        
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Table S 1.1 continued 
Czech Republic CZ 7, 2014        
Denmark DK 1, 2002        
Denmark DK 2, 2004        
Denmark DK 3, 2006        
Denmark DK 4, 2008        
Denmark DK 5, 2010        
Denmark DK 6, 2012        
Denmark DK 7, 2014        
Estonia EE 2, 2004        
Estonia EE 3, 2006        
Estonia EE 4, 2008        
Estonia EE 5, 2010        
Estonia EE 6, 2012        
Estonia EE 7, 2014        
Finland FI 1, 2002 Problems with important variables        
Finland FI 2, 2004        
Finland FI 3, 2006        
Finland FI 4, 2008        
Finland FI 5, 2010        
Finland FI 6, 2012        
Finland FI 7, 2014        
France FR 1, 2002 Problems with important variables       
France FR 2, 2004 Problems with important variables       
France FR 3, 2006        
France FR 4, 2008        
France FR 5, 2010        
France FR 6, 2012        
France FR 7, 2014        
Germany DE 1, 2002        
Germany DE 2, 2004        
Germany DE 3, 2006        
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Table S 1.1 continued 
Germany DE 4, 2008        
Germany DE 5, 2010        
Germany DE 6, 2012        
Germany DE 7, 2014        
Greece GR 1, 2002        
Greece GR 2, 2004        
Greece GR 4, 2008        
Greece GR 5, 2010        
Hungary HU 1, 2002 Problems with important variables       
Hungary HU 2, 2004 Problems with important variables       
Hungary HU 3, 2006        
Hungary HU 4, 2008        
Hungary HU 5, 2010        
Hungary HU 6, 2012        
Hungary HU 7, 2014 Problems with important variables       
Iceland IS 2, 2004 Problems with important variables       
Iceland IS 6, 2012 Imputation model does not work       
Ireland IE 1, 2002        
Ireland IE 2, 2004        
Ireland IE 3, 2006        
Ireland IE 4, 2008        
Ireland IE 5, 2010        
Ireland IE 6, 2012        
Ireland IE 7, 2014        
Israel IL 1, 2002        
Israel IL 4, 2008        
Israel IL 5, 2010        
Israel IL 6, 2012        
Israel IL 7, 2014        
Italy IT 1, 2002        
Italy IT 2, 2004 Not in the integrated files       
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Table S 1.1 continued 
Italy IT 6, 2012        
Kosovo XK 6, 2012        
Latvia LV 3, 2006 Not in the integrated files       
Latvia LV 4, 2008        
Latvia LV 7, 2014 Not yet released       
Lithuania LT 4, 2008 Not in the integrated files       
Lithuania LT 5, 2010        
Lithuania LT 6, 2012        
Lithuania LT 7, 2014        
Luxembourg LU 1, 2002        
Luxembourg LU 2, 2004        
Netherlands NL 1, 2002        
Netherlands NL 2, 2004        
Netherlands NL 3, 2006        
Netherlands NL 4, 2008        
Netherlands NL 5, 2010        
Netherlands NL 6, 2012        
Netherlands NL 7, 2014        
Norway NO 1, 2002        
Norway NO 2, 2004        
Norway NO 3, 2006        
Norway NO 4, 2008        
Norway NO 5, 2010        
Norway NO 6, 2012        
Norway NO 7, 2014        
Poland PL 1, 2002        
Poland PL 2, 2004        
Poland PL 3, 2006        
Poland PL 4, 2008        
Poland PL 5, 2010        
Poland PL 6, 2012        
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Table S 1.1 continued 
Poland PL 7, 2014        
Portugal PT 1, 2002        
Portugal PT 2, 2004        
Portugal PT 3, 2006        
Portugal PT 4, 2008        
Portugal PT 5, 2010        
Portugal PT 6, 2012        
Portugal PT 7, 2014        
Romania RO 3, 2006 Not in the integrated files       
Romania RO 4, 2008        
Russian Federation RU 3, 2006        
Russian Federation RU 4, 2008        
Russian Federation RU 5, 2010        
Russian Federation RU 6, 2012        
Slovak Republic SK 2, 2004        
Slovak Republic SK 3, 2006        
Slovak Republic SK 4, 2008        
Slovak Republic SK 5, 2010        
Slovak Republic SK 6, 2012        
Slovenia SI 1, 2002        
Slovenia SI 2, 2004        
Slovenia SI 3, 2006        
Slovenia SI 4, 2008        
Slovenia SI 5, 2010        
Slovenia SI 6, 2012        
Slovenia SI 7, 2014        
Spain ES 1, 2002        
Spain ES 2, 2004        
Spain ES 3, 2006        
Spain ES 4, 2008        
Spain ES 5, 2010        
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Table S 1.1 continued 
Spain ES 6, 2012        
Spain ES 7, 2014        
Sweden SE 1, 2002 Problems with important variables       
Sweden SE 2, 2004 Problems with important variables       
Sweden SE 3, 2006        
Sweden SE 4, 2008        
Sweden SE 5, 2010        
Sweden SE 6, 2012        
Sweden SE 7, 2014        
Switzerland CH 1, 2002        
Switzerland CH 2, 2004        
Switzerland CH 3, 2006        
Switzerland CH 4, 2008        
Switzerland CH 5, 2010        
Switzerland CH 6, 2012        
Switzerland CH 7, 2014        
Turkey TR 2, 2004 Imputation model does not work       
Turkey TR 4, 2008 Problems with important variables       
Ukraine  UA 2, 2004        
Ukraine  UA 3, 2006        
Ukraine  UA 4, 2008        
Ukraine  UA 5, 2010        
Ukraine  UA 6, 2012        
United Kingdom GB 1, 2002        
United Kingdom GB 2, 2004        
United Kingdom GB 3, 2006        
United Kingdom GB 4, 2008        
United Kingdom GB 5, 2010        
United Kingdom GB 6, 2012        
United Kingdom GB 7, 2014        
Notes:  See the explanations above for details about the color-coding as well as information about the data. 
Sources: Own illustration. 
198 
 
Supplementary material S2 Missing data, imputation models, and diagnostics 
Figure S2.1 shows the percentage of complete cases in the micro data for all of the 164 avail-
able country-rounds. On average, across all 164 country-rounds, 14 percent of workers have 
missing values on one or more variable. However, Figure S2.1 also shows that the share of 
complete cases varies substantially across country-rounds.  
Figure S2.1 Percent of complete cases by country-round 
 
Notes: See supplementary material 1 for the country codes. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 164 country-rounds. Own calculations. 
The standard “missing data technique” is listwise deletion or complete case analysis. In order 
for complete case analysis to be unbiased, the data have to be missing completely at random 
(MCAR) or some special cases for regression models have to apply (Allison 2001: 6-7). Un-
surprisingly, the MCAR assumption is not satisfied. This was tested by running a logistic re-
gression of the missing indicator of a variable on the other variables. For almost all of the 
variables used in the micro-level analyses, the logistic regression models suggest that miss-
ingness is predicted by the other variables (results not shown). 
What about the special cases? In the first special case, complete case analysis is unbiased if 
missingness in the covariates is independent of the outcome given the covariates. The second 
special case only holds for logistic regression models and assumes that the probability of 
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missing data on any variable depends on the outcome and not on any of the independent vari-
ables. I assume that these special cases are unlikely to hold in the micro-level analyses.  
Instead I use multiple imputation (MI). MI relies on the much weaker missing at random as-
sumption (MAR) stating that the probability of missing data on a variable may depend on the 
other observed variables, but does not depend on the values of this variable itself, conditional 
on the other observed variables. Under this assumption MI is unbiased. Because MI makes 
use of the information available in incomplete cases, it is usually more efficient than complete 
case analysis. 
I use the mi package in Stata 13.1 to perform multiple imputation by chained equations 
(MICE) and analyze the micro data. To avoid bias, the imputation model includes all varia-
bles used in the micro-level analyses (see Table 1) (White et al. 2011: 384). In addition, the 
model includes so-called auxiliary variables. White et al. (2011: 385) recommend including 
variables that predict the incomplete variables and variables that predict the missingness of 
the incomplete variables to make the MAR assumption more plausible and reduce bias. The 
following variables have been included as auxiliary variables:  
Participation in training within the last 12 months (1=Yes, 0=No), father working at age 14 
(1=Yes, 0=Otherwise), subjective health (1=Fair/bad/very bad, 0=Very good/good), life satis-
faction (0 “Extremely dissatisfied”-10 “Extremely satisfied”), contracted working hours, firm 
size (4 categories), sector (3 categories), lives in big city or its' suburbs/outskirts (1=Yes, 
0=No), lives with partner (1=Yes, 0=No), children at home (1=Yes, 0=No), very diffi-
cult/difficult to cope with household income (1=Yes, 0=No), an index of interpersonal trust 
(0-10), and four items from the interviewer questionnaire. For the latter the interviewers were 
asked whether the respondent asked for clarification of any questions, whether the respondent 
was reluctant to answer any questions, whether the respondent tried to answer the questions to 
the best of his or her ability, and whether the respondent understood the questions (1=never, 
5=Very often). I also included the design weights variable in the imputation model as sug-
gested by Stata (StataCorp 2013: 8). 
Binary variables were imputed by logistic regression and categorical variables by multinomial 
logistic regression. I used Stata’s augment option to avoid problems arising from perfect pre-
diction in regression models for categorical data (White et al. 2011: 394). Ordinal and contin-
uous variables were imputed by predictive mean matching (PMM) drawing from the 10 near-
est neighbors. PMM reduces the impact of model misspecification and allows for using “the 
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improved passive approach” to handle nonlinearities (White et al. 2011: 386). Because the 
analyses address the question of to what extent the effect of past unemployment on job quality 
varies across countries and time, these interactions also have to be considered in the imputa-
tion model. Therefore, imputation is performed separately for each country-round. The num-
ber of iterations for the burn-in period was set to 20. However, I initially used a burn-in period 
of 100 for one country (Czech Republic) to assess the convergence of MICE. Specifically, for 
each variable I plotted the mean and standard deviation of the imputed values against the iter-
ations to see whether the imputed values follow any definite trend. These plots (not shown) do 
not reveal any conspicuous patterns suggesting the convergence of MICE.  
The ten multiply imputed data sets are analyzed with Stata’s mi commands that combine the 
estimates and standard errors by applying Rubin’s rules (Rubin 1987). For coarsened exact 
matching (CEM), I use the multiple imputations options offered within the respective Stata 
ado (Blackwell et al. 2009: 539-540). To combine the estimated average marginal effects after 
logistic regression, I apply Rubin’s rules using the mimrgns Stata ado provided by Daniel 
Klein.  
To check the fit of the imputation model, I used some diagnostics suggested by Eddings and 
Marchenko (2012). The basic idea is to compare the distributions of the imputed and observed 
values. Very large differences or implausible imputed values point to problems with the impu-
tation model.  
In general, differences between the distributions of imputed and observed values were neither 
very large nor systematic across imputations suggesting that the imputation model is reasona-
ble. Figure S2.2 gives an example. It shows the imputed and observed values for the variable 
years of education for the third and seventh imputations across all country-round of Czech 
Republic. Besides some small differences in the tails of the distributions, the imputed values 
closely resemble the observed values. 
To check whether the estimates of the effect of unemployment on non-monetary job quality 
depend on using multiple imputation, I repeated the analyses using complete case analyses. 
The correlation between the estimates based on multiple imputation and the estimates based 
on a complete case analyses are very strong ranging between 0.92 and 0.97 depending on the 
measure of non-monetary job quality examined.  
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Figure S2.2 Example for diagnostics concerning the imputation model 
 
Notes: Third and seventh imputations for the variable years of education across all country-rounds of Czech 
Republic. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 164 country-rounds. Own calculations. 
Supplementary material S3 References for macro data 
The following macro-level variables have been used: GDP growth per capita, unemployment 
rate, unemployment benefit generosity, PLMP expenditure, ALMP expenditure, EPL for 
regular contracts. 
GDP growth per capita 
The data have been assembled from the Word Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank 
(WB). The respective series is “GDP per capita growth (annual %).” 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
Unemployment rate 
The data have been assembled from the Key Indicators of Labor Market (KILM) of Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO). I used “Table 9a. Total unemployment” from the 9th edi-
tion of the KILM interactive software. 
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Source: http://kilm.ilo.org/2015/install/ 
Unemployment benefit generosity 
The data have been assembled from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset 2 
(CWED2) by Scruggs et al. (2014). The CWED2 includes information about the replacement 
rates and benefit duration that has been used to construct the unemployment benefit generosi-
ty index. It also contains information on coverage. 
Source: http://cwed2.org/ 
PLMP and ALMP expenditure 
The data have been assembled from OECD and Eurostat. In only a few of the years missing 
OECD data have been complemented by Eurostat data. Expenditure in national currencies 
was divided by the number of unemployed taken from “Table 9a. Total unemployment” of 
KILM (see above) and, then, expressed as a percentage of GDP per capita. The latter has been 
assembled from the WDI of WB (see above). The series used is named “GDP per capita (cur-
rent LCU).” Expenditure on PLMP includes categories 8 and 9 and expenditure on ALMP 
includes categories 2 to 7. 
Sources: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LMPEXP#,http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/
labour-market/labour-market-policy/database, 
http://kilm.ilo.org/2015/install/, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
EPL for regular contracts 
The data have been assembled from OECD and Avdagic (2015). The OECD data refers to 
version 1 of the EPL for regular contracts. In few years missing OECD data have been com-
plemented by information from Avdagic (2015) who scored CEE countries following the 
OECD approach. The data from Avdagic have been received upon request. 
Sources: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/EPL-timeseries.xlsx, Avdagic (2015)  
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Supplementary material S4 Coarsened exact matching 
For the micro-level analyses, the data are pre-processed by using coarsened exact matching 
(CEM) (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus et al. 2012). That is, before estimating the effects of past 
unemployment on the different facets of job quality by using linear or logistic regression 
models, CEM is performed separately in each country-round. 
The goal of CEM is to increase the balance on pretreatment control variables between a 
treatment and control group. Specifically, workers who have experienced unemployment in 
the last five years and those who have not are matched on the following variables: age, sex, 
years of education, father’s education, mother’s education, and mother’s employment status at 
age 14 (see Table 1 for details). With the exception of age and years of education these are 
binary variables. Because exact matching on all pretreatment control variables is not possible, 
I use coarsened exact matching. As the name suggests, the pretreatment control variables are 
coarsened before exact matches are formed. The age and years of education variables are 
coarsened into five, respectively eight, equally sized groups. The binary variables are used in 
the matching as they are. Based on the coarsened variables, exact matches are formed. Be-
cause for some workers who have experienced past unemployment, the data include no work-
ers without past unemployment and the same values on the coarsened variables, CEM results 
in the loss of some treatment observations that are off support. Although excluding these ob-
servations results in a redefinition of the parameter of interest (Blackwell et al. 2009: 527), 
restricting the analyses to the empirical common support is important to avoid model depend-
ent extrapolations. Across the 164 country-rounds used in the micro-level analyses, the 
matching resulted, on average, in the loss of only about 8 percent of treatment observations. 
To judge whether the CEM successfully increased balance, it is important to compare the bal-
ance before and after the matching. I use two overall measures of balance. The first measure, 
Rubin’s B, assesses balance with respect to the absolute standardized difference of the means 
of the linear index of the propensity score in the treated and (matched) control group (Rubin 
2001). For the groups to be considered sufficiently balanced Rubin’s B is often recommended 
to be less than 25. However, the absolute values are less meaningful than the comparison of 
balance before and after matching. The second measure of balance is the so-called L1 statistic 
(see Blackwell et al. 2009: 530-31 for details). In contrast to Rubin’s B and other convention-
al measures of balance, the L1 statistic assesses the global balance with respect to the full 
joint distribution of pretreatment control variables, including all interactions. Perfect global 
balance is indicated by L1 = 0 and perfect global imbalance by L1 = 1. Similar to Rubin’s B, 
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it is, however, more important to examine whether the matching substantially reduces the im-
balance. 
Figure S4.1 illustrates that the balance has increased from before to after matching. It shows 
Rubin’s B (Panel A) and the L1 statistic (Panel B) before and after CEM for each of the 164 
country-rounds. Panel A reveals that before the CEM all country-rounds had a balance greater 
than 25 and that after the matching the balance has substantially improved, with Rubin’s B 
falling below the recommended threshold for most country-rounds. Similarly, the L1 statistic 
(Panel B) has decreased for all country-rounds, showing that the CEM has reduced imbalance 
on the pretreatment covariates. Following the idea of matching as nonparametric “prepro-
cessing”, the remaining differences are taken into account by estimating linear and logistic 
regression models separately for each country-round using the matched data. 
Figure S4.1 Balance before and after matching assessed by the Rubin’s B and the L1 statistic 
 
Notes: See the explanations above for a definition of the measures of balance. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 164 country-rounds. Own calculations. 
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Supplementary material S5 Results of the macro-level analyses 
Table S5.1 Results of the macro-level analyses: moderating effects of economic situation and labor market policies on the effect of past unem-
ployment on four indicators of non-monetary job quality (EDV regression models) 
 Effect of past unemployment on … 
 Occupational prestige Autonomy Authority Job security 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. B S.E. b S.E. 
Unemployment rate 0.26 0.14 0.24 0.31 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
Benefit generosity 0.10 0.19 1.20 0.79 0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.23 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 
ALMP expenditure -0.03 0.24 0.01 0.39 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.02 
EPL regular 0.31 0.12   0.01 0.05   0.02 0.01   -0.03 0.01   
Period fixed effects         
Country fixed effects             
N (country-rounds) 124 122 124 122 124 122 124 122 
N (countries) 26 24 26 24 26 24 26 24 
Notes: b = standardized regression coefficients, S.E. = standard errors, S.E. have been clustered by country. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 26/24 countries, 124/122 country-rounds; Table 1 and Table 2 provide details about the macro data. Own calcula-
tions. 
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Supplementary material S6 Sensitivity test of macro-level results 
Figure S6.1 shows that the results of the second-stage macro-level analyses are somewhat 
sensitive to the indicators of economic situation and benefit generosity used. For each of the 
non-monetary job quality indicators (Panels A to D), it compares the original analyses for the 
moderating role of unemployment rate and unemployment benefit generosity with sensitivity 
analyses using alternative indicators. The alternative indicators are the GDP growth per capita 
and the expenditure on PLMP per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita.  
For GDP growth per capita the results for occupational prestige, autonomy, and authority 
(Panels A-C) are very similar to the original analyses in that they do not change the conclu-
sions drawn. While we find small positive moderating effects for unemployment rate, we 
mostly find small negative or zero effects for GDP growth per capita. For both indicators the 
conclusion is that macro-economic conditions to not affect the size of the negative effect of 
past unemployment on subsequent job quality. For job security (Panel D) the results are 
somewhat different. While for unemployment rate, the results are in line with the expectation 
that poor macro-economic conditions result in larger negative effects of past unemployment 
on job security, the small negative effects for GDP growth suggest no substantially significant 
effects of macro-economic conditions.  
For benefit generosity, the results are somewhat more sensitive to measurement. For occupa-
tional prestige (Panel A), the conclusion of a buffering effect of benefit generosity is not sup-
ported by the results for PLMP expenditure and for autonomy (Panel B) the estimates for 
PLMP expenditure (specification 2) even suggest a negative effect of greater decommodifica-
tion. For job security (Panel D), the negative effect of benefit generosity (specification 2) is 
not resembled by the results for PLMP expenditure.  
Overall, these sensitivity analyses add to the arguments that the few results that suggest sub-
stantial moderating effects of macro-economic conditions or labor market policies should not 
be overinterpreted. 
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Figure S6.1 Sensitivity tests for the macro-level results with respect to measurement 
 
Notes: See Figure 4. 
Sources: European Social Survey, round 1 to 7 (2002-2014), 26/24 countries, 124/122 country-rounds; Table 1 and Table 2 provide details about the macro-data. Own calcu-
lations. 
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Abstract 
Previous studies have shown that overeducation is inferior to adequate employment. For ex-
ample, overeducated workers have lower earnings, participate less often in continuing educa-
tion and training, and are less satisfied with their jobs. This article changes perspectives by 
asking whether it is better for the unemployed to take up a job for which they are overeducat-
ed or to remain unemployed and continue the search for adequate employment. Theoretically, 
we rely on the established confrontation of the stepping-stone and trap-hypotheses which 
make opposing predictions in terms of long-term employment chances and job quality. Using 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2012) and applying a dynamic propensity score 
matching approach, the analyses reveal an interesting trade-off. Although an overeducated re-
entry increases the long-term employment chances persistently, it also implies strong lock-in 
effects into overeducation for up to five years after re-employment. In sum, the results support 
the stepping-stone hypothesis in terms of future employment chances, but also highlight non-
negligible risks of remaining trapped in a job that is below one’s level of educational qualifi-
cation.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies have shown that overeducation compared with adequate employment is 
associated with social and economic disadvantages (see McGuinness, 2006 for a review). Be-
ing employed in a job below ones level of education translates into lower earnings (Korpi and 
Tåhlin, 2009), lower chances of participating in continuing education and training (Büchel 
and Mertens, 2004), and lower job satisfaction (Verhaest and Omey, 2009). Therefore, over-
education is commonly considered inferior to adequate employment. However, comparing 
overeducation only to adequate employment neglects that it represents an important alterna-
tive to unemployment as well. Given the empirical evidence on unemployment scarring in 
terms of earnings (Gangl, 2006) and job quality (Dieckhoff, 2011), the question arises how 
overeducation compares to unemployment. We change perspectives and complement previous 
studies by asking whether it is better for the unemployed to take up a job for which they are 
overeducated or to remain unemployed and continue the search for adequate employment. 
Theoretically, we rely on the established yet undecided confrontation of the stepping-stone 
and trap hypotheses (Baert et al., 2013; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel, 2004a; Scherer, 2004). 
According to the former an overeducated re-entry increases the chances of both employment 
per se and adequate employment in the long run. In contrast, the trap hypothesis states that it 
is better to decline offers for overeducated jobs and continue the search in order to avoid dis-
advantages in terms of labour market integration and job quality. Empirical evidence from the 
few studies with a similar perspective supports the trap hypothesis, but is restricted to gradu-
ates (Baert et al., 2013; Scherer, 2004) or unemployed with vocational training (Pollmann-
Schult and Büchel, 2004a). We complement these studies by testing the opposing theoretical 
scenarios for a broader sample of unemployed. However, addressing this research question is 
not only interesting from a theoretical perspective, but also from a policy point of view. It 
informs policy-makers on strategies in fighting unemployment without losing sight of the 
trade-off between employment and job quality. Should policy-makers enforce acceptance of 
job offers irrespective of the matching between actual and required qualifications or should 
they weigh shortened unemployment durations against the potentially negative long-term ef-
fects of an overeducated re-entry, in particular, in terms of job quality? 
Against this background, our study contributes to the overeducation literature in several ways. 
Theoretically, we take the widely neglected perspective of comparing an overeducated re-
entry to remaining unemployed and continuing the job search. We complement the few previ-
ous studies by offering first evidence on the German labour market for all levels of education 
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and labour market experience. Methodologically, we apply a dynamic extension of propensity 
score matching (Sianesi, 2004) to address the central problem of selection into overeducation. 
This also allows us to adequately address the problem of choosing an appropriate control 
group. Furthermore, we analyse the effects of an overeducated re-entry considering both em-
ployment chances and the chances of adequate employment. Thereby, we shed light on poten-
tial trade-offs or cumulative (dis-)advantages between employment chances and job quality. 
Lastly, using the German Socio-Economic Panel, we are able to follow the unemployed for up 
to five years after re-employment allowing for a comprehensive assessment of the short- and 
long-term effects of an overeducated re-entry. As the predictions of the stepping-stone and 
trap hypotheses only differ in the long run, a long-term perspective appears to be particularly 
important. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: the next section addresses the question why 
an overeducated re-entry should be a stepping stone or a trap for the unemployed compared 
with continuing the search for adequate employment. The following sections present the data, 
measures, and analytic strategy, followed by a discussion of the results. The last section sum-
marises the findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
Following the overeducation literature, we draw on sociological and economic micro-level 
theories and derive the opposing stepping-stone and trap hypotheses offering a starting point 
for analysing the effects of an overeducated re-entry. Unlike previous studies, which usually 
compare overeducation to adequate employment, the following argumentation focuses on the 
comparison of an overeducated re-entry to the alternative of remaining unemployed and con-
tinuing the job search. 
2.1 Why should an overeducated re-entry be a stepping stone for the unemployed?  
While overeducation is usually considered detrimental to individuals’ careers, changing the 
reference from adequate employment to unemployment may alter this view. Various theories 
indicate that taking up an overeducated job out of unemployment may represent a bridge into 
employment and better jobs. For example, following signalling and statistical discrimination 
theories, employers may use an individual’s work history and job search decisions to over-
come the problem of insufficient information on a potential employee’s productivity 
(McCormick, 1990; Korpi and Levin, 2001). Taking up overeducated employment instead of 
remaining unemployed will be valued positively by prospective employers, since job search-
215 
 
ers signal their general motivation, employability, and productivity. In addition, this allows 
avoiding the stigma effects associated with prolonged unemployment. Recent experimental 
evidence supports this perspective by suggesting a larger stigma effect of unemployment than 
overeducation (Baert and Verhaest, 2014). 
Social network and job-shopping theory offer another argument in favour of the stepping-
stone hypothesis highlighting the comparative advantage of an on-the-job search (Granovet-
ter, 1973; Johnson, 1978). These theories emphasise that work experience increases job search 
effectiveness by giving access to information on better (matching) vacancies. More specifical-
ly, social network theory argues that an on-the-job search allows building a social network in 
the respective company or industry which may be helpful in finding adequate employment. In 
line with the signalling arguments outlined above, the higher effectiveness of an on-the-job 
search may also originate from the fact that employers take the current employment status as 
an important productivity signal for hiring decisions (Pollmann-Schult and Büchel, 2004a). 
Taken together the access to more and better matching job vacancies should reduce mis-
matches and subsequent unemployment. 
From the perspective of human capital theory, re-entering the labour market in a job for which 
one is overeducated will also reduce the depreciation of human capital, occupation-specific 
skills and general employment skills compared with remaining unemployed (Korpi and Levin, 
2001). In addition, taking up an overeducated job may not only counteract the depreciation of 
human capital, but also allow for further investments in human capital, like general employ-
ment skills, continuing education and training or work experience. Despite of empirical evi-
dence showing that overeducation is inferior compared with adequate employment in terms of 
continuing education and training (Büchel and Mertens, 2004), it may provide more and better 
opportunities than unemployment. Moreover, career mobility theory suggests the enhance-
ment of both internal and external promotion probabilities by rationally choosing overeduca-
tion as an investment into work experience (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). Therefore, re-
entering the labour market in an overeducated job compared with remaining unemployed and 
continuing the job search may not only reduce the depreciation of human capital, but also help 
to maintain and develop it further. In sum, the stepping-stone hypothesis links an overeducat-
ed re-entry with higher employment chances and higher job quality in the long run. 
Hypothesis 1a: Taking up an overeducated job compared with remaining unemployed will 
increase future employment chances and chances of adequate employment. 
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2.2 Why should an overeducated re-entry be a trap for the unemployed? 
In contrast to the argumentation above, re-entering the labour market via overeducated em-
ployment may just as well turn out to be a long-term trap, for example, by retarding transi-
tions to adequate employment (Baert et al., 2013). In the following we will sketch relevant 
mechanisms challenging the positive implications of the stepping-stone hypothesis. 
Taking up an overeducated job may as well be perceived as a bad signal by employers and 
thus negatively affect the advancement to better jobs as well as the long-term employment 
prospects. Referring to unemployed skilled workers, McCormick (1990: 311) argues that ‘low 
investment in search for another skilled job is used by firms as a productivity signal.’ Forgiv-
ing the chance of adequate employment by re-entering the labour market into overeducation 
may accordingly cause serious doubts about an unemployed skilled worker’s productivity and 
professional aspirations. 
Coupled with the uncertainty about the direction of the signalling effects, some researchers 
also challenge the presumed comparative advantage of searching on-the-job. For example, 
Baert et al. (2013) argue that the job search intensity while searching on-the-job will hardly 
be comparable to an off-the-job search. Given that search intensity and success are positively 
related, the overeducated re-entry may be disadvantageous compared with remaining unem-
ployed and searching off-the-job by retarding the search for adequate employment. 
As for the human capital development, it was argued above that taking up an overeducated 
job may prevent the depreciation of human capital that is associated with unemployment. 
However, the overeducated re-entry could also be disadvantageous if the acquisition of job-
specific human capital constitutes a long-term mobility barrier. Investing in specific skills by 
on-the-job training may lock employees into their suboptimal employment positions (Pissar-
ides, 1994) and retard the advancement to adequate employment, whereas remaining unem-
ployed always entails the possibility of directly finding an adequate job. In addition, accord-
ing to the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ principle overeducated employees will soon adapt to their lower 
job requirements and thereby lose cognitive abilities (De Grip et al., 2008), whereas waiting 
for an adequate job offer still entails the chance of using one’s skills adequately shortly after. 
In sum, these arguments imply that overeducated re-employment represents a trap involving 
lower employment chances and lower chances of advancement to adequate employment. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Re-entering the labour market in an overeducated job compared with remain-
ing unemployed will decrease future employment chances and chances of adequate employ-
ment. 
2.3 Effect heterogeneity 
Up to now our confrontation of the stepping-stone and trap hypotheses has been relatively 
general although previous findings suggest that the effects of an overeducated re-entry com-
pared with remaining unemployed differ across the unemployed (Baert et al., 2013). In par-
ticular, we expect the effects to vary by labour market experience and educational qualifica-
tions. 
First, we expect different effects for workers in their early career and established workers 
based on the assumption that information problems will be more relevant for the former (Kor-
pi and Levin, 2001). Since early-career workers lack important productivity indicators like 
past employment history or employer references, their possibilities in signalling high produc-
tivity are very limited compared with established workers. Acquiring work experience there-
fore is rational for them (Sicherman and Galor, 1990), whereas workers with a long employ-
ment history and references from former positions can also make use of other productivity 
indicators. Additionally, overeducation in the early employment career may have a very dif-
ferent meaning than in later career phases. Considering the early career as an ongoing match-
ing process, episodes of overeducation should not result in a stigma effect for workers at the 
beginning of their career. Accordingly, the unemployed in their early career are expected to 
benefit more from an overeducated re-entry into the labour market than those who have al-
ready acquired a lot of labour market experience. 
Hypothesis 2: Unemployed in their early career should benefit more from an overeducated re-
entry into the labour market than unemployed in their mid and late career. 
Second, we expect different effects for individuals with vocational and academic qualifica-
tions assuming that an overeducated re-entry represents a worse signal for the former than for 
the latter. Two arguments support this view. First, for unemployed with vocational degrees 
overeducation is by definition associated with completely unskilled positions. In contrast, 
unemployed with academic qualifications still often hold skilled positions. The greater de-
scent experienced by those with vocational qualifications likely conveys a worse signal to 
future employers than the one send by unemployed with academic qualifications. Second, an 
overeducated re-entry of those with vocational degrees may also send adverse signals, be-
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cause they accept an unskilled position despite having an occupation-specific training. This 
may, however, be more important for those unemployed with less other signals, like for ex-
ample, work experience. In sum, we expect an overeducated re-entry to be a worse signal for 
unemployed with vocational degrees than for unemployed with academic qualifications mean-
ing that an overeducated re-entry is associated with more positive effects for the latter than for 
the former. 
Hypothesis 3: Unemployed with academic qualifications should benefit more from an overed-
ucated re-entry into the labour market than unemployed with vocational degrees. 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
We draw on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the period 1984 to 
2012. The SOEP is designed to be nationally representative of German households and offers 
panel data on the individual and household level. It provides information on persons’ educa-
tion and labour market behaviour as well as retrospective data on their monthly employment 
status (Wagner et al., 2007). Based on the yearly and monthly data we create an inflow sam-
ple into unemployment following the unemployed for up to five years after re-employment. 
Left-censored spells have been excluded.1 The sample is restricted to persons of age 18-54 
years who experience at least one month of unemployment between 1984 and 2011. Because 
respondents may report more than one employment status in each month, we use a state space 
to define their main employment status. Additionally, persons without a vocational or univer-
sity degree can by definition not be overeducated and are excluded from the analyses. To fur-
ther reduce the heterogeneity among the unemployed, we only focus on those who have lost 
their job. Applying these restrictions we observe 4,538 person-spells from 3,353 persons in-
cluding 1,067 exits into overeducation. 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Overeducation 
The treatment of interest is exiting unemployment into a job for which one is overeducated. 
Overeducation is the extent to which a worker’s level of education exceeds the level that is 
                                                     
1 Combining the monthly and yearly data results in spells that end in employment (monthly information), but for 
which no yearly data is available. If a person has multiple spells in between two interviews, we only kept the 
spell closest to the next interview resulting in a loss of about 4 per cent of spells. For 20 per cent of spells that 
end in employment, information is missing, because persons are not working at the time of the interview. 
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typically required for their particular job (McGuinness, 2006). To measure overeducation we 
rely on the so-called subjective approach. The SOEP contains yearly information about a 
worker’s highest educational qualification and the qualifications typically needed for their 
current job. Comparing a worker’s educational qualification with the reported level of re-
quired education generates a vertical mismatch variable distinguishing between adequate em-
ployment and overeducation. Compared with other measurements the subjective approach has 
the advantage of ‘obtaining information from the source closest to the actual job situation, 
taking account of all specific circumstances’ (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988: 186).2 However, 
it also has been criticised for its subjectivity, for example, allowing persons to under- or over-
state the level of education typically required. For this reason, we adopt an extension of the 
subjective approach proposed by Büchel and Weißhuhn (1998). This approach validates 
workers’ subjective assessments by reference to information about their occupational status. 
A detailed description of the measurement model is given in Supplement A. The validation of 
the standard subjective measurement results in two additional categories that have to be ex-
cluded from the analyses: implausible combinations (about 2 per cent) and degree of mis-
match not clearly determinable (about 8 per cent). However, the major advantage of the ex-
tended subjective approach is its higher validity by drawing a sharper line between adequate 
employment and overeducation. Some re-entries may be misclassified because the measure-
ment is based on the yearly data and the mismatch status may have changed between the 
month of exiting unemployment and the next yearly interview. However, the number of mis-
classifications is likely to be low.3 
3.2.2 Employment chances and job quality 
To provide a balanced picture of the effects of an overeducated re-entry, we consider the fol-
lowing two outcomes. First, we measure the probability of being employed, irrespective of 
educational (mis-)match (1=employed, 0=not employed). This outcome is measured every 6 
months up to 60 months after exiting unemployment. Although it indicates a worker’s short- 
and long-term employment chances, it does not consider subsequent job quality. An objective 
measure of job quality is the chance of adequate employment (1=adequately employed, 
                                                     
2 Another measurement used in the literature is the realised matches approach (e.g. Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) 
defining the level of required education as a one standard-deviation range around the mean level of education 
within an occupation (here defined by two-digit ISCO). Using a realised-matches approach or the standard sub-
jective approach does not change the main conclusions reported below. 
3 Misclassifications are unlikely due to state dependence in educational (mis-)match. In addition, the median 
time between the unemployment exit and the next yearly interview is only five months. A sensitivity analysis 
which reduces this median time to three months gives very similar results. 
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0=overeducated). This outcome is measured annually one to five years after an overeducated 
re-entry. Analysing both employment chances and the chances of adequate employment is 
important to highlight potential trade-offs or cumulative (dis-)advantages. For example, an 
overeducated re-entry may increase the unemployed’s labour market integration in the long 
run without being a stepping stone into adequate employment. 
3.3 Methods 
To assess the effects of an overeducated re-entry compared with remaining unemployed and 
continuing the job search, we apply a dynamic propensity score matching approach (Sianesi, 
2004). It extends propensity score matching to a dynamic setting taking account of the time-
varying treatment. Instead of defining the controls as those who never take up an overeducat-
ed job, it defines them as those unemployed who do not experience the treatment until a cer-
tain point in time. Simply using the first definition may bias the results, because it conditions 
on future outcomes. For example, if the reason for never taking up an overeducated job is that 
an unemployed has found adequate employment before, the estimates will be biased towards 
negative treatment effects (Caliendo, 2006). 
For this reason, the treatment is defined by taking up an overeducated job after an elapsed 
unemployment duration 𝑢𝑢 (𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢) = 1, treated) compared with remaining unemployed and con-
tinuing the search for at least one month (𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢) = 0, controls).4 The observed outcomes of 
interest – future employment chances and chances of adequate employment – are defined over 
time 𝑡𝑡 and given by 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
(𝑢𝑢). Correspondingly, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1(𝑢𝑢)and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0(𝑢𝑢) define an unemployed’s potential 
outcomes if taking up an overeducated job at 𝑢𝑢 and if remaining unemployed at least up to 𝑢𝑢, 
respectively. 
For each elapsed unemployment duration 𝑢𝑢 the treatment effect of interest is defined as: 
 ∆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢= 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1(𝑢𝑢) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0(𝑢𝑢)|𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢) = 1� = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1(𝑢𝑢)|𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢) = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0(𝑢𝑢)|𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢) = 1�  
for 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢,𝑢𝑢 + 1, … ,𝐴𝐴 
                                                     
4 In other words, the controls are composed of those still unemployed at 𝑢𝑢, irrespective of what happens later. 
For example, they may later take up an overeducated job and become treated themselves. Specifically, a person 
may serve as both treated and control. For example, a person who enters overeducation after six months may be 
a control to a person who enters overeducation after three months. Because some persons contribute with spells 
from different periods, they may be treated or become a control after having been treated before. Consequently, 
the control observations exceed the treatment observations in each month u by far. Multiple spells also result in 
‘within-person matches’, that is, the treatment and matched control observation originate from different spells of 
the same person. This applies to about 3 per cent of the treatment observations. Excluding these treatment obser-
vations has no substantial effect on the results. 
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In the following, we will focus on the average of the ∆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 to highlight the general trends and 
patterns in the treatment effects (Sianesi, 2004).5 As the second term 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0(𝑢𝑢) | 𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢) = 1) is 
unidentified, estimating the effects involves comparing persons who enter overeducation with 
similar persons who have reached the same elapsed unemployment duration but remain un-
employed and continue the job search. Similarity is defined in terms of the propensity score, 
that is, we only compare individuals who have a similar probability of taking up an overedu-
cated job at time 𝑢𝑢, given their observed characteristics 𝑋𝑋. The propensity score is estimated 
by a discrete-time hazard independent competing risk model taking into account the exit dy-
namics from unemployment and right-censoring.6 Identification rests on the conditional inde-
pendence assumption (CIA) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
0(𝑢𝑢) ⊥ 𝐷𝐷(𝑢𝑢)| 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥 for 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢,𝑢𝑢 + 1, … ,𝐴𝐴, 
stating that conditional on observed characteristics 𝑋𝑋 and the elapsed unemployment duration 
𝑢𝑢, in the absence of the treatment the treated would experience the same outcome as the con-
trols. In other words, a causal interpretation rests on the strong assumption that we observe all 
variables that influence both taking up an overeducated job and the respective potential out-
comes. The plausibility of this assumption must be discussed in the light of the large number 
of covariates we control for, including socio-demographics, educational attainment, work bi-
ography, characteristics of the last job, and many more. The covariates have been selected 
theoretically and are measured before the treatment to avoid post-treatment bias. Table 1 re-
ports the definition and measurement of each covariate. For example, controlling for house-
hold income or family characteristics adjusts for differences in search constraints. To capture 
differences in human capital and previous labour market performance, we control for educa-
tional attainment and past and recent labour market experience. In contrast to studies that 
compare overeducation to adequate employment, our focus on unemployed who have lost 
their job should reduce both observed and unobserved differences and allows for the adjust-
ment of previous job characteristics. Matching on work biography, previous occupational 
class and labour income should at least partly control for variables we cannot observe. Specif-
ically, following Sianesi (2004: 138), we think that controlling for the elapsed unemployment 
duration should also ‘capture important unobservables’ like motivation or readiness for work.
                                                     
5 This average is calculated by weighting the individual  ∆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢 by the elapsed unemployment duration distribution 
of the treated. Note that the causal interpretation pertains to the individual  ∆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢. 
6 The discrete-time hazard model is estimated by using a multinomial logistic regression based on person-month 
data (Allison, 1982). The four independent competing risks are: overeducated employment, adequate employ-
ment, education/training, inactivity. We used a piecewise-constant specification to model the baseline hazard.  
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Table 1 Definition and measurement of the covariates 
Covariate Definition and measurement 
Socio-demographics  
   Age In years 
   Sex 1=female, 0=male 
   Migration background 1=first or second generation immigrant, 0=otherwise 
Education  
   Educational attainment 1=vocational degree, 2=technical college degreea, 3=university degree 
Work biography  
   Total employment experience  
   (2 variables) 
Total full-time experience in (decimal) years, total part-time experience in (decimal) years 
   Recent employment experience Number of months employed in the 12 months before unemployment 
   Total unemployment experience Total unemployment experience in (decimal) years  
   Previous unemployment spells Total number of previous unemployment spells since the age of 15 years 
   Recent unemployment experience Number of months unemployed in the 12 months before unemployment 
Characteristics of last job  
   Occupational class 6 categories according to the EGP class classification: 
1=higher managerial and professional workers (I), 2=lower managerial and professional workers (II), 
3=routine non-manual workers (IIIa, IIIb), 4=self-employed (IVa-IVc), 5=skilled manual workers (VI),  
6=unskilled manual workers (VIIa, VIIb) 
   Labour income Real monthly net labour income in 1000 Euro (adjusted to 2006 Euros) 
   Job satisfaction 0=completely dissatisfied, 10=completely satisfied 
Household characteristics  
   Household income Real annual equivalised disposable household income in 1000 Euro (adjusted to 2006 Euros) 
   Partner 3 categories:  
1=no partner or spouse in household, 2=partner in household, 3=spouse in household 
   Children Number of children from 0-14 years 
Health  
   Health satisfaction 0=completely dissatisfied, 10=completely satisfied 
   Disability 1=legally attested disability of 30 per cent or more, 0=otherwise 
Context characteristics  
   Year spell started 4 categories: 1=1984-1990, 2=1991-1997, 3=1998-2002, 4=2003-2011 
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Table 1 continued 
   Quarter spell started 4 categories: 1=January-March, 2=April-June, 3=July-September, 4=October-December 
   Region 4 categories according to the recommendation of the SOEP:  
1=North-Germany (Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein) 
2=East-Germany (Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Thuringia) 
3=South-Germany (Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse) 
4=West-Germany (North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland) 
   Regional unemploymentb Monthly unemployment rate of the federal state 
   Unemployment duration  
   (baseline hazard) 
8 categories:  
1=1 month, 2=2 months, 3=3 months, 4=4-6 months, 5=7-9 months,  
6=10-12 months, 7=13-15 months , 8=16 months or more 
Notes: a This degree could be acquired in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and its German name is ‘Ingenieurs-/Fachschule’. b The monthly unemployment rate of 
the federal state is taken from Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency (2015) and the monthly published official notifications of the Federal Employment Agency (1984-
1991) and has been merged to the SOEP. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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However, if both groups differ with respect to unobserved characteristics (e.g., ability) after 
controlling for these covariates, the differences in outcomes are at least partly explained by 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
To balance the treated and controls on 𝑋𝑋, we form ‘statistical twins’ in terms of the propensity 
score, that is, the discrete-time hazard. Comparing different matching algorithms, we decided 
for radius matching with a propensity score radius of 0.01, because it gave the best results 
with respect to covariate balance. Given its importance, we matched exactly on the elapsed 
unemployed duration, that is, we only compare treated and controls who have spent the same 
number of months in unemployment. Accordingly, common support is checked in every 
month 𝑢𝑢. In general, only about two per cent of the treated are off-support. Standard errors 
have been calculated using the variance approximation of Lechner (2001).7 All matching 
analyses are performed using the psmatch2 ado in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
To provide an overview of the sample Table 2 displays some descriptive statistics on the 
number and duration of unemployment spells by exit status. Summary statistics on the covari-
ates at inflow into unemployment are presented in Supplement B. Of the 4,538 unemployment 
spells, 4,038 spells are completed (89 per cent) and 500 right-censored (11 per cent). Among 
the completed spells 76 per cent end in employment, 13 per cent in education/training, and 11 
per cent in inactivity showing that the majority of the unemployed experience re-employment. 
However, more than a third of the re-employed end up in jobs for which they are overeducat-
ed. Compared with the percentage of overeducated workers in the working population (18 per 
cent) this highlights the importance of overeducation as a route out of unemployment.8 Table 
2 also summarises the duration of the completed spells. On average, unemployment spells that 
end in adequate employment are about three months shorter than those that end in overeduca-
tion emphasising that an overeducated re-entry may not be relevant to some unemployed, be-
cause they find adequate employment before. Accordingly, this implies that it is important to 
use the dynamic definition of the controls as discussed in the previous section. 
                                                     
7 Bootstrapping turned out to be too time-consuming and Lechner (2002) finds little difference between the ap-
proximated and bootstrapped standard errors. 
8 The percentage of overeducated workers in the working population has been estimated based on a sample of all 
workers of age 18-54 years over the period of 1984-2012 using the SOEP. It is in line with estimates of previous 
German studies (see Büchel, 2001: 508). 
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Table 2 Duration of completed spells by exit status (in months) 
Exit to Mean SD P25 P50 P75 N (spells) 
   Overeducation 9.4 12.8 2 6 12 1067 
   Adequate employment 6.1 7.6 2 4 8 2011 
   Education/training 9.7 11.5 3 6 12 532 
   Inactive 12.0 13.3 3 8 15 428 
Notes: P25 to P75  = 25th to 75th percentile of the distribution. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
4.2 Propensity score matching 
The following discussion focuses on a comparison of covariate balance before and after 
matching to assess the quality of matching. Supplement C reports the results of the discrete-
time hazard competing risk model that has been used to estimate the propensity score. Figure 
1 summarises the quality of the radius matching by means of an empirical quantile-quantile 
plot (Ho et al., 2007). It plots the quantiles of the propensity score distribution of the treated 
against that of the controls. Before matching, the plot is consistently below the 45-degree line, 
indicating that the treated are substantially different from the controls. After matching, the 
distributions of both groups are very similar, suggesting that they have been successfully 
matched.  
Figure 1 Quantile-quantile plot of the propensity score of the treated and controls 
 
Notes: This plot is based on the outcome ‘employment chances t+6’. The results are similar for the other 
outcomes. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations.  
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Table 3 Balance of covariates: Means and standardised bias before and after matching 
Covariates Treated 
Controls Standardised bias 
Before After Before After 
Unemployment duration (baseline hazard) 9.01 14.01 9.01 -33.2 0.0 
Age 37.83 38.72 37.73 -9.6 1.1 
Age squared 1522.00 1578.10 1513.60 -8.0 1.2 
Female 0.48 0.52 0.49 -6.4 -1.4 
First or second generation immigrant 0.17 0.11 0.16 15.9 1.7 
Vocational degree 0.80 0.88 0.80 -23.7 -0.6 
Technical college degree 0.08 0.03 0.07 18.8 1.7 
University degree 0.13 0.08 0.13 14.2 -0.5 
Total employment experience (full-time) 12.18 12.29 12.21 -1.2 -0.3 
Total employment experience (part-time) 1.61 1.75 1.56 -4.0 1.2 
Total employment experience (part-time)  
x Female 
1.47 1.47 1.41 -0.2 1.6 
Recent employment experience 10.50 10.66 10.54 -5.9 -1.5 
Recent employment experience squared 117.11 120.37 117.84 -7.5 -1.7 
Total unemployment experience 1.28 1.46 1.24 -8.1 1.6 
Total unemployment experience squared 6.42 7.02 5.98 -2.3 1.7 
Previous unemployment spells 1.69 1.68 1.65 0.6 2.2 
Recent unemployment experience 1.24 1.07 1.19 7.3 2.3 
Higher managerial and professional workers 0.04 0.06 0.04 -10.1 -0.9 
Lower managerial and professional workers 0.13 0.17 0.14 -11.8 -3.2 
Routine non-manual workers 0.21 0.23 0.22 -4.8 -2.3 
Self-employed 0.03 0.04 0.03 -5.8 -0.1 
Skilled manual workers 0.22 0.21 0.22 3.6 1.1 
Unskilled manual workers 0.37 0.29 0.35 17.2 3.9 
Labour income 1.07 1.09 1.07 -5.0 -1.5 
Labour income squared 1.37 1.56 1.40 -7.8 -1.1 
Job satisfaction 6.12 6.10 6.08 0.9 1.8 
Household income 15.55 16.39 15.85 -10.0 -3.6 
Household income squared 284.53 365.35 299.85 -8.0 -1.5 
No partner or spouse 0.30 0.32 0.30 -3.3 1.6 
Partner 0.14 0.16 0.14 -4.5 0.1 
Spouse 0.56 0.52 0.56 6.3 -1.6 
No partner or spouse x Female 0.13 0.15 0.13 -3.6 1.4 
Partner x Female 0.07 0.07 0.07 -2.7 -0.6 
Spouse x Female 0.29 0.30 0.30 -2.9 -2.3 
Children 0.66 0.67 0.65 -1.0 0.6 
Health satisfaction 6.94 6.60 6.88 16.1 2.9 
Disability 0.02 0.04 0.02 -11.6 -1.9 
Spell started in 1984-1990 0.09 0.06 0.10 11.5 -0.7 
Spell started in 1991-1997 0.34 0.28 0.34 12.8 0.0 
Spell started in 1998-2002 0.22 0.29 0.23 -16.4 -2.0 
Spell started in 2003-2011 0.34 0.36 0.33 -4.0 2.2 
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Table 3 continued 
Spell started in January-March 0.29 0.28 0.29 1.8 -0.4 
Spell started in April-June 0.22 0.23 0.22 -3.4 -1.8 
Spell started in July-September 0.24 0.26 0.24 -5.8 0.0 
Spell started in October-December 0.26 0.23 0.25 7.3 2.2 
North-Germany 0.13 0.12 0.13 4.2 1.0 
East-Germany 0.49 0.52 0.49 -5.5 1.2 
South-Germany 0.22 0.20 0.23 4.9 -1.9 
West-Germany 0.16 0.16 0.16 -1.8 -0.4 
Regional unemployment 13.12 13.58 13.15 -9.3 -0.7 
Notes: The means of the treated that are on-support are reported.  
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
We also calculated the means and the standardised bias before and after matching, to assess 
the balance on every single covariate (Table 3). Since we matched exactly on unemployment 
duration, the standardised bias for this variable falls to zero after matching. Table 3 highlights 
some other interesting differences.9 For example, the unemployed who take up an overedu-
cated job are overrepresented among younger workers, males and first or second generation 
immigrants and are also more likely to have a university degree. They have less total and re-
cent employment experience but are more likely to have been unemployed in the 12 months 
before the current unemployment spell. Considering the previous job, the treated are less like-
ly to work in higher managerial and professional occupations and are more likely to be manu-
al workers. In addition, their labour and household income is lower than that of the controls. 
Comparing the mean standardised bias before and after matching, we find that matching re-
duces the bias below the standard threshold of 5 per cent for each covariate (Caliendo, 2006). 
This confirms that matching has been successful. 
4.3 Effects of an overeducated re-entry over time 
4.3.1 Employment chances 
Figure 2 shows the probability of being employed 6 to 60 months after the treatment (time 
zero) for those who have taken up an overeducated job (treated) and those who have remained 
unemployed and continued the job search for at least one month (controls). The difference 
between these probabilities represents the treatment effect. The treatment effect is also shown 
for the two years before the treatment offering a so-called pre-treatment test of selection bias 
(Hagen, 2004). If selection bias is present, that is, both groups still differ on background char-
                                                     
9 We refrain from a comparison to previous studies on the determinants of overeducation, because different 
measurements (see Verhaest and Omey, 2010), different sample definitions, and their focus on the comparison of 
overeducation to adequate employment make such a comparison difficult.  
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acteristics, the pre-treatment effects will differ from zero. However, Figure 2 illustrates that in 
the 24 months before the treatment the probability of being employed is approximately the 
same for both groups, indicating that the CIA is plausible. 
Considering the post-treatment period, we find that 6 months after the treatment 95 per cent of 
those who experienced an overeducated re-entry are employed compared with 34 per cent of 
those who have remained unemployed. This translates into a treatment effect of about 61 per-
centage points. To give a reading example: On average, six months after the treatment the 
employment chances of those re-entering the labour market in an overeducated job are 61 
percentage points higher than of those who remained unemployed. Of course, in the first 12 
months after re-employment large effects are not surprising given that the controls remain 
unemployed for some time by definition.   
However, the positive employment effect is persistent, that is, even two to five years after re-
employment the effects range between 10 to 20 percentage points. Additional analyses (not 
shown) reveal that these positive employment effects are to a similar share explained by a 
lower unemployment risk and a lower probability of being out of labour force. Looking at 
employment chances only, these results provide strong support for the stepping-stone hypoth-
esis (1a). 
Figure 2   Treatment effects: Employment chances over time (percentage points)  
 
Notes: treated: probability of employment of those taking up an overeducated job, controls: probability of em-
ployment of those remaining unemployment and continuing the search, treatment effect (95% CI): average of the 
individual treatment effects by elapsed unemployment duration and 95% confidence interval. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
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4.3.2 Job quality 
However, despite the positive employment effects, an overeducated re-entry does not neces-
sarily have to be a stepping stone into adequate employment. Figure 3 shows the treatment 
effects for the chances of adequate employment over a period of one to five years after re-
employment. Note that these analyses only compare treated and controls who are employed in 
the respective years. In contrast to the positive employment effects, Figure 3 shows that the 
unemployed who experience an overeducated re-entry face a strong negative effect in terms of 
chances of adequate employment. One year after re-employment, they have a 40 percentage 
point lower chance to work in a job that matches their educational qualifications compared 
with those who remained unemployed. Although the time trend suggests that some workers 
advance to adequate employment, the negative effects persist up to five years after re-
employment, indicating a significant lock-in effect into overeducation. This result is in line 
with previous studies (Baert et al., 2013; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel, 2004a) showing that 
an overeducated re-entry delays the transition to adequate employment. It supports the trap 
hypothesis (1b), demonstrating that exiting unemployment into overeducation is not a step-
ping stone into adequate employment.  
Figure 3 Treatment effects: Chances of adequate employment over time (percentage points) 
 
Notes: treatment effect (95% CI): average of the individual treatment effects by elapsed unemployment duration 
and 95% confidence interval.  
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations.  
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4.3.3 Effect heterogeneity 
In order to test whether the effects vary by workers’ labour market experience and educational 
qualification (hypotheses 2 and 3) we repeated the analyses for the respective subgroups. Ta-
ble 4 and Table 5 report the treatment effects and standard errors for the two outcomes by 
labour market experience and educational qualification. Supplement D provides the respective 
figures. With respect to labour market experience, we distinguish workers with up to five 
years of total experience (early-career workers) from workers with more than five years (es-
tablished workers) of total experience (i.e., employment and unemployment experience). With 
respect to educational qualification, we distinguish between workers with a vocational degree 
and those having a university degree where workers with a technical college degree (GDR) 
are included in the latter subgroup. 
The general patterns and trends in the treatment effects closely resemble the results of the 
main analyses. We find positive employment effects and negative effects for the chance of 
adequate employment across all subgroups. These findings are, thus, reassuring and consistent 
with the main effects reported before. Considering the differences in the employment effects, 
we find slightly higher employment effects for established workers than for early-career 
workers, especially from year three onwards. As for the chances of adequate employment 
across subgroups, we find very similar effects for early-career workers and established work-
ers (Table 4). Taken together these results contradict hypothesis 2 expecting that early-career 
workers should benefit more from an overeducated re-entry than established workers.10  
How do the effects differ by educational qualification (Table 5)? In terms of employment 
chances we do not find any economically significant differences between workers with a vo-
cational degree and workers having a university degree. Considering the chance of adequate 
employment, the analyses reveal a stronger lock-in effect into overeducation for workers with 
a vocational degree, in particular, in the first four years after re-employment. This finding 
lends weak support to hypothesis 3, arguing that workers with academic qualifications should 
benefit more from an overeducated re-entry. However, considering that these differences are 
small in size and not apparent in all years, hypothesis 3 has to be rejected. In sum, the results 
are in line with previous findings by Baert et al. (2013) also suggesting that the effects do not 
vary substantially across different skill groups. 
                                                     
10 We also distinguished workers in their early careers and established workers by age. The results are similar to 
those reported, showing no substantially relevant differences between workers of age 18-29 (early-career) and 
those of age 30-54 (established workers) years. 
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Table 4 Treatment effects: Employment chances and chances of adequate employment over time by labour market experience 
 Employment chances   Chances of adequate employment 
Month 
LME: <= 5 years  LME: > 5 years labour  
Year 
LME: <= 5 years  LME: > 5 years  
TE SE TE SE  TE SE TE SE 
6 0.55 0.02 0.61 0.01  1 -0.43 0.04 -0.39 0.02 
12 0.34 0.03 0.39 0.01  2 -0.31 0.05 -0.31 0.02 
18 0.21 0.03 0.23 0.02  3 -0.31 0.06 -0.31 0.02 
24 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.02  4 -0.25 0.06 -0.29 0.03 
30 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.02  5 -0.31 0.06 -0.29 0.03 
36 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.02       
42 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.02       
48 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.02       
54 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.02       
60 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.02       
Notes: TE: average of the individual treatment effects by elapsed unemployment duration. LME: labour market experience. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
Table 5 Treatment effects: Employment chances and chances of adequate employment over time by educational qualification 
 Employment chances   Chances of adequate employment 
Month 
Vocational degree University degree  
Year 
Vocational degree University degree 
TE SE TE SE  TE SE TE SE 
6 0.61 0.01 0.58 0.02  1 -0.44 0.02 -0.29 0.03 
12 0.38 0.01 0.38 0.03  2 -0.33 0.02 -0.24 0.04 
18 0.22 0.02 0.25 0.03  3 -0.32 0.02 -0.27 0.04 
24 0.17 0.02 0.21 0.03  4 -0.31 0.03 -0.21 0.05 
30 0.18 0.02 0.20 0.03  5 -0.29 0.03 -0.29 0.04 
36 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.04       
42 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.04       
48 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.04       
54 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.04       
60 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.04       
Notes: TE: average of the individual treatment effects by elapsed unemployment duration. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations.
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5. Conclusions 
This article sought to reveal whether it is better for the unemployed to take up a job for which 
they are overeducated or to remain unemployed and continue the search for adequate em-
ployment. To test the opposing predictions of the stepping-stone and trap hypotheses, we ex-
amined the effects of an overeducated re-entry on the long-term employment chances and 
chances of adequate employment. Because it is likely that these effects vary across the unem-
ployed, we also performed subgroup analyses by labour market experience and educational 
qualification. Using the SOEP (1984-2012), our analyses are based on a dynamic propensity 
score matching approach comparing unemployed who take up an overeducated job to similar 
unemployed who continued the job search for at least one month. This dynamic extension of 
propensity score matching allows avoiding potential bias due to an inappropriate definition of 
controls and addressing the key methodological issue of selection into overeducation.  
The empirical results reveal that taking up an overeducated job is associated with long-run 
positive employment effects. Even five years after re-employment, the unemployed who take 
up an overeducated job have a 10 percentage point higher chance to be employed. Taken by 
itself, this result speaks in favor of the stepping-stone hypothesis, suggesting that policy-
makers should enforce the acceptance of overeducated jobs. However, looking at the chances 
of adequate employment, we find strong negative effects ranging from 30 to 40 percentage 
points. The latter analysis also shows that only a minority of those who take up an overedu-
cated job advance to adequate employment. These results are in line with previous studies 
(Baert et al., 2013; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel, 2004a), illustrating that an overeducated re-
entry is not a stepping stone into adequate employment. More generally, they are also sup-
portive of studies showing that overeducation is not just a temporary problem (e.g., Pollmann-
Schult and Büchel, 2004b). Considering the subgroup analyses, we find that the effects are 
rather similar for early-career and established workers as well as for workers with a vocation-
al and university degree. 
The following limitations should, however, be considered. First, although we used a very ho-
mogenous sample and controlled for many observed differences as well as elapsed unem-
ployment duration, our estimates are biased if treated and controls still differ on unobserved 
characteristics. For example, if the overeducated were less able, we would underestimate the 
positive employment effect and overestimate the negative effect in terms of adequate em-
ployment. Although a pre-treatment test suggests that the selection on observables assumption 
is reasonable, we cannot rule out the influence of unobserved heterogeneity. However, Baert 
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et al. (2013) report similar results taking account of selection on unobservables by using the 
timing-of-events approach. Against this background, we think it is unlikely that our findings 
are explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Second, the literature on overeducation has not 
yet agreed on a standard measurement. Despite using an extension of the standard subjective 
approach and testing for alternative measurements, measurement error may still be present. 
Third, the analyses do not allow identifying the relative importance of different mechanisms. 
Although lower job search intensity appears to be the most likely explanation of the lock-in 
effect into overeducation, we cannot disentangle different mechanisms empirically. One 
promising approach to address these questions is the use of field experiments (see Baert and 
Verhaest, 2014). 
What broader conclusions can be drawn from the results? From a policy-point of view, the 
analyses point to an important trade-off between employment chances and the chances of ad-
equate employment. For this reason, policies that force the unemployed into overeducation, 
for example, by tightening benefit eligibility or revising regulations for the type of work the 
jobless have to accept, may cause persistent qualification mismatches that are costly for the 
individual and the society as a whole (Baert et al., 2013). To allow for a more targeted design 
of policies, future research should investigate under which circumstances an overeducated re-
entry represents a stepping stone or a trap, respectively. Although this article shows that the 
effects vary little by labour market experience and educational qualification, it is likely that 
the above described trade-off turns out to be positive for some unemployed and negative for 
others. Follow-up studies could examine how the results vary by unemployment duration or 
the degree of mismatch. The former analysis would, for example, help to estimate the unem-
ployment duration, at which remaining unemployed only has negative effects. In general, 
changing perspective and asking how overeducation compares to unemployment seems to be 
a valuable avenue of future research providing a more comprehensive picture on the impact of 
overeducation on individuals’ careers.  
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Supplement A. Measurement model of overeducation 
Job  
requirement 
level 
Occupational status 
Classification with regard to the degree of 
congruence between job and education 
Qualification level gained 
Vocational 
degree1 
Engineering, 
technical school  
(East Germany) 
University or post-
secondary technical 
college degree2 
No special 
training 
required/ 
only a short 
introduction 
on the job 
Unskilled/ semi-skilled worker ov ov ov 
Skilled worker/ foreman/ master craftsman * - - 
White-collar worker in an unskilled job ov ov ov 
White-collar worker in a skilled job * * * 
White-collar worker in a highly skilled job - - - 
Self-employed person ov ov ov 
Civil servant - - - 
A lengthy 
period of 
coaching at 
my place 
Unskilled/ semi-skilled worker ov ov ov 
Skilled worker/ foreman/ master craftsman * - - 
White-collar worker in an unskilled job ov ov ov 
White-collar worker in a skilled job * * * 
White-collar worker in a highly skilled job * * * 
Self-employed person ov ov ov 
Civil servant * - - 
Attendance 
at special 
theoretical or 
practical 
courses/ A 
certificate of 
vocational 
training 
Unskilled/ semi-skilled worker * ov ov 
Skilled worker/ foreman/ master craftsman ad ov ov 
White-collar worker in an unskilled job ad ov ov 
White-collar worker in a skilled job ad ov ov 
White-collar worker in a highly skilled job ad ad/* 3 ad/* 3 
Self-employed person ad ov ov 
Civil servant ad ad/* 3 ad/* 3 
Engineering, 
technical 
school 
required  
(East 
Germany) 
Unskilled/ semi-skilled worker - - - 
Skilled worker/ foreman/ master craftsman - - - 
White-collar worker in an unskilled job - * ov 
White-collar worker in a skilled job ad ad ov 
White-collar worker in a highly skilled job ad ad ad 
Self-employed person ad ad ad 
Civil servant - ad ov 
A university 
or post-sec.  
technical 
college 
degree 
Unskilled/ semi-skilled worker - - - 
Skilled worker/ foreman/ master craftsman - - - 
White-collar worker in an unskilled job - - - 
White-collar worker in a skilled job - - * 
White-collar worker in a highly skilled job ad ad ad 
Self-employed person ad ad ad 
Civil servant - ad ad 
Notes: ad=adequate employment, ov=overeducation, *=degree of mismatch not clearly determinable,  
-=implausible combination 
1) including: apprenticeship, vocational school, health care school, technical school, civil service training, other 
training, master craftsman, engineering, technical degree. 
2) including: technical college, university, technical university, dissertation, habilitation. 
3) Until 1993 respondents are adequately qualified; after 1993 degree of mismatch is not clearly determinable 
due to changes in the questionnaire. 
Source: Own illustration adapted from Büchel and Weißhuhn (1998).  
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Supplement B. Descriptive statistics at the inflow into unemployment 
Covariates Mean/Per cent SD 
Age 36.1 (9.4) 
Female 46.8  
First or second generation immigrant 12.9  
Vocational degree 84.9  
Technical college degree (former GDR) 3.3  
University degree 11.8  
Total employment experience (full-time) 11.4 (9.0) 
Total employment experience (part-time) 1.6 (3.5) 
Recent employment experience 10.7 (2.4) 
Total unemployment experience 1.1 (1.9) 
Previous unemployment spells 1.5 (1.9) 
Recent unemployment experience 0.9 (2.1) 
Higher managerial and professional workers 7.3  
Lower managerial and professional workers 17.9  
Routine non-manual workers 20.8  
Self-employed 3.6  
Skilled manual workers 24.0  
Unskilled manual workers 26.4  
Labour income 1.2 (0.6) 
Job satisfaction 6.1 (2.5) 
Household income 17.4 (9.1) 
No partner or spouse 31.6  
Partner 15.9  
Spouse 52.4  
Children 0.6 (0.9) 
Health satisfaction 6.8 (2.1) 
Disability 3.0  
Spell started in 1984-1990 8.8  
Spell started in 1991-1997 28.2  
Spell started in 1998-2002 24.1  
Spell started in 2003-2011 38.9  
Spell started in January-March 26.6  
Spell started in April-June 21.7  
Spell started in July-September 25.0  
Spell started in October-December 26.8  
North-Germany 13.0  
East-Germany 44.9  
South-Germany 24.2  
West-Germany 17.9  
Regional unemployment 12.7 (5.0) 
N (spells) 4538  
N (persons) 3353  
Notes: See Table 1 for a detailed description of the definition and measurement of the covariates.  
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
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Supplement C. Discrete-time hazard competing risk duration model (Average marginal effects multiplied by 100) 
Exit to 
Overeducation Adequately employed Education/training Inactivity 
AME x 100 AME x 100 AME x 100 AME x 100 
Ref.: 1 month             
   2 months -0.251 
 
(0.349) -0.185 
 
(0.501) 0.240 
 
(0.221) 0.167 
 
(0.194) 
   3 months 0.049 
 
(0.377) -0.113 
 
(0.533) -0.029 
 
(0.218) -0.142 
 
(0.184) 
   4-6 months -0.430 
 
(0.302) -1.402 *** (0.427) 0.567 *** (0.199) 0.147 
 
(0.166) 
   7-9 months -0.401 
 
(0.333) -2.522 *** (0.452) 0.514 ** (0.224) 0.321 * (0.194) 
   10-12 months -0.207 
 
(0.374) -2.506 *** (0.496) 0.777 *** (0.267) 0.632 *** (0.237) 
   13-15 months -0.012 
 
(0.440) -3.951 *** (0.510) 0.489 * (0.297) 0.590 ** (0.277) 
   16 months or more -1.218 *** (0.294) -5.233 *** (0.386) -0.093 
 
(0.185) 0.372 ** (0.183) 
Age -0.041 * (0.022) -0.163 *** (0.033) -0.034 ** (0.017) -0.027 * (0.014) 
Female (Ref.: male) 0.132 
 
(0.187) -1.508 *** (0.302) -0.008 
 
(0.165) 0.792 *** (0.125) 
First or second generation immigrant (Ref.: otherwise) 0.855 *** (0.281) -1.586 *** (0.284) -0.344 ** (0.165) -0.107 
 
(0.151) 
Ref.: Vocational degree             
   Technical college degree (former GDR) 5.675 *** (0.892) -3.781 *** (0.356) 0.789 ** (0.355) -0.724 *** (0.167) 
   University degree 4.768 *** (0.680) -0.172 
 
(0.403) 0.210 
 
(0.252) 0.485 * (0.283) 
Total employment experience (full-time) 0.044 ** (0.022) 0.043 
 
(0.032) -0.017 
 
(0.017) -0.013 
 
(0.014) 
Total employment experience (part-time) -0.183 ** (0.074) 0.082 
 
(0.074) 0.020 
 
(0.035) -0.048 
 
(0.030) 
Recent employment experience -0.076 
 
(0.086) -0.469 *** (0.127) -0.124 ** (0.060) -0.100 * (0.053) 
Total unemployment experience -0.235 *** (0.090) -1.228 *** (0.167) -0.125  (0.086) -0.081  (0.062) 
Previous unemployment spells 0.133 ** (0.064) 0.517 *** (0.095) 0.045 
 
(0.055) -0.070 
 
(0.050) 
Recent unemployment experience 0.171 ** (0.076) -0.407 *** (0.099) -0.116 ** (0.047) -0.076 * (0.042) 
Ref.: Higher managerial and professional workers             
   Lower managerial and professional workers 0.846 *** (0.238) -1.214 ** (0.591) 0.175  (0.249) 0.464 ** (0.193) 
   Routine non-manual workers 1.454 *** (0.259) -2.377 *** (0.605) 0.345  (0.262) 0.484 ** (0.195) 
   Self-employed 0.865 ** (0.372) -2.746 *** (0.730) -0.129  (0.347) 0.802 ** (0.356) 
   Skilled manual workers 1.768 *** (0.281) -1.799 *** (0.617) 0.200  (0.265) 0.376 * (0.211) 
   Unskilled manual workers 2.517 *** (0.285) -3.400 *** (0.601) -0.058  (0.254) 0.623 *** (0.207) 
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Supplement C. continued 
Labour income -0.303  (0.237) 0.340  (0.259) 0.396 ** (0.159) -0.003  (0.144) 
Job satisfaction -0.025  (0.034) 0.089 * (0.047) -0.098 *** (0.023) 0.004  (0.021) 
Household income -0.039 ** (0.018) 0.075 *** (0.017) 0.041 *** (0.012) 0.002  (0.008) 
Ref.: No partner or spouse             
   Partner 0.318  (0.250) 0.756 ** (0.313) -0.141  (0.178) 0.158  (0.141) 
   Spouse 0.578 *** (0.209) 1.346 *** (0.288) -0.097  (0.161) 0.487 *** (0.132) 
Children -0.134  (0.107) -0.402 *** (0.147) -0.005  (0.079) -0.082  (0.074) 
Health satisfaction 0.164 *** (0.042) 0.157 *** (0.057) -0.024  (0.028) -0.066 *** (0.025) 
Disability -1.249 *** (0.329) -1.342 ** (0.525) -0.181  (0.288) 1.005 *** (0.388) 
Ref. Spell started in 1984-1990             
   Spell started in 1991-1997 -0.669 * (0.405) -0.920 ** (0.425) 0.743 *** (0.242) -0.501 ** (0.233) 
   Spell started in1998-2002 -1.353 *** (0.408) -0.047  (0.450) 0.570 ** (0.250) -0.541 ** (0.237) 
   Spell started in 2003-2011 -1.037 *** (0.394) 0.253  (0.424) -0.371 * (0.217) -0.301  (0.231) 
Ref.: Spell started in January-March             
   Spell started in April-June -0.160  (0.231) -0.446  (0.307) -0.018  (0.155) 0.320 ** (0.140) 
   Spell started in July-September -0.400 * (0.215) -0.876 *** (0.287) 0.233  (0.158) 0.237 * (0.131) 
   Spell started in October-December -0.024  (0.227) 0.068  (0.309) 0.061  (0.161) 0.401 *** (0.148) 
Ref.: North-Germany             
   East-Germany -0.192  (0.348) -0.090  (0.495) 0.469 * (0.256) -0.609 ** (0.239) 
   South-Germany 0.031  (0.331) -0.745 * (0.394) -0.078  (0.200) 1.079 *** (0.402) 
   West-Germany -0.331  (0.301) -0.918 ** (0.379) -0.045  (0.196) 0.651 ** (0.274) 
Regional unemployment -0.052  (0.034) -0.120 ** (0.047) -0.016  (0.025) 0.088 *** (0.023) 
N (person-months)  40888            
N (spells) 4538            
N (persons) 3353            
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.05, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; AME and SE are multiplied by 100; Variables specified with quadratic terms are represented by one 
AME (Age, recent employment experience, Total unemployment experience, Labour income, household income); Coefficients of interactions are not displayed (Female x 
Total employment experience (part-time), Female x Partner). 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
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Supplement D. Figures for effect heterogeneity analyses (Table 4 and Table 5) 
Figure D1. Treatment effects: Employment chances over time by labour market experience 
(percentage points) 
 
Figure D2. Treatment effects: Chances of adequate employment over time by labour market 
experience (percentage points) 
 
Notes: Treatment effect: average of the individual treatment effects by elapsed unemployment duration, see Ta-
ble 4 for the treatment effects and standard errors. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
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Figure D3. Treatment effects: Employment chances over time by educational qualification 
(percentage points) 
 
Figure D4. Treatment effects: Chances of adequate employment over time by educational 
qualification (percentage points) 
 
Notes: Treatment effect: average of the individual treatment effects by elapsed unemployment duration, see Ta-
ble 5 for the treatment effects and standard errors. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2012, own calculations. 
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Abstract 
Recent years have witnessed an increase in interest towards the long-term health consequenc-
es of early-career job loss and youth unemployment. Relying on detailed retrospective data 
from the third wave (2008/09) of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) this paper investigates whether an involuntary job loss in the first 10 years after 
labour market entry has lasting negative effects on health more than 30 years later. The results 
show that an early-career involuntary job loss due to a layoff or plant closure increases the 
probability of fair or poor self-rated health in late life by about 6 percentage points. Moreover, 
examining the mechanisms behind this relationship, the analysis reveals that the subsequent 
unemployment risks and employment instability only explain a small share of the total effect. 
In line with previous studies, these findings highlight the importance of early career experi-
ences for workers’ later life health.  
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1. Introduction 
Research and policy debates over the long-term health consequences of job loss and unem-
ployment, in particular for young people, have intensified over the last ten years. For exam-
ple, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007/08 and the subsequent economic recession 
some authors have argued that youth has “suffered disproportionately” in the recession (Bell 
& Blanchflower, 2011, p. 241) and others have raised concerns about a “lost generation” 
(Scarpetta et al., 2010, p. 4). Although many studies show that job loss and unemployment 
have negative direct effects on health (e.g. Burgard et al., 2007; Strully, 2009), surprisingly 
little is known about the potential long-term consequences, especially for workers who expe-
rience negative labour market events in their early-career. 
While the long-term consequences for young people who lost their jobs over the course of the 
financial crisis of 2007/08 cannot yet be analysed, the data from older birth cohorts allows 
investigating the potential for lasting health effects of job loss and unemployment.1 A few 
previous studies on the long-term health consequences mostly examine the general population 
(Daly & Delaney, 2013; Schröder, 2013). However, recent evidence from long-run cohort 
studies suggests that young people may be particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of 
unemployment (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Strandh et al., 2014). There are a number of po-
tential explanations for these findings. For example, Brydsten et al. (2015) highlight that the 
early-career represents a sensitive period in the life course as well as that young workers lack 
experience and resources to cope with and overcome unemployment. 
Moreover, past research primarily focuses on the long-term effects of unemployment which 
may be either voluntary or involuntary. However, from a substantial as well as a methodolog-
ical point of view, additional data on the reason for job loss provide rich information (Schrö-
der 2013). Specifically, research on life events emphasises that their effects on health vary by 
‘their desirability, by the degree of control people have over their occurrence, or by whether 
or not they are scheduled’ (Pearlin et al., 1981, p. 339), making it likely that only involuntary 
job losses will have lasting negative effects. In fact, voluntary job changes may even improve 
health as they either reflect an ‘escape from a … stressful role situation’ (Wheaton, 1990, p. 
                                                     
1 Previous studies mostly use data from two longitudinal cohort studies: The National Child Development Study 
(NCDS), following a sample of persons born in 1958 in Great Britain (e.g. Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Daly & 
Delaney, 2013) or the Northern Swedish Cohort (NSC) following all pupils in their last year of compulsory 
school in a medium-sized industrial town in Sweden in 1981 (Brydsten et al., 2015; Strandh et al., 2014). Fol-
lowing Schröder (2013), we draw on the retrospective life history data from the SHARELIFE survey.  
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2010) or upward socio-economic mobility (Schmelzer, 2012). In contrast, studies focusing on 
unemployment examine a state that mixes very heterogeneous experiences (Brand, 2015). 
Analysing involuntary job losses also helps addressing the methodological challenges of 
health selection and confounding (Burgard et al., 2007). They may be considered more of an 
exogenous shock than unemployment. In particular, job losses due to plant closures can be 
thought to be ‘largely beyond the control of the individual worker’ (Brand, 2015, p. 360), 
making it unlikely that they are determined by workers’ health or other observed and unob-
served characteristics (Baumann et al., 2016, p.161). For these reasons, this article focuses on 
involuntary job losses in the first 10 years after the labour market entry and distinguishes 
layoffs from plant closures.2 
Following recent interest in the mechanisms behind the negative long-term effects of job loss 
and unemployment on health (e.g. Strandh et al., 2014), we additionally examine how the 
subsequent unemployment risks and employment instability mediate this relationship. Alt-
hough the previous empirical evidence is scarce (see Brydsten et al., 2015 for an exception), 
theoretically, a life course perspective is often employed arguing that initial disadvantages 
produce further relative disadvantages over time (e.g. DiPrete & Eirich, 2006). Specifically, 
the negative effects of an early-career job loss may work through channels of increased sub-
sequent unemployment risks (e.g. Brandt & Hank, 2014), employment instability (e.g. Man-
zoni & Mooi-Reci, 2011) and lower job quality (e.g. Brand, 2006; Dieckhoff, 2011; Gangl, 
2006). 
This paper focuses on the following research questions. First, what are the long-term effects 
of an early-career involuntary job loss on self-rated health in late life? Second, do these ef-
fects differ for job losses due to layoff or plant closure? Third, to what extent do the subse-
quent unemployment risks and employment instability mediate the potential negative effects? 
To answer these questions, data from the third wave (2008/09) of the Survey of Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are used. The SHARELIFE survey collected retro-
spective life histories of elderly Europeans from 14 countries. It provides information on self-
rated health at the time of the interview as well as details about respondents’ work histories, 
childhood health and childhood socio-economic status. As Daly and Delaney (2013) empha-
                                                     
2 Although researchers emphasise that the school-to-work transition rather represents a process than a transition 
(Brzinsky-Fay, 2014), they have yet to agree on a common definition of the early-career. Because definitions of 
the school-to-work process often cover 5 years, we define the early-career to include the first 10 years of the 
career. 
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sise, data on these early-life circumstances are important to take into account selection into 
job loss and unemployment. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the next section provides theoretical con-
siderations on why an involuntary early-career job loss can have negative effects on health in 
late life and how unemployment and employment instability following the job loss may medi-
ate this effect. The next section presents the data, measures and methods followed by a dis-
cussion of the results. The last section summarizes the findings and offers some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
The life course perspective distinguishes two basic models explaining how early socio-
economic conditions, in general, as well as job loss and unemployment, specifically, affect 
future health (e.g. Strandh et al., 2014). 
The first model (I) assumes that the direct negative effect of an early-career job loss on health, 
once it occurred, for the most part persists over time. The direct effect itself may be explained 
by the deprivation of economic and psychosocial rewards that are associated with employ-
ment (see Nordenmark and Strandh, 1999 for a theoretical synthesis). Specifically, the loss of 
economic rewards requires individuals’ to adjust their living conditions as well as restricts the 
control over their lives and ability to plan ahead. Besides its financial consequences, an invol-
untary job loss may also deprive workers’ of psychosocial rewards of employment (Jahoda, 
1982) as well as entail the loss of a major social role and identity. This deprivation of the re-
wards of employment can both negatively affect mental health and over time accumulate and 
manifest into poorer physical health. For example, physical health may not only be affected 
through changes in living standards, but also increases in health-damaging and decreases in 
health-promoting behaviour (Nizalova and Norton, 2017). Lastly, previous studies highlight 
that negative psychological effects over time can translate into physical health problems (see 
Korpi, 2001 for a detailed discussion). 
In contrast, the second model (II) supposes that an early-career involuntary job loss negatively 
affects later life health, because it elicits a ‘chronic stress process’ (Burgard et al., 2007, p. 
370; Pearlin et al., 1981) or a ‘social chain of risks’ (Brydsten et al., 2015, p. 799). This per-
spective also echoes a key argument from life course sociology stating that trigger events, 
such as an early-career involuntary job loss, set young people on trajectories that negatively 
affect their health throughout their life. According to this cumulative (dis-) advantage frame-
250 
work (e.g. DiPrete & Eirich, 2006), initial disadvantages may produce further relative disad-
vantages resulting in greater inequalities over time. In this model, the negative effect of an 
early-career involuntary job loss on health is assumed to be mostly operating indirectly; for 
example, through channels such as increased unemployment risks, employment instability and 
lower job quality over the course of the subsequent career. 
Moreover, the direct negative effect of an early-career involuntary job loss on health may 
partly explain why workers have difficulties in finding re-employment as well as jobs that 
match their pre-unemployment positions. Put differently, the long-term negative effects on 
health may be reinforced over the life course through an additive and sequential interplay of 
processes of health selection and social causation (West, 1991). 
The specific mechanisms of increased unemployment risks, employment instability and lower 
job quality can be derived from economic and sociological labour market theories and have 
been attested in numerous empirical studies on the so-called scar effects of job loss and un-
employment (e.g. Brand, 2006; Brandt & Hank, 2014; Dieckhoff, 2011; Gangl, 2006; Manzo-
ni & Mooi-Reci, 2011). For instance, Becker’s (1993) human capital theory argues that job 
losses result in the loss of specific as well as the depreciation of general human capital, which, 
in turn, entails fewer and lower quality job offers by prospective employers. Another explana-
tion is based on theories of unemployment stigma and signalling (e.g. Spence 1973). Because 
employers have to overcome uncertainty about applicants’ productivity, they make use of 
observable characteristics such as their employment history. Job losses and periods of unem-
ployment will likely signal job searchers’ ‘doubtful quality’ and ‘[create] scepticism about 
their merit’ (e.g. Young, 2012), weakening their bargaining position. 
To explain why increased subsequent unemployment risks and employment instability nega-
tively affect health across the life course, one can draw on the mechanisms for the direct nega-
tive effects as described above for the first model (I). In addition, work stress theories, such as 
the demand-control model or the effort-reward imbalance model, predict that reduced job 
quality over one’s career likely has negative effects on  health, too (e.g. Wahrendorf et al., 
2013). Against this theoretical background, it is assumed that the potential negative long-term 
effects of an early-career involuntary job loss on later life health are partially mediated 
through these channels. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are derived: 
Hypothesis 1: An early-career involuntary job loss has a negative effect on later life health. 
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Hypothesis 2: The total negative effect of an early-career involuntary job loss is partially me-
diated by increased unemployment risks and employment instability across workers’ subse-
quent careers.3 
3. Data, measures and methods 
3.1 Data 
This article used data from SHARELIFE, the third wave (2008/09) of the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The target population consists of all persons 
aged 50 years and over at the time of sampling who have their regular domicile in a respective 
SHARE country. Persons who are incarcerated, hospitalized, out of the country during the 
entire survey period, unable to speak the country’s language or who have moved to unknown 
addresses are excluded. In all countries, the data were collected based on individual or house-
hold probability samples with the use of computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI). Cur-
rent partners living in the same household were interviewed regardless of age. The average 
response rate in wave 1 was 62 percent and the average individual retention rates were 73 
percent for wave 2 and 77 percent for wave 3 (Börsch-Supan et al., 2013).4 
SHARELIFE collected retrospective life histories for all individuals who participated in wave 
1 or 2 of SHARE (see Schröder, 2011 for methodological details). The following 14 countries 
were included: Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, 
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland. The data provided infor-
mation on self-rated health at the time of the interview as well as details about respondents’ 
work histories, childhood health and childhood socio-economic status, making it well-suited 
for the analysis of the long-term consequences of life course events (Brandt & Hank, 2014; 
Schröder, 2013). 
To warrant high quality retrospective data, a life grid was used (Blane, 1996), taking respond-
ents step by step through the questionnaire, starting with modules on children and partners. In 
the CAPI, dates of births and marriages were represented in a calendar, serving as anchor 
points for further questions (Schröder, 2013). The work history module collected data for eve-
ry job lasting at least six month including the start and end, job characteristics and the reason 
                                                     
3 Theoretically, the job quality is also of interest. However, the data only allow for tests concerning unemploy-
ment as well as employment instability across workers’ subsequent career. This issue is also revisited in the 
conclusion.  
4 In wave 2, three new countries entered SHARE and refreshment samples were drawn. The respective average 
response rates were 61 percent and 54 percent. As SHARE is a multinational survey the sampling procedures 
differ between countries (see Börsch-Supan et al., 2013 for details). 
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for its end. If the gap between two jobs was six months or longer, respondents were asked for 
their activity status in between. Moreover, the activity statuses between leaving education and 
the first job as well as after the last job were reported. 
For the analyses, the sample was restricted to persons 50 years and over reporting at least one 
job spell. Because the analyses focused on early-career involuntary job losses, only persons 
who started their first job between the ages 14 to 35 years were considered.5 In addition, per-
sons who were self-employed or retired in their early-career were excluded. Job losses of 
these persons are unlikely to be exogenous (Schröder, 2013). Moreover, information on 
whether any early-career job ended due to an illness or disability was exploited (see Burgard 
et al., 2007 for a similar approach). Excluding such health-induced job losses further address-
es concerns about health selection issues.6 Lastly, only workers with an interview at least 15 
years after the early-career were considered, to ensure the analyses’ focus on the long-term 
effects of job loss on health. The resulting sample provided complete information on 16,826 
persons, including 946 early-career involuntary job losses. 
3.2 Measures 
Table S1 in the supplementary materials provides details about the measurement. Tables 1 
and 2 offer descriptive statistics. The independent variable early-career involuntary job loss 
was defined as any job loss due to layoff or plant closure within the first 10 years after the 
labour market entry (see footnote 2). The other reasons for separation either reflected volun-
tary job changes (i.e. resignation) or ambiguous situations (i.e. mutual agreement, temporary 
job completion, other). Because previous studies used different ‘control groups’, persons with 
involuntary job losses were compared with two different groups. First, they were compared 
with persons who did not experience any involuntary job loss in the first 10 years after start-
ing their first job. Second, a comparison group of persons who did not experience involuntary 
job loss and, in addition, was continuously employment throughout their early-career was 
used. 
The dependent variable self-rated health is an overall measure of health status with answers 
ranging from 1 ‘excellent’ to 5 ‘poor’ on a five-point scale. For the analyses, the responses 
were grouped into a binary variable in order to focus on the key contrast between bad (‘fair’, 
‘poor’) and good health (‘excellent’, ‘very good’, ‘good’). A sensitivity analysis using the 
                                                     
5 Moreover, only persons who left education between the ages 11 to 35 years were considered, because some 
control variables only pertained to persons who were in school at age 10 years.  
6 Of the reported early-career involuntary job losses less than 1 percent were also due to illness or disability.  
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five-point self-rated health scale is reported in Table S4 in the supplementary materials. Re-
spondents have been found to take into account a wide range of health factors, including both 
aspects of physical as well as mental health, in forming an assessment of their own health (see 
Gabarski, 2016 for a research synthesis). Moreover, it has been shown that self-rated health is 
a valid and reliable measure of overall health and is predictive of mortality even after adjust-
ing for specific health measures and other covariates (e.g. Idler & Benyamini, 1997), making 
it well-suited for our analyses. 
To further address the issues of health selection and confounding, several sets of control vari-
ables were selected assuming that they affect both the risk of involuntary job loss and the late 
life health. In the displacement literature, for example, poor health or work performance are 
discussed as factors that drive the selection into involuntary job loss and, in particular, layoffs 
(e.g. Baumann et al., 2016). Variables that are consequences of job loss were not considered 
as controls, but are discussed as mechanisms below. Besides country of residence, age at the 
interview, sex, and years of education, childhood health (age 0 to 15 years) and childhood 
socio-economic status (age 10 years) were considered relevant (e.g. Daly & Delaney, 2013). 
Specifically, respondents’ reported whether they were in fair or poor health, stayed for one 
month or more in hospital, or had one or more illnesses according to two check lists of ill-
nesses during childhood.7 In addition, they indicated whether their parents smoked or drank 
heavily. Controlling for these factors should, in particular, reduce concerns about health selec-
tion. Furthermore, childhood socio-economic status was measured by whether the home was 
poorly equipped, the number of books that were available as well as the number of persons 
per room and the occupation of the main breadwinner. A home was poorly equipped if it had 
none of the following five amenities: a fixed bath, cold or hot running water, an inside toilet, 
central heating. The occupation of the main breadwinner was based on the four skill levels 
associated with the ISCO-88 major groups (ILO, 1990). Furthermore, respondents reported 
their relative position in math and language at age 10 compared to their classmates. Next to 
the socio-demographic variables, childhood socio-economic status and school performance 
are important factors for individuals’ career choices and, thus, their risk of involuntary job 
loss. They are also likely factors that determine later life health. The last set of control varia-
                                                     
7 The illnesses on list 1 included: infectious disease (e.g. measles, rubella, chickenpox, mumps, tuberculosis, 
diphtheria, scarlet fever), polio, asthma, respiratory problems other than asthma, allergies (other than asthma), 
severe diarrhoea, meningitis/encephalitis, chronic ear problems, speech impairment, difficulty seeing even with 
eyeglasses. The illnesses on list 2 included: severe headaches or migraines, epilepsy, fits or seizures, emotional, 
nervous, or psychiatric problem, broken bones, fractures, appendicitis, childhood diabetes or high blood sugar, 
heart trouble, leukaemia or lymphoma, cancer or malignant tumour (excluding minor skin cancers), other serious 
health condition. 
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bles concerned characteristics at the first job. Because these characteristics precede any invol-
untary job loss, they allow further reducing heterogeneity between those workers who experi-
ence a job loss and those who do not. The importance of these confounding variables is high-
lighted by studies suggesting that layoffs, but also plant closures occur more often in indus-
tries “that are more vulnerable to economic and structural problems” (Baumann et al., 2016, 
p. 161). In our data, the type of employment, the occupation, the sector and working time 
were reported allowing us to control for some associated factors. In addition, measures of 
whether the person lived with a partner or had children at the first job were constructed. Last-
ly, the age at the first job and the labour market entry cohort were controlled for. 
To assess workers’ subsequent careers, the following mediating variables, concerning the 
years 11 to 25 of the careers, were used. Subsequent unemployment risks were measured by 
the cumulated unemployment duration in years and employment instability was indicated by 
the number of job ends and the number of involuntary job losses. Because previous research 
suggests that career complexity is best measured by analyses of holistic trajectories as com-
pared to single states (Manzoni & Mooi-Reci, 2011), in addition, a complexity index based on 
a sequence analysis of workers’ activity statuses in years 11 to 25 of their careers was con-
structed. The complexity index proposed by Gabadinho et al. (2011) ranges from zero (no 
complexity) to one (maximum complexity) and is a composite measure of the number of tran-
sitions and the longitudinal entropy. The latter measures the diversity of states within a se-
quence meaning that, overall, careers with more transitions and greater variety in activity sta-
tuses were considered more complex.8 
3.3 Methods 
To estimate the effect of an early-career involuntary job loss on later life health, logistic mul-
tiple regression models with cluster-robust standard errors by country were used.9 Because the 
coefficients of logistic regression models cannot be easily interpreted and can also not be 
compared across nested models (Mood, 2010), average marginal effects (AME) are reported. 
Three different models were fitted. Model 1 was a bivariate regression of fair or poor health 
                                                     
8 The following activity statuses were used: unemployed, retired, training and education, domestic work, other 
and working. Overlaps were solved using the listed order. For less than 1 percent of persons, gaps have been 
filled using the preceding activity status (Kröger, 2015). The complexity index was constructed using the Tra-
Miner library in R (Gabadinho et al., 2011). The data preparation and all analyses were performed in Stata 14.  
9 As the SHARELIFE data include variables about self-rated health in both childhood and adulthood, it may be 
asked why the advantages of panel data regression models were not utilised (i.e. differencing out time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity using, for example, change score models). Although the measures of self-rated health 
concerning early and later life are similar, they differ in their reference period as well as the allowed responses 
meaning that we do not measure the same dependent variable over time.   
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on early-career involuntary job loss. Model 2 added the control variables and Model 3, in ad-
dition, included the mediating variables to examine to what extent the total effect (Model 2) 
was operating through channels of increased subsequent unemployment risks and employ-
ment instability. The analyses were first performed for all involuntary job losses combined. In 
addition, they were repeated using an indicator variable to distinguish layoffs and plant clo-
sure. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive findings 
Table 1 provides details about the early-career involuntary job losses. Of the 946 involuntary 
job losses about 70 percent (N=657) were due to layoffs while the remaining 30 percent 
(N=289) followed plant closures. A minority of job losses were experienced by civil servants. 
The median job loss concerned the first job, the fifth year of the career and happened at the 
age of 22 years in 1969, showing that the analysed job losses pertain to workers’ early ca-
reers. The median time to the interview was 39 years emphasising the analyses’ focus on the 
long-term effects of job loss on health. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics on early-career involuntary job losses 
 Median/Percent N Minimum Maximum 
Reason for job loss      
   Layoff 69.5% 657   
   Plant closure 30.5% 289   
Type of employment     
   Employee 95.8% 906   
   Civil servant 4.2% 40   
Job  1  1 6 
Year in the early career 5  1 10 
Age 22  14 40 
Year 1969  1931 1992 
Time to interview (in years) 39  16 77 
Notes: See Table S1 in the supplementary material for further details on the measurement. 
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
Table 2 offers descriptive statistics on the dependent, control and mediating variables separat-
ing workers who experienced a job loss and those who did not. Persons who involuntarily lost 
a job in their early career more often reported to be in fair or poor health at the time of the 
interview, illustrating the potential for negative long-term effects.  
For the majority of the control variables, the mean standardized difference between the two 
groups was small to moderate. However, for some variables, relevant differences were re-
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vealed. Specifically, persons with involuntary job losses were younger and less educated. Alt-
hough they also consistently reported worse childhood health, these differences were small to 
moderate. Moreover, the parents of persons with involuntary job losses were more likely to 
smoke and drink heavily during the respondents’ childhood. Regarding the childhood socio-
economic status, persons with a job loss more often lived in households with none or very few 
books. The respective main breadwinners were less likely to hold a medium-skilled (skill lev-
el 2) and more likely to hold a lower-skilled (skill level 1) occupation. Persons with an invol-
untary job loss also reported to be worse or much worse compared to their classmates in math 
and languages. Moreover, they were less likely to be civil servants as well as less likely to be 
in higher-skilled (skill level 4) and more likely to be in lower-skilled (skill level 1) occupa-
tions at their first job. Their first job was also more likely in the manufacturing and energy 
sectors and less likely in the public, health or education sectors. Finally, they were younger at 
the time of labour market entry and were (under-) overrepresented in (older) younger labour 
market entry cohorts. Overall, the descriptive findings suggest that persons who experienced a 
job loss and those who did not differ on a number of characteristics that have to be controlled 
for to ensure that the estimated associations between job losses and health are not spurious. 
Furthermore, Table 2 shows the differences in the mediating variables concerning years 11 to 
25 of workers’ careers. As expected, early-career involuntary job losses were associated with 
longer subsequent unemployment durations, more job ends, more involuntary job losses, and 
a higher career complexity. However, Table 2 also reveals that the careers in the sample ana-
lysed were overall quite stable and that the differences by involuntary job loss were moderate.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics on the dependent, control, and mediating variables 
 Early-career involuntary job loss? 
 No (N=15880) Yes (N=946) 
 Mean/Percent SD Mean/Percent SD 
Dependent variable     
   Fair or poor self-rated health (at the interview) 34.9%  42.1%  
Control variables     
   Demographics and education     
     Age at interview (in years) 64.89 9.09 63.56 9.62 
     Female 53.0%  52.7%  
     Education (in years)  13.68 3.64 13.00 3.31 
   Childhood health (age 0-15)     
     Fair or poor self-rated health 7.9%  8.7%  
     1+ month in hospital  6.5%  8.1%  
     1+ illness(es) from list 1 84.6%  86.7%  
     1+ illness(es) from list 2 25.1%  26.2%  
   Parents health behaviour     
     Parents smoked 63.0%  71.9%  
     Parents drank heavily 7.5%  12.5%  
   Childhood socio-economic status (age 10)     
     Poorly equipped home 21.6%  22.0%  
     Number of books     
       None or very few  33.5%  40.8%  
       Enough to fill one shelf 25.3%  22.2%  
       Enough to fill one bookcase 25.7%  22.9%  
       Enough to fill two or more book cases 15.5%  14.1%  
     Persons per room     
       ≤ 1 person 29.7%  29.9%  
       > 1 and  ≤2 persons 48.5%  48.3%  
       > 2 persons 21.8%  21.8%  
     Occupation breadwinner     
       Major group 1 (no skill level) 5.3%  4.3%  
       Major group 2 (skill level 4) 4.7%  3.7%  
       Major group 3 (skill level 3) 5.6%  6.1%  
       Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 65.7%  59.8%  
       Major group 9 (skill level 1) 15.4%  22.5%  
       Major group 0 (no skill level) 1.9%  1.6%  
       No breadwinner 1.5%  1.9%  
     Relative position in math     
       Much better 12.0%  11.0%  
       Better 26.6%  23.0%  
       About the same 50.0%  50.6%  
       Worse or much worse 11.4%  15.3%  
     Relative position in language     
       Much better 12.0%  11.0%  
       Better 28.9%  25.3%  
       About the same 48.5%  48.5%  
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Table 2 continued 
       Worse or much worse 10.6%  15.2%  
   Characteristics (at) first job     
     Civil servant 10.6%  3.7%  
     Occupation     
       Major group 1 (no skill level) 2.0%  0.5%  
       Major group 2 (skill level 4) 10.0%  5.6%  
       Major group 3 (skill level 3) 9.5%  7.1%  
       Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 58.8%  55.1%  
       Major group 9 (skill level 1) 18.3%  30.5%  
       Major group 0 (no skill level) 1.5%  1.2%  
     Sector     
       Primary sector 8.1%  7.2%  
       Manufacturing and energy 24.0%  32.3%  
       Construction 7.6%  8.7%  
       Services 35.5%  38.9%  
       Public sector, health, and education 24.8%  12.9%  
     Full-time 96.7%  97.3%  
     Living with a partner 12.7%  12.2%  
     Children 5.7%  6.8%  
     Labour market entry     
       < 1950 11.5%  13.3%  
       1950-59 23.2%  17.5%  
       1960-69 38.4%  36.2%  
       ≥ 1970 26.9%  33.0%  
     Age at first job 18.69 3.75 18.05 3.58 
Mediating variables     
   Unemployment duration (in years) 0.18 1.15 0.74 2.39 
   Employment instability (year 11-25)     
     Number of job ends 0.65 0.97 0.93 1.15 
     Number of involuntary job losses 0.08 0.30 0.23 0.54 
     Complexity index (0-1) 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.10 
Notes: See Table S1 in the supplementary material for further details on the measurement. 
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
4.2 Multivariate findings 
The results of the bivariate and multiple logistic regression analyses are illustrated graphically 
and average marginal effects (AME) with 90 percent confidence intervals are presented (Jann, 
2014). The full regression tables are provided in the supplementary materials. Model 1 in Fig-
ure 1 (left side, Table S2.1) shows that an involuntary job loss compared to no job loss in the 
early-career was associated with a 7.2 percentage point higher probability to report fair to 
poor self-rated health. After adjusting for country of residence, demographics and education, 
childhood health, parents’ health behaviour, childhood socio-economic status and characteris-
tics at the first job, the estimated total effect was reduced to 6.3 percentage points (Model 2). 
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This suggests that despite extensive controls for health selection and confounding, an early-
career involuntary job loss is negatively associated with later life health. 
Figure 1 Effects of an early-career involuntary job loss on fair or poor self-rated health in late 
life (average marginal effects, 90% confidence intervals) 
Notes: See Table S2.1 (left side) and Table S2.2 (right side) in the supplementary material for the full logistic 
regression models. 
Sources: SHARELIFE (N=16,826), authors’ calculations. 
Similar results were found using the five-point self-rated health scale and applying models for 
ordinal or continuous dependent variables. Table S4 in the supplementary materials compares 
the results for Model 2 using a binary logistic regression (see Figure 1) to the findings from an 
ordinal logistic and a linear regression model. In Model 3, the mediating variables indicating 
subsequent unemployment risks and employment instability were added, to test to what extent 
the negative effect of job loss was explained by these factors. Although the total effect further 
diminished to 5.5 percentage points (direct effect), the proportion mediated (PM = (6.3-
5.5)/6.3 = 0.127) only amounted to about 13 percent.10 
On the right side of Figure 1 (Table S2.2), the results are shown for the analyses using an al-
ternative control group of persons who did not experience job loss and were, in addition, con-
                                                     
10 The variables measuring employment instability may be more meaningful if the employment duration in years 
11-25 is controlled. The results were very similar if in addition to the mediating variables the employment dura-
tion is included in Model 3.  
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tinuously employed throughout their early career. Overall the estimated average marginal 
effects were very similar, showing that the findings are not sensitive to the definition of the 
control group. The estimated total and direct effects of 6.1 and 5.2 percentage points were 
slightly smaller and the proportion mediated was about 15 percent. Even if compared to con-
tinuously employed persons, the subsequent unemployment risks and employment instability 
only explained a small share of the total effect of job loss on later life health. In summary, 
these results support hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 can only partially be confirmed, as the subse-
quent unemployment risks and employment instability seem to play a limited role in the me-
diation of the total effect. 
Figure 2 shows the results of the analyses using an indicator variable to further distinguish 
layoffs from plant closures. The upper and lower parts show the results for layoffs and plant 
closures, respectively. As stated before, job losses due to plant closure can be considered to be 
‘largely beyond the control of individual workers’ (Brand, 2015, p. 360) and, thus, provide a 
good sensitivity test for the above reported findings. 
Figure 2 Effects of an early-career involuntary job loss on fair or poor self-rated health in late 
life by reason for job loss (average marginal effects, 90% confidence intervals) 
Notes: See Table S3.1 (left side) and Table S3.2 (right side) in the supplementary material for the full logistic 
regression models. 
Sources: SHARELIFE (N=12,135), authors’ calculations. 
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On the left side of Figure 2 (Table S3.1), results are shown for the control group of persons 
who did not experience involuntary job loss in their early career. Overall, the effects were 
very similar to those for the combined analyses and the differences between layoffs and plant 
closures were relatively small, with somewhat higher point estimates for the latter. Wald tests 
comparing the effects of job losses due to layoff and plant closure revealed that the differ-
ences were not statistically significant (model 1: p=0.89, model 2: p=0.88, model 3: p=0.84). 
Moreover, given the fewer job losses due to plant closure, the respective effects were estimat-
ed with greater uncertainty, as indicated by the wide 90 percent confidence intervals. The 
proportion mediated was estimated to be 13 percent for layoffs and 9 percent for plant clo-
sures, confirming the previous findings that the subsequent unemployment risks and employ-
ment instability only mediate a small share of the total effect. 
The right side of Figure 2 (Table S3.2) shows the results for the analyses using the alternative 
control group. As for the combined analyses, the results were very similar for the different 
control groups, with somewhat smaller estimates for the total and direct effects of job loss and 
slightly larger estimates for the proportion meditated (i.e. 19 percent for layoffs, 12 percent 
for plant closures). Again, Wald tests of whether the effects of layoffs and plant closures dif-
fer were not statistically significant (model 1: p=0.89, model 2: p=0.86, model 3: p=0.81). 
Overall, the results suggest that an early-career job loss had a moderate negative effect on the 
probability to be in fair or poor health in late life. This finding was robust to the control group 
used as well as the reasons for involuntary job loss considered. The latter result is particularly 
relevant, as the use of plant closures should further reduce concerns about health selection and 
confounding. 
5. Conclusions 
This article contributes to the growing literature on the long-term effects of job loss and un-
employment on health (Daly & Delaney, 2013; Schröder, 2013) and, in particular, comple-
ments previous studies on the lasting negative health consequences of youth unemployment 
(Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Brydsten et al., 2015; Strandh et al., 2014). Specifically, it exam-
ines the effects of involuntary job loss in the first ten years after labour market entry on self-
rated health measured for more than 30 years later. In addition, it takes up the increased inter-
est in the mechanisms behind this relationship (e.g. Strandh et al., 2014) by analysing to what 
extent the negative effects are mediated through channels such as increased subsequent un-
employment risks and employment instability. 
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Using detailed retrospective data from the third wave (2008/09) of the Survey of Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) the analysis shows that workers’ who involuntarily 
lost a job in their early career have on average a 6 percentage point higher probability to re-
port fair or poor health at the time of the interview. Comparing the size of this effect to other 
effects in the same model, it is about as large as the effect of having five years less of educa-
tion.11 These results are based on analyses that carefully control for health selection and con-
founding. Specifically, health-induced job losses due to illness or disability were excluded 
beforehand and the regression models adjusted for demographics and education, childhood 
health, childhood socio-economic status as well as characteristics at the first job. Moreover, it 
was revealed that the effects are very similar for involuntary job losses due to layoffs and 
plant closures. As in plant closures almost all workers are let go, it is less likely that the corre-
sponding job loss is due to health or other observed and unobserved characteristics (Strully, 
2009). This should further reduce concerns that the revealed associations are spurious. The 
finding of moderate negative long-term consequences is also in line with the recent evidence 
from British and Swedish cohort studies showing negative effects of youth unemployment on 
functional somatic symptoms, life satisfaction, mental health, and self-rated health (Bell and 
Blanchflower, 2011; Brydsten et al., 2015; Strandh et al., 2014). 
Moreover, this article also contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms behind these 
long-run relationships. Additional analyses controlling for indicators of unemployment risks 
and employment instability concerning workers’ subsequent careers showed that the total ef-
fect of an early-career involuntary job loss was only reduced by about 10 to 15 percent. This 
is consistent with findings by Brydsten et al. (2015), showing that the association between 
youth unemployment and later health remained similar after adjusting for later unemploy-
ment. 
There remain, however, some important caveats to the current analyses. First, this article used 
retrospective data, implying, that measures of childhood health and childhood socio-economic 
status are not as specific as, for example, in prospective cohort studies. In addition, although 
the SHARELIFE survey was carefully planned and techniques to improve data quality, such 
as the life grid, were used (Schröder, 2011), the results may be affected by recall errors. How-
ever, a recent study by Havari and Mazzonna (2015) assesses the internal and external con-
                                                     
11 Although such a comparison may help in judging the size of effects, we note, that it must be interpreted with 
caution as for involuntary job loss a total effect is estimated, while for years of education a direct effect is esti-
mated as the model already controls for variables that mediate the effect of education on health.  
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sistency of the SHARE data, offering empirical evidence about the importance of this issue. 
They conclude that respondents remember childhood health and living conditions fairly well. 
Second, because panel data with a comparable time window are not available, the analyses 
addressed issues of health selection and confounding by adjusting for a large number of ob-
served variables. Moreover, the use of involuntary job losses and analyses taking into account 
the reason for job loss provide some evidence that the found associations are not spurious. 
However, even for involuntary job losses due to plant closures, selection may still be a prob-
lem as closures are anticipated to some extent and specific workers’ may (be) select(ed) out of 
plants before they close (Baumann et al., 2016). For example, Schwerdt (2011, p. 93) de-
scribes two scenarios: one in which positively selected workers leave early and one in which 
negatively selected workers are dismissed by the management. Using Austrian administrative 
data he finds support for the former scenario by examining pre- and post-separation labour 
market outcomes. As we cannot observe such strategic behaviour in our data, the current 
analyses rest on the assumption, that these issues are sufficiently addressed by controlling for 
observed variables. If, however, ‘more qualified and adaptive employees’ leave early (Brand, 
2015, p. 362) and these workers are also more healthy, our results may overestimate the long-
term negative health effects of job loss.12 
Lastly, our results, in particular, the finding that the subsequent unemployment risks and em-
ployment instability only mediated a small share of the total effect of job loss on health, may 
not necessarily generalise beyond the cohorts represented in the data.13 Most of the respond-
ents in the SHARELIFE survey entered the labour market under good economic conditions 
implying that it was easier to avoid long interruptions after a job loss, as a sufficient number 
of adequate jobs for reemployment were available (Schröder 2013). However, the results at 
least suggest that concerns about the potential long-term consequences should be taken seri-
ously and more empirical evidence needs to be accumulated. 
Overall, this article points to the importance of workers’ early career experiences for later life 
health, highlighting the potential long-term costs of involuntary job loss. The finding that the 
unemployment risks and employment instability across workers’ subsequent careers played 
only a limited role in explaining the negative health effects, merits attention in future re-
                                                     
12 The selection out of plants before they close may, however, be less of a problem in survey data as workers 
who leave early are likely to report that their job ended due to an (upcoming) plant closure. 
13 As highlighted in the introduction current studies on the long-term consequences necessarily have to use data 
about older birth cohorts. 
264 
search. Specifically, an investigation on whether this result generalises to other cohorts as 
well as whether other mechanisms, such as the subsequent job quality, are important, seems 
worth examining.  
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Table S1 Measurement of variables 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent variable  
   Fair or poor self-rated health  1 = fair, poor, 0 = excellent, very good, good; at the SHARELIFE interview 
Independent variable  
   Early-career involuntary job loss  
     Control 1: no involuntary job loss 1 = at least one job left due to layoff or plant closure, 0 = no job left due to layoff or plant closure, 
jobs left due to resignation, mutual agreement, temporary job completion, and other reasons are 
allowed; in the first 10 years after labour market entry 
     Control 2: + continuous employment  Control 1 + continuous employment; in the first 10 years after labour market entry 
     Layoffs vs. plant closures The same measurements as above, but layoffs and plant closures are separate categories 
Control variables  
   Demographics and education  
     Age at interview Age in years; at the SHARELIFE interview 
     Female 1 = female, 0 = male 
     Education Education in years 
   Childhood health    
     Fair or poor self-rated health 1 = fair, poor, 0 = excellent, very good, good, varied a great deal; age 0-15 
     1+ month in hospital 1 = in hospital for one month or more, 0 = otherwise; age 0-15 
     1+ illness(es) from list 1a 1 = one or more illness(es) from list 1, 0 = otherwise; age 0-15 
     1+ illness(es) from list 2b 1 = one or more illness(es) from list 2, 0 = otherwise; age 0-15 
   Parents health behaviour  
     Parents smoked 1 = parents smoked, 0 = otherwise; age 0-15 
     Parents drank heavily 1 = parents drank heavily, 0 = otherwise; age 0-15 
   Childhood socio-economic status  
     Poorly equipped home 1 = no fixed bath, cold or hot running water supply, inside toilet, and central heating,  
0 = otherwise; age 10 
     Number of books 1 = none or very few (0-10 books), 2 = enough to fill one shelf (11-25 books), 3 = enough to fill one 
bookcase (26-100 books), 4 = enough to fill two (or more) book cases (101-200 books, more than 
200 books); age 10 
     Persons per room 1 = ≤ 1 person, 2 = > 1 and ≤ 2 persons, 3 = > 2 persons 
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Table S1 continued 
     Occupation breadwinner Based on ISCO-88 major groups (mg) and skill levels (sl), 1 = mg 1 (no sl), 2 = mg 2 (sl 4), 3 = mg 
3 (sl 3), 4 = mg 4-8 (sl 2), 5 = mg 9 (sl 1), 6 = mg 0 (no sl), 7 = no breadwinner; age 10  
     Relative position in math Compared to classmates, 1= much better, 2 = better, 3 = about the same,  4 = (Much) worse 
     Relative position in language Compared to classmates, 1= much better, 2 = better, 3 = about the same,  4 = (Much) worse 
   Characteristics (at) first job  
     Civil servant 1 = civil servant, 0 = employee; first job 
     Occupation Based on ISCO-88 major groups (mg) and skill levels (sl), 1 = mg 1 (no sl), 2 = mg 2 (sl 4), 3 = mg 
3 (sl 3), 4 = mg 4-8 (sl 2), 5 = mg 9 (sl 1), 6 = mg 0 (no sl); first job 
     Sector 1 = primary sector, 2 = manufacturing and energy, 3 = construction, 4 = services, 5 = public sector, 
health, and education; first job 
     Full-time 1 = full-time job, 0 = part-time job; first job 
     Living with a partner 1 = Living with a married or unmarried partner, 0 = otherwise; at the first job 
     Children 1 = At least one natural or adopted child, 0 = otherwise; at the first job 
     Labour market entry 1 = < 1950, 2 = 1950-1959, 3 = 1960-1969, 4 = ≥ 1970 
     Age at first job Age in years; at the first job 
Mediating variables  
     Unemployment duration Unemployed duration in years; in year 11 to 25 
     Employment instability  
       Number of job ends Number of jobs that ended; in year 11 to 25 
       Number of involuntary job losses Number of involuntary job losses (layoff, plant closure); in year 11 to 25 
       Complexity index Gabadinho et al.’s (2010) complexity index (0-1); for year 11-25 
Notes: a Illnesses on list 1: infectious disease (e.g. measles, rubella, chickenpox, mumps, tuberculosis, diphtheria, scarlet fever),  polio, asthma, respiratory problems other 
than asthma, allergies (other than asthma), severe diarrhoea, meningitis/encephalitis, chronic ear problems, speech impairment, difficulty seeing even with eyeglasses; b Ill-
nesses on list 2: severe headaches or migraines, epilepsy, fits or seizures, emotional, nervous, or psychiatric problem, broken bones, fractures, appendicitis, childhood diabetes 
or high blood sugar, heart trouble, leukaemia or lymphoma, cancer or malignant tumour (excluding minor skin cancers), other serious health condition. 
Sources: Own illustration.  
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Table S2.1 Logistic regression models for Figure 1 (left side), fair or poor self-rated health, average marginal effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
AME SE AME SE AME SE 
Independent variable          
   Early-career involuntary job loss 
   (Ref. no involuntary job loss) 0.072 *** (0.02) 0.063 *** (0.01) 0.055 *** (0.01) 
Control variables          
   Country (Ref. Austria)          
     Germany 
   
0.129 *** (0.01) 0.125 *** (0.01) 
     Sweden 
   
-0.001  (0.01) -0.005  (0.01) 
     Netherlands 
   
0.002  (0.01) -0.001  (0.01) 
     Spain 
   
0.106 *** (0.01) 0.108 *** (0.01) 
     Italy 
   
0.044 *** (0.01) 0.046 *** (0.01) 
     France 
   
0.054 *** (0.01) 0.053 *** (0.01) 
     Denmark 
   
-0.031 *** (0.01) -0.036 *** (0.01) 
     Greece 
   
-0.100 *** (0.01) -0.098 *** (0.01) 
     Switzerland 
   
-0.075 *** (0.01) -0.075 *** (0.01) 
     Belgium 
   
-0.015 ** (0.01) -0.014 ** (0.01) 
     Czech Republic 
   
0.140 *** (0.01) 0.147 *** (0.01) 
     Poland 
   
0.290 *** (0.01) 0.288 *** (0.01) 
     Ireland 
   
-0.085 *** (0.00) -0.088 *** (0.00) 
   Demographics and education          
     Age at interview (in years) 
   
0.006 *** (0.00) 0.007 *** (0.00) 
     Female (Ref. male) 
   
0.022 * (0.01) 0.007  (0.01) 
     Education (in years) 
   
-0.012 *** (0.00) -0.011 *** (0.00) 
   Childhood health (age 0-15)          
     Fair or poor self-rated health (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.173 *** (0.02) 0.171 *** (0.02) 
     1+ month in hospital (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.036 ** (0.01) 0.036 ** (0.01) 
     1+ illness(es) from list 1 (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.008  (0.01) 0.008  (0.01) 
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     1+ illness(es) from list 2 (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.024  (0.01) 0.023  (0.01) 
   Parents health behaviour          
     Parents smoked (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.019 * (0.01) 0.019 * (0.01) 
     Parents drank heavily (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.058 *** (0.01) 0.055 *** (0.01) 
   Childhood socio-economic status (age 10)          
     Poorly equipped home (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.001  (0.02) 0.001  (0.02) 
     Number of books (Ref. None or very few) 
   
      
       Enough to fill one shelf 
   
-0.020 ** (0.01) -0.020 ** (0.01) 
       Enough to fill one bookcase 
   
-0.027 ** (0.01) -0.027 ** (0.01) 
       Enough to fill two or more book cases 
   
-0.017  (0.01) -0.018  (0.01) 
     Persons per room (Ref. ≤ 1 person)          
         > 1 and  ≤2 persons 
   
0.004  (0.01) 0.003  (0.01) 
         > 2 persons 
   
0.028 *** (0.01) 0.026 *** (0.01) 
     Occupation breadwinner  
     (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level)) 
   
      
         Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
   
0.004  (0.03) 0.005  (0.03) 
         Major group 3 (skill level 3), 
   
0.014  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
         Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
   
0.034 * (0.01) 0.036 ** (0.01) 
         Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
   
0.047 * (0.02) 0.048 ** (0.02) 
         Major group 0 (no skill level) 
   
0.071 * (0.03) 0.072 ** (0.03) 
         No breadwinner 
   
0.016  (0.03) 0.016  (0.03) 
     Relative position in math (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
   
0.006  (0.01) 0.005  (0.01) 
       About the same 
   
0.021  (0.01) 0.020  (0.01) 
       Worse or much worse 
   
0.046 ** (0.02) 0.045 ** (0.02) 
     Relative position in language (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
   
-0.011  (0.02) -0.010  (0.02) 
       About the same 
   
-0.003  (0.02) -0.002  (0.02) 
       Worse or much worse    0.001  (0.02) 0.002  (0.02) 
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   Characteristics (at) first job          
     Civil servant (Ref. employee) 
   
-0.008  (0.01) -0.007  (0.01) 
     Occupation (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level))          
       Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
   
0.015  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
       Major group 3 (skill level 3) 
   
0.034  (0.03) 0.034  (0.03) 
       Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
   
0.047  (0.03) 0.045  (0.03) 
       Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
   
0.068 ** (0.03) 0.064 * (0.03) 
       Major group 0 (no skill level) 
   
0.058  (0.05) 0.054  (0.05) 
     Sector (Ref. primary sector)          
       Manufacturing and energy 
   
-0.028  (0.02) -0.029  (0.02) 
       Construction 
   
-0.001  (0.02) -0.002  (0.01) 
       Services 
   
-0.018  (0.02) -0.018  (0.02) 
       Public sector, health, and education 
   
-0.032 * (0.01) -0.030 * (0.01) 
     Full-time (Ref. part-time) 
   
0.016  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
     Living with a partner (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.029 * (0.01) 0.031 * (0.01) 
     Children (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.005  (0.02) 0.005  (0.02) 
     Labour market entry (Ref. < 1950)          
       1950-59 
   
-0.041 * (0.02) -0.042 ** (0.02) 
       1960-69 
   
-0.050 * (0.02) -0.051 * (0.02) 
       ≥ 1970 
   
-0.091 ** (0.03) -0.091 ** (0.03) 
     Age at first job 
   
0.002  (0.00) 0.002  (0.00) 
Mediating variables          
   Unemployment duration (in years) (year 11-25)       0.003  (0.00) 
   Employment instability (year 11-25)          
     Number of job ends       -0.002  (0.01) 
     Number of involuntary job losses       0.010  (0.01) 
     Complexity index (0-1) 
      
0.298 *** (0.06) 
Observations 16826 16826 16826 
Notes: See Table S1 for further details on the measurement, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
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Table S2.2 Logistic regression models for Figure 1 (right side), fair or poor self-rated health, average marginal effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
AME SE AME SE AME SE 
Independent variable          
   Early-career involuntary job loss 
   (Ref. no involuntary job loss + continuous employment) 0.078 *** (0.02) 0.061 *** (0.01) 0.052 *** (0.01) 
Control variables          
   Country (Ref. Austria)          
     Germany    0.110 *** (0.01) 0.107 *** (0.01) 
     Sweden    -0.010  (0.01) -0.009  (0.01) 
     Netherlands    -0.006  (0.01) -0.008  (0.01) 
     Spain    0.089 *** (0.01) 0.089 *** (0.01) 
     Italy    0.028 *** (0.01) 0.029 *** (0.01) 
     France    0.040 *** (0.01) 0.042 *** (0.01) 
     Denmark    -0.036 *** (0.01) -0.035 *** (0.01) 
     Greece    -0.113 *** (0.01) -0.112 *** (0.01) 
     Switzerland    -0.085 *** (0.01) -0.083 *** (0.01) 
     Belgium    -0.019 * (0.01) -0.018 * (0.01) 
     Czech Republic    0.123 *** (0.01) 0.131 *** (0.01) 
     Poland    0.272 *** (0.01) 0.271 *** (0.01) 
     Ireland    -0.089 *** (0.00) -0.095 *** (0.00) 
   Demographics and education          
     Age at interview (in years)    0.007 *** (0.00) 0.007 *** (0.00) 
     Female (Ref. male)    0.023 * (0.01) 0.008  (0.01) 
     Education (in years)    -0.012 *** (0.00) -0.012 *** (0.00) 
   Childhood health (age 0-15)          
     Fair or poor self-rated health (Ref. otherwise)    0.165 *** (0.03) 0.165 *** (0.03) 
     1+ month in hospital (Ref. otherwise)    0.032  (0.02) 0.032  (0.02) 
     1+ illness(es) from list 1 (Ref. otherwise)    0.013  (0.01) 0.014  (0.01) 
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     1+ illness(es) from list 2 (Ref. otherwise)    0.022  (0.02) 0.022  (0.02) 
   Parents health behaviour          
     Parents smoked (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.029 ** (0.01) 0.029 ** (0.01) 
     Parents drank heavily (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.053 *** (0.01) 0.051 ** (0.02) 
   Childhood socio-economic status (age 10)          
     Poorly equipped home (Ref. otherwise) 
   
-0.010  (0.02) -0.010  (0.02) 
     Number of books (Ref. None or very few) 
   
      
       Enough to fill one shelf 
   
-0.022  (0.01) -0.021  (0.01) 
       Enough to fill one bookcase 
   
-0.031 * (0.01) -0.029 * (0.01) 
       Enough to fill two or more book cases 
   
-0.021  (0.01) -0.021  (0.01) 
     Persons per room (Ref. ≤ 1 person)          
         > 1 and  ≤2 persons 
   
0.011  (0.01) 0.011  (0.01) 
         > 2 persons 
   
0.035 *** (0.01) 0.034 *** (0.01) 
     Occupation breadwinner  
     (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level)) 
   
      
         Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
   
-0.015  (0.03) -0.013  (0.03) 
         Major group 3 (skill level 3), 
   
-0.012  (0.03) -0.011  (0.03) 
         Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
   
0.004  (0.02) 0.005  (0.02) 
         Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
   
0.016  (0.03) 0.017  (0.03) 
         Major group 0 (no skill level) 
   
0.063  (0.03) 0.063 * (0.03) 
         No breadwinner 
   
-0.003  (0.04) -0.002  (0.04) 
     Relative position in math (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
   
0.019  (0.02) 0.019  (0.02) 
       About the same 
   
0.030 ** (0.01) 0.029 ** (0.01) 
       Worse or much worse 
   
0.069 *** (0.02) 0.067 *** (0.02) 
     Relative position in language (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
   
-0.010  (0.02) -0.008  (0.02) 
       About the same 
   
0.008  (0.02) 0.007  (0.02) 
       Worse or much worse 
   
0.006  (0.03) 0.007  (0.03) 
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   Characteristics (at) first job          
     Civil servant (Ref. employee) 
   
-0.018  (0.01) -0.019  (0.01) 
     Occupation (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level))          
       Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
   
0.014  (0.03) 0.015  (0.03) 
       Major group 3 (skill level 3) 
   
0.025  (0.04) 0.026  (0.04) 
       Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
   
0.046  (0.04) 0.046  (0.04) 
       Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
   
0.061  (0.03) 0.059  (0.04) 
       Major group 0 (no skill level) 
   
0.074  (0.05) 0.070  (0.05) 
     Sector (Ref. primary sector)          
       Manufacturing and energy 
   
-0.046 ** (0.01) -0.047 ** (0.01) 
       Construction 
   
-0.017  (0.02) -0.019  (0.02) 
       Services 
   
-0.032  (0.02) -0.033  (0.02) 
       Public sector, health, and education 
   
-0.055 ** (0.02) -0.052 ** (0.02) 
     Full-time (Ref. part-time) 
   
0.009  (0.03) 0.008  (0.03) 
     Living with a partner (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.011  (0.01) 0.014  (0.01) 
     Children (Ref. otherwise) 
   
0.016  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
     Labour market entry (Ref. < 1950)          
       1950-59 
   
-0.020  (0.02) -0.020  (0.02) 
       1960-69 
   
-0.037  (0.03) -0.037  (0.03) 
       ≥ 1970 
   
-0.074 * (0.04) -0.073 * (0.04) 
     Age at first job 
   
0.003  (0.00) 0.003  (0.00) 
Mediating variables          
   Unemployment duration (in years) (year 11-25)       0.004  (0.00) 
   Employment instability (year 11-25)          
     Number of job ends       -0.006  (0.01) 
     Number of involuntary job losses       0.005  (0.02) 
     Complexity index (0-1) 
   
   0.336 *** (0.09) 
Observations 12135 12135 12135 
Notes: See Table S1 for further details on the measurement, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
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Table S3.1 Logistic regression models for Figure 2 (left side), fair or poor self-rated health, average marginal effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
AME SE AME SE AME SE 
Independent variable          
   Early-career involuntary job loss – layoff 
   (Ref. no involuntary job loss) 0.070 ** (0.03) 0.061 *** (0.02) 0.053 *** (0.02) 
   Early-career involuntary job loss – plant closure 0.077  (0.04) 0.068  (0.03) 0.062  (0.04) 
Control variables          
   Country (Ref. Austria)          
     Germany    0.129 *** (0.01) 0.125 *** (0.01) 
     Sweden    -0.001  (0.01) -0.005  (0.01) 
     Netherlands    0.002  (0.01) -0.001  (0.01) 
     Spain    0.106 *** (0.01) 0.108 *** (0.01) 
     Italy    0.044 *** (0.01) 0.046 *** (0.01) 
     France    0.054 *** (0.01) 0.054 *** (0.01) 
     Denmark    -0.031 *** (0.01) -0.035 *** (0.01) 
     Greece    -0.100 *** (0.01) -0.098 *** (0.01) 
     Switzerland    -0.074 *** (0.01) -0.075 *** (0.01) 
     Belgium    -0.015 ** (0.01) -0.014 ** (0.01) 
     Czech Republic    0.140 *** (0.01) 0.147 *** (0.01) 
     Poland    0.290 *** (0.01) 0.288 *** (0.01) 
     Ireland    -0.085 *** (0.00) -0.088 *** (0.00) 
   Demographics and education          
     Age at interview (in years)    0.006 *** (0.00) 0.007 *** (0.00) 
     Female (Ref. male)    0.022 * (0.01) 0.007  (0.01) 
     Education (in years)    -0.012 *** (0.00) -0.011 *** (0.00) 
   Childhood health (age 0-15)          
     Fair or poor self-rated health (Ref. otherwise)    0.173 *** (0.02) 0.171 *** (0.02) 
     1+ month in hospital (Ref. otherwise)    0.037 ** (0.01) 0.036 ** (0.01) 
     1+ illness(es) from list 1 (Ref. otherwise)    0.008  (0.01) 0.008  (0.01) 
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     1+ illness(es) from list 2 (Ref. otherwise)    0.024  (0.01) 0.023  (0.01) 
   Parents health behaviour          
     Parents smoked (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.019 * (0.01) 0.019 * (0.01) 
     Parents drank heavily (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.058 *** (0.01) 0.055 *** (0.01) 
   Childhood socio-economic status (age 10)          
     Poorly equipped home (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.001  (0.02) 0.001  (0.02) 
     Number of books (Ref. None or very few) 
  
       
       Enough to fill one shelf 
  
 -0.020 ** (0.01) -0.020 ** (0.01) 
       Enough to fill one bookcase 
  
 -0.027 ** (0.01) -0.027 ** (0.01) 
       Enough to fill two or more book cases 
  
 -0.017  (0.01) -0.018  (0.01) 
     Persons per room (Ref. ≤ 1 person)          
         > 1 and  ≤2 persons 
  
 0.004  (0.01) 0.003  (0.01) 
         > 2 persons 
  
 0.028 *** (0.01) 0.026 *** (0.01) 
     Occupation breadwinner (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level)) 
  
       
         Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
  
 0.004  (0.03) 0.005  (0.03) 
         Major group 3 (skill level 3), 
  
 0.014  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
         Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
  
 0.034 * (0.01) 0.036 ** (0.01) 
         Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
  
 0.047 * (0.02) 0.048 ** (0.02) 
         Major group 0 (no skill level) 
  
 0.071 * (0.03) 0.072 ** (0.03) 
         No breadwinner 
  
 0.016  (0.03) 0.016  (0.03) 
     Relative position in math (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
  
 0.006  (0.01) 0.005  (0.01) 
       About the same 
  
 0.021  (0.01) 0.020  (0.01) 
       Worse or much worse 
  
 0.046 ** (0.02) 0.045 ** (0.02) 
     Relative position in language (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
  
 -0.011  (0.02) -0.009  (0.02) 
       About the same 
  
 -0.003  (0.02) -0.002  (0.02) 
       Worse or much worse 
  
 0.001  (0.02) 0.002  (0.02) 
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Characteristics (at) first job          
     Civil servant (Ref. employee)    -0.008  (0.01) -0.007  (0.01) 
     Occupation (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level))          
       Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
  
 0.015  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
       Major group 3 (skill level 3) 
  
 0.034  (0.03) 0.034  (0.03) 
       Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
  
 0.047  (0.03) 0.045  (0.03) 
       Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
  
 0.068 ** (0.03) 0.064 * (0.03) 
       Major group 0 (no skill level) 
  
 0.058  (0.05) 0.054  (0.05) 
     Sector (Ref. primary sector)          
       Manufacturing and energy 
  
 -0.028  (0.02) -0.029  (0.02) 
       Construction 
  
 -0.001  (0.02) -0.002  (0.01) 
       Services 
  
 -0.018  (0.02) -0.018  (0.02) 
       Public sector, health, and education 
  
 -0.032 * (0.01) -0.030 * (0.01) 
     Full-time (Ref. part-time) 
  
 0.016  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
     Living with a partner (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.029 * (0.01) 0.031 * (0.01) 
     Children (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.005  (0.02) 0.005  (0.02) 
     Labour market entry (Ref. < 1950)          
       1950-59 
  
 -0.041 * (0.02) -0.042 ** (0.02) 
       1960-69 
  
 -0.050 * (0.02) -0.051 * (0.02) 
       ≥ 1970 
  
 -0.091 ** (0.03) -0.091 ** (0.03) 
     Age at first job 
  
 0.002  (0.00) 0.002  (0.00) 
Mediating variables          
   Unemployment duration (in years) (year 11-25)       0.003  (0.00) 
   Employment instability (year 11-25)          
     Number of job ends       -0.002  (0.01) 
     Number of involuntary job losses       0.010  (0.01) 
     Complexity index (0-1) 
   
   0.298 *** (0.06) 
Observations 16826 16826 16826 
Notes: See Table S1 for further details on the measurement, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
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Table S3.2 Logistic regression models for Figure 2 (right side), fair or poor self-rated health, average marginal effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
AME SE AME SE AME SE 
Independent variable          
   Early-career involuntary job loss - layoff 
   (Ref. no involuntary job loss + continuous employment) 0.076 ** (0.03) 0.059 *** (0.02) 0.048 ** (0.02) 
   Early-career involuntary job loss – plant closure 0.083 * (0.04) 0.067  (0.03) 0.059  (0.03) 
Control variables          
   Country (Ref. Austria)          
     Germany    0.110 *** (0.01) 0.107 *** (0.01) 
     Sweden    -0.009  (0.01) -0.008  (0.01) 
     Netherlands    -0.006  (0.01) -0.007  (0.01) 
     Spain    0.089 *** (0.01) 0.089 *** (0.01) 
     Italy    0.028 *** (0.01) 0.029 *** (0.01) 
     France    0.040 *** (0.01) 0.043 *** (0.01) 
     Denmark    -0.036 *** (0.01) -0.035 *** (0.01) 
     Greece    -0.113 *** (0.01) -0.112 *** (0.01) 
     Switzerland    -0.085 *** (0.01) -0.083 *** (0.01) 
     Belgium    -0.019 * (0.01) -0.017 * (0.01) 
     Czech Republic    0.123 *** (0.01) 0.131 *** (0.01) 
     Poland    0.272 *** (0.01) 0.272 *** (0.01) 
     Ireland    -0.089 *** (0.00) -0.095 *** (0.00) 
   Demographics and education          
     Age at interview (in years)    0.007 *** (0.00) 0.007 *** (0.00) 
     Female (Ref. male)    0.023 * (0.01) 0.008  (0.01) 
     Education (in years)    -0.012 *** (0.00) -0.012 *** (0.00) 
   Childhood health (age 0-15)          
     Fair or poor self-rated health (Ref. otherwise)    0.165 *** (0.03) 0.165 *** (0.03) 
     1+ month in hospital (Ref. otherwise)    0.032  (0.02) 0.032  (0.02) 
     1+ illness(es) from list 1 (Ref. otherwise)    0.013  (0.01) 0.014  (0.01) 
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     1+ illness(es) from list 2 (Ref. otherwise)    0.022  (0.02) 0.022  (0.02) 
   Parents health behaviour          
     Parents smoked (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.029 ** (0.01) 0.029 ** (0.01) 
     Parents drank heavily (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 0.053 *** (0.01) 0.051 ** (0.02) 
   Childhood socio-economic status (age 10)          
     Poorly equipped home (Ref. otherwise) 
  
 -0.010  (0.02) -0.010  (0.02) 
     Number of books (Ref. None or very few) 
  
       
       Enough to fill one shelf 
  
 -0.022  (0.01) -0.021  (0.01) 
       Enough to fill one bookcase 
  
 -0.031 * (0.01) -0.029 * (0.01) 
       Enough to fill two or more book cases 
  
 -0.021  (0.01) -0.021  (0.01) 
     Persons per room (Ref. ≤ 1 person)          
         > 1 and  ≤2 persons 
  
 0.011  (0.01) 0.011  (0.01) 
         > 2 persons 
  
 0.035 *** (0.01) 0.034 *** (0.01) 
     Occupation breadwinner (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level)) 
  
       
         Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
  
 -0.015  (0.03) -0.013  (0.03) 
         Major group 3 (skill level 3), 
  
 -0.012  (0.03) -0.011  (0.03) 
         Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
  
 0.004  (0.02) 0.005  (0.02) 
         Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
  
 0.016  (0.03) 0.017  (0.03) 
         Major group 0 (no skill level) 
  
 0.063  (0.03) 0.063 * (0.03) 
         No breadwinner 
  
 -0.003  (0.04) -0.001  (0.04) 
     Relative position in math (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
  
 0.019  (0.02) 0.019  (0.02) 
       About the same 
  
 0.030 ** (0.01) 0.029 * (0.01) 
       Worse or much worse 
  
 0.069 *** (0.02) 0.067 *** (0.02) 
     Relative position in language (Ref. much better)          
       Better 
  
 -0.009  (0.02) -0.008  (0.02) 
       About the same 
  
 0.008  (0.02) 0.008  (0.02) 
       Worse or much worse 
  
 0.006  (0.03) 0.007  (0.03) 
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   Characteristics (at) first job          
     Civil servant (Ref. employee)    -0.018  (0.01) -0.019  (0.01) 
     Occupation (Ref. major group 1 (no skill level))          
       Major group 2 (skill level 4) 
 
  0.014  (0.03) 0.015  (0.03) 
       Major group 3 (skill level 3) 
 
  0.025  (0.04) 0.026  (0.04) 
       Major group 4-8 (skill level 2) 
 
  0.046  (0.04) 0.045  (0.04) 
       Major group 9 (skill level 1) 
 
  0.061  (0.03) 0.059  (0.04) 
       Major group 0 (no skill level) 
 
  0.074  (0.05) 0.070  (0.05) 
     Sector (Ref. primary sector)          
       Manufacturing and energy 
 
  -0.046 ** (0.01) -0.047 ** (0.01) 
       Construction 
 
  -0.017  (0.02) -0.019  (0.02) 
       Services 
 
  -0.032  (0.02) -0.033  (0.02) 
       Public sector, health, and education 
 
  -0.055 ** (0.02) -0.052 ** (0.02) 
     Full-time (Ref. part-time) 
 
  0.009  (0.03) 0.008  (0.03) 
     Living with a partner (Ref. otherwise) 
 
  0.011  (0.01) 0.014  (0.01) 
     Children (Ref. otherwise) 
 
  0.016  (0.02) 0.016  (0.02) 
     Labour market entry (Ref. < 1950)          
       1950-59 
 
  -0.020  (0.02) -0.020  (0.02) 
       1960-69 
 
  -0.037  (0.03) -0.037  (0.03) 
       ≥ 1970 
 
  -0.074 * (0.04) -0.073 * (0.04) 
     Age at first job 
 
  0.003  (0.00) 0.003  (0.00) 
Mediating variables          
   Unemployment duration (in years) (year 11-25)       0.004  (0.00) 
   Employment instability (year 11-25)          
     Number of job ends       -0.006  (0.01) 
     Number of involuntary job losses       0.005  (0.02) 
     Complexity index (0-1) 
 
     0.336 *** (0.09) 
Observations 12135 12135 12135 
Notes: See Table S1 for further details on the measurement, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
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Table S4 Sensitivity analyses using the five-point self-rated health scale and applying ordinal logistic as well as linear regression (model 2 in 
Table S2.1) 
 
 Logistic regression 
(1=fair, poor health; 0=excellent, 
very good, good health) 
Ordinal logistic regression 
(1=poor, 2=fair, 3=good, 4=very 
good, 5=excellent health) 
Linear regression 
(1=poor, 2=fair, 3=good, 4=very 
good, 5=excellent health)   
AME SE 
 
AME SE  b SE 
Independent variable          
   Early-career involuntary job loss 
   (Ref. no involuntary job loss) 1=  0.063 *** (0.01) 1= 0.020 ** (0.01) -0.12 ** (0.04) 
    2= 0.025 *** (0.01)    
    3= -0.008  (0.00)    
    4= -0.023 *** (0.01)    
    5= -0.015 ** (0.00)    
Control variables    
Observations 16826 16826 16826 
Notes: See Table S2.1 for the full model 2 including a list of the control variables, See Table S1 for further details on the measurement, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01,  
* p < 0.05, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: SHARELIFE, authors’ calculations. 
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Abstract 
Unemployment not only affects individuals but also their families. Using panel data from 
Germany this article examines the consequences of job loss for couples’ division of house-
work and total household production. Fixed-effects models reveal that increases in unem-
ployed spouses’ total housework hours are not offset by decreases in partners’ time implying 
an expansion of total production next to a reallocation of housework. Supporting time availa-
bility and relative resources hypotheses, the authors find larger increases for unemployed hus-
bands than wives, casting doubt on the idea that men “do gender” by refusing additional 
housework. However, task-specific estimates show that husbands spent more of their extra 
time on male-typed activities, whereas wives increase their hours more through routine 
chores. Additionally, this study shows that couples react immediately to unemployment, chal-
lenging arguments that spouses need time to adapt to new employment constellations or that 
men withdraw from housework the longer they remain non-employed.  
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1. Introduction 
Employment is of primary importance in Western societies providing individuals with money 
and identity. Accordingly, extensive research has shown that job loss not only has negative 
consequences for workers’ long-term employment and earnings prospects, but also affects a 
wide range of non-economic outcomes such as individuals’ social integration or health 
(Brand, 2015). In the last decade, a growing body of literature has also established that the 
negative effects of unemployment are likely to have repercussions for other family members, 
too. For example, job loss may impact on couples’ fertility and marital stability as well as 
negatively affect spouses’ psychological well-being and children’s socio-economic outcomes 
(Brand, 2015; Ström, 2003). The topic that has received most attention in this respect con-
cerns how spouses of unemployed individuals increase their labor supply to at least partly 
offset the falls in family income associated with job loss (e.g., Stephens, 2002). Empirical 
evidence for this so-called “added-worker effect” is mixed with the results depending on the 
countries investigated underlining the importance of various contextual factors (e.g., 
Bredtmann, Otten, & Rulff, 2017). 
Whereas changes in paid labor in response to one spouse’s unemployment have been exten-
sively researched, much less is known about how couples’ division of housework and total 
household production is affected. This is surprising as investigating changes in unpaid labor 
not only sheds light on how families alter their daily routines in reaction to a disruptive life 
event, but also informs us about how households make specialization decisions in general 
(e.g., Gough & Killewald, 2011; van der Lippe, Treas, & Norbutas, 2017). Although women’s 
increased participation in education and the labor market as well as demographic changes 
have led to some convergence in time use, the division of labor remains gendered and the rel-
evance of different explanations is highly contested (e.g., Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 
2000; Sayer 2005). 
In an innovative study Gough and Killewald (2011), therefore, used panel data from the US to 
examine how spouses reallocate their housework as well as change their total household pro-
duction while facing unemployment. They argued that investigating job loss, as an exogenous 
shock to working hours, allows for a more rigorous test of competing theories. Specifically, 
whereas formally gender-neutral time-availability or relative resources hypotheses assume 
that specialization follows economic rationales (Bianchi et al., 2000; England & Farkas, 1986) 
predicting similar effects for job loss by husbands and wives, theories that stress how women 
and men “do gender” by performing or avoiding housework (Berk, 1985; West & Zimmer-
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mann, 1987) state that men will not increase or even decrease their share following a job loss. 
An investigation of the gender-specific reactions to unemployment, thus, also addresses recent 
debates about the strength of the evidence for mechanisms of gender display (Brines, 1994) or 
gender-deviance neutralization (Greenstein, 2000) as a number of recent studies have used 
sophisticated research designs to reexamine these hypotheses (Auspurg, Iacovou, & Nicoletti, 
2017; Hook, 2017; see Sullivan, 2011 for a review). Accordingly, the first research questions 
we address are: What are the effects of unemployment on couples’ reallocation of housework 
and total household production and how do they vary by the gender of the unemployed 
spouse? 
Although Gough and Killewald (2011) extended the few existing cross-sectional or short-run 
longitudinal studies (Brines, 1994; Shamir, 1986; Ström, 2002; van der Lippe et al., 2017) by 
applying sophisticated methods to large-scale panel data, some important aspects still remain 
unanswered. Specifically, as their housework measure emphasized routine chores it is unclear 
whether their finding that wives increase their housework hours more than men can be gener-
alized to all domestic tasks or whether men may have increased their time more in neutral 
(e.g., errands and shopping) or male-typed activities (e.g., repairs and garden work) which 
were not inlcuded in their data. Distinguishing different housework tasks is also informative 
about arguments of specialization and gender construction (e.g., Coltrane, 2000). In the spe-
cific case of job loss we expect women to invest relatively more time in female-typed activi-
ties while men should perform more additional hours in male-typed domains. Our second re-
search question, therefore, is: How do the effects of unemployment on couples’ reallocation 
of housework and total household production vary by the specific tasks considered? 
Another issue that is often raised in the literature (e.g., van der Lippe et al., 2017) concerns 
how the effects of unemployment on housework develop over time. Several authors have ar-
gued for a lagged adaption because habits must be constantly challenged, skills have to be 
acquired, and gender norms need to be weakened for couples to overcome inertia (e.g., 
Gershuny, Bittmann, & Brice, 2005). Whereas a recent qualitative study supports this view 
showing that couples attempt to maintain the status quo in their division of labor as long as 
possible following unemployment (Gush, Scott, & Laurie, 2015, p. 713), we are not aware of 
any quantitative evidence based on large-scale and long-run panel data. 
Moreover, in her seminal study on gender display Brines (1994) showed that it is the long-
term jobless men who withdraw from housework to reassert their masculinity offering an al-
ternative prediction about changes over time. The importance of a dynamic perspective is also 
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reaffirmed by studies of other life events such as childbirth or retirement suggesting potential 
for lead and lag effects (Kühhirt, 2012; Leopold & Skopek, 2015). Therefore, a third, contri-
bution of this article is to examine how couples’ reallocation of housework and their total 
household production changes across the transition from employment to unemployment over 
several years. 
To address these questions, we use longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) spanning the period 1991-2015 and apply fixed-effects models. Our data are unique 
in that they offer disaggregated information on specific tasks (i.e., errands and shopping; 
washing, cleaning, cooking; repairs and garden work; childcare) as well as allow to follow 
couples for several years before and after job loss. This offers insights into whether house-
holds’ adaptation is immediate or lagged as well as whether potential processes of gender 
display become overt the longer men stay out of the labor force. 
2. Background 
To derive hypotheses about couples’ reaction to unemployment, we review two opposing per-
spectives concerning how households make specialization decisions in general (Bianchi et al., 
2000; Coltrane, 2000). The first perspective comprises formally gender-neutral theories em-
phasizing the role of spouses’ different time constraints, relative resources, and relative 
productivities in the market and domestic sphere. In contrast, the second, gender-based per-
spective argues that housework allows for a symbolic enactment of gender relations with 
women and men performing gender-appropriate tasks relatively independent of economic 
considerations. We also review additional arguments to explain how the effects of unem-
ployment may differ for women and men according to the specific tasks considered as well as 
form expectations about the post-unemployment dynamics in housework over time. 
2.1 Gender-neutral perspective 
Within the gender-neutral perspective two hypotheses are usually distinguished: time availa-
bility and relative resources. The time-availability hypothesis states that couples rationally 
allocate housework based on partners’ relative market hours and the total household produc-
tion that needs to be completed (Bianchi et al., 2000; England & Farkas, 1986). Although it 
has received some support in empirical studies that model housework hours by using spouses’ 
time in market work as predictors (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2000; Bittmann et al., 2003; Brines, 
1994), Gough and Killewald (2011) caution that these cross-sectional studies implicitly as-
sume that couples first decide on their paid hours and then allocate their unpaid labor accord-
290 
 
ingly. If households, however, jointly decide on market and domestic hours, the latter are en-
dogenous to the former. They instead suggest using panel data and examine job loss, as 
changes in housework in this case can be assumed to follow from an exogenous shock to 
working hours. 
The relative resource hypothesis argues that spouses allocate housework based on their rela-
tive earnings such that the partner who contributes the larger share to the family income, per-
forms less domestic tasks. This hypothesis can be derived from Becker’s (1981) microeco-
nomic model about households’ specialization decisions or from social exchange theories 
(Blood & Wolf, 1960; Brines, 1994). The former assumes that a gendered division of labor 
arises from returns to specialization, as spouses’ different relative productivities in paid and 
unpaid labor allow maximizing their joint utility by capitalizing on their comparative ad-
vantages. Whereas the original work emphasizes women’s lower human capital and their 
higher efficiency in childcare and domestic activities, any other factors leading women to 
have lower earnings potentials reproduce a gendered division of labor as well (Auspurg et al., 
2017).  
Although social exchange or bargaining theories challenge the assumption of a joint utility 
maximization (England & Folbre, 2005), they arrive at the same hypothesis. In this view, the 
relative resources, however, establish a power relation with the breadwinning partner having a 
better bargaining position in negotiations over undesirable housework (Blood & Wolf, 1960). 
A variant of this theme argues that spouses (mostly wives) take the responsibility for house-
hold chores, because they are economically dependent and cannot bargain out (Brines, 1994). 
Empirical studies have tended to support the relative resources hypothesis showing that 
spouses’ time in housework is negatively associated with their earnings relative to their part-
ners’, although not necessarily across the full range (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2000; Bittmann et al., 
2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004). Therefore, it is predicted that job loss shifts 
the housework to the unemployed spouse and away from the partner, as time and relative re-
sources change in favor or disfavor of the former. 
Hypotheses 1: Unemployment increases the person’s housework hours and decreases the 
partner’s housework hours. 
While the presented arguments are formally gender-neutral and unemployment of husbands 
and wives should, therefore, have similar consequences, gender differences in the “initial 
conditions” (Brines, 1994, p.654) suggest that men experience greater gains in time and larger 
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losses in relative resources, given that they usually work longer and earn more than women. 
Men’s larger losses in bargaining power can also be explained from a gender-based variant of 
the argument stating that women’s resources are discounted in societal contexts of male dom-
ination such that the same resources have a different value depending on gender (e.g., Fuwa, 
2004). Given that unemployment by men results in more additional time and a larger loss of 
resources with a potentially greater reduction in the associated bargaining power, the follow-
ing gender-specific reactions are expected. 
Hypotheses 2a: The positive effect of unemployment on the person’s and the negative effect on 
the partner’s housework hours are larger for men than women. 
2.2 Gender-based perspective 
Criticizing the neglect of gender, sociologists have emphasized the role of norms in the emer-
gence of a gendered division of labor. In the doing gender approach households are arenas for 
the symbolic enactment of femininity and masculinity with spouses performing or avoiding 
domestic tasks to facilitate the reproduction of gender relations (Berk, 1985; West & Zim-
mermann, 1987). Accordingly, nontraditional arrangements threaten individuals “gender ac-
countability” in terms of how they are viewed by their partners, friends, and themselves. Spe-
cific versions of this approach are Brines’ (1994) gender display and Greenstein’s (2000) 
gender-deviance neutralization hypotheses arguing that economically dependent husbands 
underperform and breadwinning wives overperform housework to display their gender and 
compensate for the deviation from expectations about their “normal” roles. While these hy-
potheses have received support beyond the original research (e.g., Bittmann et al., 2003, 
Evertsson & Nermo, 2004), the validity of the results has been questioned in a number of 
studies, too (e.g., Hook, 2017; Killewald & Gough, 2010). A review by Sullivan (2011) con-
cluded that for women findings of gender display or deviance neutralization were mainly due 
to model misspecification, whereas for men these mechanisms are limited to small and specif-
ic subgroups. With respect to unemployment the gender-based perspective makes an opposite 
prediction to the above theories stating that husbands refuse to increase or even decrease their 
share following a job loss. Their wives are assumed to “do gender” by not relinquishing re-
sponsibilities for domestic activities. In contrast, for women becoming unemployed is in line 
with their traditional role and their male partners can improve their “gender accountability” by 
reducing their hours. 
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Hypotheses 2b: The positive effect of unemployment on the person’s and the negative effect on 
the partner’s housework hours are larger for women than men. 
Besides theoretical assumptions about the reallocation of housework among partners, previous 
research has also put forward several arguments for why the total household production in-
creases in case of unemployment. These include the loss of financial resources restricting 
couples’ opportunities to “outsource” domestic tasks and buy substitutes, the fact that addi-
tional housework accrues as the home is used more often and extensively, spouses being less 
efficient in their time use, and the idea that couples take up so-far neglected or unnecessary 
tasks (Gough & Killewald, 2011; Gush et al., 2015; van der Lippe et al., 2017). 
2.3 Different tasks and dynamics over time 
So far the role of different tasks has been neglected in empirical studies on the effect of un-
employment (e.g., Gough & Killewald, 2011; van der Lippe et al. 2017), but theoretically it is 
plausible that women’s and men’s reactions depend on the activities considered. Although the 
gender-neutral perspective makes no direct mention of different housework tasks, the underly-
ing specialization argument (Becker, 1981) may suggest that spouses increase their domestic 
activities in areas where they possess a comparative advantage. As women not only do more 
housework, but especially perform the majority of the less optional, less postponable, and less 
enjoyable routine chores (Coltrane, 2000), it can be assumed that they have a higher relative 
productivity in this domain. In contrast, men may possess comparative advantages in non-
routine tasks such as repairs and garden work. Despite of the different theoretical foundation a 
similar prediction is derived from the gender-based perspective as cultural expectations may 
not only concern who should do the paid and unpaid labor but also which domestic activities 
reflect femininity and masculinity (Berk, 1985). Therefore, spouses may not only construct 
gender by increasing or decreasing their total housework hours in case of unemployment, but 
also by reallocating their additional time relatively more to those tasks that demonstrate that 
they are a productive member of a specific gender category (Coltrane, 2000). 
Hypotheses 3: The effects of unemployment differ between men and women with respect to the 
specific tasks. Women and men becoming unemployed are expected to increase their time 
more in female- and male-typed tasks respectively with the according changes in their part-
ner’s housework hours. 
Despite being often highlighted as a research gap (e.g., van der Lippe et al., 2017), the post-
unemployment dynamics in couples’ housework hours have been rarely studied. A qualitative 
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study found that they mainly carried on as usual and that both men and women refused to 
swap roles (Gush et al., 2015). The authors explain this by socio-psychological motives em-
phasizing the status quo as something desirable. Moreover, the study showed that couples 
considered the reemployment prospects with husbands spending their time on job search and 
wives supporting these efforts instead of focusing on their own employment. This suggests 
that changes may not occur immediately but only over longer durations of men’s non-
employment. These descriptions fit well with three “inertial mechanisms” that have been 
elaborated by Gershuny et al. (2005, p. 658) predicting a lagged adaption, because (1) chang-
ing habits requires continuous effort, (2) the acquisition of housework skills needs time, and 
(3) the gendered meaning associated with domestic activities may inhibit women to decrease 
and men to increase their housework hours in nontraditional arrangements. Note that these 
mechanisms can be expected to be more important for unemployed men than women, since 
women do more (time-consuming) housework even if they are employed. Accordingly, for 
women changes in housework following a job loss can be expected to take place immediately. 
Hypotheses 4a: The positive effect of unemployment on the husband’s and the negative effect 
on their wife’s housework hours increase the longer the husband remains non-employed. 
While Gershuny et al. (2005) argue that the gendered meaning of paid and unpaid labor to-
gether with the other inertial processes results in a lagged adaptation, Brines (1994, p.672) 
makes an even stronger prediction stating that “joblessness may have a negative effect on 
husbands’ housework time – particularly among the long-term unemployed, whose prolonged 
experience might intensify any distress over lost claims to male accountability.” As the devi-
ance from the male breadwinner norm growths with men’s time out of the labor force, the 
gender-based perspective suggests that while they may take up some additional housework 
initially unemployed men will relinquish their domestic responsibilities over time with the 
according changes observed for their wives. 
Hypotheses 4b: The positive effect of unemployment on the husband’s and the negative effect 
on their wife’s housework hours decrease the longer the husband remains non-employed. 
3. Methods 
3.1 Data and sample 
We use data from the 1991-2015 waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, version 32.1, 
doi: 10.5684/soep.v32.1). The SOEP is an annual household panel survey designed to be na-
tionally representative of the German adult population living in private households (Wagner, 
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Frick, & Schupp, 2007). In the latest wave, 2015, about 27,000 persons living in 16,000 
households were interviewed. For our purposes, the SOEP has three advantages. First, it is 
one of the longest running household panel surveys allowing us to explore the dynamics in 
couples’ division of housework and total household production in the years preceding and 
following one spouse’s job loss. Second, because all household members aged 16 years and 
over are interviewed, each partner provides separate information about their time use and la-
bor market status. Third, the SOEP offers disaggregated information on housework making it 
possible to examine how the effects of unemployment differ for time spent on neutral,  
female-, and male-typed tasks as well as to distinguish housework from childcare. For the 
analyses, we select heterosexual couples where both spouses participate in the personal inter-
view. To rule out effects of (early) retirement (e.g., Leopold & Skopek, 2015), we censor 
couples once one partner exceeds the age of 54 years. For simplicity, we refer to all partners 
as “spouses,” “wives,” and “husbands” although our sample includes cohabiting couples, too. 
Only waves from 1991 onwards are used, because the time use data collected in previous 
years are not comparable. As we study families’ responses to a husband’s or wife’s job loss 
we restricted the sample to couples where at least one partner is at risk of job loss during the 
window of observation. This includes couples where the husband or the wife experience at 
least one transition from employment to unemployment (unemployment spell) as well as 
those were at least one member is continuously employed (employment spell). The later cou-
ples provide information about changes in housework hours in the absence of one spouse’s 
job loss and serve as a control group contributing to the estimation of the effects of the control 
variables in the fixed-effects models described below (e.g., Brüderl & Ludwig, 2015, p. 346). 
Finally, we restricted the sample to couples observed at least twice in the panel, leaving us 
with 75,700 couple-years from 12,183 couples. For 302 of these couples job loss is observed 
for both partners, whereas in 1,036 couples only the husband and in 802 couples only the wife 
experiences the transition from employment to unemployment. 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Since 1991 the SOEP repeatedly asks respondents about how many hours they spent on an 
average weekday on seven different activities including childcare and the following three do-
mestic tasks: (1) “errands (shopping, procurements, trips to government agencies),” (2) rou-
tine “housework (washing, cooking, cleaning),” and (3) “repairs at the house, in the flat, of 
the car, garden work.” After deleting observations with implausible values of more than 24 
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hours on all seven activities, we define four outcomes for each spouse: the total housework 
hours, that is, the sum of all domestic tasks as well as the hours for each separate activity. In 
line with previous studies, we consider errands (1) as neutral tasks, whereas routine house-
work (2) as well as repairs and garden work (3) reflect female- and male-typed tasks respec-
tively (Coltrane, 2000). We do not include childcare hours as Sullivan (2013, p. 74) notes that 
time spent with children is at least to some extent “perceived rewarding and enjoyable” such 
that theoretical arguments assuming housework to be undesirable are only partly applicable. 
However, as care work also represents a relevant arena for “doing gender” (Berk, 1985; West 
& Zimmerman, 1987), some findings for childcare are reported in the sensitivity analyses. 
Following standard practice in the literature, we use absolute hours, because we are interested 
in changes of couple’s division of housework as well as their total household production 
(Gough & Killewald, 2011; van der Lippe et al., 2017). Relative measures such as the hus-
band’s share conflate changes in husband’s and wife’s behavior not telling us who in the 
household reacted to job loss in which way (e.g., Hook, 2017). Using absolute hours, the es-
timated effects for total housework, in addition, can be decomposed into the effects for each 
specific task. In the sensitivity analyses we report robustness checks for relative measures. 
Although stylized questions as compared to diary methods are susceptible for over-reporting 
(e.g., Juster, Ono, & Stafford, 2003), previous studies suggest that effect estimates based on 
stylized and diary data are quite similar in sign and statistical significance (Kan & Pudney, 
2008). Stylized estimates also have been shown to adequately reflect trends over time (Juster 
et al., 2003) and Gough and Killewald (2011, p.1090) note that fixed-effects models (see be-
low) are not only unaffected by classical measurement error, but also net out any time-
constant (upward) bias in couples’ reports on housework hours. 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
We define job loss by the transition from employment to unemployment from one interview 𝑡𝑡 
to the next interview 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Each unemployment spell also consists of the years in employ-
ment preceding and the years in unemployment and inactivity following the job loss. In line 
with the theoretical arguments, we follow persons throughout non-employment instead of 
only unemployment, because their situation remains comparable with respect to the gains in 
time, the loss in relative resources, and the departure from the breadwinner role. Unemploy-
ment spells are, however, censored if individuals find reemployment or take up education or 
training as these transitions result in a new situation. Employment spells are defined by being 
continuously employed throughout consecutive interviews. To capture the dynamics across 
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the transition we use a series of dummy variables that indicate relative time to job loss. As 
interviews in the SOEP are about one year apart the observations in 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 approximate-
ly reflect the situation half a year before and after job loss. The following seven dummy vari-
ables are included in the models: a) 2.5 years before, b) 1.5 years before, c) 0.5 years before, 
d) 0.5 years after, e) 1.5 years after, f) 2.5 years after, g) 3.5 years or more after job loss with 
all observations 3.5 years or more before the event serving as the reference category. 
3.2.3 Controls 
As we are interested in the total effects of unemployment, we only control for time-varying 
covariates that are assumed to affect one spouse’s unemployment risk as well as both part-
ners’ housework hours in order to avoid overcontrol bias (Elwert & Winship, 2014; Gough & 
Killewald, 2011). Variables that are assumed to lie on the causal path from unemployment to 
housework and are, therefore, not controlled for include spouses’ health satisfaction, house-
hold income, and home properties which may change due to relocations. The same holds true 
for partner’s employment status as the added-worker effect proposes that partners adapt their 
labor supply in response to their spouse’s job loss (Stephens, 2002). 
Among the variables we consider exogenous to unemployment are husband’s or wife’s age 
(squared) as well as year dummy variables accounting for ageing effects and common trends 
in housework time. Moreover, couples’ residence in East- or West-Germany and the state 
unemployment rate is included as regional labor market conditions constrain employment 
prospects and also affect household labor decisions (Burda & Hammermesh, 2010). Finally, 
we control for couple’s care work responsibilities, because these likely influence specializa-
tion decisions concerning paid and unpaid labor and also have been shown to increase house-
work time, particularly for women (Kühhirt, 2012). Specifically, we add the number of chil-
dren aged 0-14 years as well as five dummy variables indicating the presence of at least one 
child in a specific age range (0-1, 2-4, 5-7, 8-10, 11-14 years). To also consider other care 
work we added a dummy variable indicating that a person in need of care lives in the house-
hold. We check the robustness of our results by adding different sets of covariates in the sen-
sitivity analyses. 
3.3 Fixed-effects models 
To examine the effects of job loss on spouses’ housework hours we estimate the following 
fixed-effects models separately for husbands and wives 
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yit =  ai +  � 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘≥+3.5
𝑘𝑘=−2.5 +  𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measuring husband or wife 𝑖𝑖‘s own or their partner’s hours in year 𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 as a couple- 
and spell-specific fixed-effects, 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 as seven dummy variables indicating time relative to the 
reference category (i.e., ≥ 3.5 years before job loss), 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as a vector of control variables, and 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as idiosyncratic errors. The coefficients 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘 reflect the time path in the effect of job loss on 
housework hours. Standard errors have been clustered at the couple-level. By couple- and 
spell-specific we mean that the fixed-effects are only fixed within the context of a specific 
couple and unemployment or employment spell such that repeated spells within one couple or 
subsequent relationships are treated as separated observations (Gough & Killewald, 2011). As 
fixed-effects models only use within-couple variation any time-constant heterogeneity, even if 
unobserved, is rendered irrelevant (Brüderl & Ludwig, 2015) including, for example, stable 
preferences for paid and unpaid labor as well as standards for housework. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive findings 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables for three pe-
riods: 1991-1999, 2000-2009, and 2010-2015. Note that these refer to the couples in our sam-
ple and are presented to highlight relevant differences in husbands’ and wives’ labor market 
status, working hours, and labor incomes as well as to show that the observed patterns and 
trends in paid and unpaid labor are consistent with what is known from previous research. The 
majority of husbands are employed (92-95%) or searching for a job (2-5%) and the average 
working hours of employed men marginally decreased from 9.7 to 9.5 hours on an average 
weekday. Their monthly net labor income (in 2011 prices) somewhat increased ranging from 
€2,210 in 1991-1999 to €2,370 in 2010-2015. In contrast, their wives have considerably lower 
employment rates which, however, significantly increased from 65% in the early to 79% in 
the late period. An opposite trend is observed for inactivity rates. The average working hours 
of employed women decreased from 7.3 to 6.8 hours on an average weekday. Next to a gen-
eral decline in working hours this reflects that women’s increased labor force participation is 
associated with a growing share of part-time employment. The wives’ monthly net labor in-
come if employed remained relatively stable ranging from €1,120 to €1,190. Looking at the 
employment and earnings patterns in our sample two aspects are particularly noteworthy. 
First, wives work about 2.5 to 3.0 hours less per average weekday than husbands implying 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 1991-1999  2000-2009  2010-2015 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Husband         
  Age (in years) 39.51 8.19  41.62 7.34  43.43 7.37 
  Employed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.94 0.23  0.92 0.27  0.95 0.22 
  Unemployed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.03 0.18  0.05 0.23  0.02 0.15 
  Education or training (1=yes, 0=no) 0.01 0.11  0.01 0.07  0.01 0.08 
  Inactive (1=yes, 0=no) 0.01 0.11  0.02 0.14  0.02 0.14 
  Monthly labor income/1000 (in 2011 €)a 2.21 1.14  2.26 1.30  2.37 1.47 
  Working hours ab 9.72 1.68  9.67 1.84  9.53 1.90 
  Total housework hoursb 2.18 1.70  2.22 1.74  2.14 1.61 
  Neutral housework hoursb 0.69 0.73  0.69 0.70  0.67 0.69 
  Female-typed housework hoursb 0.57 0.79  0.67 0.82  0.73 0.76 
  Male-typed housework hoursb 0.92 0.99  0.86 0.97  0.73 0.86 
  Childcare hoursb 0.82 1.35  0.84 1.42  0.91 1.46 
Wife         
  Age (in years) 37.00 8.00  39.34 7.50  41.13 7.67 
  Employed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.65 0.48  0.72 0.45  0.79 0.41 
  Unemployed (1=yes, 0=no) 0.06 0.23  0.05 0.22  0.03 0.16 
  Education or training (1=yes, 0=no) 0.02 0.13  0.02 0.13  0.02 0.14 
  Inactive (1=yes, 0=no) 0.28 0.45  0.22 0.41  0.17 0.37 
  Monthly labor income/1000 (in 2011 €) a 1.12 0.64  1.08 0.75  1.19 0.82 
  Working hours ab 7.27 2.75  6.73 2.91  6.76 2.85 
  Total housework hoursb 4.99 2.48  4.50 2.27  3.97 2.06 
  Neutral housework hoursb 1.35 0.80  1.24 0.71  1.14 0.70 
  Female-typed housework hoursb 3.09 1.86  2.69 1.63  2.28 1.44 
  Male-typed housework hoursb 0.56 0.78  0.57 0.77  0.55 0.77 
  Childcare hoursb 3.05 3.87  2.97 3.83  2.78 3.68 
Household         
  Number of children aged 0-14 years 0.84 0.96  0.76 0.92  0.75 0.93 
  Child aged 0-1 years (1=yes, 0=no) 0.07 0.25  0.05 0.22  0.05 0.22 
  Child aged 2-4 years (1=yes, 0=no) 0.17 0.37  0.14 0.35  0.14 0.35 
  Child aged 5-7 years (1=yes, 0=no) 0.18 0.38  0.16 0.37  0.17 0.37 
  Child aged 8-10 years (1=yes, 0=no) 0.18 0.38  0.17 0.38  0.16 0.37 
  Child aged 11-14 years (1=yes, 0=no) 0.17 0.38  0.18 0.38  0.17 0.37 
  Person in need of care (1=yes, 0=no) 0.02 0.13  0.02 0.14  0.02 0.13 
  East-Germany (1=yes, 0=no) 0.19 0.39  0.18 0.38  0.18 0.38 
  State unemployment rate (%) 10.42 3.87  10.67 4.41  7.69 2.72 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015, weighted. N = 12,183 couples and 75,700 couple-years. 
a Monthly labor income/1000 and working hours are reported for the employed. b Working hours and housework 
hours refer to an average weekday.  
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smaller gains in time following a job loss. Second, given husbands’ considerably higher labor 
incomes, their relative resources and, correspondingly, their bargaining power drops to a larg-
er degree if they become unemployed. These differences in the initial conditions support the 
reasoning underlying Hypotheses 2a. 
Looking at the time husbands and wives spent on domestic tasks and childcare, the sample 
shows some convergence in time use but also highlights that the division of paid and unpaid 
labor remains highly gendered (e.g., Bianchi et al. 2000; Sayer, 2005). Whereas men’s aver-
age total housework hours per day remained quite stable, small increases are revealed for time 
spent on routine housework and childcare, with corresponding reductions in hours spent on 
repairs and garden work. However, the large changes took place among wives who reduced 
their total housework from about 5.0 hours in the early period to roughly 4.0 hours in the late 
period, mainly through spending less time on routine chores. Their hours in childcare slightly 
decreased over time, but the average number of children and the share of couple’s with young 
children (0-1, 2-4 years) are also lower in the later period. 
Moreover, in line with previous studies (Coltrane, 2000), we see that women shoulder the 
major share of the total housework. Even in the latest period (2010-2015), wives contribute 
about two thirds to couples’ total hours. This is even more evident for the more time consum-
ing female-typed tasks such as washing, cooking, and cleaning where women contribute more 
than 80% of the time. In contrast, men perform a somewhat greater share (57%) of the less 
time consuming male-typed tasks. Women also completed the larger share of neutral tasks 
including errands and shopping as well as spent considerably more time on childcare under-
lining the uneven distribution of housework and carework. 
4.2 Multivariate findings 
Figure 1 and 2 provide answers to our hypotheses. The respective coefficients of the fixed-
effects models are presented in Table A1 and A2 in the appendix. Figure 1 shows the effects 
of husband’s (left panel) and wife’s unemployment (right panel) on both spouses total house-
work hours on an average weekday including 95% confidence intervals. Looking at the left 
panel, we find that following a job loss husbands increase their total hours for domestic tasks 
by about 2.3 to 2.5 hours with the changes taking place immediately after their transition. 
Even though their wives’ hours are reduced – in particular, the longer the husbands remain 
jobless – the effects range from about 0.3 to 0.8 hours and do not match up the additional time 
husbands spent. 
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The findings for wife’s unemployment are similar (Figure 1, right panel) although the in-
creases in total housework after job loss (1.9 to 2.0 hours) are somewhat smaller. Their hus-
bands reduce their daily time by only about 0.3 to 0.4 hours, accordingly. In case of wives’ 
unemployment the changes also happen in the year of job loss, but their spouses reactions 
seem not to depend on the duration of their non-employment. For both partners’ job losses 
there is little evidence for changes preceding unemployment, for example, as couples may 
anticipate the event and already adapt their division of housework beforehand. 
Figure 1 Effects of husband’s (left) and wife’s (right) unemployment on their total housework 
hours on an average weekday 
  
Notes: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790/72,977 couples/couple-years for husband’s and 
9,339 couples/53,685 couple-years for wife’s unemployment.  
The estimates for husband’s and wife’s unemployment from the fixed-effects models are reported in the Appen-
dix in Table A1, Model 1 (husband’s hours) and Model 5 (wife’s hours) and Table A2, Model 1 (wife’s hours) 
and Model 5 (husband’s hours). Spikes show 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors. 
Concerning couples’ overall reaction it can be stated that unemployment by either the hus-
band or the wife results in an expansion of the total household production. For example, in 
case of husband’s unemployment half a year after job loss couples increase their total house-
work by 2.1 hours (=2.4-0.3). This supports previous findings (Gough and Killewald, 2011; 
van der Lippe et al. (2017) suggesting that couples extend their home production, because 
they have less income for outsourcing or buying substitutes, more housework accrues if one 
spouse becomes unemployed, they undertake previously neglected tasks or simply use their 
time less efficiently. Concerning the derived hypotheses, our findings support Hypothesis 1 
suggesting that couples adapt to changes in spouses’ relative time constraints and resources 
by shifting household chores to the unemployed spouse and away from the partner. 
Consistent with a gender-neutral perspective that takes account of the gender-specific initial 
conditions (Hypothesis 2a) men are shown to increase their housework hours somewhat more 
301 
 
than women with the according reactions by their partners. This finding is likely due to men 
experiencing greater time gains and relative resource losses as the descriptive findings 
showed that they work longer and earn more than women. We revisit this explanation in the 
sensitivity analyses by only comparing job losses of full-time employed husbands and wives. 
No support is found for the gender-based arguments that women would increase their total 
housework to a larger extent (Hypothesis 2b) mainly because men would refuse additional 
domestic tasks or even decrease their involvement following a job loss. Interestingly, we find 
little signs of a lagged adaptation after men’s unemployment (Hypothesis 4a) or an intensifi-
cation of their avoidance of housework (Hypothesis 4b) the longer they remain out of labor 
force. These results are at odds with the qualitative study by Gush et al. (2015) who showed 
that couples aimed at maintaining their status quo. The only trend discernable in Figure 1 
concerns wife’s increasing relief from housework after their husband’s job loss suggesting 
that it takes some time before they are able or willing to dispense domestic tasks. 
However, the aggregated assessment of total housework may hide differences by specific 
tasks which are associated with a gendered meaning and may exhibit different dynamics over 
time. Therefore, Figure 2 presents the results of task-specific models. The left and right panels 
show the results for husband’s and wife’s unemployment respectively. Overall the results re-
semble those for total housework. For all tasks we find that the unemployed spouse increases 
his or her time to a larger extent than the partner reduces their hours meaning that the total 
production expands across all domains. We also see that the majority of the change happens 
in the year of the transition from employment to unemployment and that the time paths with 
the exception of female-typed activities suggest that couples react more or less immediately.  
However, Figure 2 also reveals some interesting task-specific differences. While both men 
and women increase their time after becoming unemployed in all three activities, we find that 
husbands spent relatively more additional hours on neutral and, in particular, male-typed 
tasks, whereas wives’ extra time is to a large extent attributable to increases in routine chores. 
These findings highlight the importance of a disaggregated examination of changes in house-
work hours and confirm Hypotheses 3 which predicted a gender-specific reaction in the kind 
of domestic work performed. Slight signs of adaptation are apparent for the case of husbands’
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Figure 2 Effects of husband’s (left) and wife’s (right) unemployment on their task-specific 
housework hours on an average weekday 
  
  
  
Notes: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790/72,977 couples/couple-years for husband’s and 
9,339 couples/53,685 couple-years for wife’s unemployment.  
The estimates for husband’s and wife’s unemployment from the fixed-effects models are reported in the Appen-
dix in Table A1, Models 2-4 (husband’s hours) and Models 6-8 (wife’s hours) and Table A2, Models 2-4 (wife’s 
hours) and Models 6-8 (husband’s hours). Spikes show 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard 
errors.  
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unemployment and routine housework (Hypothesis 4a), but not for job losses by women or 
any other tasks. This is consistent with the arguments by Gershuny et al. (2005) as for wom-
en’s job loss the inertial processes are theoretically less important and for men adaptation 
should be more apparent in tasks they do not perform routinely, they have the least skills in, 
and that carry the strongest gender meaning. However, given that these small changes cannot 
be estimated very precisely, the stark immediate changes after unemployment are perhaps 
more striking. 
Do the task-specific results change the assessment of the gender-neutral and gender-based 
perspectives? As men also increase their routine housework following a job loss, the findings 
are not in line with a strict interpretation of gender display or deviance neutralization, predict-
ing that men do not change or even decrease their share (Hypothesis 2b) as well as withdraw 
from housework with ongoing non-employment (Hypothesis 4b). In the gender-based per-
spective wives should also not decrease their routine housework over time. Nevertheless, the 
finding of slightly larger increases in time on female-typed tasks for wives’ job loss confirms 
previous results pointing to some “stickiness” in the division of labor either due to gender 
norms or task-specific skills (Gough & Killewald, 2011, p. 1089; van der Lippe et al., 2017). 
4.3 Sensitivity analyses 
In the following we summarize the results of sensitivity analyses checking the robustness of 
our findings to decisions about measurement and model specification as well as providing 
some further insights. The respective tables are available in the online supplementary 
material.  
Although we believe that absolute hours are more appropriate for our study, we estimated 
models using the share of total or task-specific housework hours performed by the spouse 
who becomes unemployed as the dependent variable (see Tables S1.1 and S1.2). The results 
confirm the main analyses as both men and women immediately increase their share of total 
and task-specific housework hours following a job loss with larger effects for men than  
women. 
We also checked whether including additional covariates alters our findings, as decisions 
about which control variables to include are not without ambiguity. For example, whether to 
control for spouses’ health hinges on the question whether it is more plausible that health af-
fects job loss or the other way around. Holding constant both spouses’ health satisfaction 
leaves the estimated unemployment effects virtually unchanged (see Tables S2.1 and S2.2). 
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Adding partner employment status, we find slightly larger reductions in the partners’ house-
work hours, while the estimates for the unemployed spouses remain about the same (see Ta-
bles S3.1 and S3.2). The former finding is at odds with the idea of an added worker effect as 
decreases in partners’ housework should be smaller once their employment status is held con-
stant. Furthermore, we controlled for some couple characteristics such as marital status (see 
Tables S4.1 and S4.2) and properties of the home (size, owner, garden, house) (see Tables 
S5.1 and S5.2) which each had little impact on the estimated unemployment effects. Finally, 
we added the household income (squared) to the original specification, finding some small 
increases in partners’ reductions of housework (see Tables S6.1 and S6.2). Holding families’ 
financial resources fixed, the positive effect on the total home production reduces, supporting 
the idea that the expansion in total production is partly due to the fact that they have less op-
portunities for “outsourcing” tasks. However, as these changes are rather small, other mecha-
nisms likely play an important role, too. 
As we highlighted above childcare is conceptually and analytically distinct from housework 
(Sullivan, 2013). We here provide some findings to check whether the effects of job loss on 
housework and childcare are similar, as previous studies often cannot rule out that respond-
ents report childcare within measures of housework (e.g., Gough & Killewald, 2011). For 
these analyses, we restricted our sample to couples who have at least one child below the age 
of 14 living in their home. Tables S7.1 and 7.2 reveal that if spouses lose their job they in-
crease their childcare hours with women spending, however, more additional time, particular-
ly, the longer they remain non-employed. 
Finally, we only focused on transitions from full-time employment to unemployment adjust-
ing for differences in the initial conditions between men and women (see Tables S8.1 and 
S8.2). The results concerning total housework time strengthen the gender-neutral perspective, 
in that, the reaction to unemployment by husbands and wives in case of losing a full-time job 
is almost the same. 
5. Discussion 
In this study we examined how couples react to one spouse’s job loss by reallocating their 
division of housework and adjusting their total household production. Using long-run panel 
data from Germany, our results are consistent with previous longitudinal studies (Gough & 
Killewald, 2011) showing that couples mostly follow economic rationales in reallocating their 
time spent on domestic work. Specifically, we find that both husbands and wives increase 
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their total housework hours with larger increases by men being explained by differences in the 
initial conditions reflecting that they gain more time or lose more resources following a job 
loss. 
Moreover, the reallocation of housework is “only half of the change” observed (Gough & 
Killewald, 2011, p.1097; van der Lippe et al., 2017) as increases in unemployed spouses’ 
hours are not completely offset by decreases in their partners’ time implying an expansion of 
the total household production. Although our data do not allow disentangling all potential 
explanations falls in family income appear not to be the main reason. Therefore, other mecha-
nisms including a more frequent and extensive usage of the home, partners’ less efficient time 
use, or the completion of previously neglected tasks deserve more attention in future research. 
The present study addressed two additional research gaps. First, we examined how house-
holds’ responses may change with the non-employment duration of the unemployed spouse as 
theoretical arguments (Gershuny et al., 2005) as well as qualitative evidence (Gush et al., 
2005) suggest that couples’ only slowly adapt, especially following job losses by men. Our 
results challenge this view showing that spouses mostly react within the year of unemploy-
ment with little signs of a lagged adaption and no evidence for husband’s withdrawal from 
housework responsibilities over time. Second, our results are helpful in contextualizing previ-
ous findings, showing that wives increase their housework hours more than husbands when 
using a measure emphasizing routine chores (Gough & Killwald, 2011). This study may have 
underestimated men’s additional housework as our task-specific analyses reveal that unem-
ployed men increase their domestic work more through spending additional time on errands 
and shopping as well as repairs and garden work. In contrast, extra time by women is to a 
larger extent attributable to female-typed tasks including washing, cooking, and cleaning. 
Although these gender-specific reactions in the task-specific estimates are consistent with a 
gender-based perspective arguing that men and women do gender by performing domestic 
tasks that are culturally defined to be masculine or feminine (e.g. Berk, 1985, West & Zim-
mermann, 1987) rather than by doing more or less total housework, they are also in line with 
the specialization perspective stressing that spouses spent relatively more of their extra time in 
tasks they possess skills for (Gough & Killwald, 2011). While we cannot distinguish these 
explanations, overall our results rather support time availability and relative resources hy-
potheses about couples’ division of housework. The findings that men increase their total 
housework more than women as well as that they also immediately and substantially increase 
their routine housework hours, are difficult to reconcile with gender display (Brines, 1994) 
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and deviance neutralization (Greenstein, 2000) accounts. Our findings are consistent with 
previous studies (Shamir, 1986; Ström, 2002) as well as support recent critiques towards the 
gender deviance neutralization argument (e.g., Auspurg et al., 2017; Hook, 2017). However, it 
is important to note that some recent cross-sectional studies report results in line with gen-
dered arguments (e.g., van der Lippe et al., 2017) as well as that housework is not the only 
area in which women and men may do gender (Hook, 2017). 
Despite the present study’s strengths, there remain some important limitations. First, stylized 
time use data are inferior to diary methods. Although the fixed-effects models guard us from 
any upward bias in estimates due to a stable over reporting of housework hours, time-varying 
measurement error due to respondents over reporting more extensively after they have lost 
their jobs to appear, for example, productive remains possible. Another shortcoming is that 
our data do not allow us to investigate in detail the role of childcare. Although a sensitivity 
analysis shows that both women and men spend additional time with their children following 
a job loss, it is known that women do more of the less enjoyable tasks (e.g., changing nappies, 
preparing children for school), while men spent more time on interactive and fun activities 
with children (Sullivan, 2013) something we cannot differentiate. Finally, our data do not 
include measures of gender ideology, allowing us examining whether job loss may provoke 
stronger gender-specific reactions in couples holding more traditional attitudes. 
Overall, this article highlights that unemployment substantially alters families’ daily routines 
with domestic tasks being shifted to the unemployed spouse and away from the partner as 
well as an accompanying increase in couples’ total household production. Two avenues for 
future research include the question of why the total home production is extended as well as 
how couples adapt their care work in response to unemployment. Specifically, longitudinal 
diary data on couples’ time use would be helpful, allowing for a more precise and fine grained 
measure of activities shedding light, for example, on the questions whether men and women 
spent additional time with their children differently or whether couples take up previously 
neglected tasks. On a more general note, our findings support previous studies (e.g., Brand, 
2015; Ström, 2003) that it is important to study the effects of job loss as well as other life 
events from the perspective of families including not only partners but also parents, children, 
and siblings as their lives are linked and effects spread through family networks and beyond.  
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7. Appendix 
Table A1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.19** 0.08* 0.07 0.05  0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.02  0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.08  -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.37*** 0.64*** 0.92*** 0.81***  -0.35*** -0.08** -0.19** -0.07* 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.51*** 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.83***  -0.43*** -0.02 -0.30*** -0.11** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.32*** 0.59*** 1.00*** 0.73***  -0.69*** -0.15** -0.43*** -0.11* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.45*** 0.60*** 1.06*** 0.79***  -0.75*** -0.14** -0.41*** -0.20*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 3.02* 0.22 1.15 1.64*  -2.96 -0.11 -2.29 -0.55 
 (1.19) (0.61) (0.59) (0.73)  (1.59) (0.64) (1.25) (0.57) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790 couples and 72,977 couple-years.  
Models include husband’s age and age squared, the number of children aged 0-14 years, dummy variables for children aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-7, 8-10, and 11-14 years, person in 
need of care, East-Germany, and the year as well as the state unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table A2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05  -0.13 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
-1.5 years -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.04  -0.10 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
-0.5 years 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.06  -0.20* -0.06 -0.03 -0.11* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
0.5 years 1.94*** 0.41*** 1.25*** 0.28***  -0.31*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.11* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
1.5 years 1.92*** 0.40*** 1.23*** 0.29***  -0.35** -0.06 -0.21*** -0.07 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
2.5 years 1.87*** 0.44*** 1.14*** 0.29***  -0.28* -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.04*** 0.35*** 1.39*** 0.30***  -0.42** -0.13* -0.19*** -0.09 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Constant 0.49 -0.10 0.77 -0.18  2.38 -0.27 1.12 1.53 
 (1.61) (0.76) (1.13) (0.66)  (1.62) (0.75) (0.85) (0.92) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 9,339 couples and 53,685 couple-years.  
Models include wife’s age and age squared, the number of children aged 0-14 years, dummy variables for children aged 0-1, 2-4, 5-7, 8-10, and 11-14 years, person in need of 
care, East-Germany, and the year as well as the state unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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8. Supplementary material (online only) 
Table S1.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
share of total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday 
Table S1.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s share of 
total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday 
Table S2.1  Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (ad-
ditional control for husband’s and wife’s health) 
Table S2.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and hus-
band’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (addi-
tional control for husband’s and wife’s health) 
Table S3.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (ad-
ditional control for wife’s employment status) 
Table S3.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and hus-
band’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (addi-
tional control for husband’s employment status) 
Table S4.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (ad-
ditional control for marital status) 
Table S4.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and hus-
band’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (addi-
tional control for marital status) 
Table S5.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (ad-
ditional control for home characteristics) 
Table S5.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and hus-
band’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (addi-
tional control for home characteristics) 
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Table S6.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (ad-
ditional control for household income) 
Table S6.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and hus-
band’s total and task-specific housework hours on an average weekday (addi-
tional control for household income) 
Table S7.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s 
and wife’s childcare hours on an average weekday 
Table S7.2 Fixed-effects  models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on husband’s and 
wife’s childcare hours on an average weekday 
Table S8.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment out of full-time 
employment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday 
Table S8.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment out of full-time 
employment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday 
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Table S1.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s share of total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday 
 Husband’s share   
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed      
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.02* 0.03* 0.01 0.01      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
-1.5 years 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
-0.5 years 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
0.5 years 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.14***      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
1.5 years 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.16***      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
2.5 years 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.17***      
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)      
≥ 3.5 years 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20***      
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)      
Constant 0.74*** 0.10 0.56*** 1.63***      
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.14) (0.30)      
N couples 11,778 11,488 11,733 8,938      
N couple-years 72,832 69,985 72,466 48,735      
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S1.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s share of total and task-specific housework hours on an aver-
age weekday 
 Wife’s share   
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed      
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.03* 0.03* 0.00 0.03      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
-1.5 years 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
-0.5 years 0.03* 0.02 0.01 0.04*      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
0.5 years 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.10***      
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)      
1.5 years 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09***      
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)      
2.5 years 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08**      
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)      
≥ 3.5 years 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11***      
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)      
Constant 0.40* 1.13*** 0.62** -0.12      
 (0.17) (0.28) (0.20) (0.37)      
N couples 9,331 9,085 9,291 7,131      
N couple-years 53,441 51,187 53,105 36,249      
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S2.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday (additional control for husband’s and wife’s health) 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed Male-typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.19** 0.07* 0.07 0.05  0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.02  0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.08  -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.37*** 0.64*** 0.92*** 0.81***  -0.35*** -0.08** -0.19** -0.07* 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.50*** 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.83***  -0.43*** -0.02 -0.30*** -0.11** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.32*** 0.58*** 1.00*** 0.73***  -0.69*** -0.15** -0.43*** -0.11* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.44*** 0.59*** 1.06*** 0.79***  -0.75*** -0.14** -0.41*** -0.21*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 3.04* 0.25 1.16* 1.63*  -2.95 -0.11 -2.30 -0.55 
 (1.19) (0.61) (0.59) (0.73)  (1.59) (0.64) (1.25) (0.57) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790 couples and 72,977 couple-years.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Models in addition include husband’s and wife’s health satisfaction (0-10). Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in 
parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 316 
 
Table S2.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday (additional control for husband’s and wife’s health) 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05  -0.13 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
-1.5 years -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.04  -0.10 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
-0.5 years 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.06  -0.20* -0.06 -0.03 -0.11* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
0.5 years 1.94*** 0.41*** 1.25*** 0.28***  -0.31*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.11* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
1.5 years 1.92*** 0.40*** 1.23*** 0.29***  -0.35** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.07 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
2.5 years 1.87*** 0.44*** 1.14*** 0.29***  -0.28* -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.04*** 0.35*** 1.39*** 0.30***  -0.42** -0.14* -0.19*** -0.09 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Constant 0.49 -0.08 0.74 -0.17  2.42 -0.23 1.13 1.52 
 (1.61) (0.76) (1.13) (0.66)  (1.62) (0.75) (0.85) (0.92) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 9,339 couples and 53,685 couple-years.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Models in addition include husband’s and wife’s health satisfaction (0-10). Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in 
parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 317 
 
Table S3.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday (additional control for wife’s employment status) 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.19** 0.08* 0.07 0.05  0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.02  -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.12 -0.01 0.05 0.08  -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.38*** 0.64*** 0.93*** 0.81***  -0.43*** -0.10** -0.25*** -0.08** 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.52*** 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.83***  -0.50*** -0.03 -0.35*** -0.12** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.34*** 0.59*** 1.01*** 0.73***  -0.79*** -0.17*** -0.50*** -0.12* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.45*** 0.60*** 1.07*** 0.79***  -0.82*** -0.16** -0.45*** -0.21*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 3.08** 0.23 1.20* 1.65*  -3.46* -0.19 -2.69* -0.58 
 (1.19) (0.61) (0.59) (0.73)  (1.55) (0.64) (1.21) (0.57) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790 couples and 72,977 couple-years. 
Table A1 lists included control variables. Models in addition include indicators for wife’s employment status. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parenthe-
ses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S3.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday (additional control for husband’s employment status) 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05  -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
-1.5 years -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.04  -0.14 -0.04 0.00 -0.10* 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
-0.5 years 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.06  -0.20* -0.06 -0.03 -0.11* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
0.5 years 1.95*** 0.41*** 1.26*** 0.28***  -0.38*** -0.07* -0.17*** -0.14* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
1.5 years 1.93*** 0.40*** 1.23*** 0.29***  -0.42*** -0.08 -0.24*** -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
2.5 years 1.88*** 0.44*** 1.15*** 0.29***  -0.41*** -0.09 -0.17** -0.15* 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.05*** 0.35*** 1.40*** 0.30***  -0.48*** -0.15** -0.22*** -0.11 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Constant 0.49 -0.10 0.78 -0.19  2.27 -0.31 1.06 1.51 
 (1.61) (0.76) (1.13) (0.66)  (1.56) (0.74) (0.82) (0.91) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 9,339 couples and 53,685 couple-years.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Models in addition include indicators for husband’s employment status. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in paren-
theses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S4.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday (additional control for marital status) 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.19** 0.08* 0.07 0.05  0.06 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.02  0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.08  -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.37*** 0.64*** 0.92*** 0.81***  -0.35*** -0.08** -0.20** -0.07* 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.51*** 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.83***  -0.43*** -0.02 -0.31*** -0.11** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.33*** 0.59*** 1.00*** 0.73***  -0.69*** -0.15** -0.44*** -0.11* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.45*** 0.60*** 1.06*** 0.79***  -0.75*** -0.14** -0.41*** -0.20*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 2.88* 0.16 1.07 1.65*  -2.82 -0.11 -2.18 -0.54 
 (1.19) (0.61) (0.59) (0.73)  (1.59) (0.64) (1.25) (0.57) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790 couples and 72,977 couple-years.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Models in addition include an indicator for couple’s marital status. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parenthe-
ses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S4.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday (additional control for marital status) 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed Male-typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05  -0.13 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
-1.5 years -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.04  -0.10 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
-0.5 years 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.06  -0.20* -0.06 -0.03 -0.11* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
0.5 years 1.94*** 0.41*** 1.25*** 0.28***  -0.30*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.11* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
1.5 years 1.92*** 0.40*** 1.22*** 0.29***  -0.34** -0.06 -0.21*** -0.07 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
2.5 years 1.86*** 0.44*** 1.14*** 0.29***  -0.28* -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.04*** 0.35*** 1.39*** 0.30***  -0.42** -0.13* -0.19*** -0.09 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Constant 0.63 -0.10 0.90 -0.17  2.21 -0.39 1.04 1.56 
 (1.61) (0.76) (1.13) (0.67)  (1.62) (0.75) (0.85) (0.92) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 9,339 couples and 53,685 couple-years.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Models in addition include an indicator for couple’s marital status. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parenthe-
ses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 321 
 
Table S5.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday (additional control for home characteristics) 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.20** 0.08* 0.06 0.06  0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.07 0.04 -0.00 0.04  0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.10*  -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.39*** 0.64*** 0.92*** 0.83***  -0.33*** -0.08** -0.19** -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.54*** 0.70*** 0.97*** 0.87***  -0.40*** -0.02 -0.30*** -0.08* 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.36*** 0.59*** 1.00*** 0.78***  -0.64*** -0.15** -0.42*** -0.07 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.51*** 0.59*** 1.05*** 0.86***  -0.68*** -0.14** -0.39*** -0.15** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 3.35** 0.21 1.14 2.00**  -2.68 -0.10 -2.25 -0.32 
 (1.19) (0.61) (0.59) (0.73)  (1.59) (0.64) (1.25) (0.57) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790 couples and 72,977 couple-years.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Models in addition include home size/10 and home size/10 squared (in square meters) as well as indicators for whether home is 
owned, home has a garden, and home is a house. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S5.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday (additional control for home characteristics) 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.06  -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
-1.5 years -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 0.05  -0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
-0.5 years 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.07  -0.19* -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
0.5 years 1.95*** 0.41*** 1.26*** 0.29***  -0.29*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
1.5 years 1.94*** 0.40*** 1.23*** 0.31***  -0.33** -0.06 -0.21*** -0.06 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
2.5 years 1.88*** 0.44*** 1.15*** 0.30***  -0.27* -0.05 -0.12* -0.09 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.06*** 0.35*** 1.39*** 0.32***  -0.40** -0.13* -0.20*** -0.07 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Constant 0.61 -0.08 0.78 -0.10  2.42 -0.27 1.07 1.62 
 (1.61) (0.76) (1.13) (0.66)  (1.62) (0.75) (0.85) (0.91) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 9,339 couples and 53,685 couple-years. 
Table A2 lists included control variables. Models in addition include home size/10 and home size/10 squared (in square meters) as well as indicators for whether home is 
owned, home has a garden, and home is a house. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S6.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-specific housework hours on 
an average weekday (additional control for household income) 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed Male-typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.19** 0.08* 0.07 0.05  0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.02  0.02 -0.00 0.05 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.08  -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.37*** 0.64*** 0.92*** 0.81***  -0.44*** -0.10** -0.27*** -0.08* 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.50*** 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.83***  -0.53*** -0.03 -0.38*** -0.12** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.32*** 0.59*** 1.00*** 0.73***  -0.81*** -0.17*** -0.52*** -0.12* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.45*** 0.60*** 1.06*** 0.79***  -0.88*** -0.16** -0.51*** -0.21*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Constant 3.03* 0.23 1.14 1.66*  -1.97 0.04 -1.53 -0.47 
 (1.19) (0.61) (0.59) (0.73)  (1.58) (0.64) (1.24) (0.57) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,790 couples and 72,977 couple-years.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Models in addition include equivalised disposable household income/1000 and household income/1000 squared (in 2011 Euro). 
Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S6.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-specific housework hours on an 
average weekday (additional control for household income) 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05  -0.14 -0.07 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
-1.5 years -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.04  -0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
-0.5 years 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.06  -0.22* -0.07 -0.04 -0.12* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
0.5 years 1.93*** 0.41*** 1.24*** 0.28***  -0.36*** -0.07 -0.16*** -0.13* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
1.5 years 1.91*** 0.40*** 1.21*** 0.29***  -0.41*** -0.08 -0.24*** -0.09 
 (0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
2.5 years 1.85*** 0.43*** 1.12*** 0.29***  -0.36** -0.07 -0.16* -0.13 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.02*** 0.35*** 1.37*** 0.30***  -0.52*** -0.16** -0.24*** -0.12 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Constant 0.55 -0.09 0.83 -0.19  2.63 -0.20 1.23 1.60 
 (1.61) (0.76) (1.13) (0.66)  (1.61) (0.75) (0.84) (0.92) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 9,339 couples and 53,685 couple-years.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Models in addition include equivalised disposable household income/1000 and household income/1000 squared (in 2011 Euro). 
Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S7.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s childcare hours on an average weekday 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years -0.01     0.03    
 (0.09)     (0.23)    
-1.5 years -0.06     0.32    
 (0.10)     (0.23)    
-0.5 years -0.11     0.11    
 (0.11)     (0.24)    
0.5 years 1.66***     -0.24    
 (0.14)     (0.24)    
1.5 years 1.65***     -0.32    
 (0.18)     (0.30)    
≥ 2.5 years 1.74***     -0.31    
 (0.25)     (0.37)    
Constant -0.24     4.58    
 (1.68)     (4.21)    
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 5,343 couples and 24,485 couple-years.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S7.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment on husband’s and wife’s childcare hours on an average weekday 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years -0.12     -0.10    
 (0.21)     (0.16)    
-1.5 years 0.00     -0.18    
 (0.24)     (0.16)    
-0.5 years -0.02     -0.24    
 (0.25)     (0.16)    
0.5 years 1.64***     -0.45**    
 (0.27)     (0.17)    
1.5 years 2.10***     -0.42    
 (0.33)     (0.22)    
≥ 2.5 years 2.36***     -0.33    
 (0.39)     (0.23)    
Constant 13.40**     4.29    
 (5.09)     (2.93)    
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 4,090 couples and 17,013 couple-years.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S8.1 Fixed-effects models for the effects of husband’s unemployment out of full-time employment on husband’s and wife’s total and task-
specific housework hours on an average weekday 
 Husband’s hours  Wife’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.19* 0.08* 0.07* 0.04  0.08 0.01 0.09 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
-1.5 years 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02  0.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
-0.5 years 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.05  -0.08 -0.03 -0.00 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
0.5 years 2.44*** 0.67*** 0.95*** 0.82***  -0.37*** -0.09** -0.21** -0.08* 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
1.5 years 2.57*** 0.73*** 1.01*** 0.84***  -0.43*** -0.01 -0.30*** -0.12** 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.12) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
2.5 years 2.48*** 0.62*** 1.06*** 0.80***  -0.74*** -0.14** -0.46*** -0.14** 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)  (0.14) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.54*** 0.63*** 1.10*** 0.81***  -0.80*** -0.13* -0.43*** -0.24*** 
 (0.18) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12)  (0.16) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) 
Constant 3.39** 0.41 1.20* 1.78*  -3.01 -0.06 -2.45 -0.50 
 (1.20) (0.62) (0.60) (0.74)  (1.61) (0.65) (1.27) (0.58) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 11,334 couples and 70,213 couple-years.  
Table A1 lists included control variables. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table S8.2 Fixed-effects models for the effects of wife’s unemployment out of full-time employment on wife’s and husband’s total and task-
specific housework hours on an average weekday 
 Wife’s hours  Husband’s hours 
 Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed  Total Neutral 
Female-
typed 
Male-
typed 
Years before/after unemployment  
(Reference group: ≤ -3.5 years)          
-2.5 years 0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.03  -0.13 -0.02 0.03 -0.14 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
-1.5 years 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02  -0.25* -0.07 -0.02 -0.16* 
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
-0.5 years 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01  -0.29* -0.07 -0.01 -0.20* 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)  (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
0.5 years 2.48*** 0.55*** 1.64*** 0.29***  -0.55*** -0.12* -0.22*** -0.21* 
 (0.14) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
1.5 years 2.43*** 0.54*** 1.60*** 0.30***  -0.53*** -0.09 -0.34*** -0.10 
 (0.18) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08)  (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
2.5 years 2.44*** 0.64*** 1.51*** 0.28***  -0.55*** -0.16* -0.23** -0.15 
 (0.23) (0.08) (0.16) (0.08)  (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
≥ 3.5 years 2.59*** 0.50*** 1.78*** 0.31***  -0.57** -0.23** -0.21* -0.12 
 (0.22) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08)  (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Constant -0.02 0.44 -0.75 0.29  3.10 0.02 2.66* 0.42 
 (2.01) (1.04) (1.30) (0.88)  (2.18) (1.04) (1.20) (1.25) 
Note: Socio-Economic Panel, v32.1, 1991-2015. N = 4,661 couples and 24,258 couple-years.  
Table A2 lists included control variables. Standard errors are clustered by couple and shown in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
